ANALYSIS OF PROS AND CONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE LOS CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200290008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORT

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Analysis of Pros and Cons
and Implementation of the
Option to Withdraw
from the LOS Conference
Arguments in Favor of Withdrawal From the LOS Conference
A decision to withdraw from the Law of the Sea Conference
would demonstrate an American resolve not to participate in
multilateral negotiations in which the terms of the draft
agreement (a) do not fairly reflect US political and economic
interests and financial contributions or (b) contain NIEO
principles which we find unacceptable and which developing
countries could employ to promote their aims in other negotiations.
Because of the extreme character of this action, withdrawal
from the Conference might cause other countries, including US
allies, to rethink their commitment to the treaty and eventually
decide not to ratify the treaty. The option avoids the risk
that US interests in deep seabed mining might be compromised
further through continued negotiation and might increase the
effectiveness of a US denunciation of objectionable provisions
of the treaty. The option would appeal to those Americans
who feel that US interests should not be subjected to majority
votes by developing countries in international organizations.
Arguments Against Withdrawal From the LOS Conference
On the other hand, the Option to withdraw would eliminate
any realistic possibility of improving the Draft Convention
and would not capitalize on our currently strong bargaining
position. It could further lead to the unravelling of
important navigational provisions to the detriment of US
security interests and, therefore, could reduce US ability
effectively to assert its minority view of navigation.rights
in the face of adverse coastal state claims.
This Option would isolate the US from most other countries
on this issue and provoke substantial international controversy,
including severe criticism from US allies and others for
walking away from the negotiating table.
State Dept. review completed
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It would be viewed as a major departure from the tradi-
tional US practice of cooperating in efforts to reach multi-
lateral solutions to foreign policy issues thereby reducing
US credibility as a reliable participant in multilateral
negotiations and possibly affecting other US foreign policy
goals adversely.
Withdrawal from the Conference would virtually eliminate
any possibility of a US flag deep seabed mining industry,
unless the US could convince its allies and other key countries
not to ratify the treaty and to join an alternate regime.
Otherwise, investors likely would operate under a foreign
flag pursuant to the treaty, unless fully indemnified by the
government against risk.
This action could result in US allies being unable to
pursue and implement a reciprocating states agreement with
the US since they would stay in the LOS negotiations and the
.US would be seeking a permanent, alternative regime rather
than a transitional regime consistent with a law of the sea
treaty.
Withdrawal from the Conference would offer the Soviets
an opportunity to criticize the US in international fora for
using "high-handed" tactics and would be opposed by those
Americans who do not believe the US should walk out of
negotiations and who favor multilateral solutions to major
world problems and an international rule of law.
Implementation
If Option I is selected, the Interdepartmental Group
believes that the following actions should be undertaken.
A public relations effort should be carried out which
could include a White House announcement of the decision.
It should be designed both to obtain domestic political'
advantages and to minimize domestic and international._.'
disadvantage such as the adverse editorial comments that
followed announcement in March 1981 of the' US review of law
of the sea policy.
Contingency plans should be executed to protect US
non-seabeds interests outside a law of the sea treaty. These
plans are being prepared.
If the US wishes to attempt to persuade its allies
not to ratify the treaty, a high-level, and potentially
politically costly, effort should be made.
The US would have to develop a strategy for establishing
an alternative regime for commercial investment in deep
seabed mining.
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The prospects for establishing such an alternative regime
would be affected by decisions made by US-allies... Currently,
the IG believes that the prospects are virtually nil for
inducing the allies to withdraw from the negotiations with
the US. The US would then have to seek to induce the allies
not to ratify the treaty.
If the US should succeed in convincing its allies not to
ratify the treaty, an effort would have to be undertaken to
establish an alternative regime for commercial-scale investment
in deep seabed mining. If such a regime were to be established
in the face of a law of the sea treaty that comes into force,
or is likely to come into force, companies may require.
financial protections from their governments. If the US
fails to convince its allies not to participate in the treaty
and decides to establish a unilateral regime under which its
nationals would invest in-commercial-scale deep seabed mining,
the US would have to provide additional financial protections
for its miners, because of serious international legal and
political risks.
At one extreme, if a comprehensive treaty enters into
force and the United States is the only major nation which is
not a party to the treaty, commercial-scale deep seabed mining
under US licenses almost certainly would not occur on an
unsubsidized basis because of serious international legal and
political risks.
At the other extreme, in the unlikely event that the
treaty did not enter into force for many of the nations
interested in deep seabed mining (US, UK, France, FRG, Belgium,
Japan, Netherlands, and Italy), the USSR, certain major
developing countries, and other industrialized countries,
and provided the US could induce them to join in an alter-
native regime, investment in commercial-scale deep seabed
mining under US and foreign licenses might occur under that
regime.
A variety of cases lie between the two extreme alter-
native situations outlined above. The IG"cannot predict
with a reasonable degree of confidence whether commercial-scale
investment would occur under any such case. The various
industrial consortia hold differing views on this subject.
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