LIBYAN CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AND NORTHWEST AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400091-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: December 22, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

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i op aecret
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Libyan Capabilities and
Activities in Sub-Saharan and
Northwest Africa
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Top Secret
SNIE 36.5/70-81
22 December 1981
Copy
300
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LIBYAN CAPABILITIES AND
ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AND
NORTHWEST AFRICA
Information as of 22 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Note: This Estimate is focused on Sub-Saharan Africa. A discussion of Libyan involvement in the Western
Sahara dispute has been included, but treatment of relations with the Arab states of North Africa-notably
Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia-has been omitted because these topics would require delving into aspects of
Arab politics and of the Arab-Israeli dispute which are outside the scope of this paper.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Libyan meddling in Africa is motivated by Qadhafi's attempt to
accelerate what he sees as the inevitable unification of the international
community of Islam, as well as by territorial, strategic, and economic
goals. Libyan furtherance of these goals has taken numerous forms-
economic and political support; aid to indigenous subversive groups;
provision of terrorist and guerrilla warfare training; sponsorship of
coups and assassination attempts; and outright military intervention.
Libyan and Soviet short-term goals have often been complemen-
tary. Libya's transfer of funds and Soviet-supplied military equipment
to other countries and insurgent groups serves Soviet interests in
promoting regional instability. Moreover, Libya's role as a major, direct
supporter of international terrorism fosters leftist, anti-Western ele-
ments while allowing the USSR to remain one step removed from overt
involvement in such operations. Moscow views some Libyan activity as
counterproductive and adventurous, but the advantages of the overall
relationship outweigh any concerns that the Soviets might otherwise
feel.
Neither Qadhafi's political ideas nor his Pan-Islamic goals have
struck a responsive chord with governments in black Africa; they do,
however, hold some appeal for Muslim and dissident political groups.
Chronic economic difficulties, coupled with traditional religious, ethnic,
and regional rivalries and the corruptibility of many African govern-
ment officials, however, make the region highly susceptible to Libyan
meddling.
The threat from Libya is primarily subversive, rather than conven-
tionally military. Although Qadhafi's acquisition of a huge inventory of
arms and equipment has substantially enhanced Libya's military com-
bat capability, Tripoli cannot hope to succeed in a major offensive
against such countries as Algeria or Egypt, or to defeat US forces
operating in the region. But his funneling of arms into existing trouble
spots impedes the finding of moderate solutions to the continent's
problems.
Libya's high-priority objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa will remain
the domination of Chad, the unseating of Sudanese President Nimeiri,
the ouster of Siad Barre of Somalia, and the toppling of Kountche of Ni-
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ger. While meddling in those countries, Libya will pose as the defender
of Africa and the Middle East against US imperialism, thus undercut-
ting possible criticism from the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Despite the recent Libyan withdrawal from Chad, Qadhafi has
reason to expect that the OAU peacekeeping effort may collapse,
returning Chad to a state of civil war. In that event, he probably hopes
that his protege Acyl Ahmat will emerge on top and call for renewed
Libyan aid or that Goukouni will again request his assistance. Such a
scenario could find Libya in a stronger position in Chad than before the
withdrawal.
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