TALKING POINTS - NSC MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA 23 NOVEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400680004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 23, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
Tab A DCI Talking Points--NIO/LA
Tab B Country Briefing Papers--ALA/DDI
Tab C Potential Problems--C/LA/DDO
Tab D Issues and Ojbectives Paper for President's
Trip
Tab E Draft NSDD on US Policy
Tab F SNIE on Prospects for Central America
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NSC MEETING
LATIN AMERICA
23 November 1982
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TALKING POINTS - NSC MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA
23 November 1982
There is dichotomy of attitude running through the nations of
Latin America. On the-one hand, the Falklands affair has brought increased
reluctance to be too closely identified with the United States. On the
other hand, impending financial crisis and fear of increased Cuban and
Soviet troublemaking in the area have strengthened a desire for more
decisive US leadership. I would say that this is a stronger pull.
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In Brazil the major interest is almost certain to be financial and
economic.
Colombia has pursued the most prudent economic policies in Latin America
and as a result it is not heavily burdened by debt, has enjoyed a 3% growth
in 1982 and has just announced a major austerity program in anticipation
of continuing global recession. Cuba has supported extreme left guerrillas
there since early 1980, estimated at about 2,000 armed guerrillas scattered
in both rural and urban areas. President Betancur tried to negotiate and
improve relations with Cuba last August but nothing appears to have
materialized. An estimated 75% of the marijuana and cocaine used in the
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United States during 1982 is seen as originating or transitting through
Colombia. Cuba has been.and is probably still involved in this traffic.
The present anti-narcotic cooperation between the United States and
Colombia will probably continue but it is unlikely that Betancur will
agree to any crop control program.
At the meeting in Costa Rica and Honduras the regional subversion
from Cuba and Nicaragua, along with economic and financial troubles, will
be the focus of concern. Costa Rica sometimes with and sometimes without
its consent has been used as a staging base by Cuban and Sandinistas in 1978
and is currently being used by Nicaragua as a staging base for supplies
being sent to El Salvador, as well as by anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans who
have been given asylum there on the basis that they will not do anything
Cosh R -w
.which would embarrass the Monge government. *mW has a Communist party
of about 6,000 members and trained and armed far-left guerrillas probably
number somewhere inthe neighborhood of 500.
Although government forces are stronger the insurgency shows continued
strength as supplies continue to flow in from Nicaragua. There is no
end in sight.
In Guatemala Rios Montt's counterinsurgency strategy of active
patrolling in guerrilla strongholds combined with developmental assistance
to peasant villages has been highly effective. More than 50,000 peasants
are organized in civil defense units to defend their villages from guerrilla
attack. The Army has reasserted control in many areas dominated by the
insurgents six months ago.
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The military is short on supplies, however, and will have to cut back
its effort over the next several months. The insurgents have been lying
low to avoid encounters with the Army, and many have probably crossed
into Mexico for safehaven. They may step up their activity once the military
Honduras continues its hardline opposition to domestic and regional
leftist radicals. The Honduran military recently sent some 1500 troops
to the Salvadoran border to aid a large Salvadoran counterinsurgency operation.
Inside Nicaragua there is now probably something on the order of
4,000 partially armed and partially trained anti-Sandinista guerrillas
not well organized and scattered in small camps. However, there may be
the capability on the part of 1,000 or 1,500 armed Miskito Indians in the
northeast and some 300 anti-Sandinistas under Eden Pastora in the southeast
to converge and cut road transportation between Managua and the two
Nicaraguan ports on the Atlantic Coast. There is concommitant danger
that this will cause the Nicaraguan army to enlarge an effort to extinguish
armed anti-Sandinista opposition.
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believe that it will not be possible to corner the anti-Sandinista forces
in the mountains and swamps along the Atlantic Coast which prevail
throughout the eastern half of Nicaragua.
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The Nicaraguans and Cubans have the ability to sponsor embarrassing
or distracting incidents during your visit including propaganda activities,
possible violent incidents and demonstrations. We know that the Sandinistas
have been working with American citizens in Managua to plan a propaganda
campaign against the US
This could be the basis for demonstrations or violent incidents in Honduras
or even Costa Rica during your visit. Although Honduran security is good,
the Sandinistas and El Salvador insurgents have demonstrated the ability to
carry off bombings and assassinations. Although the ability is there, our
judgment is that the fear which prevails in Managua that the US is the
basis for military action is such that they are not likely to employ the
ability to disrupt for fear of provoking a strong reaction.
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