INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC & ENERGY WEEKLY 7 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of -SeeFe*
Intelligence
Weekly
International
Economic Energy
7 October 1983
(ar
DI IEEW~3' 040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
866
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01 CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
International
Economic & Energy
Weekly
iii Synopsis
Perspective-The Refugee Problem
3 Briefs Energy
International Finance
Global and Regional Developments
National Developments
13 Refugees: Regional Pattern
17 LDCs: Growing Labor Surpluses in the 1980s
23 Eastern Europe: Continuing Slowdown in Trade With the West
25X1
25X1
29 Japanese Energy Imports: Prospects for Enhancing Energy Security
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. They may be
directed to Directorate of Intelligence, telephone
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
secret
International
Economic & Energy
Weekly
Synopsis
Perspective-The Refugee Problem
At least 11 million people are currently seeking refuge outside their own
countries-victims of war, political/cultural persecution, or natural disaster.
Refugees: Regional Patterns
Despite recent successes with resettling Indochinese refugees and repatriating
some of those in Africa, there is no reason to believe that the global problems
of refugee migration and the need for assistance will decrease.
LDCs: Growing Labor Surpluses in the 1980s
Growing labor forces and slower economic growth will worsen employment
problems in developing countries throughout the 1980s. Although Sub-
Saharan Africa will be hardest hit, the Central American and Caribbean
regions will be close behind and have the most potential to affect the United
States.
Eastern Europe: Continuing Slowdown in Trade With the West
25X1
Eastern Europe's trade with the Developed West has dropped sharply in the
last two years and will likely fall further this year and next
Japanese Energy Imports: Prospects for Enhancing Energy Security
Lowered prospects for economic growth and improved energy efficiency have 25X1
sharply reduced future Japanese energy needs. Nonetheless, with its poor
domestic resources, Japan will remain heavily dependent upon imported
energy, leaving the country vulnerable to energy supply disruptions.
iii Secret
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
International
Economic & Energy
Weekly
Perspective The Refugee Problem
The economic, social, and political costs associated with the refugee situation
are enormous. At least 11 million people are currently seeking refuge outside
their own countries-victims of war, political/cultural persecution, or natural
disaster. Of this number, the State Department identifies more than 7.7
million as requiring protection and assistance from the international communi-
ty. Compared with a small number of European nations after World War II,
there are now 33 countries-mostly in the Third World-that are the principal
sources of the world's refugees. By far the largest is Afghanistan, with 3.4-4.5
million of its citizens having fled to Pakistan and Iran
On an individual level the toll levied in human misery can barely be
comprehended. Fear, malnutrition, disease, and death are both the precipita-
tors and constant companions of refugee flight. Refugee movements can also
work hardships at the national level. The generating countries inevitably lose
valuable human capital when their citizens flee abroad, and for receiving
countries the advent of refugees, especially those of different ethnic back-
grounds, is often an unexpected and unwelcome event.
Despite recent successes with resettling Indo-Chinese refugees and repatriat-
ing some of those in Africa, there is no reason to believe that the global
problems of refugee migration and the need for assistance will decrease. In
almost every region of the world, there is a strong potential for additional, rap-
id, massive, and costly refugee flight. Central America currently presents the
most imminent threat. 25X1
For both political and practical reasons it will continue to be difficult to plan
for future refugee situations:
? By the limits of his mandate, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees can only react to ongoing refugee situations and only after he is in-
vited by the host government.
? While open conflict caused by international aggression, as in Indochina and
Afghanistan, or domestic turmoil, as in Central America, Lebanon, and
much of Africa, almost always generates refugee flows, no one can predict
the magnitude.
? Making public preparations for expected refugee flows may actually encour-
age potential refugees to flee their present circumstances and thus precipi-
tate large-scale migrations
1 Secret
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
The burden of providing first asylum has also created international tension as
the traditional resettlement countries steadily reduced their refugee "offtake"
during the past three years. The present host countries, especially those in
Southeast Asia, are concerned that they may inherit large residual refugee
populations that cannot be resettled out of the region. At a recent international
symposium on refugee movement, there was some discussion of "compassion
fatigue" beginning to appear among donor/resettlement countries. If this is
indeed the case, the United States, which over the past 10 years has provided
funding for 30 to 40 percent of UN refugee programs, will be asked to
shoulder an even larger share of the burden.
25X1,
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Energy
Spot Oil Market Spot oil product prices in the key Rotterdam market have fallen an average of
Trends more than $1 per barrel over the last five weeks. Spot crude oil prices also con-
tinue to weaken, with spot prices for most crudes now below official prices.
Some traders attribute soft market conditions to rising North Sea output and
increased Saudi production. One trade publication reported earlier this week
that Saudi production is rumored to be as high as 7 million b/d in recent days.
Product prices in the Rotterdam market now indicate a value of about $27.50
per barrel for Arab Light and $29.52 per barrel for Bonny Light, versus
official prices of $29 and $30, respectively.
Mexico and Venezuela Mexico and Venezuela have increased the price of their heavy crude oils for
Hike Heavy Oil the second time in two, months. The new round of hikes was largely spurred by
Prices a relative firming of US spot prices for fuel oil-the principal refined product
from these crudes. The increase in spot prices has enabled refiners in recent
months to net as much as $4 per barrel from the heavier oil. Effective 1
October, the price of Mexican Mayan crude rose by $1 to $25 per barrel. At
current export levels, this should give Mexico City an additional $300 million
annually in oil-revenue. Venezuela has imposed price increases on 10 grades of
its heaviest oils, ranging from 69 cents to $1.25 per barrel. The hikes bring the
price of the average barrel of Venezuelan heavy oil to about $23.50. With
exports of these crudes currently running at 400,000 to 450,000 b/d, the move
could provide as much as $200 million annually in additional revenues for
Caracas.
United Kingdom Oil Oil production in the United Kingdom-including natural gas liquids-hit a
Production Reaches new peak of 2.4 million b/d in August, up 240,000 b/d from depressed June
New High levels. The rise reflects completion of scheduled maintenance at Brent and the
startup of production at the Brae field. Production should increase even further
in September with the addition of output from the Magnus field where
production commenced in mid-August and is already close to 80,000 b/d. In
addition, Maureen-another new field-started production in mid-September
and could reach its expected 72,000-b/d peak output before yearend. For the
first nine months of this year, total oil production has averaged more than 2.3
million b/d, or about 6 percent above 1982 levels.
3 Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Sharp Cutback US consular officials report that over the past two months technical problems
in Algerian at the LNG plant at Arzew have forced Sonatrach to export only 60 percent of
LNG Deliveries monthly contractual volume of 1.3 billion cubic meters to US and West
European customers. Sonatrach has allocated the shortfall by giving priority to
West European buyers because they pay a higher contract price than US
customers. Trunkline, Sonatrach's major US customer, has not received any
deliveries since August. Most of Sonatrach's problems stem from a walkout by
key foreign technicians and poor maintenance and operating procedures at the
LNG plants. Although Sonatrach recently awarded a multimillion-dollar
contract to a US firm for LNG plant maintenance, we believe gas export
shortfalls probably will recur given production problems in Algerian gasfields
and delays in the development of new production capacity.
Italy To Maintain According to the director of AGIP, Italy's state oil and gas procurement firm,
Current Gas Rome has decided to maintain the existing level of domestic natural gas
Production Level production of about 13 billion cubic meters. The change reflects Rome's belief
that it can recover 14 to 15 bcm annually for the next 15 years, rather than the
7 bcm called for in the national energy plan and still maintain reserves of 175
bcm. In addition, the move is designed to improve the profitability of ENI, the
state energy company, which lost over $1 billion last year
The decision reverses the national energy plan's policy of conserving domestic
resources and means that Italy may rely less on imported gas from Siberia and
other sources to meet future energy requirements. On the other hand, broader
political and economic considerations could still cause Rome to buy more
Soviet gas. Many businessmen believe that Soviet purchases of Italian goods
will depend on gas contracts, although some government officials believe that
if Rome can obtain better pricing terms from the Soviets it could set a useful
precedent for negotiations with Algeria in 1986. Even if Rome does not agree
to buy more Soviet gas now, probable future supply shortfalls eventually are
likely to result in increased purchases from the Soviets.
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Soviet Interest in The USSR reportedly is seeking Western assistance in developing and
Coal Slurry Pipelines constructing long-distance coal pipelines. Soviet officials have met with
Western businessmen to discuss a possible joint venture to construct a 250 to
300-kilometer coal slurry pipeline in Central Siberia. In a separate develop-
ment, Soviet negotiations with Italian firms on a high-concentration coal
slurry pipeline are being delayed because a Soviet ministry has not supplied es-
sential data. the Soviets also have been 25X1
considering t he construction of a major coal export pipeline thousands of
kilometers long which could be intended for export purposes. 25X1
These projects would be much larger than the longest coal pipelines-about 10
kilometers-currently operating in the USSR. They would require manufac-
turing and construction capabilities not now available in the USSR. The
Soviets have been investigating the possibility of buying Western equipment
and technology for projects that could be started during the 1986-90 Five-
Year Plan. Pipelines extending thousands of kilometers, however, probably will
Argentine Foreign Delays in disbursements of IMF and commercial bank funds have forced the
Exchange Problems Argentine Central Bank to sharply tighten foreign exchange outflows. Both
Mount the sales of foreign currency and the issuing of import licenses were suspended
temporarily last weekend pending an expected announcement of import
controls and prioritizing debt payments. External interest payments in August
and September pushed reserves down sharply leaving Buenos Aires with only
about $250 million in liquid foreign currency and prospects of immediate
inflows are slim. According to the US Embassy, the IMF has decided to delay
a $325 million drawing until two weeks after the 30 October elections.
5 Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Commercial banks have delayed disbursement of $500 million, the first
tranche of a $1.5 billion medium-term loan, until at least 17 October in the
wake of the local court injunction against the rescheduling agreement recently
signed for the state airline. Should the central government fail to overturn the
injunction, the bank loan will be stalled indefinitely. Without fresh inflows of
foreign exchange, Buenos Aires will fall far behind on external interest
payments and leave an unmanageable situation for the new government.
Venezuela Secures International lenders have given Caracas a 30-day deferral on the repayment
Another Debt of public debt principal. The bankers plan to give another 90-day extension be-
Repayment Deferral ginning 1 November provided Venezuela successfully clears interest arrear-
ages on private foreign debt by at least $125 million. The action followed a
move last week by Venezuela's Council of Ministers approving a presidential
decree permitting Central Bank release of preferential rate dollars for $400-
600 million in overdue interest payments on private debt. A special commission
has been established by the decree to review applications for access to the
subsidized exchange rate.
Private-sector reaction to the decree has been mixed. Because commission
rulings must be unanimous, Venezuelan businessmen fear discrimination
against eligibility will be more deeply rooted by the presence on the commis-
sion of Central Bank President Diaz Bruzual, who has repeatedly held up debt
repayment. Others are more hopeful that the Herrera administration's desper-
ate need for a further rollover next month may force it to facilitate a partial
payment of the private debt.
Thailand Seeks The Thai Board of Investment last month announced measures aimed at
Hong Kong Capital attracting funds from Hong Kong residents concerned about the expiration of
the British lease in 1997. Resident visas will be granted to foreigners who
invest at least $430,000 in a new project or a minimum of $348,000 in
government bonds plus $260,000 for a spouse and $87,000 for each child.
These measures are unlikely to increase substantially the transfer of funds
from Hong Kong to Thailand, estimated at more than $180 million in the first
half of this year. Complicated immigration and residence procedures-
including legal prohibitions against foreign property ownership-will limit the
number of applicants. In addition, financial analysts believe that Thailand's
poorly developed capital market will discourage the inflow of funds.
Australian Dollar The Australian dollar has appreciated steadily (on a trade weighted basis) over
Rebounds the past several months and has nearly reached the level registered before the
10-percent devaluation last March. Interest rate differentials, which had been
sufficient to attract foreign short-term capital, have fallen sharply because of
Secret 6
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
continuing weak private-sector loan demand and rapid monetary growth from
capital inflows. Capital inflows totaling $1.3 billion in July and August will
help finance the prospective $6 billion current account deficit in 1983. At the
same time, the higher level of the dollar has effectively eroded any competitive
advantage gained in the devaluation.
Burma Receives IMF According to press reports, Rangoon has drawn $30.8 million from the IMF's
Compensatory Compensatory Financing Facility, the second such loan in eight months.
Financing Burma qualified for the most recent drawing because of a 15-percent drop in
export earnings for the year that ended in March. Burma has also asked Japan
to provide $10-20 million in balance-of-payments assistance as part of its
annual aid package, which totals about $225 million and is looking elsewhere
for even more financing. Foreign exchange reserves have dropped to about $35
million, less than one month's imports, because of depressed export earnings,
increased imports, and sharply rising debt service payments. Unless the
economy worsens substantially, however, we do not believe Rangoon will
request an IMF standby loan, which would require Burma to adopt austerity
measures. Burmese leader Ne Win has been unwilling to accept multilateral or
bilateral aid that mandated changes in Burmese economic policy.
Global and Regional Developments
Impact of Docker The boycott against Soviet ships by east and west coast longshoremen since the
Protests on downing of the KAL airliner will have little impact on US grain shipments to
US-Soviet Trade the USSR under the long-term grain agreement.. About 85 percent of Soviet-
purchased grain normally moves on non-Soviet ships under charter to the
USSR, and the USSR could easily sustain its movement of US grain using
non-Soviet grain carriers already under long-term time charter. As of mid-
September, the USSR had already substituted at least two foreign-flag vessels
for Soviet ships scheduled to load grain in US ports.
The longshoremen's protest will increase the cost of moving general cargo in
US-Soviet trade. Footdragging by stevedores has caused the diversion of at
least three Soviet ships from California to Mexican ports and a fourth from
two east coast ports to Canada. Soviet ships visiting the Gulf coast have
encountered no problems. If the protests persist, US importers and Soviet
purchasers of US goods will be forced to rely on the costly alternative of using
Canadian and Mexican ports with overland connections to the United States.
7 Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Airbus To Promote Airbus Industrie reportedly is preparing to send an A3 10 wide-body aircraft
Sales in China on a promotional tour of China in October. The consortium also plans an A310
familiarization program for Chinese pilots before the aircraft's visit. Beijing is
modernizing its commercial airline services and improving the military airlift
capability of its jet fleet. Since the early 1970s, China has purchased modern
jet passenger aircraft from British Aerospace, Boeing, and McDonnell Doug-
las. The commercial fleet helps augment China's overall military airlift
capability. The Chinese so far.have been willing to sacrifice the operational ef-
ficiencies gained by using a single manufacturer's aircraft in order to maintain
access to a broad range of suppliers.
The tour provides Airbus with the potential for a high profile sale in the Far
East. If Beijing decides to buy the A3 10, the initial sale is likely to be small-
four to six aircraft. An initial order by China's national airline would be
important for Airbus because it would mark their first success in the Chinese
market and come at a time when Airbus is trying to offset Japanese and
Australian airlines recent purchase of Boeing 767s.
Specialty Steel Austria has become the first country in the current series of talks to conclude a
Discussions specialty steel orderly marketing agreement (OMA) with the United States.
US negotiators also report that an agreement with Japan is near. The United
States is offering to negotiate bilateral OMAs that would guarantee a share of
the global import quotas it imposed in July. Austria pledged not to seek trade
compensation in the GATT in exchange for a liberal share of the global quota
and dismissal of a separate US complaint against Austria. Nontraditional
suppliers, such as Spain, South Korea, and Brazil, are seeking advantageous
Secret
7 October 1983
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
formulas for determining quotas since their historic market shares are low.
Brazil has also requested that debtor countries receive higher quotas. The EC
has firmly rejected an OMA and instead demanded trade compensation. By
addressing only compensation issues, the EC has avoided discussion of steel
subsidization and investment, topics which the United States would like to
include in OMA talks. Discussions are also being held with Canada, Sweden,
Finland, Argentina, and Poland.
National Developments
Developed Countries
Japanese Leading The pace of economic activity appears to be quickening in Japan after several
Indicators Up quarters of sluggish growth. The Economic Planning Agency's index of leading
economic indicators rose again in July, with nine of the 12 components up
from June levels. Despite these early signs, we agree with the Japanese
Economic Planning Agency and the Bank of Japan who are both cautious
about prospects for domestic demand. Private plant and equipment investment
remains at low levels. Real private consumption rose only 0.3 percent in the
second quarter, and private housing investment plummeted 13.7 percent.
Much of the economy's recent strengthening is due to the pickup in exports
which began in May. If exports continue to provide most of the fuel for
recovery, Prime Minister Nakasone will face increasing pressure to stimulate
domestic demand.
Italian Budget Prime Minister Craxi unveiled a draft budget for 1984 last week that calls for
Battle Looming increased taxes and substantial cuts in social spending. The proposal is
designed to reduce the deficit from a projected $88 billion to $58 billion. The
package includes cuts in social spending of $5.1 billion, cuts in defense
spending of nearly $1 billion, and tax increases totaling $8.1 billion. Although
the new measures are regarded as the toughest in decades, the budget deficit
will still equal 15 percent of GDP, down only 1 percentage point from this
year. 25X1
The proposed budget cuts will hit hard at voter constituencies important to the
coalition parties. The Christian Democrats lost heavily in the national election
in June, and some of the party's leaders are especially sensitive to proposed
cuts in social services. Trade union leaders, including some from Craxi's
Socialist Party, also have criticized the proposals. The debate on the budget
probably will be protracted, and the final package is likely to be more
expansionary and inflationary than the government wants.
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Less Developed Countries
Kampuchea Rice Kampuchea's main rice crop may fall 300,000 metric tons short this year,
Crop Warnings 25X1
Non-Communist aid donors, however, are unlikely to agree to substantially
increased food aid without more definitive evidence of an impending shortage.
Kampuchean officials apparently have not yet decided on an appeal for help;
some officials say it is too early to determine crop size while others anticipate a
shortfall of 400,000 tons
St. Lucia's Banana Heavy rains and high winds last month destroyed some 40 percent of the
Crop Damaged island's banana plants, according to preliminary government estimates. Ba-
by Storm nana production-which accounted for almost 10 percent of GDP and about
40 percent of export earnings in 1982-will be depressed for at least six to nine
months. The already troublesome current account deficit will widen as a result
of lower export earnings and increased imports of the fertilizers, herbicides,
and pesticides necessary to restore production. Moreover, rehabilitation efforts
could derail the government's efforts to reduce the budget deficit. The
Compton administration has begun seeking aid from multilateral and bilateral
donors, including the United States, to help defray these costs.
Soviet Economic Economic performance in the USSR improved during the first eight months of
Performance 1983 in almost all sectors, and GNP probably will grow by 3.5-4 percent by
the end of the year-well above the 2-percent annual growth rate achieved in
1981-82. The biggest improvement has been in agriculture, and total farm
output could reach a record level. The grain harvest probably will be the best
in five years, other crops are doing well, and livestock production is at an
alltime high.
Growth of industrial production is likely to reach 3 percent by the end of the
year. Although this would be higher than rates achieved in the past few years,
it largely reflects a short-term recovery from the performance registered in
early 1982. Performance in the consumer sector has been mixed. Food supplies
were greater through August than during the same period last year, and a re-
cord high in per capita meat consumption should be achieved if recent- high
levels of imports continue. The consumer has fared less well in the availability
of nonfood items as production of these goods continues to increase slowly
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
The anticipated higher growth levels this year are unlikely to continue
throughout the decade. Much of the improvement, particularly in agriculture
and transportation, is the result of the mild winter of 1982-83 and favorable
growing conditions so far this year. The factors constraining growth since the
late 1970s-smaller additions to the labor force, sluggish growth of the capital
stock, raw materials shortages, and transportation bottlenecks-probably will
not be resolved soon. These same factors are likely to keg average growth for
the 1980s below the levels achieved this year. 25X1
Soviet Lipservice The Andropov regime continues to stress the provision of consumer goods and
to Consumers services, but the leadership remains unwilling to shift additional resources to
the consumer sector. According to Soviet press reports, the Politburo acknowl-
edged that the provision of consumer goods and services "still lags behind the
requirements of Soviet people and gives ?rise to just censure on the part of the
working people." The members demanded improvement-but on the basis of
current equipment and technology and through fuller use of existing capacity.
A recent Council of Ministers resolution also castigated failings of consumer
goods manufacturers and the retail trade network. The resolution reportedly
lists measures to remedy these deficiencies, but gives no details.
China Issues Equity Beijing last month issued detailed regulations for its equity joint-venture
Joint-Venture program, codifying several important concessions aimed at attracting more
Regulations foreign investment. The regulations allow some of these ventures to sell in
China's domestic market. Previously they had only been allowed to produce for
export. The regulations also require the Chinese to provide enough foreign
exchange to meet these joint ventures' expenses and provides for tax and
customs exemptions on certain imported materials and the ventures' exports.
Beijing hopes that formalizing these changes will reassure investors and
generate the high level of investment that has eluded the program so far. Since
the program's inception in 1979, China has attracted 105 equity joint ventures
worth approximately $200 million, in foreign investment, only 12 percent of
total foreign investment in China.
1 ? Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Refugees: Regional Patterns
Most refugees originate in developing countries.
They are the unhappy byproducts of wars, civil
unrest, and social and economic uncertainty. A
recent estimate of global refugees places the num-
ber of people currently in need of protection and
care from the international community at 7.7 mil-
lion. This figure excludes those several million
more who receive assistance from national or local
rather than international sources and those who
have means of their own. The cost of these refugee
movements is large; the United States spent over
$1 billion in 1983
Regional Survey
Africa. In most cases refugee problems in Africa
have been caused by the instability associated with
the process of consolidating disparate ethnic, social,
and cultural groups into independent states. The
1.8 million refugees and 1 million displaced persons
currently adrift on the continent have fled from
civil strife, economic disruption, and political/
cultural persecution that are endemic in this pro-
cess. Relatively small in numbers by Third World
standards, in many cases these refugees do not
constitute serious domestic political problems for
the host countries and more often than elsewhere in
the world are successfully repatriated. An excep-
tion, however, is the situation in the Horn of Africa
where the 1974 coup in Ethiopia and the ongoing
struggle for territorial control have sent over
400,000 Ethiopians and Eritreans fleeing to Sudan
and an equal number of ethnic Somalis to Somalia.
We believe the probability is low that the causes of
refugee flight in Africa will be corrected in the
short term. Political and economic stability are not
likely to be achieved any time soon. In Ethiopia the
Refugees: A Delinition
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, ". . .
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion is
outside the country of his nationality (or habitual
residence) and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country. " Despite a 1961 General Assembly reso- 25X1
lution that extends this definition by encouraging
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees "to pursue his activities on behalf of refugees
within his mandate or those for whom he extends
his good offices,"the definition of refugees remains
a highly restrictive one and does not include
millions of internally displaced persons who have
.fled persecution or the ravages of war, but have not
crossed an international boundary.
Communist regime is still engaged with strong
separatist and opposition forces, and until these
struggles cease they will continue to have the strong
potential for generating additional refugee flight. A
renewed threat exists in Chad where during the last
few years over 100,000 refugees took flight and
were subsequently repatriated. If the Libyan cam-
paign causes open warfare in the heavily populated
southern regions, huge numbers of refugees may
once again cross the borders into Cameroon and
Nigeria 25X1
EastAsia. Since the fall of Saigon in April of 1975,
Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea have been the 25X1
primary sources of refugees in East Asia. Under
Secret
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Hanoi's direction the harsh restructuring of these
societies along traditional Marxist-Leninist lines
has severely restricted individual freedom and sys-
tematically persecuted many of those who were
associated with former regimes or with the US
effort in Indochina. In addition, armed conflict
between Vietnam and resistance forces continues in
Kampuchea, presenting a constant threat to large
numbers of Kampuchean civilians. As a conse-
quence, more than 1.5 million refugees have fled
Indochina since 1975. The flow has diminished in
recent years, but each month several thousand
people manage to escape and seek refuge in neigh-
boring, non-Communist countries.
The prospects for improved political and economic
conditions in Indochina are not bright. The political
consolidation of South Vietnam continues, as does
the "reeducation" campaign. In Kampuchea the
food situation has improved, but the continuing
weakness of the Kampuchean Government in the
face of resistance forces and the growing evidence
of an extensive influx of Vietnamese settlers en-
sures the continued presence of Vietnamese forces.
This military threat against Khmer nationals has
created an internally displaced population along the
Thai border of over 200,000.
Under these conditions the pressure on disaffected
Vietnamese, Khmer, and Lao to seek refuge beyond
the region probably will not diminish. However, the
enforcement of more stringent refugee admission
requirements by the traditional resettlement coun-
tries in concert with Thailand's policy of "humane
deterrence" reduces the hope of successful escape
and the actual number of new arrivals. Nonethe-
less, the potential for a renewed surge of refugees
from Indochina remains great should resettlement
opportunities improve, repression intensify, or
Hanoi adopt a policy of generating refugees as it
did in 1978-79 when it forced out ethnic Chinese.
Other Southeast Asian countries also rave the
potential to generate refugee flows. If a military
regime were to come to power in the Philippines,
aggressive measures would likely be taken against
Secret
7 October 1983
Refugees Requiring Protection
and Assistance: Principal Generating
and Asylum Countries, 1983 a
Generating
Countries
Thousand
Persons
Asylum
Countries
Thousand
Persons
Angola
273.0
Angola
96.2
Burundi
160.0
Burundi
58.0
Ethiopia
833.1
Djibouti
31.5
Namibia
74.8
Rwanda
45.0
Rwanda
102.0
Somalia
400.0
Uganda
287.0
Sudan
600.0
Zaire
51.4
Tanzania
168.7
Zaire
269.4
Zambia
88.0
Kampuchea
98.0
Hong Kong
13.6
Laos
75.8
Indonesia
9.3
Vietnam
49.7
Malaysia
11.5
Philippines
17.2
Thailand
144.7
Vietnam
30.0
Chile
30.0
Costa Rica
36.0
El Salvador
63.7
Honduras
45.6
Guatemala
41.5
Mexico
45.5
Nicaragua
77.0
Nicaragua
18.0
Middle East
Iraq
100.0
Palestinians
1,954.0
560.0-
1,500.0
Western Sahara
50.0
Jordan
759.0
Lebanon
246.5
Syria
225.0
Gaza Strip
381.0
West Bank
345.0
South Asia
Afghanistan
3,400.0-
4,500.0
Pakistan
Europe
Eastern
Europe/USSR
100.0+
Austria
10.0
a Because of the difficulties associated with defining and enumerat-
ing refugees, these figures represent only one of several estimates
and should be regarded as orders of magnitude.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
the opposition, and hundreds of thousands of Filipi-
nos could be displaced. All probably would need
assistance from the international community, and
many could turn to other countries for asylum or
resettlement. Further down the road, a possible
Chinese takeover of all Hong Kong when the New
Territories Lease expires in 1997 could initiate a
massive outmigration of Chinese reluctant to live
remain in Gaza and on the West Bank, which were
occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war. In the
short term it seems certain that most Palestinians
will continue to live as frustrated and frequently
unwelcome residents of Israeli-occupied territory
under Beijing's jurisdiction.
Latin America. Of the 225,000 Latin American/
Caribbean refugees currently receiving protection
and assistance, over 80 percent originated in Cen-
tral America. The Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and
Guatemalan conflicts have resulted in an unprece-
dented refugee flight from these three countries.
The latest figures indicate that over 180,000 people
are receiving assistance in foreign countries, princi-
pally Honduras, Mexico, and Costa Rica, but
reports vary and the total number of refugees may
be much larger. One US Government source esti-
mates that there are only 30,000 to 40,000 refugees
in Mexico, while a paper discussed at a recent
symposium suggests that the number may be as
high as 250,000. Throughout the region an addi-
tional 740,000 are internally displaced, and large
numbers of additional refugees may be uncounted.
In addition, it is possible that during the next 12
months there will be increased conflict in Guate-
mala, and violence in El Salvador probably will
continue at present levels, if not intensify. These
events could sharply increase the number of refu-
gees in this region over this period.
Middle East. Palestinians make up the oldest
continuing refugee group in the world today. Most
fled present-day Israel following the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war. Of the estimated 4 million Palestinians
in the Middle East, 2.0 million are registered as
refugees with the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency. The greatest number of registered Pales-
tinian refugees, 760,000, is in Jordan where they
are afforded indefinite residence privileges and the
right to seek citizenship. An additional 244,000 are
in Lebanon, 225,000 are in Syria, and 726,000
and the countries bordering Israel.
A significant number of Lebanese have also been
displaced by the war in their country. The fighting 25X1
between the Druze and the Lebanese Army has
forced 150,000 to flee into Israeli-occupied south-
ern Lebanon. If the fighting intensifies so too does
the probability of large-scale refugee flight. Syria
and Israel would be the most likely destination for
these people.
South Asia. The 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan
followed by the Soviet invasion and the subsequent
war between Soviet/ Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan forces and the Mujahadeen freedom
fighters have created the largest current refugee
population in the world. Fleeing from political
repression, the threat of religious persecution, and
the ravages of war, an estimated 3 million Afghans
have found sanctuary in Pakistan and perhaps 1.5
million are in Iran. The prospects for peace and
successful large-scale repatriation will remain
slight unless the Soviets withdraw and an Islamic
government acceptable to the refugees and the
Mujahadeen is established in Kabul. These condi-
tions seem unlikely in the near future, and the
Afghan refugee populations probably will remain in
asylum and continue to increase
Elsewhere in the region, communal animosities in
Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka pose a constant
threat to public order. The recent communal riots
in Assam and Sri Lanka underscore the potential of
this threat. Religious, racial, and economic jealou-
sies are likely to spark renewed violence, producing
heavy refugee flows.
Europe. European refugee flows originate exclu-
sively in Eastern Europe and, for the most part, are
a response to the oppressiveness of Communist
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
systems rather than to widespread persecution.
Closed borders and close control over internal
mobility generally eliminate the possibility of rapid,
large-scale flight. While illegal exit is possible,
most of those who reach the West do so with
permission. Thus the volume of refugee flow will
fluctuate with changes in emigration policy.
Events such as the introduction of martial law in
Poland should be considered an exception; an esti-
mated 200,000 Poles were out of the country when
the decree was announced. While many chose to
return to Poland, over 40,000 applied for temporary
asylum in Austria and more than 10,000 decided
not to return. For most East European refugees,
Austria is the country of first asylum. Five to 10
percent settle there while others are resettled in
third countries, primarily France, the United
States, Canada, and Australia.
Prospects. In all refugee situations voluntary repa-
triation is the preferred solution. Among the major
refugee generating regions, only in Africa-where
more than 50,000 Chadians, Ethiopians, and Ugan-
dans were able to return home-was it an effective
method of dealing with the problem during 1983.
Elsewhere the numbers of returnees were much
smaller, and there seems to be little expectation
that repatriation will become a viable alternative in
the near future.
When repatriation is not possible, resettlement to a
third country may be the best outcome for refugees.
This alternative is expensive, however, and as ad-
missions programs continue to shrink, so do the
opportunities. If present trends continue, the oppor-
tunity for third-country resettlement may be avail-
able to only a very few of the world's refugees
Secret
7 October 1983
Failing repatriation or resettlement, the options
that remain open are continued asylum, and per-
haps eventual assimilation, or forced repatriation.
In many situations assimilation is a real possibility,
but for large populations-such as the Afghans in
Pakistan-or where ethnic or racial tension is
strong the prospects are not bright and forced
repatriation is a real threat.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
LDCs: Growing Labor Surpluses
in the 1980s[ 7
Growing labor forces and slower economic growth
will worsen employment problems in developing
countries throughout the 1980s. Although Sub-
Saharan Africa will be hardest hit, the Central
American and Caribbean regions will be close
behind and have the most potential to affect the
United States. Outcomes of the faster working-age
population growth will probably include:
? Increased tensions between ethnic and religious
groups as economic pressures intensify.
? Prolongation of the international financial crisis
as Third World governments respond to domestic
pressures to relax austerity and provide jobs and
welfare assistance.
? Accelerated emigration, illegal and legal, to de-
veloped countries.
? Faster rural to urban migration with the accom-
panying difficulties of more rapid urbanization.
Accelerating Labor Force Growth
and Weakening Economic Performance
Of the 605-million increase in the world's adult
population in the 1980s, 545 million will occur in
developing countries, an increase of 110 million
more persons than were added in the 1970s.1
According to UN estimates, more than two-thirds
of the increase will be in Asia and the remainder
split almost evenly between Africa and Latin
America. The substantial growth of working-age
population in the developing countries is largely the
result of continued high fertility rates combined
with rapid declines in mortality rates that began
'Population estimates and projections are taken from the medium
scenario of Demographic Indicators of Countries, United Nations,
1982. W rki - ulation includes all persons aged 15 to 64.
during the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, large
juvenile populations are now entering LDC work
forces. 25X1
The growth of working-age populations during the
1980s will be occurring at a time when most
forecasters anticipate slower economic expansion.
Real GNP growth in the LDCs is projected to be
well below historical levels. Many LDCs face lin-
gering international debt problems, others suffer
from the decline in oil revenues, and all face
probable slower growth in exports to developed
countries. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Asso-
ciates (WEFA) projects LDC output to rise by 3.2
percent annually through 1988-barely half the
6.2-percent yearly pace enjoyed during the 1970s.
The World Bank and IMF agree that LDC eco- 25X1
nomic growth will remain below the levels of the
1976-79 recovery for the next several years. Conse-
quently, the expansion in employment opportunities
will be insufficient to absorb all new labor force
Africa will be hardest pressed overall by the
combination of rapid population growth 2 and poor
economic performance. The non-oil-producing
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, containing about
two-thirds of Africa's population, will bear the
worst of the fallout. Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
and Zambia will experience working-age popula-
tion growth rates of 3.3 to 3.9 percent a year in the
1980s; during the 1970s it ranged from 2.4 to
'The table at the end of this article presents working-age popula-
tion growth rates for each of the nearly 100 countries examined in
Secret
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Changes in Global Working-Age Population
Africa
80
60
3.3 percent. Prospects for economic expansion are
slim; the World Bank projects only slightly positive
GNP growth over the medium term for Africa, and
WEFA forecasts 1.1-percent annual growth
through 1988. High rural underemployment al-
ready is a problem in many African nations and
will get much worse.
Parts of Latin America, especially Central Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries, face growing eco-
nomic pressure from extremely rapid working-age
population growth. The labor forces in El Salvador,
Suriname, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and
Venezuela will grow by at least 3.5 percent annual-
ly during the 1980s; they will grow nearly as fast in
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Guyana,
Panama, Costa Rica, and Jamaica. In nearly half
of the Latin American countries, the pace of the
1980s will be at least as rapid as growth during the
1970s; only in Costa Rica will 1980s adult popula-
tion growth rates be significantly lower than their
1970s pace.
We estimate that the combined unemployed and
underemployed exceed 50 percent of the labor
forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
and 25 percent in Nicaragua; unemployment levels
in the Caribbean countries average more than
25 percent. Given expectations of slow real GNP
growth-WEFA projects only an annual growth
rate of 2.6 percent in Latin America during
1983-88-sharp increases in unemployment seem
inevitable.
According to the United Nations, the most rapidly
growing working-age populations will be in the
Middle East, with adult population growth rates for
countries in the Persian Gulf region ranging from
3.0 to 4.6 percent annually. These projections
25X1.
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Developing Countries: Population
Growth, 1981-908
Africa
3.5
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
Total population
I 1Working-age population
3.5
3.0
22-5
2.0
1.5
0 Caribbean Central South
aGeographic divisions conform with United Nations' conventions.
Source: United Nations
incorporate UN assumptions that significant immi-
gration continues. To date, these countries have
welcomed rapid working-age population increases
to facilitate ambitious development programs.
Thus, the Gulf countries can mitigate any surplus
labor problems that might occur should develop-
ment slow by restricting the inflow of workers. To
the extent this occurs, however, the burden will be
shifted to the labor exporting countries-including
Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and Jordan-that will be
hard pressed to cope 25X1
Domestic labor force growth will be high in several
other Asian countries. India has slowed overall
population expansion to under 2 percent-thanks to
concerted efforts in promoting family planning
practices-but the adult populations will continue
to swell by about 2.5 percent, or 11 million persons
a year, during this decade. In Pakistan and Bangla-
desh, adult population growth will average 3 per-
cent or more each year as it will in Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. Economic growth-
forecast at between 4 and 7 percent annually for
the whole of Asia and the Middle East-will ease
the consequences of rapid adult population growth
more than in other regions. 25X1
Strains From Increased Labor Surplus
Labor surpluses in developing countries will leave
governments hard pressed for solutions to such
problems as rapid urbanization. Rural underem-
ployment will continue to drive urban migration;
high urban unemployment is unlikely to signifi-
cantly alter these trends because, in our judgment,
the migrants will continue to perceive that their
chances of improving their living standards are
better in metropolitan than in rural areas.
Rapid urbanization and overcrowding will heighten 25X1
tensions between various ethnic and racial groups
competing for scarce jobs, food, and housing. Peo-
ple with different languages, religions, and ethnic
heritage often are barely tolerant of one another.
The recent flareup between Tamils and Sinhalese
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Major LDC Debtors:
Selected Indicators of Economic Performance
Total Debt,
GNP Per
GNP Growth
Working-Age
Average Annual Average Annaul
1982
(billion US $)
Capita
(1980 US $)
1971-80
(percent)
Population
1980
Working-Age
Population
Working-Age
Population
(thousand
Growth, 1971-80 Growth, 1981-90
persons)
(percent)
(percent)
Algeria
17.2
1,480
7.6
9,296
3.6
3.7
Argentina
36.7
2,050
2.5
17,133
1.3
1.1
Brazil
85.4
2,070
8.8
69,448
3.1
2.7
Costa Rica
2.6
1,680
5.6
1,295
4.0
2.8
Ecuador
6.6
1,050
8.0
4,173
3.3
3.3
Egypt
21.5
570
4.6
23,807
2.8
2.6
India
21.5
200
2.8
389,378
2.6
2.5
Indonesia
23.5
420
12.9
85,242
2.5
2.4
Ivory Coast
6.1
930
6.1
4,291
3.9
3.0
Malaysia
9.9
1,360
7.3
7,900
3.5
3.0
Mexico
83.2
2,040
5.7
36,170
3.5
3.5
Morocco
10.1
600
4.3
10,340
3.5
3.5
Nigeria
10.0
700
11.0
38,663
3.0
3.3
Pakistan
10.3
240
4.5
45,299
3.2
3.2
Peru
11.7
1,200
3.6
9,580
3.2
3.0
Philippines
16.2
600
6.4
27,219
3.4
3.0
Sudan
5.9
340
3.2
9,734
2.6
2.8
Thailand
11.1
600
7.1
26,238
3.3
3.1
Venezuela
33.7
3,400
7.3
8,601
4.3
3.5
in Sri Lanka is an example of what is likely to
occur throughout the Third World as larger num-
bers of idle workers multiply opportunities for
friction. These conflicts will spill over into the
political arena, and may, at times, escalate to
regime-threatening proportions.
International migrant flows are likely to become a
more politically sensitive issue during the next
several years. Problems between receiving and orig-
inating country governments will include workers'
rights, remittance flows, and displaced employment
of host countries' indigenous workers. Illegal mi-
gration, already on the rise, will be of particular
concern as countries act to control unchecked
movements of workers. India, for example, has
Secret
7 October 1983
announced its intention to fence the nearly 2,300-
kilometer border with Bangladesh to control illegal
immigration and to prevent a repeat of the violence
that occurred in Assam earlier this year when
Bangladeshis crossed the border into the Brahma-
putra valley.
Major Problem Countries
LDC debtor countries will be caught in a vice
between the ill effects of too-rapid labor force
growth and the need to continue austerity meas-
ures. Many of these countries already are showing
economic and social strains
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Total Average Annual Growth of Total Average Annual Growth of
Population, Working-Age Population Population, Working-Age Population
1980 (percent) 1980 (percent)
(thousand (thousand
persons) 1971-80
1981-90 persons) 1971-80 1981-90
Gambia, The 603 2.9
2.6 Sri Lanka 14,815 2.6 2.5
Guatemala 7,262 3.4
3.3 Sudan 18,371 2.6 2.8
Lesotho 1,341 2.2 2.4
Liberia 1,976 3.3 3.5
Zimbabwe 7,396 3.2 3.5
21 Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
More than two-thirds of Mexico's 76 million people
live in metropolitan areas and nearly one-third of
all urban dwellers live in Mexico City. Unemploy-
ment and crime are becoming a way of life for
many city dwellers. Restrictive policies designed to
stabilize the economy will keep economic expansion
well below 1970's norms, aggravating the impact of
continued rapid adult population growth on surplus
labor.
Joblessness and underemployment already is a
serious problem for Nigeria's nearly 45 million
adults. Four-fifths of the populace depend on sea-
sonal agricultural work, and only 20 to 30 percent
of Nigeria's new secondary school graduates report
finding jobs. Nonetheless, Ghanaian migrants are
starting to pour back in because conditions are
worse in their own country. These problems will
worsen over the course of this decade.
Almost one-third of Pakistan's nearly 95 million
people live in overcrowded cities. Pakistan faces
problems of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differ-
ences between Pushtuns, Sindhis, Baluchs, and
Punjabis, as well as about 3 million Afghan refu-
gees. Unemployment and underemployment has
made Pakistan a major source of temporary work-
ers throughout the region, but weakening economic
conditions in Gulf countries may remove this safety
valve.
Underemployment probably will be the worst eco-
nomic problem facing Indonesia's estimated 156
million inhabitants in this decade. Nearly 2.3 mil-
lion juveniles will reach adulthood each year during
the remainder of the 1980s and school leavers face
poor job prospects. Adjusted unemployment, ac-
cording to World Bank estimates, already exceeds
40 percent of the labor force and probably will
worsen.
The fragile economies of Central America and the
Caribbean also will be facing heightened strains
from their rapidly growing work forces. They have
been unable to support urban labor force growth in
the past, and their performance seems likely to
deteriorate in the medium term. In the Dominican
Republic, for example, the nonagricultural labor
Secret
7 October 1983
force grew 5 percent yearly from 1960 to 1975
while nonagricultural job growth was only 4 per-
cent; Jamaica's performance was even worse.
Consequently, many Latin American and Caribbe-
an governments have for years tacitly or openly
encouraged immigration as an avenue to relieve
unemployment and population pressure.
The problem is likely to worsen in this region as
adult-population growth rates remain high or accel-
erate. In El Salvador the annual growth rate has
jumped to over 4 percent from 3.4 percent during
the 1970s. Honduran population growth has risen
from 3.3 to 3.8 percent and in Nicaragua from 3.0
to 3.3 percent. Along with slow job growth in
industry and services in most of Central America
and the Caribbean, the scarcity of arable land is
hastening peasant migration to urban centers or
abroad.
Implications for the United States
Rapid Third World labor force growth during the
1980s will have several adverse consequences for
US interests:
? As the Mexican and Central American econo-
mies face increased difficulties in providing
employment opportunities, many workers will
view migration to the United States as the best
alternative. We estimate three-fourths of United
States illegal immigrants presently come from
Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras.
? In many LDCs, tensions over stagnant or declin-
ing real incomes could be exploited by radical
opposition groups that could blame the US for
economic problems and would oppose US
interests.
? The present international financial crisis could be
prolonged by mounting domestic pressure in debt-
ridden LDCs to provide jobs and increase welfare
expenditures rather than sticking to tough eco-
nomic austerity programs
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Eastern Europe: Continuin Slowdown In
Trade With the West
Eastern Europe's trade with the Developed West ? Turnkey manufacturing plants equipped with ad-
has dropped sharply in the last two years and will vanced Western machinery and equipment were
likely fall further this year and next. Prospects for constructed.
growth during the following three or four years is ? Modern production lines to upgrade or expand
modest at best, even with an improving world productive capacity were installed in existing
economy. East European planners must weigh the plants. 25X1
possible benefits of reviving trade with the West
against the severe problems their economies have In general, however, Eastern Europe was not able
experienced from the 1981-82 credit squeeze. to use its manufactured goods imports effectively.
Where possible they will seek substitutes for West- Managers often lacked the experience to anticipate
ern goods from suppliers within the Soviet Bloc.[:::]the problems involved in putting into production 25X1
A Soaring Trade Deficit
Eastern Europe's trade with the Developed West
expanded rapidly during the 1970s, aided by the
advent of detente. As political relations warmed,
Eastern Europe welcomed the opportunity to im-
port Western goods and technology, much of it
financed by Western credits. Imports from the
West grew by an average 20 percent annually from
1972 to 1978, with the bulk of the increase occur-
ring in 1973-74. Manufactured goods consistently
accounted for about three-fourths of these imports;
foodstuffs made up the second-largest categor
averaging about 11 percent.'
large amounts of new equipment, procedures, and
technology. Furthermore, construction and startup
difficulties frequently prevented full utilization of
the new equipment. As a result, Eastern Europe
increasingly found it difficult to realize the antici-
pated returns from their investment; export sales
from these installations often proved disappointing,
particularly in hard currency markets.
As a result of sharply rising imports, Europe's hard 25X1
currency trade deficit jumped from $2.1 billion in
1972 to $9.4 billion in 1975; for the remainder of
the decade the deficit averaged $9.0 billion annual-
ly. Although export growth was good-averaging
17 percent annually between 1972 and 1978-it
failed to match the increase in imports.
Eastern Europe made some gains as a result of
growing East-West trade, particularly in the stand- 1978-83: Slow Adjustment
and of living:
? Imports of feedgrains and breeding cattle im-
proved the protein content of East European
diets.
'Trade figures are derived from official East European statistics,
except for data on the commodity composition of trade with the
Developed West, which is derived from partner (OECD) statistics.
Recognizing the trade imbalance, the East Europe-
ans first responded by trying to boost exports and
then later resorted to slashing imports. The adjust-
ment effort was complicated, however, by Western
recession and by Eastern Europe's slow response to
Secret
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Eastern Europe: Commodity Distribution
of Trade With the OECD
Commodity distribution (percent)
Exports
Fuels and other
Raw materials
Foodstuffs
Manufactures
Secret
7 October 1983
The slowdown in the availability of Western credits
in 1981, followed by large cuts in lending in 1982,
forced most of the East European countries to
intensify adjustment measures. They reduced hard
currency imports by 8 percent in 1981 and by
another 22 percent last year. The most severe
import reductions during 1981-82 were made by
Romania (55 percent), Poland (48 percent), and
East Germany (32 percent). According to Western
statistics, imports from the Developed Western
countries during the first six months of 1983 were
down a further 12.6 percent from the year-earlier
period.
East European planners focused import cuts on
those items that would have the least immediate
impact on their economies and populations. Pur-
chases of capital equipment were denied or post-
poned wherever possible, since the loss of `these
items would not seriously jeopardize current pro-
duction. As a result, the share of machinery and
transport equipment in imports from the Developed
West fell from 40 percent in 1977 to 31 percent in
1981. Restrictions were less severe on imports of
raw materials, chemicals, and other semifinished
goods needed for production. Most East European
regimes have been cautious about reducing pur-
chases of consumer goods and foodstuffs, and the
import share of these goods consequently rose from
12 to 22 percent between 1977 and 1981F
The tough austerity measures led to a dramatic
turnaround in Eastern Europe's hard currency
trade balance. In 1982 the deficit shrank by $5.5
billion; East Germany and Romania contributed
the most to this improvement.
As Eastern Europe recovers from the economic
adjustments of the last several years and as the
world economy improves, East-West trade will
revive. After the harsh experience of recent adjust-
ments, however, Eastern Europe is not likely to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
necrer
Exports
7,209
13,222
28,622
26,456
24,824
Bulgaria
347
586
1,638
1,354
1,257
Czechoslovakia
973
1,672
3,226
3,281
2,718
East Germany
1,425
2,631
5,199
5,446
5,598
Hungary
824
1,327
4,063
3,845
3,726
Poland
1,507
3,278
5,857
4,274
4,404
Romania
909
1,854
4,453
3,783
3,408
Yugoslavia
1,224
1,874
4,186
4,473
3,713
Imports
9,299
22,659
35,687
32,784
25,687
Bulgaria
391
1,289
1,657
2,054
1,909
Czechoslovakia
1,098
2,244
3,692
3,603
2,856
East Germany
1,970
3,695
6,857
5,892
4,663
Hungary
890
1,966
3,784.
3,572
3,119
Poland
1,821
6,199
6,699
4,498
3,508
Romania
1,085
2,218
4,250
3,525
1,933
Yugoslavia
2,044
5,048
8,748
9,640
7,699
Balance
-2,090
-9,437
-7,065
-6,328
-863
Bulgaria
-44
-703
-19
-700
-652
Czechoslovakia
-125
-572
-466
-322
-138
East Germany
-545
-1,064
-1,658
-446
935
- 66
-639
279
273
607
-314
-2,921
-842
-224
896
-176
-364
203
258
1,475
-820
-3,174
-4,562
-5,167
-3,986
encourage a return to the freewheeling trade boom
of the 1970s but instead will follow a more cautious
policy.
East European trade with the West during the next
two or three years will remain below the peak 1980
level. The East European economies will be strug-
gling to recover from supply shortages and other
economic distortions generated by rigorous adjust-
ments. In addition, exports of key commodities-
steel, machinery, chemicals, and textiles-will en-
counter stiff competition in Western markets.
We expect trade growth to remain modest for the
rest of the decade. Western economic growth is
likely to remain low by postwar standards while the
trend toward protectionism continues in various
Western countries-particularly with respect to
basic industries such as steel. If translated into
tighter import quotas or higher tariffs, growing
protectionism will further limit Eastern Europe's
ability to earn the hard currency to repay debts to
the West and to purchase Western imports. In an
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
OECD: Share of Exports Going to Eastern Europe
Total
Percent
Secret
7 October 1983
83 0 1970 75 80 81 82 83
I and II I and II
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
secret
Eastern Europe: Domestic
Economic Indicators
GNP per capita
Consumption per
lj~ capita
Investment
further behind the West they will be technological-
ly. The ensuing lack of competitiveness in world
markets will make it harder to expand exports
Persistent East European hard currency debt prob-
lems and the lingering effects of the credit crunch
will limit any rebound in East European imports
from the West in 1984 and 1985. Even if there is an
easing of East European financial problems, we
expect central planners to maintain a tight lid on
purchases of industrial goods from the West at
least through 1984. Imports will consist primarily
of items needed for current production. Consumer
good imports also will continue to be curtailed.
Agricultural imports, especially those which sup-
port vital export industries (for example, feedgrains
and cotton), will tend to get higher priority.
effort to limit the effects of Western protectionist
actions on their exports, both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia this year approached EC and West
European government officials for exploratory
trade talks. Hungary is seeking a broad trade
agreement similar to the one it has with Finland,
while the Czechoslovaks have put forward requests
on specific manufactured goods. Progress is not
expected soon on either inquiry
Cuts in imports of capital equipment from the
Developed West during the past two years will have
a serious impact on future East European industrial
production and exports. The longer the East Euro-
pean countries continue to delay modernization, the
East European central planners are trying to utilize
Soviet Bloc trading partners wherever possible as 25X1
sources for imports. Most intra-CEMA trade is
settled on a clearing account basis, thus minimizing
hard currency outlays. In addition, the East Euro-
pean countries have turned increasingly to counter-
trade during the last two or three years. These
moves have met with limited success. The value of
buyback countertrade contracts for East European
exports during 1981-82 has been estimated at $2.7
billion by the Secretariat of the Economic Commis-25X1
sion for Europe. These contracts comprised about
6.6 percent of East European exports to the Devel-
oped West during the period. Western firms have
resisted using countertrade because it forces them
to take on Eastern Europe's marketing difficulties.
25X1
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Japanese Energy Imports:
Prospects for Enhancing Energy Security
Lowered prospects for economic growth and im-
proved energy efficiency have sharply reduced fu-
ture Japanese energy needs. Nonetheless, with its
poor domestic resources, Japan will remain heavily
dependent upon imported energy, leaving the coun-
try vulnerable to energy supply disruptions. In-
creased imports of US energy could enhance Japa-
nese energy security and improve the bilateral
trade balance problem. We believe expanded pur-
chases of US energy products probably would
require a much more rapid growth in Japanese
energy requirements than most forecasts now ex-
pect. Alternatively, Japan could increase imports of
US energy at the expense of other suppliers if US
energy sources-particularly coal-became more
price competitive or the Japanese Government un-
dertook a commitment to expand US imports. F_
Japanese energy consumption rose sharply during
the 1960s and early 1970s jumping from 1.9
million barrels per day of oil equivalent (b/doe) in
1960 to 7 million b/doe in 1973. Rapid growth in
energy demand ended abruptly following the 1973
oil crisis. Through 1982, total energy consumption
increased by less than 300,000 b/doe, and oil use
declined by 900,000 b/d.
Sluggish growth in energy demand and the falloff
in oil use can be traced to slower economic growth
and sharply higher oil prices. Annual economic
growth averaged 3.4 percent between 1973 and
1982-approximately one-third the rate of the
1961-72 period. On the price front, imported crude
oil prices increased ninefold after 1973-spurring
major improvements in energy efficiency. The ener-
gy-to-GNP ratio-a measure of an economy's ener-
gy efficiency-has fallen 25 percent since 1973 and
Japan: Measures of Efficiency
I I I I I I I I I
is the lowest of any major industrialized country.
The ratio of oil to GNP has fallen even faster.
Contributing to these declines has been a structural
shift in the economy away from heavy, energy-
intensive industries, such as steel and shipbuilding,
to processing and assembling industries with low
energy inputs, such as electronics. Interfuel substi-
tution has also reduced oil demand.
Secret .
DI IEEW 83-040
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Demand Outlook: Diminished Expectations
Energy efficiency improvements, together with
lowered prospects for economic growth, have sharp-
ly reduced energy demand projections:
? The Japanese Government currently projects
1990 requirements at between 8.2 and 8.7 million
b/doe-roughly 20 percent below its April 1982
forecast.
? The Petroleum Association of Japan places 1990
requirements at 8.1 million b/doe-10 percent
below last year's projection.
? Major US oil companies have trimmed forecasts
of Japanese energy needs by 5 to 10 percent
compared with year-earlier projections.
These revised forecasts suggest that Japanese ener-
gy demand will increase from about 7.3 million
b/doe in 1982 to about 8.0-8.8 million b/doe in
1990 and to about 9.0-10.0 million b/doe in the
year 2000. These projections assume a modest rate
of economic growth in Japan-averaging about 3 to
4 percent during the 1980s, declining to about 2.5
to 3.5 percent annually in the 1990s. The forecasts
also assume declining real oil prices to 1985, flat
real prices from 1985 to 1990, and real price
increases of 1.5 to 3.0 percent per year through the
year 2000.
Oil. Despite prospects for slow growth in energy
consumption, Japan will remain heavily dependent
on oil over the next two decades. Based on recent
industry estimates, we believe oil consumption will
approximate 4.5-4.7 million b/doe in 1990 and
around 4.3-4.8 million b/doe in the year 2000. As a
result, imported oil will account for nearly 55
percent of Japan's energy requirements in 1990 and
about 50 percent by the end of the century
Natural Gas. Because of Japanese efforts to reduce
oil use and the clean burning properties of gas,
demand for natural gas is likely to grow more
rapidly than the demand for any other major fuel
during the 1980s. Based on recent forecasts, we
believe Japan's gas needs will rise from current
levels of around 500,000 b/doe to approximately
900,000 b/doe in 1990. This demand is substantial-
ly less than the Japanese were expecting when they
Secret
7 October 1983
initiated many of their gas supply projects in the
mid-1970s. Consequently, government officials
concede that planned LNG projects will probably
be delayed by about four or five years.
From 1990 to the end of the century, growth in gas
demand is likely to be sluggish, increasing by only
around 200,000 b/doe, according to most recent
forecasts. Current price trends and contract terms
will likely restrain demand growth. The price of
imported LNG is tied to crude oil prices in existing
contracts, and, consequently, heavy fuel oil-a
lower quality byproduct of crude oil and a major
fuel in electric utilities and industry-is cheaper
than LNG. Moreover, LNG contracts contain in-
flexible "take or pay" clauses, which the Japanese
are now reluctant to accept. As a result, industry
sources foresee little growth in gas use for electric-
ity generation beyond 1990, and the projected
increase in industrial gas use is minimal because
the price is high relative to alternative fuels. The
lack of a significant distribution infrastructure
outside of Japan's major cities will limit
residential/commercial gas-demand.
Coal has borne the brunt of cutbacks in future
energy needs. The current government projection
has slashed coal requirements in 1990 by around 25
percent compared with its April 1982 assessment,
largely as the result of reduced electricity needs
and coal's position as a residual fuel in electricity
generation. Because of existing "take or pay" LNG
contracts and large investments in nuclear power
plants under construction, the bulk of the reduction
in new power plant construction has fallen on coal.
US Embassy reporting indicates a total of 350,000
to 450,000 b/doe of steam coal under contract for
delivery in 1990 has been postponed due to plant
delays or cancellations.
Nuclear Power. Japan has an aggressive nuclear
power program ranking in size only behind those of
the United States and France. Future growth in
nuclear power, however, will be constrained by
reduced prospects for economic growth, reduced
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Japan: Electricity Generation Dual Switching Capability'
Yearend Fiscal 1982
Oil
Megawatts electric
58,670
Oil/coal
1.2
Oil/gas Gas/oil
5.0 14 44.0
Oil only
93.8
Natural Gas
Megawatts electric
19,200
growth rates for electricity demand, public opposi-
tion, and siting difficulties. Given current construc-
tion status and the long leadtimes required, we
project Japanese nuclear-electric generating capac-
ity to reach only about 27,500 MWe by 1990. As a
result, we expect nuclear power output to represent
the equivalent of about 650,000 to 700,000 b/doe.
By the year 2000, Japanese plans call for nuclear
power output equivalent to about 1.8 million b/doe.
We believe that Japan may fall as much as 700,000
b/doe below this level for the year 2000.
Import Dependence Implications
Although future energy requirements will be sharp-
ly below levels expected one to two years ago,
Japan will still rely on imports for over 80 percent
of energy needs. Japan will have to rely on imports
for nearly all of its oil requirements through the
year 2000, and the bulk of these supplies probably
Coal
Megawatts electric
6,250
will continue to come from Persian Gulf sources.
Thus, Japan will remain extremely vulnerable to
Middle East oil supply disruptions over the next
two decades.
The electric power sector, which consumes around
one-third of Japanese final oil use, has only a
limited capability to switch to alternate fuels in the
event of an energy supply disruption. At yearend
1982, Japan had an installed electricity generating
capacity of 134,000 MWe. Only 9 percent of this
capacity, however, can be switched to alternate
fuels. Some two-thirds of the fuel switching capa-
bility uses oil as a backup fuel at gas-fired power
plants. Only 6 percent of oil-fired generating ca-
pacity can be switched to gas or coal as alternate
fuels. Thus, a prolonged oil supply disruption would
adversely affect about 40 percent of Japan's elec-
tric power generating capacity; a simultaneous
disruption of both oil and gas supplies would affect
nearly 60 percent
25X1'
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Japan: Changing Fuel Mix
for Electricity Generation
2000
(Percent)
(TWh) b
(Percent)
100.0
955
100.0
22.3
380
39.8
16.5
160
16.8
9.4
150
15.7
Natural gas/LNG/other
gases
13.5
180
25.9
180
18.8
a Based on fuel inputs, a consistent detailed breakdown for 1980 is
not currently available.
b Terawatt-hours.
Enhancing Japanese Energy Security
Given the high level of dependence on oil in electric
utilities and the lack of fuel switching capability,
we believe Japan could take several steps to en-
hance its energy security in this sector. While
continued conservation gains, prospects for less
robust economic growth, and increasing real elec-
tricity prices will hold down the growth rate for
electricity demand, we still expect demand to grow
an average 3.2 percent annually based on estimated
GNP growth of about 4.0 percent. As a result, we
expect Japanese gross electricity requirements in
1990 to approximate 695 terawatt-hours (TWh),'
up 20 percent compared to 1980. Our analysis
indicates that Japan is likely to require 955 TWh
by the year 2000, up 37 percent over the decade. To
limit oil dependence, Japan already is planning to
build nuclear and LNG-fired electricity capacity to
meet the majority of the increase with the remain-
ing portion being filled mostly by coal and hydro.
Still, oil will account for over 25 percent of electric-
ity generation in 1990. Coal will provide only
around 9 percent of 1990 electricity needs, the
same as in 1980 despite construction of new coal-
fired capacity.
To enhance energy security, Japan could place 25X1
greater emphasis on coal for electricity generation.
Coal is a secure fuel, avoids many of the problems
associated with nuclear power, and is the cheapest
means of conventional thermal power generation in
Japan. Forecasters, moreover, expect coal to main-
tain its price advantage over competing fuels. Al-
though it is not currently economic to build new
coal power generating capacity to replace existing
oil-fired capacity, coal capacity will be substituted
for oil-fired units at the end of their economic life.
This trend could be accelerated through govern-
ment subsidies and incentives to offset the high
capital costs of switching to coal. Such a policy
would lessen Japan's dependence on imported oil in
the late 1980s and early 1990s and increase the
potential market for imported coal
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Japan: LNG Supplyaand Demand
I I I 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I 1 1 1 1
1982 85 90 95 2000
a Based on projects under construction or agreed to.
bMITI projection extrapolated from 1995 to 2000.
c Petroleum Association of Japan forecast.
Potential for US Exports
Sharp cutbacks in Japanese energy demand, com-
bined with existing long-term supply arrangements,
have reduced the potential for additional Japanese
energy purchases, including imports from the Unit-
ed States. Increased imports of US energy could
enhance Japanese energy security and improve the
bilateral trade balance problem. We believe, how-
ever, expanded US exports probably would require
a much more rapid growth in Japanese energy
Secret
7 October 1983
Japan: Imported Coal Prices
US $ per metric ton
Steam Coal
Average a
52.62
65.67
64.77
South Africa
38.98
55.39
60.82
Canada
53.05
62.93
62.94
Australia
53.73
65.69
64.93
China
48.09
65.97
66.32
United States
66.02
73.20
70.60
Metallurgical Coal
Average a
65.79
71.30
73.93
South Africa
52.92
64.13
66.98
Australia
59.28
65.68
68.11
China
55.54
65.74
68.61
Canada
61.73
64.67
70.41
USSR
57.35
63.83
70.85
United States
80.11
83.48
82.91
requirements than most forecasts now expect. Al-
ternatively, Japan could increase imports of US
energy at the expense of other supplies if US
energy sources-particularly coal-became more
price competitive or export restrictions on oil were
lifted.
Japanese refiners recently expressed an interest in
purchasing up to 50,000 b/d of Alaskan oil. This
would require the lifting of the export ban on
Alaskan oil sales as has been proposed by the
Reagan administration. Imports of Alaskan oil will
help Japan reduce its bilateral trade surplus with
the United States and marginally reduce its reli-
ance on Middle East oil.
Although current gas supply contracts appear to
meet Japanese needs through the early 1990s, we
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
believe additional contracts will be needed in subse-
quent years. Alaskan North Slope gas would signif-
icantly enhance Japanese energy security; under
current agreements Indonesia and Malaysia will
provide Japan with nearly two-thirds of its con-
tracted gas supplies in the mid-1990s. The export of
Alaskan North-Slope gas to Japan, however, will
depend upon its price competitiveness with other
suppliers and the willingness of other buyers-
particularly South Korea and Taiwan-to contract
for some of the gas to support the proposed capacity
of the pipeline. At present, most Japanese gas
suppliers have a decided advantage over Alaskan
gas in the cost of transporting LNG to Tokyo.
Additional Japanese purchases of US coal will
likely depend upon Japanese efforts to accelerate
coal use in electricity generation or a substantial
decrease in the delivered price of US coal to Japan.
US coal is currently the most expensive purchased
by Japan, and the Japanese are reluctant to sign
long-term contracts with US suppliers until prices
are more competitive. The absence of long-term
contracts, however, has deterred US suppliers from
constructing the necessary infrastructure to reduce
transport costs
Concern over the bilateral trade balance with the
United States, however, has caused the Japanese
and Prime Minister Nakasone to seek ways, includ-
ing purchases of US energy, to reduce the deficit.
Government-to-government discussions seeking to
resolve this issue before President Reagan's visit to
Japan in November are under way. Japanese ener-
gy users, including industry and utilities, have been
reluctant to sign long-term energy purchase agree-
ments with the United States because of the high
cost of US energy compared to other potential
suppliers. Unless US energy supplies become more
competitive, it is doubtful that much additional
coal or LNG could be sold to the Japanese on a
strictly commercial basis. We believe significant
increases in US energy sales to Japan will require
changes in Japanese Government policy strongly
pushing industry and utilities to enhance Japanese
energy security despite the price or through some
means of formal energy price subsidy
Secret
7 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/01: CIA-RDP84-00898R000300130007-3