NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON CARIBBEAN BASIN 19 FEBRUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 19, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on Caribbean Basin
19 February 1982
My briefing of February 10th, 1982, provided an overview of the many
facets of the threat to Central America and the Caribbean region. At that
time I described the partnership between Cuba and the Soviet Union, which
has resulted in Cuban military and covert support for extreme left movements
and anti-US regimes in Africa and the Middle East as well as in Latin America.
I also described the new pattern of events in Central America since 1978
where after years of comparatively 'low-level Cuban support for the core
Marxist/Leninist groups from those countries, Castro made a decision to offer
greatly expanded support in return for the unification of the various extreme
left organizations. The pattern has been clear and led to success in
Nicaragua in 1979, vast expansion of the insurgency in El Salvador in 1980,
in Guatemala in 1981, and recently a unity meeting in Havana to bring
together the extreme left of Honduras.
For Costa Rica, which successfully held a presidential election on
February 7 and where the anti-communist Social Democrat, Mr. Monge, will take
office in May, Castro is taking action to establish a radical left political
front together with armed paramilitary groups. The Cuban aim in Honduras and
Costa Rica in the next year seems most likely to focus on preventing them
from helping Guatemala and El Salvador in any way, and to make them neutral
in the conflict so that their territory will not be available for any anti-
Sandinista activities. With that broad picture in mind, I will briefly
update the situation in each country.
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in Nicaragua, repres,si-ow- of mcder?ates, the ' ilitary buildup, and -:the`.
export of subversion continue. We have evidence that terrorists in training
camps there have begun to be deployed -- perhaps in Central Amer4ca-pr..,.other,
Latirn_,Amerlcan counwe have reports that aa1 1,000
mere insurgents are in camps for probable infiltration into El Salvador
or Guatemala to support the expanded violence which is planned for the next
weeks,] We also have highly disturbing but still unconfirmed reports that
Castro intends to use a foreign terrorist group -- perhaps the Spanish
Marxist/Leninist ETA separatists -- for some type of dramatic commando action,
possible in Guatemala.
Though this
is speculative on my part, possible targets could include the US Embassy in
Nicaragua -- with anti-NATO symbols complementing anti-imperialist ones --
the US Embassy in Guatemala, Spanish diplomatic or business targets or some
other high visibility group of individuals whose killing or capture would
attract media attention. We have dramatic photographs of Indian villages in-
tact in early January and destroyed in early February that highlight
Sandinista repression.
A presidential election is scheduled for Guatemala for March 7, and we
have had consistently accurate reporting that guerrilla violence would increase
in an effort to disrupt and discredit that election. Four guerrilla
organizations recently announced their unification; and in mid February,
staged the largest urban operations to date attacking electrical facilities,
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fuel storage tanks in the capital, and two nearby urban centers. Our
assessment is that if El Salvador falls, there is little chance that Guatemala
can survive.
Lmn El Salvador the situation continues with the government stretched
thin and guerrilla violence increasing. We have a very reliable report
which sets out an agenda for greatly expanded violence before the March 28
Ii-elections -- this includes "annihilation strikes" on the 14th of March, an
unidentified but very large operation on the 18th of March, and plans to use
mortars in urban attacks in the capital and another city around March 20th
On the government side, the civil-military coalition is holding, and
preparations for the elections continue. However, despite reports of some
isolated government successes against the guerrillas in El Salvador, the
Army generally appears to be trying to avoid combat with the guerrillas.
This was most evident in a recent sweep of the Usulutan region which was
terminated early with few guerrilla casualties. Guerrilla commanders. have
improved their ability to strike civilian and military targets on schedule,
and they appear more willing to follow operational orders from their head-
quarters in Managua. Even if they are only partly successful in their
ambitious plans to sabotage the March 28 election, a real possibility exists
that government morale could fall sharply and the momentun could shift to the
insurgents.
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In Honduras, the good news is that the transition to constitutional
government has gone well and the military has pledged its full support to
the new civilian president who intends to continue cooperation against the
Salvadoran guerrillas, and permission for anti-Sandinista groups to use
Honduran territory.
wa44&-to .._enc,oAirage-this- kind -of- neutra isnT both `by ' promi ses a
threats.
Moving far across the Caribbean to the small state of Suriname which
borders Brazil, there is bad news possibly connected to Cuban subversion.
The military strongman has removed the moderate civilian president whom
we had been counting on to act as a counterweight to the growing Castro
influence there. We also have reports of Cuban support for subversive
efforts against the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Venezuela, Panama, as well
as Cuban support for terrorists in Colombia and Chile.
There is some recent good news on the international front. Mexico has,
for the first time, expressed its concern about repression to the Sandinista
nnvernment_ and President Lopez Portillo said he would not visit that
country unless the three businessmen were released -- and that bccur--red
t th,-aet leave the country. The former Venezuelan President and
Social Democrat leader, Carlos Andres Perez, has finally begun to move
towards realism about Nicaragua. He insisted that the Sandinista party had
considerable Marxist/Leninist influence and therefore could not be the sole
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representative of Nicaragua at the scheduled February 22 Socialist International
meeting in Caracas, Venezuela. As a. result, the SI President, Willy Brandt,
cancelled the meeting. That prevented what probably would have been another
misleading and confusing Social Democrat endorsement of the extreme left in
Cnetral America which in turn might have opened the way to more support for them
from socialist European governments such as France.
The Christian Democrats of Europe and Latin America as well as the non-
communist free trade union federations, all the Latin American democracies
and other friends there continue their support for the Duarte government and
the election while opposing the extreme leftist: groups.
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