DRAFT TALKING POINTS: U.S. STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200380018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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Draft Talking Points: U.S. Strategy
1. There are three requirements for an effective
strategy:
must deal with the situation on the ground in
El Salvador, with Nicaragua as a platform for
destabilizing the area, and with Cuba as the
source of the trouble;
must maintain majority support in the U.S. public
and Congress;
must mobilize as much support in the region as
possible.
The three are interrelated: the more company we have
in the region, the more support we'll get at home. The
more effective our action is on the ground, the more likely
Congress and the public will be to suspend judgment.
2. In U.S. public and Congressional opinion there
is a broad but still unmobilized majority that doesn't
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want to see the communists win in Central America, an over-
lapping (and aroused) majority that recoils against the
violence, and a hostile minority composed of the old Vietnam
network plus many church groups.
3. In the region there are many countries -- with
Venezuela and Colombia the most important -- that fear
a communist victory and want to act to prevent it. Little
by little they are coming out in the open. But they are
still not sure the U.S. has the will and staying power
to win Mexico which talks left abroad and rules right at
home, is unlikely to change course, although de la Madrid
will probably take fewer foreign initiatives than Lopez
Portillo. The gathering economic crisis will inhibit Mexican
activism.
4. The strategy that has emerged from many NSC discus-
sions and the two NSDD's responds to these requirements.
It has six elements.
First, we have to hold on the ground in El Salvador.
That means training and equiping a substantially
larger army that-will gain the military advantage.
But it also means increased economic aid. The
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insurgents' attack against the economy will discredit
the government unless we offset the costs.
Second, we have to press on with the reforms
in El Salvador -- elections, land reform, human
rights. This is the way ultimately to defeat
the insurgents (they marginalize themselves by
not participating in the process). It also is
the only way to maintain U.S. Congressional and
public support or tolerance.
Third, we must take the war to Nicaragua. They
are vulnerable, as the Miskito Indian and various
high level defections indicate. We doubt we
can overthrow the government. But we can disrupt
support to El Salvador, and up the cost to the
Cubans and Soviets.
Fourth, we must isolate Nicaragua, preparing
a coalition of countries "to support us and possibly
act with us should the Soviets and Cubans move
fast to arm Nicaragua. That is the purpose of
the CADC, including Nicaragua's neighbors, with
support,from Venezuela, Colombia and us. It
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-4-
is now a political and economic grouping. More
heavy arms flowing into Nicaragua would transform
it into a military grouping.
Fifth, we must lay the basis for future prosperity
in the area through the CBI. The program, which
is an innovative blend of government action and
private enterprise, is intended to preempt new
insurrections in the area, broaden support at
home, and provide a vehicle for cooperation (if
not cooptation) of such regional powers as Canada,
Mexico, Venezuela. Colombia may now join. .
Sixth, we must build pressure on Cuba. Radio
Marti (which at last is moving), preparation
to defend against a new Mariel, tightening the
embargo, squeezing Cuban staffs at the UN and
in Washington, and the use of military exercises
and simulations are all elements here.
5. That is where we are at the moment. Two remarks.
First, this is still, most of us who have been
working on it believe, an incomplete strategy.
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We have yet to find the way to deal effectively
with Cuba. You authorized contingency planning
for petroleum quarantine/embargo/air strikes
against Cuba, along with similar actions against
Nicaragua. The planning has been done. But
central questions remain: could the U.S. stand
up to a long crisis? Could Castro claim victory
merely by surviving? Could the tentacles (Cuban
activities in Africa and Central America) survive
even if the head were struck? What we need is
the right political concept. If Poland were
invaded we could "take Cuba hostage" (for example
by a petroleum quarantine) and hold it at low
levels of economic performance for as long as
the Soviets strayed in Poland. The U.S. public
would probably support us in that case. We are
looking for other concepts. Once we find a way
to bring a credible threat against Cuba -- one
we would be prepared to carry out -- we can construct
a bargaining scenario that offers Castro an alterna-
tive.
Second, this is an interrelated strategy. It
I
won't do us much good to squeeze Nicaragua or
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hassle Cuba if we lose on the ground in El Salvador.
But in order to hold there, we need emergency
economic as well as military assistance. The
economic aid is part of the CBI, still to be
announced. To those such as myself who have
been spending a lot of time on the Hill lately,
it will not be possible to get Congressional
consent to the CBI in this year of recession,
budget cutting and elections, unless we make
the strategic argument vigorously and at very
high level.
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