PAKISTAN: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONCERNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570004-4
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Pakistan: External and Internal Concerns
1. Evidence of Soviet-Afghan collusion in the recent hijacking
of a Pakistani airliner by Pakistani dissidents has strongly
reinforced the Zia regime's basic belief that outside powers
will exploit Pakistan's internal weaknesses.
2. Pakistan remains extremely concerned about the Soviet threat
from Afghanistan and believes the ultimate Soviet aim is to
gain overland access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistani
territory.
-- It fears a future Soviet ground or air incursion of
major proportions to punish Pakistan for its support to
the Afghan insurgents--and to demonstrate the Zia
regime's inability to defend Pakistan--but believes
Moscow will first attempt to pressure Pakistan through
India or by meddling in Pakistan's domestic troubles.
Islamabad is deeply worried about Indo-Soviet
collaboration against Pakistan and sees evidence that
Moscow and New Delhi are preparing joint pressure
against Pakistan's overland link to China--the Soviets
by putting troops in Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor and
the Indians by building up on the Kashmir ceasefire
line.
Zia is concerned that the Soviets are becoming involved
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Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570004-4
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in supporting Baluch dissidents and is convinced that
the Soviets have had a hand in recent and continuing
efforts by radical students and opposition leaders to
bring about the violent overthrow of the Zia regime.
3. We do not believe Zia and his advisers are ne4 now prepared
to concede ground Afghanistan in response to Soviet
pressure.
-- Zia believes the Soviets will not withdraw from
Afghanistan.
-- Islamabad holds that the US and Pakistan have parallel
interests in keeping the Soviets off balance and bogged dc'v--
in Afghanistan.
4. Zia wants a strong US-Pakistan security relationship that
will guarantee Pakistan's territorial integrity against
Indian as well as Soviet designs and provide for the
rearming of Pakistan's armed forces.
Such a relationship would gain broad support in
Pakistan if it provided a shield behind which the
country could turn to solving its political and
economic problems. Half measures, however, will
strengthen those who argue that the US is unreliable-
and who advocate a degree of accommodation with the
USSR.
5. The regime is reacting carefully to domestic unrest.
-- Too soft a response will encourage the opposition,
while too hard a crackdown could make Zia a hated
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Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570004-4
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rather than a respected--if unloved--leader.
The regime worries about the coalescing of a broad
opposition front that can force the Army to defend the
regime in the streets.
The Army would rather replace Zia with another general
than use force to keep Zia in power.
The opposition has not coalesced and, most importantly,
shows no sign of arousing mass support.
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