WHITHER POLAND?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 22, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/05/1 06 $, fPP84B00049R000200330021-6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Chief, Polish Task Force
1. The Polish military regime has the situation mostly under
control and, with the exception of having created new Polish
martyrs, should be satisfied with its performance during the
imposition of martial law. Solidarity remains a force to be
reckoned with, but it has not during this critical period been
able to demonstrate with strikes and demonstrations that it, and
not the regime, controls the loyalty of the vast majority of
Poles.
2. The Church has chosen to play its traditional role as
conciliator. This has in effect placed it on the side of the
regime in the past 10 days. Archbishop Glemp no doubt considered
that to side clearly with Solidarity militants would have risked
the worse evils of a Polish civil war and a Soviet military
intervention. The Church is attempting to mediate between the
regime and Solidarity, even though it has no great expectations
of success.
3. The key unknown is what sort of public mood will develop
in Poland after the holidays when the shipyard workers of the
Baltic are scheduled to report back to work. The public's
initial reaction to martial law was shock and despair. If that
mood of hopelessness holds, Jaruzelski's problem will become how
to regain enough of a measure of public confidence to obtain
cooperation in restoring order to the Polish economy. He may
still hope, with the Church's assistance, to coopt a number of
former Solidarity leaders into leading a tame union movement.
4. If when the initial shock wears off, on the other hand,
the public mood turns angry, any number of regime actions
associated with the austery program it must impose, could again
quickly reignite strikes, demonstrations and violence.
Revolutions classically occur when public expectations have been
dashed and there is a sense that there is nothing more to lose.
We will not have a good sense as to the likelihood of this
possible course of events for two weeks or so.
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SECRET
5. Going on the precedents in Polish post-war history, we
would have to put our money on a restoration of public order,
with the regime's attempting to muddle through for a number of
years without ever really restoring much vitality to the Polish
economy or society. We do not believe Jaruzelski stands a chance
of becoming another Kadar--in the sense of being able to win
forgiveness for what he has done to the Polish public or of
possessing the requisite political skills to reform and
revitalize Poland. We would. expect, therefore, that another
Polish crisis lies several years down the road, like those of
1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81.
6. The Soviets will be perceived in Poland as co-culprits in
the events of the last 10 days, which means the Poles will remain
as anti-Russian as ever. There is also a substantial prospect of
friction in relations between the Jaruzelski regime and Moscow
over the level of aid the Warsaw Pact states now provide to
Poland and as the Soviets attempt to prevent Jaruzelski from
doing anything unorthodox as he attempts to rebuild Poland. The
country may remain, in other words, as troublesome an ally of the
Soviets as it ever has been.
7. From the US point of view, the US clearly cannot be seen
as supporting a regime that has just attempted to crush a revival
of pluralism in Poland. Humanitarian concerns argue,
nevertheless, that the US cannot be indifferent to the plight of
the Poles in the months and years ahead. It should be possible
to differentiate in US policies and programs between those
intended to establish some leverage over the actions of the
Polish regime and those intended to aid the Polish public and
realization of its national aspirations. It would also seem to
be in the US interest to keep a finger in the Polish pie in case
Jaruzelski, whose interests now are likely to diverge
increasingly from those of the USSR, yet turns out to be
something of a Polish nationalist.
-2-
SECRET
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Approved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330021-6
BALKING POINTS
Prospects
-- Imposition of martial law reflects and will accentuate a shift in
internal political balance within the Polish leadership favoring
more orthodox and pro-Soviet elements. In conjunction with still
greater dependency of the regime on Soviet assistance, this change
will further constrain Jaruzelski's foreign as well as domestic
policy options.
-- Even apart from the change, regime professions of an intention to
proceed with economic reform following "normalization" should be
treated with extreme skepticism. Steps taken by the regime so far--
arrest of their putative negotiating partners, liquidation of
self-management, extension of working hours, etc., belie such a
strategy.
-- There is no evidence that the military leadership even has a serious
plan for coping with Poland's structural economic problems; nor is
the military equipped to formulate an effective economic reform
program. We can anticipate continued attempts to extract greater
effort from the labor force through coercive means plus halfhearted
measures combining some steps toward decentralization with retention
of the basic Soviet-style economic model.