A POLICY FOR DEALING WITH LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400890004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 16, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 17, 1981
Dear Chuck,
I just spent an hour with Henry Schuler,
a former foreign service officer now in business,
who spent a long time in Libya. He seemed to me
a very thoughtful man (of course he agreed with
me on most issues).
Attached is a draft of an article he is
submitting to SAIS soon. It's very good reading
when you have time.
If ever, we get this paper to the NSC, I
hope the meeting will open with an intelligence
briefing from the Director. It is my judgment
that the downsides of going the way I suggested
in my remarks at our last meeting are really
quite small in terms our security interests.
It seems to me that that judgment is borne
out by intelligence assessments.
Warm Regards
Sincerely
State Dept. review completed
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A POLICY FOR DEALING WITH LIBYA
G. Henry M. Schuler
Director for Energy Planning & Development
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 460
Washington, D.C. 20036
[phone]
November 16, 1981
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Preliminary evidence linking the assassins of
President Anwar Sadat to a Moslem extremist group called
"Al Jihad" has rekindled debate about. the best way to
frustrate Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's deadly ambitions.
Although Cairo and Washington did not choose to
republicize Al Jihad's Libyan connection in the immediate
aftermath of the assassination, journalists. in both
capitals have been reporting for several years that Libya
was providing funds, arms and training to that
organization in its "holy war" against the late Egyptian
President. The debate about meeting the Qaddafi threat
has been thrust repeatedly upon policy-makers by over a
decade of Libyan attacks on America's security interests,
strategic relationships and diplomatic ..initiatives all
around the world, but the issue has never. been debated to
a conclusion so American policy has been marked by
indecision and inaction.
The principal barrier to conclusive deliberations lies
in the refusal by many area experts to attribute much
historical relevance or regional significance to Libya or
its aggressive leader. Those who subscribe to this
conventional wisdom cannot defend his tactics but neither
do they attribute much importance to them because they do
not take seriously his repeatedly proclaimed strategic
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goals. At first glance, those goals certainly do appear
excessively ambitious at home and abroad. Qaddafi's
domestic policy seeks a total transformation of Libyan
society by mixing conservative religious fundamentalism
with the radical political and economic innovation of his
Green Book. His goals in foreign affairs are even more
startling, including establishing an Islamic state across
the Sahara, championing anti-colonialism as the leader of
the Organization of African Unity, leading a world-wide
Pan-Islamic
influence throughout
agenda, many
Pan-Arab revival and reducing American
analysts doubt both the degree of
also the amount of_ popular-Libyan
Starting from that perspective,
inevitably conclude that it is
time before he "mellows" or
the region. Faced with that
challenging
Q.addafi's- commitment and
support for his goals.
those so-called experts
only a question of
is rejected
without outside pressure, so they counsel that he be
ignored and even accommodated instead of singled-out and
confronted. As a result, the policy discussions are
side-tracked before they reach the fundamental question of
how to frustrate Qaddafi's ambitions.
The inconclusive results of the debate and the lack of
a definitive policy choice have led to a decade of
American vacillation, with the "accommodators" reviving
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their quest for a modus vivendi every time there is a 1
after some especially egregious violation of the norms of
international behavior has temporarily pushed
"confronters" the
to the fore. This vacillation has
disheartened our friends in the region, discredited our
efforts to secure European support, emboldened the
Union and prompted Soviet
Qaddafi to continue probing the limits
of our irresolution.
We cannot afford further indecision and inaction, for
Qaddafi has proclaimed his intention to fuel the flame
open insurgency and to of
fan the spark of discontent
throughout Africa and the Middle East, ...Morocco, Tunisia,
Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia,
Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen).... to name
only those which are e
presently at the top of his priority
list without. venturing further afield to Europe, the
Americas and the Far East. Some would belittle the
significance of a changed orientation in several of those
ose
but no one would deny that many of them lie
perilously close to the
energy heartland where efforts to
create radical and hostile regimes would almost certainl
lead to a superpower Y
confrontation. Therefore, if we are
to avoid drifting into a perilous conflict, we must move
toward a coherent Libya policy by reexamining the
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preliminary question of Qaddafi's significance and
relevance as well as the fundamental question of how best
to deal with the meance which he poses.
I. An Historical Appraisal of Qaddafi's Goals
It may well be that much of the tendency to
underestimate Qaddafi and Libya can be attributed to the
fact that neither fits into any of the neat niches in
which journalists, scholars and bureaucrats practice their
professions. Although Libya is part of the African
Continent, it is assigned to that smaller group of
specialists who devote their lives to that culturally and
racially distinct group of countries lying north- of the
Sahara. But" even on the North African coast, Libya does
not fit into the Maghreb or Arab West where Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia are characterized by French and Berber
influences which are absent in Libya. Similarly, although
the bedouin tribes which dominate Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania are the purest Arabs outside the Arabian
Peninsula, Libya does not fall into the domain of experts
who study the Mashriq or Arab East because they are
physically separated by non-Arab Egypt with its totally
distinct culture and history. As for Qaddafi, he fits the
conventional niches even less well than his country.
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Analysts have never even been able to agree whether the
events of September 1st were a coup d'etat or a
revolution, and journalists have variously characterized
his philosophy as both "leftist" and "rightist."
Failing to find, in Libya or Qaddafi, the
characteristics which establish importance in their areas
of analysis, it would appear that too many experts simply
conclude that it is unnecessary to do anything more than
wait until "Qaddafi abandons his "Quixotic adventures" or
until the Libyan people recognize that he is a "transient
anachronism" who has outlived his moment. Before
accepting those policy implications, we would do well to
consider Qaddafi's strategic goals in the Libyan context
in which he has evolved and continues to operate.
Qaddafi's Emphasis Upon the Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism
Colonel Qaddafi has cast himself as the champion of
Islamic revival since the earliest days of his
rule....almost a decade before so-called Islamic
Fundamentalism became fashionable among the youth of Iran,
Egypt, Tunisia and throughout the Moslem world. Because
of the pervasive nature of Islam, its revival provided a
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virtual manifesto for Qaddafi. Moral .rescue meant ridding
Libya of all vestiges of the monarchical regime because it
had- come to be riddled with corruption and degeneracy.
Spiritual regeneration called for the suppression of all
foreign influences as well as the imposition of
prohibition, the banning of pork, the censorship of
Western films and the closing of Christian churches.
Economic resurgence required wresting control of the
Libyan oil industry from the foreign companies which had
been granted legally binding concessions by the old
regime. And finally, political reunification was perhaps
the most important aspect of the Islamic revival for
Qaddafi, because elimination of "colonial boundaries" and
removal of "imperial remnants" (a code-word for Israel)
would enable Qaddafi to play a role far beyond, the borders
of this country of only two million people.
To be sure, Qaddafi's Islamic revival was ambitious,
but his quest for identity and legitimacy had deep roots
in Libya. In fact, the origins of the Libyan state lay in
an early 19th Century religious revival which had led,
ironically, to the creation of the very Sanussi monarchy
which Qaddafi eventually overthrew. Although that first
Libyan revival began in the 1830's, its founder Mohammed
Ibn Ali al-Sanussi (subsequently called the Grand
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Sanussi), had strikingly similar motivations - resentment
of foreign intrusion epitomized by the French occupation
of his native Algeria in 1830; disgust with the
corruption, despotism and dependence upon foreign advisors
which characterized the dying days of the pirate regime of
the Karamanlis in Tripoli; concern that a once driven
people had lost all incentive to work or initiate and
accepted a subsistence existence; and awareness that a
Moslem could be at home anywhere in the Dar es Salam or
House of Believers which preceded the establishment of
colonial boundaries. Proof of this last point is provided
by the fact that. the Grand Sanussi was born in Algeria;
founded his Sanusiyah religious order in. the Hijaz as the
counterpart to the Wahhabi order' in the Nejd; and then
moved his headquarters to Cyrenaica' where it ultimately
came to direct an order with three million adherents and
some 150 lodges ranging from Senegal in the south to
Turkey in the north, from Morocco in the west to the Dutch
East Indies in the east.
Clearly, then, the birth of a secular or political
movement out of a spiritual or religious revival is not a
new phenomenon in Libya....or elsewhere in the Moslem
world.
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Qaddafi's Efforts to Impose Philosophical,
Political and Economic Innovations
Those who have predicted the imminent collapse of
Qaddafi....for over a decade(!).... contend that it is far
easier to gain power under the banner of Islamic revival
than it is to hold onto power in a fractious society.
They have long predicted that the unsophisticated Libyan
people would eventually balk at the pretentious theorizing
of Qaddafi's Green Book or Third International Theory, his
nationalization of the shops and rental properties and his
substitution of "peoples committees" for embassies,
cabinet departments and other Western notions of organized
government. Perhaps, but, like the Grand Sanussi who
established a power base which lasted until its original
precepts were abandoned. 125 years later, Qaddafi has
demonstrated an acute and instinctive awareness of Libya's
substantially bedouin society.
Bedouin leadership is based upon highly personal
traits - what sophisticated analysts would label charisma
-,even though the average bedouin might not always seek to
emulate those traits. Individuals are respected and even
feared but_ they are never considered superior. Nor may
they adopt a life style which sets them apart, for wealth
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is considered a sort of tribal asset. As long as an
individual possesses that charisma and resists the
temptation to set himself apart, the bedouin will follow
him and recognize his philosophy.... in distinctly that
sequence, for it is men who matter, not institutions or
doctrines. Qaddafi may have some esoteric ideas; but he
is still the Brother-Colonel who lives a spartan life and
periodically returns to a tent in the great Sirte Desert.
No one would deny that Qaddafi's socialist measures
have alienated the small shop keepers and landlords, but
the bulk of the bedouin view wealth as a sort of tribal
asset which should be distributed on the.. basis of need or
merit. Similarly, Qaddafi's departure from the form of
organized government is not alien to'tribal society which
is based upon a diffusion of authority to a multiplicity
of segments,. units and sub-units so that there is
essentially no government and no corporate body. Indeed,
decisions arise out of the circumstances rather than out
of any formalized process.
In view of these elements of bedouin society, we might
do well to view Qaddafi's program - unusual by Western
standards as one of adaptation rather than innovation.
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Qaddafi's Design for a Pan-Saharan Islamic State
,'Although Qaddafi may appear Quixotic in his declared
intention to establish an Islamic state across' all of
Saharan Africa, it is -certainly not a new "fantasy," for
it was also the goal of the Grand Sanussi's son and
successor, Sayyid Mahdi, before the turn of the century.
Because of an accident of geography which places Tripoli
250 miles further south than Tunis or Algiers, Libya has
always served as the gateway for overland travel from the
Mediterranean into central Africa. Therefore, it was
natural for Sayyid Mahdi - or Muammar Qaddafi - to see a
Pan Saharan nation as the initial step towards a new
Islamic state which would transcend political boundaries
like the Imamate of old. To facilitate this. development,
Sayyid Mahdi moved the headquarters of the Sanusiyah first
to the Kufra Oasis deep in the Cyrenaican desert and then,
in 1899, to Qiru in the (French) Sudan. With the help of
some 25,000 foot soldiers and 1,500 horsemen, the
Sanusiyah gained control over all of the central Sahara,
including the Kingdom of Chad as well as those of Ennedi
and Waddai. This nascent Saharan state flourished' under
Sanussi direction for several decades until the French
colonial army prevailed while the Libyans were preoccupied
with the Italians on the coast.
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Clearly Qaddafi's Saharan ambitions possess sufficient
historic and geographic relevance to. limit any major
degree of popular Libyan revulsion over his military
adventures.... so long as they are not disastrous.
Qaddafi's Credentials as an Anti-Colonialist
Some analysts espouse the mistaken view that Libya did
not have to fight for its ,independence in the sense that
the Algerians and other North Africans did, and that,
therefore, the Libyan people lack personal commitment to
Qaddafi's anti-colonialism. To be sure, Libya was handed
its independence by -the _UN in 1952, but if we are willing
to extend our historic perspective back 70 years, we find
that Libyans fought one of the last, longest and bloodiest
colonial wars which began with an Italian invasion in
September 1911. The Ottoman Caliph promptly declared a
'Jihad or Moslem holy war against this infidel invasion,
and the bedouin, especially of Cyrenaica, rallied to serve
as mujahidden or fighters for the faith under the
leadership -of Ahmed Shariif al-Sanussi, Sayyid Mahdi's
successor as leader of the Sanusiyah.
There was a brief respite after World War I while the
Italian government grappled with the Wilsonian principles
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Of its war-time ally, but that came to an end with the
Fascist March on Rome im 1922. Thereafter, the guerilla
war was fought with all the bitter zeal of a conflict
between religions, civilizations and cultures, for
Mussolini saw the extension of fascist civilization to
"the fourth shore of our sea....Cas] not only a
territorial, military and mercantile expression but a
spiritual and moral one as well." When the poorly-armed
mujahidden of Ahmed Shariif and, later, Umar Mukhtar,
could not be subdued by the "search-and-destroy missions"
and "free fire zones" which were later to become so
familiar to Americans fighting another guerilla war, the
Italians resorted to brutality. Some 80,000 bedouin were
herded into desert internment camps. Wells were poisoned
or filled with cement. The Sanussi lodges were closed,
their property seized and their shaikhs exiled to the
island of Ustica. A "tribunale volante" flew from place
to place ordering summary executions for engaging in any
contact with the rebels. On occasion, execution took the
form of a shove from an airplane circling the village of a
convicted rebel. Planes attacked the rebel encampments,
annihilating vast numbers of noncombattants and herds with
bombs, mustard gas and machine guns, forcing the remnants
into the desert to face starvation and thirst. Still,
small bands of mujahidden fought on until 1931 when Umar
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Mukhtar was wounded in battle and hanged at Suluq before
some 20,000 sullen bedouin shaikhs and. town notables who
had been assembled to observe the final,-triumph of Italian
might. Although the Italians proclaimed the restoration
of Pax Romana, Mussolini confided to his diary that
"Cirenaica verde di piante" had become "rossa .di sangue"
after 20 years of warfare.
Clearly then, the Libyan bedouin have as much right as
any African people to wave the banner of anti-colonialism,
and, Qaddafi's own grandfather was, in fact, killed
fighting the Italians.
Qaddafi's Claim to Leadership of the-Pan-Islamic
and Pan-Arabic Movements
If Qaddafi's claim to leadership of a Pan-Saharan
state strikes African specialists as Quixotic, his claim
to leadership-of an even wider pan-Islamic or pan-Arabic
movement strikes Middle Eastern experts as down-right
crazy. Those who have devoted their careers to the states
of the Fertile Crescent, the Nile Valley, the Arabian
Peninsula and Anatolia, cannot imagine a Cyrenaican
bedouin taking seriously the ambition to lead these
historically important people. But like their African
counter-parts they ignore Libyan history.
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As a result of his leadership of the jihad against
Italian occupation, another Cyrenaican bedouin, Ahmed
Shariif, became the personal embodiment of the Pan-Islamic
movement which was stirring around the world in the early
years of the Twentieth Century. His bedouin were, after
all, the only Moslems still resisting European domination
at the outbreak of World War I so they became the
surrogates for previously subjugated people throughout
Asia and Africa. Their resistance took on heroic
dimensions, for at one point a hand full of mujahidden
were fighting over 100,000 troops of 3 Great Powers: Italy
on the coast, France in the south and Britain on the
Egyptian border.
Eventually, the weight of superior force prevailed.
Goaded into 'overextending his forces and betrayed by his
counsin Sayyid Idris (later Libya's first and only King),
Ahmed Shariif had to be stealthily evacuated from the Gulf
of Sidra aboard a German U-boat in September 1918. But he
went to Turkey in truimph, not in humiliation, for he was
the symbol of resurgent Islam's renewed struggle against
European domination. During the remaining 15 years of his
-life, this provincial Cyrenaican played a role far beyond
his native land. He rallied the Arab and Kurdish
minorities to the support of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk in
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Turkey; he was invited to lead a revitalized Caliphate; he
presided over the first Pan-Islamic Conference at Sivas in
Turkey; he was designated King of Iraq by that Conference
although Britain imposed its own Hashemite candidate; he
was expelled by the French from Damascus for attempting to
reunify Syria with Turkey; and he served as a key advisor
to King Ibn Saud and as mediator of the incessant quarrels
among the shaikhs of the Arabian Peninsula. In 1933 he
died at Medina in the Hijaz where his grandfather had
founded the Sanusiyah a century earlier.
One need not.equate Muammar Qaddafi with Ahmed Shariif
to recognize that a Moslem could indeed be at home
anywhere in Dar es Salaam and t,iat leadership could come
from unlikely places....as it did at the very birth of
Islam!
Qaddafi's Collaboration with the Soviet Union
There is yet a final element of Qaddafi's current
posture which carries with it an historical
dimension.... his relationship to the Soviet Union. Let it
be clear at the outset that Qaddafi is not a communist and
not a witting Soviet surrogate. But he is no less useful
to the USSR, for he has adopted the ancient strategy that
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"my enemy's enemy is my friend" in order to reduce
American influence in the region. There is ample evidence
of this relationship which has been expanding steadily
even during periods when the United States has attempted
to reach a modus vivendi with Libya. Stockpiles of
technologically advanced Soviet military equipment which
far exceed Libya's capacity to maintain or operate.
Thousands of military' advisors, technicians and even
operating personnel from various Warsaw Pact nations and
Cuba. Extension of airfield runways to handle the Soviet
Backfire bomber which is not in Libya's inventory but has
been flown in from Crimean bases on a trial basis.
Installation of a dozen Soviet- SS12 Scaleboard missiles
which are capable of carrying megaton nuclear warheads and
of reaching the southern flank of the NATO alliance.
Creation of military alliance with the surrogate Soviet
states of Ethiopia and the Peoples Democractic Republic of
Yemen (Aden or South Yemen).
Many analysts deprecate the implications of these
links because they question the strategic or geopolitical
importance of Libya' to the Soviet Union. Once again an
understanding of history is instructive. When the Allies
met at Potsdam in July 1945, Stalin stunned Churchill and
Truman with a demand for control over the Italian colony
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of Tripolitania as war reparations for damage inflicted by
10 Italian divisions in Russia. According to Molotov's
explanation, "The Soviet Union should take the place that
is due it and therefore should have bases in the
Mediterranean...." Although the demand was couched in
terms of a mere trusteeship and the traditional Russian
desire for warm water ports to the south, Secretary of
State Byrnes recognized that "the Soviets' interest in
this territory was primarily military." With the Second
.World War only just concluded, the Western powers knew
that control of the coast between Tripoli and Tobruk
provided the base of a triangle which could successfully
interdict passage between the Atlantic. and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Therefore, they -employed- every available
strategem to deny that geopolitical prize to the Soviet
Union. Their efforts were successful for 25 years, but
continued failure to confront Qaddafi while the United
States still maintains its military edge in the
Mediterranean only permits the Soviets more time to
consolidate their position.
The point of establishing Qaddafi's historic relevance
and Libya's regional significance is not to glorify or
justify Qaddafi's ambitions. Much less is it intended to
imply that he will succeed in attaining his many strategic
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goals. Rather, it is designed to demonstrate that Qaddafi
is, in fact, fully committed and enjoys the instinctive
support of a significant portion of the Libyan people,
especially that large proportion of the society which
became adults during the Qaddafi era. Therefore, we
cannot accept the conventional wisdom that
we should
ignore him until he modifies his ambitions or is replaced
by a less ambitious leader.
This is simply not going to
happen unless significant Outside resistance-or pressure
di
verts Qaddafi or the Libyan people
from those ambitions.
II. An Assessment of the Policy Options
Having squarely addressed the preliminary question
which has diverted previous deliberations for a decade,
the policy options can be
presented in three straight
foward choices. Firstly, should we attempt to accommodate
Qaddafi's tactics and-ambitions or should we confront them
with firm resistance? Secondly, should confrontation be
limited to passive measures designed to enhance the
capability of target countries to resist Qaddafi or should
they extend to active measures designed to reduce
Qaddafi's capability to attack? And thirdly, what sort of
active confrontation measures are required?
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Accommodation or Confrontation?
Some will argue that posing the second choice in this
fashion presupposes ready rejection of the accommodation
option. That is precisely the intention, for no American
effort at accommodation has brought Qaddafi to the
bargaining table since September 1, 1969 when he seized
power. Those analysts who argue that we should try the
accommodation option simply.betray the fact that they have
only had time to focus on Libya for the past year or so
because they ignore a decade of American initiatives to
reach an accommodation or modus vivendi. None has worked
not the 1978 relaxation of U.S. export barriers for
non-military goods. Not the 19d0 cancellation of naval
exercises which were held in other disputed waters
elsewhere around the world. Not turning the other cheek
in the face of charges that Libya had used its diplomatic
pouch to smuggle into Khartoum the weapons which were used
to murder two American diplomatic hostages in 1973. Not
Secretary of State Vance's profession to Libya's UN
Ambassador -of an American desire to improve relations.
Not President Carter's willingness to receive the Libyan
representative in the Oval Office. Not a decade of
accepting oil policy demands which were expressly designed
to destroy agreements painstakingly negotiated with
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moderate regimes of the Arabian Peninsula. Not even
warning Qaddafi of dissent among members of his first
Cabinet who were less autocratic and- more favorably
disposed' toward the United States. In fact, each effort
to improve relations has been rewarded with another
outrage or another non-negotiable demand.
Those die=hard accommodators_ who. contend that the
United States has not tried hard enough would do well to
consider the example of France, for Paris certainly left
no stone unturned in attempting to accommodate Qaddafi.
Less than six months after he seized power, France agreed
to sell Libya 130 of its -highly regarded Mirage
figher-bombers, arguing that failure to accommodate his
arms needs would only drive him into the embrace of the
Russians (an argument whose insidiousness is only exceeded
by its survivability since it is still made today even
after the Soviets have already provided a mighty bear
hug.) French exporters and oil companies quickly
capitalized on this opening with vastly expanded trade and
technology exchange. Nothing would stand in the way of a
typical Gallie modus vivendi. When Libya sent the Mirages
to Egypt during the 1973 war, Paris ignored the violation
of an express prohibition in the original sales contract.
When Libya began its subversive activities in the Sahara,
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long an important French sphere of influence, Paris looked
the other way. When uranium belonging to a French company
in Senegal was diverted to Libya for its weapons program,
France failed to protest. When Secretary Kissinger
convened the Washington Conference in February 1974 to
develop a consumer nation response to the OPEC price
increases which were placed by Libya, Paris refused to
cooperate and instead received Libya's Prime Minister for
five day visit which led to more arms exports, more
trade and the sale of a nuclear power plant. And, of
course, Paris had early changed its Middle Eastern policy
to satisfy the most hard-line Arab states.
Was France rewarded for al_ of these extraordinary
efforts to reach accommodation with Qaddafi even at the
expense of relations with the United States? Only if one
takes a rather masochistic view of rewards. In January
1980, Libya sponsored an armed-insurrection against
Tunisian President Bourguiba, France's closest Ally in the
Arab world. The next month, mobs incited by false Libyan
government-radio broadcasts, destroyed the French Embassy
in Tripoli. In March of that same year, Libyan backed
rebels revived the civil war in Chad which ultimately
forced the. French to withdraw from their strategic base
and led to occupation by Libyan troops. Since then Paris
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has been moving away from accommodation. Nor is the
French experience unique, for the policies of Britain,
Italy and West Germany have fared no better.
It seems clear, - in summary, that Qaddafi views
accommodation as a one-way street on which he moves at
will while everyone else gets out of his way. Since the
available evidence offers little hope that accommodation
will prompt Qaddafi to moderate his policies, we are
forced to defend ourselves by moving forward, however
reluctantly, to a policy which directly confronts those
ambitions and tactics.
Passive Confrontation or Active Confrontation?
Even after we have been forced to adopt the
confrontation option, we must decide whether Qaddafi's
aggressive ambitions can be successfully frustrated simply
by enhancing the ability of his many targets to defend
themselves or whether measures to reduce his ability to
attack are also required. Let it be clear throughout this
discussion that both. of these options are entirely
defensive in nature,.being prompted by Libyan aggression.
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The magnitude of frustrating Qaddafi's ambitions from
the muzzle end of the weapon is dramatized by the
world-wide scope of his subversive contributions, ranging
from the Philippines to El Salvador, from the Canary
Islands to Thailand. But the undertaking is difficult and
massive enough even if we limit our discussion to the
targets in Africa and the Middle East, for it requires an
across-the-board strengthening of their internal security,
military economic and political defenses, when any one of
those tasks would be formidable by itself.
After Sadat's. assassination, it was revealed that the
United States had spent tens of millions on training and
technology for his personal security.: Given our own
record of protecting Presidents, -we should not be
surprised that it is impossible to shield activist public
figures from determined assassins who have access to arms
and funds. Some will argue that this merely emphasizes
the folly of relying upon a single leader; however; the
limitations on our ability to provide internal security
assistance . extend beyond isolated assassination to
full-scale revolution. That became clear when the close
cooperation between the CIA and Savak failed to detect the
scope of Iranian discontent and subversion.
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Although Qaddafi's threat is not primarily military, a
policy of passive confrontation cannot ignore his massive
arms, build-up. The ability of the United States to
provide 'a quick infusion of superior air capability was
undeniably established by the lop-sided dog fight over the
Gulf of Sidra and the prompt dispatch of AWACS planes to
Egypt. Although less certain, Operation Bright Star II
may evidence a capability to airlift a few battalions
during an emergency. Despite these costly but limited
achievements, there is no substitute for building the
defense capability of the target states themselves. That
will not be easy, for Libya has used a significant portion
of its oil revenues - 40% of. which are provided by
American consumers - to purchase an estimated $15 billion
worth of Soviet arms. Countering that massive arsenal
effectively would require expenditures even beyond the $4
billion in arms credits already committed to Egypt over
five years through fiscal year 1985....at a time when the
Reagan Administration is under enormous budget pressures.
Other recipients of U.S. arms aid who are already menaced
by the Libyan military build-up - Sudan, Tunisia,
Morocco,. Oman, Somalia, and perhaps even Chad - would
increase their shipping lists as well. But arms exports
incur political as well as financial costs for the
Administration because many legislators favor economic.-
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over military aid. The Soviets are not required to face
this choice, for the Libyans pay in full for their
purchases with dollars, thereby permitting the USSR to
preposition arms at Libyan - actually American - expense.
As in the recent AWACS- debate, other American legislators
will attack a countervailing arms build-up by. uncertain
governments as a potential threat to regional peace and to
U.S. technological superiority. Here again, the Soviets
have no compunction, selling Qaddafi their most advanced
weapons,the first Mig 25's and TU 22's available outside
the-Warsaw Pact; whereas the United States was loathe to
sell Egypt its most advanced fighter, the F15 Eagle, even
before Sadat's death.
For similar reasons, it is also difficult for the
United States to help friendly states to match Libyan's
economic progress. In fact, it is impossible for the
United States to do so because we are financing both sides
of the competition, and in 1980, the last full year, we
provided Libya with $7 billion in oil revenues while
providing Egypt with just over $1 billion in financial
aid. And, since the Egyptian program is. already our
largest commitment anywhere, it is unlikely to be
increased -significantly. President Sadat hoped that
private American investments would provide additional
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development capital under the "open door" policy which he
proclaimed in 1974, but that never really materialized
even under the political stability which Sadat was seen to
provide: Prospects are even less certain now, in the
aftermath of the assassination.
The last componet of an across-the-board enhancement
of the defensive capability of_ target states involves
their political vulnerability as supporters of American
policy. Some of the critics of proposals to confront
Qaddafi contend that greater priority should be given to
achieving a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian
issue. They contend that more. progress on Palestinian
autonomy might have saved Sadat, .and that an overall
settlement would defuse hostility to the United States and
its supporters in the region thereby isolating Qaddafi.
Although many others dispute the likelihood of any instant
panacea, this does not reduce the need for steady progress
in solving the issue. But that is hardly an argument for
an entirely passive approach to Qaddafi because he is
irreconcilably opposed to any negotiated settlement. Put
quite simply, there will be no negotiated solution so long
as he is in a position to outbid the moderate leaders for
mass support; to finance the hard line elements under the
PLO umbrella to reject even Prince Fahd's eight point-
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plan; and to support terrorist incidents which alienate
American public opinion each time. it shows some
understanding of the Palestinian position. Progress
requires time, and time will not be available if Qaddafi
is permitted to attack at will.
On the basis of this analysis of America's limited
capabilities to enhance simultaneously the internal
security, military preparedness, economic development and
political vulnerability of the many countries on Qaddafi's
target list, it seems undeniable that we look not only at
the muzzle end of the weapon of international subversion,
but to its breech end as well. In short, we must limit
his ability to attack nations, which support American
interests in the area.
Possible Measures for Limiting Qaddafi's
Offensive Capability
Having determined that passive measures of
confrontation are not enough, we can finally turn our
attention to a range of active measures which might curb
Qaddafi's offensive capability. In reviewing the
possibilities, we will start by summarily dismissing
several of the more drastic.
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An American-Backed Egyptian Invasion
,Although there have been reports that the Reagan
Administration, prior to President Sadat's assassination,
promised a protective umbrella against Soviet
intereference in the event of an Egyptian invasion of
Libya, there is little to commend that drastic step. Most
importantly, it would imperil the safety and liberty of
over one thousand American citizens whose presence is
encouraged by Qaddafi in part for precisely the reason
that it has discouraged Egyptian -intervention in the
past. Nor is an American rescue operation a viable
possibility, for they are scattered all over Libya without
adequate communication or transportation. Libya's oil
installations- would also be jeopardized if, as seems
likely, Qaddafi resorted to a version of the scorched
earth policy. An Egyptian invasion would also rally the
Libyan people, who have long feared the designs of their
huge neighbor, and end Qaddafi's isolation from the
moderate Arab leaders who are probably more fearful of
unleashing the new risk of internecine warfare than they
are of accepting the old risk of Libyan subversion. And,
finally, it is far from certain that an Egyptian Army
which has been subjected to a decade of propaganda and
subversion would blindly follow orders to attack Libya.
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In short, there is clearly no need to pursue a military
option at this time.
American-Sponsored Subversion
The same considerations which foreclose a military
operation also foreclose a clandestine operation,
especially in. the climate. which has prevailed in
Washington for a decade.
A Tightened Arms Embargo
Having ruled-out overt and covert force, we can direct
our attention to various forms. of sanctions which are
fully authorized by the United Nations Charter. Perhaps
the most obvious is an 'arms embargo. Although Western
arms embargo is significantly blunted by apparent Soviet
willingness to sell quantities well beyond Libya's
capability to absorb, nevertheless Qaddafi's persistent
efforts to purchase U.S. and European arms indicates some
dissatisfaction with Soviet quality so the option retains
some usefulness. There is in fact greater hope for a
meaningful Western embargo now than ever before because
the Mitterand government has pledged to refrain from
accepting new Libyan orders and may be persuaded to slow
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delivery of spare parts and new arms already in the
pipeline. Britain has cooperated in the past; Belgium
should be susceptible to persuasion; the current Italian
government appears less intimidated by Libya; .and the
cooperation of Spain - the source of a number of Libyan
submarines - should be sought in the negotiations for
acceptance by NATO.
While there is hope for .a tightened Western embargo of
equipment and technology which are undeniably instruments
of war, there must also be restrictions on other exports
which have a military capability. But there is little
hope of securing European cooperation ..so long as the
United States' own embargo is full of holes. Examples
abound, for Libya's purchasing agents have unrestricted
funds. Although the C130 is subject to a highly touted
embargo, Qaddafi has purchased its civilian version, the
L100, in the used plane market. Although the U.S. refused
to export 400 heavy duty trucks to haul Libyan tanks, they
permitted the same company to sell 400 somewhat modified
trucks "to haul oil rigs." One of the television networks
recently showed a-large quantity of trailers on their way
to Libya....not what you would call a weapon except that
they were designed to be towed by armored personnel
carriers. The Libyans have even tried to obtain an
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extremely powerful and versatile new explosive in order
"to put out oil well fires" .... a valid use for explosives
except the quantity was probably more than Red Adair has
used in his entire lifetime of fighting fires all over the
world.
If U.S. export of ambiguous goods is bad, the export
of military technology and training capability is far
worse. And yet this is. precisely what has happened
through the alleged recruiting by Edmond Wilson and Frank
Terpil. Some of the human contributions to Qaddafi, eg,
bomb making, is, blatantly military, but other is more
ambiguous,. When an American pilot applies for a passport,
who is to determine whether he has been 'recruited to fly
for the Libyan National Oil Company or the Libyan Army?
Who decides whether an American mechanic is going to Libya
to maintain the turbines used to drive water injection
pumps or those used to power helicopters? Can an American
contractor bid on a contract to build Libyan army
barracks? Static defenses? Missile pads?
Failure of the United States to enforce its own
embargo renders it impossible to persuade our European
allies to do better. Moreover, as was the case when the
United States tried very recently to persuade Britain not
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to sell its Airbus, our allies have begun to reply "Come
back with your request when you have stopped supplying
Qaddafi with the revenues to purchase our exports!"
Imposition of an Oil Embargo
idea of barring Libyan oil imports from the
American market has instant 'appeal for politicians and
policy makers frustrated, over financing Qaddafi's
aggression to the tune of $7 billion per year, but it
requires careful examination. Those who complain that
other oil consumers will not cooperate are less than
heroic in their commitment to America's strategic
interests and may very well be wrong in their assessment
of our allies. With strong leadership, , the Reagan
Administration might well persuade several European
countries to accept risks which are significantly reduced
by current market conditions. With Saudi Arabia producing
8.5 million barrels per day and other Gulf producers vying
to regain market share, the overall oil supply situation
is likely to retain some slack. Libya's oil is,. to be
sure, especially valuable in a market which puts a premium
on low sulfur characteristics and a large gasoline yield,
but that describes the American product slate not that of
Europe and accounts for the fact that the United States-
has been buying 40% of Libya's total production in recent
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.years. In any event, Europe has access to light sweet
crude oil from the British and Norwegian North Seas as
well as from Nigeria where the oil currently enjoys a
$1.50 per barrel cost advantage over comparable crude from
Libya. Japan is simply too far away to provide a
significant alternative market when the Persian/Arab Gulf
is so much closer. While it is true that supply
conditions may change, it is also possible that other
Middle Eastern and African. producers can be persuaded to
retain current production and pricing policies in order to
combat Libyan aggression which is, after all, more of a
threat to them than it is to the United States. In
addition to denying those massive.. revenues to Libya, it
would make eminent sense to divert them to Nigeria,
Africa's largest democracy, which has ample shut-in
capacity to meet a Libyan' short-fall and desperately needs
the revenues for internal development.
Having described a variety of reasons why an oil
embargo of Libya would be of little consequence to
consumers and might be of benefit to more-deserving
producers, there are, nonetheless, legitimate doubts about
the wisdom of a United States initiative to impose it.
Qaddafi would promptly label an American embargo as "an
act of economic aggression." Although the distinction
between aggression and retaliation may lie in the eye of
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the beholder, it seems undesirable to provide Qaddafi with
any grounds - however spurious - for seizing American
hostages; to hand other consumers an excuse for failing to
cooperate; to enable oil companies to complain about
American "politicization" of the oil. trade; or to give
producing states reason for making common cause. Besides,
American imposition of an embargo could be rendered
superfluous if Qaddafi 'is left to his own inclination to
do the same thing.
Withdrawal of All American Citizens
After reviewing the limitations on various policy
options for confronting the Qaddafi threat, withdrawal of
American personnel seems to provide the ultimate
sanction. Not only is it an effective measure in and of
itself, but it also strengthens or removes restraints on
some of the other options. Moreover, it is a legitimate -
even mandatory - step to protect the lives and well being
of American citizens from what appears to be a collision
course. As such, it is a purely defensive action
practiced by all civilized nations, most. recently by
France which withdrew its citizens from Iran after asylum
was granted to Bani Sadr. Although enraged by French
acceptance of the deposed Prime Minister, Teheran
cooperated in that withdrawal, for it knew world opinion
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would not permit it to do otherwise. Surely the United
States has even greater responsibility for withdrawing
Americans in a situation which has already led to the
downing of two Libyan fighters and talk of invasion.
Withdrawal would probably prompt Qaddafi to declare an
embargo, but. we have already seen that this is not an
unacceptable risk, especially if the initiative does not
come from the United States. Even if there is no formal
embargo, withdrawal could prompt some companies to follow
the. Exxon example of relinquishing their interests and
might well prompt Qaddafi to nationalize the remainder;
however, this rupture of the last vestige of the old
concessionary link will end the E'ra when companies with an
equity interest are willing to purchase Libyan oil even
when it is overpriced relative to other comparable crudes.
In addition,. denial of American expertise, familiarity
with Libyan operations and spare parts would impair
Libya's ability to produce oil, thereby limiting the
impact of any failure by our allies to join the embargo.
Since withdrawal would inevitably lead to a rupture of all
commercial relations, it would become much easier to
police the American arms embargo and to deny to Europeans
an excuse-for refusing to cooperate. A total rupture
would also remove the concern by oil companies that an
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embargo of oil alone is inequitable and politicizes the
oil trade. And, of course, it would bar American money and
technology from aiding Qaddafi in winning the economic or
diplomatic competition or in achieving his, deadly
ambitions at the expense of American supporters in the
region.
As important as all-of these factors are, there is yet
another more compelling reason for withdrawing American
personnel and thereby severing all commercial links.
Because that step is opposed by a number of powerful
special interests in the United States, it will send an
unmistakable signal that the American people are more
repulsed by Libyan based terrorism and subversion, than
they are enticed by Libyan sourced oil and profits. That
signal must be transmitted to Qaddafi - and to erstwhile
Qaddafis elsewhere - if . the United States and the
community of civilized nations is to escape cataclysm in
the perilous 1980's!
(This analysis reflects G. Henry M. Schuler's many years
in Libya as a Foreign Service officer, oil company
executive and member of the oil industry's negotiating
team. A graduate of Princeton (History) and the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (International Law),
Mr. Schuler is Director for Energy Planning and
Development in the Washington National Affairs office of
Deloitte Haskins and Sells.)
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