FIRST SIG (SPACE) MEETING
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R000501280003-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 3, 2009
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 17, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
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1 VI JLy1\L 1
NRO Review Completed as Redacted.
NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified
17 September 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: First SIG(Space) Meeting
1. Background: The National Space Policy (NSDD-42) established a Senior
Interdepartmental Group for Space, (Attachment 1). The first meeting of this
group is scheduled for 4:00 pm on Monday, 20 September 1982 (See Attachment
3). Four major items are on the agenda.
- SIG (Space) Terms of Reference (Attachment )
- Space Launch Policy (Attacment -4)
- Manned Space Station (Attachment b)
- Remote Sensing (Attachment")
A member of my staff and a representative of the NRO Staff have been
attending Working Group meetings on this subject. The Terms of Reference and
the three specific issue write-ups have been extensively discussed within the
Working Group but do not represent a consensus. There are still major
philosophical differences between the agencies and the NSC Staff on the extent
to which the SIG(Space) should involve itself in programmatic issues and
implementation of NSDD-42. Each of these issues is discussed individually in 25X1
the following paragraphs.
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SEP 23 12 45.
:- :Mting-Director of Central 'Inteljigence
DCI/ICS
23 September 1982
k4
trst SIG(Spaee). Meeting
RREIICE; fl/ICS Poem
to DDC dated -17 September 198
25X1 2; Same Subject
' k
Executlve Registry
F1g; 5 92
T following additional- information is provided.
/NASA S ~9. u e of addressed the
yqposiaa commemorating the 15th aflniversary of the signing of the
Outer. Space Treaty on the subject of-the President?s Space Policy. In
referring to the SIG(Space), Judge Clark in his prepared remarks stated that
an: the conduct of the, National Space Prpgrarn. These remarks underscore
erence get rreen the NSC Staff and the agencies on the appropriate Terms
--- of Reftrence for the SIG(Space).
2. The recommendations relative to the Manned Space Station issue (see
'aw 5 of Reference) should-be augmented as follows:
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SUBJECT: First SIG(Space) Meeting
Recommendations:
Note that the space station effort is a long-term multi-year effort.
As such, it should be clear from the outset that the SIG(Space)
working group is to keep all parties informed and to insure all
national concerns are being addressed in on-going efforts.
5. Remote Sensing*:
Summary: Charters a SIG(Space) working group to monitor and
coordinate ongoing activities relating to the policy implications of
current and projected civil remote sensing satellite activities. Calls
for policy recommendations impacting the FY84 budget in November, 1982
with completion scheduled for Feburary 1983.
Concerns: Short term concerns relate to FY84 budget decisions on
the transfer of METSAT and LANDSAT to the private sector and the use of
classified archival intelligence system data for civil/commercial
applications. Longer term concerns relate to the potential for
international abuse of civil remote sensing from space with potentially
adverse national security implications for the US.
Discussion: This is an issue that OSD and the Intelligence
Community have agreed to examine together as a result of an initiative in
the DoD Space Policy Study.
Other agencies, Commerce and
State, are conducing internal policy studies as well. The SIG(Space)
issue paper appears to place the SIG(Space) Working Group in a
coordination role for the activities. As long as this is not a directive
role, we have no objections. However, there is a concern over the policy
recommendations that are due in November to coincide with the FY 1984
budget process. Implied are decisions on the transfer of METSAT, LANDSAT
and the use of classified archival intelligence system data for
civil/commercial applications. We do not support the concept of the
SIG(Space) being used as a method to drive programmatic decisions. If
the intent is to resolve policy issues with program decisions to be made
in other fora we do not object. H
Agency Position: DoD and State are believed to share our concerns.
* See Attachment 7.
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SUBJECT: First SIG(Space) Meeting
Recommended Talking Points:
That the SIG(Space) initial review of agency remote sensing studies
be informational in nature and that the agency studies be used as
the policy base to support other programmatic issues.
- The remote sensing issue should be decoupled from programmatics.
6. Talki s Proposed talking points arP cnncnliriatari in
Attachment 1.
Attachments (8)
21. NSDD-42
. Memo from William P. Clark, dtd 09/11/82
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SUBJECT: First SIG(Space) Meeting
Distribution:
Copy #1-DDCI
#2-Executive Registry
#3-D/ICS
#4-A-DD/ICS
#5-D/OCC
#6-D/OPBC
#7-D/OP
#8-D/OSC
#9-D/OICE
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#11-E0/OA&E
#12-OA&E Chrono
#13-ICS Registry
DCI/ICS/0A&E~ X09/17/82)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT : Meetings
a
ES/MI # 191
14 September 1982
Type of`Meeting SIG (Space) (First meeting)
Date Monday, 20 September
Time
Place
4:00 - 5:00 p.m.
Rm. 305 OEOB
Chaired By Judge Clark
Principal Only? Yes
Subject/Agenda Space Terms of Reference and initial set of issues
When to Expect Papers
0/D
0/D
ExDi
DDI
Chm/
DDO
SA/ I
OCO/aw
ES
D/ES
Forwarded with memo dtd 11 Sept. 1982
Via memo dtd 11 Sept. 1982
DDCI will attend.
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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 42
July 4, 1982
NSC review completed - may be declassified in part
Attachment 2.
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (U)
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPLES (U)
This directive establishes national policy to guide the
conduct of United States space program and related activities;
it supersedes Presidential Directives 37, 42, and 54, as well
as National Security Decision Directive 8. .This directive
is consistent with and augments the guidance contained in
existing directives, executive orders, and law. The decisions
outlined in th:.s directive provide the broad framework and
the basis for the commitments necessary for the conduct.of
United States space programs. (U)
The Space bhuttle is to be a major factor in the future
evolution of United States space programs. It will continue
to foster cooperation between the national security and civil
efforts to ensue efficient and effective use of national
resources. Specifically, routine use of the manned Space
Shuttle. will provide the opportunity to understand better
and evaluate the role of man in space, to increase the
utility of space programs, and to expand knowledge of the
space environment. (U)
The basic goals of United States'space policy are to:
(a) strengthen the security of the United States; (b) maintain
United States space leadership; (c) obtain economic and
'scientific benefits through the exploitation of space;
(d) expand United States private-sector investment and
involvement in civil space and space-related activities;
(e) promote international cooperative activities that are in
the national interest; and (f) cooperate with other nations
in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that
enhance the security and welfare of mankind. (U)
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Review on July 4, 1992
Classified & Extended by:
William P. Cla:?k
Reason for Ext. NSC 1.13(e)
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The United States space program shall be conducted in
accordance with the following basic principles: (U)
A. The United States is committed to the exploration
and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes
and for the benefit of all mankind. "Peaceful purposes"
allow for military and intelligence-related activities in
pursuit of national security and other goals. (C)
B. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty
by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any
portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the funda-
mental right to acquire data from space. (U)
C. The United States considers the space systems of
any nation to be national property with the right of passage
through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful
interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement
upon sovereign rights. (U)
D. The United States encourages domestic commercial
exploitation of space-capabilities, technology, and systems
for national economic benefit. These activities must be
consistent with national security concerns, treaties, and
international agreements. .(U)
E. The United States will conduct international
cooperative space-related activities that achieve sufficient
scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits
for the nation. (U)
F. The United States space program will comprise.three
separate, distinct, and strongly interacting sectors --
Military, National Foreign Intelligence, and Civil. Close
coordination, cooperation, and information exchange will be
maintained among these sectors to avoid unnecessary dupli-
cation. All programs in these sectors will operate under
conditions that protect sensitive technology and data and
that promote acceptance and legitimacy of United States
space activities. (S)
G. The United States Space Transportation System
(STS) is the primary space launch system for both national
security and civil government missions. STS capabilities
and capacities shall be developed to meet appropriate national
needs and shall be available to authorized users -- domestic
and foreign, commercial, and governmental. (U)
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H. The United States will pursue activities in space
in support of its right of self-defense. (U)
I. The United States will continue to study space arms
control options. The United States will consider verifiable
and equitable arms control measures that would ban or other-
wise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons-systems
should those measures be compatible with United States
national security. The United States will oppose arms
control concepts or legal regimes that seek general prohi-
bitions on the military or intelligence use of space. (S)
II. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (U)
The Space Transportation System (STS) is composed of
the Space Shuttle, associated upper stages, and related
facilities. The following policies shall govern the develop-
ment and operation of the STS: (U)
A. The STS is a vital element of the United States
space program and is the primary space launch system for
both United States national security and civil government
missions. The STS will be afforded the degree of survivability and
security protection required for a critical national space resource.
(U)
B. The first priority of the STS program is to make
the system fully operational and cost-effective in providing
routine access to space. (U)
C. The United States.is fully committed to maintaining
world leadership in space transportation with an STS capacity
sufficient to meet appropriate national needs.. The STS program
requires sustained commitments by all affected departments
and agencies. The United States will continue to develop
the STS through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DoD).
Enhancements of STS operational capability, upper stages,
and efficient methods of deploying and retrieving paylods
should be pursued as national requirements are defined. (U)
D. United States Government spacecraft should be
designed to take advantage of the unique capabilities of the
STS. The completion of transition to the Shuttle should
occur as expeditiously as practical. (U)
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E. NASA will assure the-Shuttle's utility to the
civil users. In coordination with NASA, the DoD will assure
the Shuttle's utility to national defense and will integrate
national security missions into the Shuttle system. Launch
priority will be provided for national security missions,
F. Expendable launch vehicle operations shall be con-
tinued by the United States Government until the capabilities
of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and obligations.
Unique national security considerations may dictate developing
special-purpose launch capabilities. (U)
G. For the near-term, the STS will continue to be
managed and operated in an institutional arrangement consistent
with the current NASA/DoD Memoranda of Understanding. Responsi-
bility will remain in NASA for operational control of the
STS for civil missions and in the DoD for operational control
of the STS for national security missions. Mission management
is the responsibility of the mission agency. As the STS
operations mature, options will be considered for possible
transition to a different institutional structure. (U)
H. Major changes to STS grogram capabilities will
require Presidential approval. U)
III. CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM (U)
The United States shall conduct civil space programs to
expand knowledge of the Earth, its environment, the solar
system, and the universe; to develop and promote selected
civil applications of space technology; to preserve the
United States leadership in critical aspects of space science,
applications, and technology; and to further United States
domestic and foreign policy objectives. Consistent with the
National Aeronautics and Space Act, the following policies
shall govern the conduct of the civil space program. (U)
A. Science, Applications, and Technology: United States
Government civil programs shall continue a balanced strategy
of research, development, operations, and exploration for
science, applications, and technology. The key objectives
of these programs are to: (U)
(1) Preserve the United States preeminence in
critical major space activities'to enable continued exploita-
tion and exploration of space. (U)
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(2) Conduct research and experimentation to
expand understanding of: (a) astrophysical phenomena and the
origin and evolution of the universe, through long-term astro-
physical observation; (b) the Earth, its environment, and
its dynamic relation with the Sun; (c) the origin and evolution
of the solar system, through solar, planetary, and lunar
sciences and exploration; and (d) the space environment and
technology required to advance knowledge in the biological
sciences. (U)
(3) Continue to explore the requirements, operational
concepts, and technology associated with permanent space
facilities. (U)
.(4) Conduct. appropriate research and experimentation
in advanced technology and systems to provide a basis for
future civil space applications. (U)
B. Private Sector Participation: The United States
Government will provide a climate conducive to expanded
private sector investment and involvement in civil space
activities, with due regard to public safety and national
security. Private sector space activities will be authorized
and supervised or regulated by the government to the extent
required by treaty and national security. (U)
C. International Cooperation: United States cooperation
in international civil space activities will: (U)
(1) Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct
readout of data from Federal civil systems to foreign ground
stations and the provision of data to.foreign users under
specified conditions. (U)
(2) Continue cooperation with other nations by
conducting joint scientific and research programs that yield
sufficient benefits to the United States in areas such as
access to foreign scientific and technological expertise and
access to foreign research and development facilities, and
that serve other national goals. All international space
ventures must be consistent with United States technology-
transfer policy. (C)
D. Civil Operational Remote Sensing: Management of
Federal civil operational remote sensing is the responsibility
of the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce
will: (a) aggregate Federal needs for civil operational remote
sensing to be met by either the private sector or the Federal
government; (b) identify needed civil operational system
research and development. objectives; and (c) in coordination
with other departments or agencies, provide for regulation
of private-sector operational remote sensing systems. (U)
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IV. MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM (U)
The United States will conduct those activities in
space that are necessary to national defense. The military
space program shall support such functions as command and
control, communications, navigation, environmental monitoring,
warning, tactical intelligence, targeting, ocean and battlefield
surveillance, and force application (including an aggressive
research and development program which supports these functions)..
In addition, military space programs shall contribute to'the
satisfaction of national intelligence requirements. The
following policies shall govern the conduct of the military
space program: (S)
A. Survivability. Survivability and endurance of
space systems, including all system elements, will be pursued
commensurate with the planned use in crisis and conflict,
with the threat, and with the availabilit of other assets
to perform the mission.
B. Anti-satellite (ASAT) capability.
will develop and deploy an ASAT capability
The United States
C. Force Application. The United States will, consistent
with treaty obligations: (a) develop and maintain an integrated
attack warning, notification, verification, and contingency
reaction capability which can effectively detect and react
to threats to United States space systems; (b) conduct
research and planning to be prepared to develop, acquire,
and deploy space weapon systems and to counter adversary
space activities, should national security conditions dictate.
These efforts must ensure a reasonable hedge against breakout
in space and space-related weapons by any adversary and
should support technology advances that will place the
United States in a favorable strategic posture. (TS)
D.. Interaction with the National Foreign Intelligence
Space Program. The Secretary of Defense, in concert with
the Director of Central Intelligence, and for the purpose-of
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supporting operational military forces, may propose modifications
or augmentations to national foreign intelligence space s stems
as necessa
E. Security. The military space program, including
dissemination of data, shall be conducted in accordance with
Executive Orders and applicable directives for protection of
national security information and commensurate with both the
missions performed and the security measures necessary to
protect related space activities. (C)
V. NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SPACE PROGRAM (C)
The United States foreign intelligence program shall
include a space program to acquire. information and data
required for the formulation and execution of foreign,
military, and economic policies; to support the planning for
and conduct of military operations; to provide warning; to
support crisis management; to monitor treaties; and to perform
research and development related to these functions. The
following policies shall govern the conduct of this program; (S)
A. Survivability. The national foreign intq CODEDlce
space program shall be configured to operate in a hostile
environment. The guidance set forth in subparagraph IV. A.
shall be aggressively pursued by the intelligence community. (S)
B. Support of Military Operational Requirements.
Support of military operational requirements is a major
space intelligence mission. National space intelligence
assets shall provide appropriate support to deployed military
operational forces in balance with their primary mission
capabilities. In order to ensure a proper balance between
the national and tactical missions of these assets, there
will be military involvement in the requirements, taskings,
exploitation, and dissemination functions and in the develo -
ment ro ram.
C. Interaction with the Military Space Program. The
Director of Central Intelligence, in concert with the Secretary
of Defense, may propose modifications or augmentations to
military space systems necessary to support national foreign
intelligence needs. (TS)
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D. Security. The nature, the attributable collected
information, and the operational details of intelligence space
activities will be classified. As is necessary to protect
sensitive aspects, they will be controlled in special compart-
mented security channels as determined by the Director of
Central Intelligence. Collected information that cannot be
attributed to space systems will be classified according to
its content. The following security guidelines apply to
the conduct of these programs: (S)
(1) The fact of satellite "photoreconnaissance"
for use in monitoring arms control agreements is UNCLASSIFIED.
The fact that the .United States conducts satellite reconnais-
sance for intelligence purposes, without disclosing the
generic type of activity, is classified CONFIDENTIAL. All
other facts and details concerning the overall national
foreign intelligence space program will continue to require
appropriate classification and security controls. (C)
(2) Operational aspects of intelligence space
activities shall be afforded strict security protection
within a special acc(as program system as determined by the
Director of Central intelligence. (S)
(3) Strict -ontrol over public statements and
background concerninc space reconnaissance will be maintained.
(C)
(4) Chang.s to the space intelligence security
policy can be author zed only by the President. (C)
VI. INTER-SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES (U)
This section contains guidance applicable to and binding
upon the military, national foreign intelligence, and civil
space programs. (S)
A. The military, intelligence, and civil space sectors
will be closely coordinated and will emphasize technology
sharing within necessary security constraints. Technology
transfer issues will be resolved within the framework of
laws, directives, and executive orders. (S)
Civil Earth-imaging from space,
will be permitted under controls
to civil benefits, national security, and foreign policy. (C)
and when such needs are justified and assessed in relation
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C. Civil remote sensing system constraints on spatial
resolution, timeliness, spectral resolution, substantive
content, or other appropriate parameters will be periodically
reviewed to determine when policy constraints should'be
revised. or imposed. (S)
D. United States intelligence, military, and civil
Federal agencies should foster maximum use of satellite
imagery products, consistent with essential security require-
ments and user needs. The Director of Central Intelligence
will continue efforts to facilitate the availability of
imagery products outside of special control channels. (S)
F. Civil space systems identified as critical to
national security may be modified at the expense of the
requesting agency or department. These actions should
provide a level of survivability commensurate with planned
use and/or a capability to deny use by an enemy in time of
national emergency declared by the President. To the maximum
extent possible, these systems, when modified, should retain
their normal operational utility. The fact, or details, of
such measures shall be classified. (S)
- G.. The United States Government will maintain and
coordinate separate national security and civil operational
space systems when differing needs of the sectors dictate. (U)
VII. IMPLE,NENTATION (U)
Normal interagency coordinating mechanisms will be
employed to the maximum extent possible to implement the
policies enunciated in this directive. To provide a forum
to all Federal agencies for their policy views, to review
and advise on proposed changes to national space policy, and
to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy
issues to the President for decisions.as necessary, a Senior
Interagency Group (SIG) on Space shall be established. The
SIG (Space) will be chaired by the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and will include the Deputy or
Under Secretary of State, Deputy or Under Secretary of
Defense, Deputy or Under Secretary of Commerce, Director of
Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the
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Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration. Representatives of the Office of Management and
Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy will
be included as observers. Other agencies or departments will
participate based on the subjects to be addressed. (U)
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Attachment 3
CONFIDENTIAL WASH 1 N GTO N fsocutlve Regis"
SECRET ATTACHMENT 82-5928
September 11, 1982
CIA COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
SUBJECT: First SIG(Space) Meeting (U)
REFERENCES: a. NSDD-42, National Space Policy, dated
July 4, 1982 (C)
b. NSC Memorandum, subj: Senior Interagency
Group for Space, dated July 21, 1982 (U)
The President's firm commitment to the U.S. Space Program is
reflected in his National Space Policy (NSDD-42) promulgated
on July 4, 1982. This document established a Senior Inter-
agency Group for Space to implement his policy and to identify
and resolve issues necessary to fulfill his major goal of
maintaining U.S. leadership in space. (C)
The first meeting of the SIG(Space) will be held on September 20.,-
).m. , from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. in Room 305 of the Old
Executive Office Building. The primary purpose of the
meeting will be to review and approve the attached SIG(Space)
Terms of Reference and initial set of issues develope y
the working group chartered by reference b. By September 16,
1982, please notify Gilbert Rye at 395-5022 of the name of
your representative and of any substantive difficulties
with the attachments. (U)
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F[1R T1iW. ARF.STDENT_ .O LOAI
Wi am P. Clark
Attachments : Tabs A,B,C,D
n-
cc: The Vice President ....cos
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CONFIDENTIAL Upon removal of attachments
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