INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
t-
see
GI IPI 83-003
October 1983
copy 6 17
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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, on
Secret
GI IN 83-003
October 1983
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to
Instability and
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
This is the third issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide timely
warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US
interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 July to
30 September 1983, examines events and processes that could lead to
major regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-term
warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the
potential for instability during the next two years in a periodic, systematic,
and thematic way through. the consistent application of a set of indicators.
We believe that most of 25X1
the 90 indicators are applicable to most of the countries we examine; other
indicators are more country specific. All indicators are examined for every
country for each issue. Those countries for which indicators have changed
significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated in a
detailed way in the text.
The quarterly includes four parts:
? A brief overview of each country.
? A more detailed assessment of countries in which there have been
developments of interest.
? A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and
tables tracing political and economic changes during the past several
years.
This issue assesses a total of 28 countries that we have identified as
particularly salient to US interests. These countries are included because
they are strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US
friends or allies, or geographically close to the United States.
iii Secret
GI IN 83-003
October 1983
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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest 7
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I
Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
two northern states.
The continuing decline in living standards brought about by President de la
Madrid's austerity program-which has improved financial stability and
long-term economic prospects-could touch off more substantial antigov-
ernment demonstrations than have already occurred. Discontent contribut-
ed to modest setbacks for the ruling PRI party in recent local elections in
El Salvador' The insurgents are fighting to retake the initiative after a period of several
months in which the government made significant political and military
gains. The delay of national elections until 1984 will benefit the guerrillas
and work against the Christian Democrats.
Guatemala' General Mejia, who ousted former President Rios Montt in August with
broad military and considerable civilian support, faces serious challenges
from an otherwise divided armed forces and from ultrarightist political
groups. The insurgents-divided and weakened by the government's
counterinsurgency programs-are in no position to mount a successful
major offensive this year.
Honduras Army troops in eastern Honduras are mopping up a 100-man guerrilla
force suffering from poor logistic support and low morale. The guerrillas
entered from Nicaragua in July after training in Nicaragua and Cuba.
Additional insurgent groups may be getting ready in Nicaragua for new in-
cursions.
from government and Guard positions.
The sudden withdrawal of retired National Guard Commander Paredes
from the presidential race probably stems from his anger over recent
cabinet changes and his loss of support from key government and military
leaders. Subsequent coup rumors implicating Paredes may have been
floated by National Guard leaders to justify their removal of his supporters
Colombia A worsening economy and heightened insurgency may soon begin to erode
President Betancur's popular standing but are not likely to endanger the
country's democratic political system
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Venezuela The party that wins the December election will inherit a crippled economy,
including widespread bankruptcies, mounting unemployment, and soaring
inflation which, if unresolved, could result in social and political turmoil.
The weakening economy is eroding support for President Herrera's COPEI
party. The opposition candidate for president, Jaime Lusinchi of the
Democratic Action party, enjoys a widening lead in the polls that should
allow him to defeat his opponent, Rafael Caldera of COPEI, by a large
margin.
Argentina
Spain
are ill prepared and reluctant to assume power.
President Belaunde is rapidly losing popularity because of the growing
insurgency, factionalism in the ruling Popular Action Party, the resurgence
of the major opposition party (the American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance), economic difficulties, and natural calamities. Belaunde remains
likely to survive these crises because the military and the civilian opposition
health.
Public discontent is mounting over the IMF-mandated austerity program
and the leadership of President Figueiredo, who has been weakened by ill
private banks for repaying $40 billion of foreign debt
The party that wins the general election on 30 October and assumes power
by January may enjoy a brief honeymoon in which to address serious
political and economic issues. The most pressing include subordinating the
military to civilian rule and renegotiating agreements with the IMF and
government and negotiations with the opposition.
Senior military commanders still support Pinochet but would move to
replace him if the dialogue with the opposition collapses and the level of vi-
olence escalates. Many officers favor an accelerated transition to civilian
unemployment to 17.5 percent is of growing concern.
Incidents of flag burning and demonstrations by radical Basque separatists
have enraged the military and rightists, but Prime Minister Gonzalez's
firm response to the provocations has satisfied most critics. A rise in
domestic prices and could occasion mild popular discontent.
Delinking the drachma and the dollar may provide short-term relief for
Greece's severe balance-of-payments problem but also will force up
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Turkey The military regime is permitting the general election to be held as planned
on 6 November but has curbed political activity by opposition groups. A
slight increase in inflation portends a slowing down of the economic
recovery experienced in the past three years.
Morocco Austerity measures recently introduced to help resolve serious foreign
exchange problems will probably soon depress living conditions. King
Hassan may have to rely more heavily on the country's relatively efficient
security forces to put down unrest.
Egypt
change situation.
The legal opposition, whose relations with President Mubarak continue to
deteriorate, is boycotting fall local elections and threatening to boycott
next year's parliamentary elections unless Mubarak appoints an interim
coalition government to oversee electoral procedures. The government is
avoiding unpopular austerity measures despite a worsening foreign ex-
Saudi Arabia Low-key criticism from businessmen who have been hurt by a slowdown in
government contract payments does not pose a serious political problem.
The government continues to limit expenditures even though oil exports for
the quarter rose to an average of 5.1 million barrels per day as compared to
4.1 million in the previous quarter.
Iraq '
Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas, have opened a second front in Iraqi Kurdistan. F-1 25X1
The use of Super Etendard aircraft-if France delivers them-against
Iranian oil exports in the Gulf are likely to prompt Iranian attacks that
would be devastating to Iraq's battered economy and threatening to the
stability of Saddam Husayn's regime. Iranian troops, now spearheaded by
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Widespread demonstrations protesting deteriorating living conditions and
religious demonstrations in Mashhad and Esfahan attacking the govern-
ment's economic and social policies do not threaten the regime at this time.
Pakistan' President Zia could be unseated by senior generals if unrest in Sind
Province is prolonged or if the violence spreads to Punjab Province.
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' See part 2 for detailed discussion
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Nigeria ` Lingering opposition resentment over irregularities in the August elections,
in which President Shagari's National Party won a massive victory,
threatens the country's still-fragile civilian political institutions. Serious
economic problems remain despite Lagos's ability to reschedule about a
third of its estimated $6 billion in short-term arrears
Kenya
the regime as long as the tribes remain riven.
Insurgents sponsored by Ethiopia and Libya have been unable to exploit in-
creasing tribal infighting, which, although an irritant, will not endanger
discontent among the Kikuyu is growing.
President Moi's unopposed reelection last month reflects his control over
national political affairs. His critics remain fragmented, and his ability to
lead has been enhanced by a temporary improvement in the country's
foreign exchange position. However, the election results also indicate that
devaluation, may increase the price of staples and provoke unrest.
inflation, which has followed an IMF-mandated 80-percent currency
President Mobutu is monitoring the activities of former parliamentarians,
released from prison in May, who are trying to establish a party in
opposition to his ruling Popular Revolutionary Movement party. Soaring
South Africa Terrorist activity may increase as the 2 November referendum on Prime
Minister Botha's constitutional reform proposals approaches. Botha's
powerful National Party machine is likely to win the referendum despite
opposition from both leftist and rightist parties and from most nonwhite
groups. An unexpected loss could lead to Botha's ouster and would
discourage future efforts at reform.
Philippines A combination of developments-including an escalation of the violent
protests that have followed the Aquino assassination, a further withdrawal
of support by business leaders, increased unity among moderate opposition
groups, and a perception among senior military commanders that President
Marcos is losing his grip or becoming physically unable to run the nation-
could usher in a period of serious, prolonged instability, including the
deposal of Marcos.
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ta's international financial position.
Government dress regulations for public schools have prompted protests
from Muslim students and deepened orthodox Muslims' suspicions of
government policy. Austerity measures are beginning to strengthen Jakar-
South Korea The Soviet shootdown of the KAL airliner has diverted public attention
from domestic issues. Security officials do not anticipate serious campus
disturbances this fall but are concerned about possible antigovernment
protests during President Reagan's visit. Clashes with North Korean
infiltrators have heightened government concern over possible terrorist
disruptions of forthcoming international conferences in Seoul.
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
? Sustained government offensives that started in
June have forced the guerrillas to mount a series of
counterattacks in eastern and central El Salvador to
try to recapture the initiative and regain credibility
at home and abroad.
? Government civic action programs are making prog-
ress, and the amnesty law has attracted some former
guerrilla combatants
? Protracted debate by the Constituent Assembly on
the draft constitution has eliminated virtually all
likelihood of a presidential election in 1983.
? The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) fears that it
will be outmaneuvered by rightist parties in the
political jockeying prior to the presidential elections
and suspects that the Army's recent successes may
reinforce its traditional inclination to play the role
of political arbiter.
Comment
We believe the insurgents have suffered important
military and political setbacks during the past three
months that have seriously undermined their pros-
pects for at least the near term. The insurgents'
failure to disrupt or otherwise halt the Army's sum-
mer campaign indicates the continued inability of the
guerrillas to defend their base areas from determined
government attacks. The insurgents' weakness was
further reflected in their avoidance of significant
combat and the defensive posture they temporarily
adopted throughout most of the country. Concurrent-
ly, the confidence of the Salvadoran military in-
creased. Improved small-unit tactics, the strong per-
formance of the three US-trained quick-reaction
battalions, declining guerrilla
morale are encouraging the Army to stay in the field.
A substantial reduction in military casualties since
June has elicited further armed forces support for the
aggressive strategy being pursued by Defense Minis-
ter Vides
El Salvador
SAN SALVADOR*
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Nevertheless, we believe it is premature to reach firm
conclusions about the longer-term significance of
these recent developments. The newfound resolve of
the military, for example, could dissipate rapidly if
the guerrillas-who have suffered only moderate
losses of men and equipment-were to significantly
expand their current tactical operations and score a
few more battlefield successes. Recent successful at-
tacks on San Miguel, the country's third-largest city,
and on several small towns and government outposts
demonstrate, moreover, that the guerrillas remain a
power in the north and east. We expect the insurgents
will continue to launch periodic offensives in hopes of
improving their military credibility and potential ne-
gotiating position.
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Effective civic action programs in San Vicente and
Usulutan departments-including new roadbuilding
projects, the reopening of schools, and improved local
health care-are adding further pressure on the guer-
rillas. We believe the guerrillas probably will focus
much of their counteroffensive on these departments
out of fear that otherwise the civic action programs,
which have expanded more rapidly than initially
envisioned, will undercut their popularity in. these 25X1
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former strongholds. We also believe the insurgents are
concerned about the results of the recently expired
amnesty program. According to the government's
figures, which may be exaggerated, some 585 insur-
gents, including 250 combatants, turned themselves in
between May and August 1983. Salvadoran military
leaders regard the defections as another indicator of
declining guerrilla morale and are likely to push for a
renewal of the program
Recent'signs that Nicaragua and Cuba, preoccupied
with the events inside Nicaragua, increasingly see the
insurgency in El Salvador as negotiable represent still
further grounds for guerrilla concern. Compounding
guerrilla difficulties are continuing differences be-
tween the five guerrilla factions over political and
military strategy, growing doubts about the likelihood
of a popular uprising, diminishing support in Western
Europe, and increasing cooperation between the Sal-
vadoran Army and its allies in Central America.
The government's forced postponement of the presi-
dential election from 1983 to 1984, however, means
that the guerrillas will not immediately have to face
popular repudiation at the polls as they did in the
March 1982 election. We believe the postponement
reflects the desire of most political parties to buy time
as well as the Central Elections Council's need to
complete its tardy logistic preparations. The postpone-
ment may have the beneficial side effect of increasing
voter participation, especially since the previous
schedule clashed with the harvest period in many
We believe the Christian Democrats have the most to
lose in the election. They opposed postponement be-
cause the party's superior organization had given it a
headstart. Christian Democratic leaders also fear that
President Magana is seeking to strengthen the Party
of National Conciliation, a moderate rightwing party
traditionally aligned with the Army. We believe these
concerns, plus PDC suspicions that the Army wants to
play a decisive political role, are well founded. How-
ever, Magana also may fear that neither Christian
Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte nor Assem-
bly leader and potential candidate Roberto D'Aubuis-
son can unite the country. Consequently, Magana
may be looking toward the moderate right for a
candidate capable of creating a broad-based political
? Widespread guerrilla attacks on military and eco-
nomic targets plus terrorism in the capital and other
cities.
? An erosion of military confidence and subsequent
return to a static defense posture as a result of
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newly successful guerrilla operations.
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? Conversely, continued effective military operations
that lead to a further deterioration in the guerrillas'
tactical situation.
? Stepped-up Cuban-Nicaraguan logistic support to
the insurgents.
? A relaxation of the civic action programs as evi-
denced by a reduction in the size and number of
civic action teams, or the Army's failure to provide
adequate security in areas previously cleared.
? Rightist intimidation of labor and other potentially
pro-Christian Democratic groups as the election
draws near.
? Growing disunity within the government over the
issue of negotiations with the guerrillas.
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? Senior military officers ousted President Rios Montt
in August in a near bloodless coup.
? Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia, the new chief of state
who retains his position as Defense Minister, lacks
national support and is having difficulty unifying
the armed forces which, although broadly support-
ive of the coup, remain seriously factionalized over
major issues
? To reinforce armed forces support for his leadership
and to avoid antagonizing differing military fac-
tions, Mejia is moving cautiously on policy issues,
avoiding innovative policies and attempting to im-
prove relations with the United States.
? Lacking a strong base of support, Mejia also is
attempting to gain the approval of key civilian
groups, particularly the rightist parties
? Mejia has responded to rightwing pressure by abol-
ishing the Council of State-which Rios Montt
established without the participation of rightist par-
ties-and by reducing an unpopular tax.
? Although the insurgents stepped up urban terrorism
during September, they have been unable to exploit
the unsettled military, political, and economic situa-
tion.
Comment
General Mejia, who previously had opposed a coup,
reluctantly agreed with a majority of his senior
military commanders to oust Rios Montt largely
because the former President's activities-particular-
ly his Protestant evangelism, enactment of tax re-
forms unpopular with business and rightwing groups,
and refusal to set an early date for elections-were
undermining military unity and precipitating strong
public criticism. Mejia and other senior commanders
also wanted to preempt a coup planned by dissident
middle and junior grade officers that might have
ended in a more substantial change in the regime and
weakened the military as an institution.
We believe that, although opposition to Rios Montt is
widespread in the armed forces, their support of
General Mejia is only tepid because of his previous
o 50 Kilometers
Mexico
Guatemala
North
Pacific
Ocean
GUATEMALA
Boundary representa9en is
no, neCeasaNy authoritative
strong backing for Rios Montt and his thwarting of
earlier coup attempts. Indeed, many in the military
hate him. To win over middle and junior grade
officers, we believe that he will continue to move
cautiousl on policy issues and avoid major changes.
Mejia has abolished Rios Montt's widely criticized
secret courts and executions, reinstituted a 90-day
amnesty for insurgents, and, under pressure from the
established political parties, may advance the constit-
uent assembly elections from July 1984, the date set
by Rios Montt. In response to rightwing pressure,
Mejia has weakened Rios Montt's tax reforms by
reducing the unpopular value-added tax. Although he
promises to pursue Rios Montt's successful counterin-
surgency campaign emphasizing civilian defense
forces and civic action and may soon step up counter-
insurgency operations-in part to divert the military's
attention from politics-we are concerned that he
may gradually come to favor conventional military
operations over civic action.
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Realizing that many military officers disliked Rios
Montt's strongly nationalistic, anti-US stance, Mejia,
in his initial foreign policy announcements, has allied
Guatemala more closely with the West and strongly
supported US policy initiatives in Central America.
We believe Mejia now will press Washington for
increased military and economic assistance to support
the counterinsurgency effort. We believe he is likely
to reject any help conditioned on Guatemala's human
rights performance, however, and that the officer
corps' disenchantment with his leadership will in-
crease should he fail to obtain this aid.
The ultrarightist National Liberation Movement is
the greatest civilian threat to the new President. Any
delay in the return to civilian government or addition
to the tax burden would allow the Movement to
exploit existing military discontent with Mejia. The
Movement wants early elections because its estab-
lished political constituency, strong financial backing,
and ties to conservative military groups currently give
it a decided edge over the other parties. The Move-
ment's leaders probably calculate that an early elec-
tion would also undermine the organizational efforts
of some 20 center and leftist parties that were newly
formed or reorganized last March as a part of Rios
Montt's efforts to diffuse rightwing political power.
? Sentiments expressed by the military, especially
among middle and junior grade officers, that Mejia
is not doing what is necessary to ensure that the
elections scheduled for July 1984 will be held on
time.
? Mejia's failure to garner more foreign military and
economic assistance by mid-1984.
? Mejia's introduction of legislation or regulations
threatening to the economic interests of rightwing
activists and their supporters.
? Government abandonment of civic action programs
in favor of a strictly military response to guerrilla
activity
Despite a recent upsurge of urban terrorism and
insurgent attacks on economic targets such as farms
and power generators, we believe the guerrillas' in-
ability to move decisively to exploit the unsettled
postcoup political situation underscores guerrilla
problems as well as the success of the government's
civic action and amnesty programs. In our opinion,
the insurgents are too disorganized and short of
supplies to substantially increase their current level of
attacks, although we do expect a gradual increase in
sabotage and terrorism
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? The two-year economic recession and President
Pinochet's reluctance to accelerate the timetable for
a return to civilian rule have promoted the growth of
a strong opposition movement.
? A broad spectrum of political and labor activists
have sponsored a "day of national protest" each
month since May as well as national strikes. The
security forces have responded sternly, with 49
civilian deaths as of mid-September
? The Communist Party and the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) have carried out several
acts of terrorism, including bombings and the assas-
sination of the military governor of Santiago. The
extreme left was instrumental in fomenting violence
during the August "day of protest."
? Moderates in the government have persuaded Pino-
chet to permit several prominent political exiles to
return, lift the state of emergency, and consider
congressional elections before the scheduled date of
1989.
? The armed forces, while continuing to back Pino-
chet, strongly support the political dialogue with the
opposition being conducted by Interior Minister
Jarpa.
Comment
Most senior Army officers, spurred on by less influen-
tial Air Force and Navy officers, favor restoration of
some aspects of civilian rule before 1989.
the military continues to support
Pinochet's presidency, but we believe that senior
commanders would move to replace him with another
officer or a conservative civilian if negotiations with
the moderate opposition collapse and violence spirals
upward. The officer corps is concerned that the armed
forces' unity and professional image will erode if the
military is called upon repeatedly to assist the police
in controlling violent protests.
Recognizing the need to address these concerns, Pino-
chet has reluctantly opened a limited political dia-
logue with his civilian opponents. His speech on 11
September marking the 10th anniversary of Allende's
ouster avoided confrontation. That tack and the fact
that the violence occasioned by the protest on
South
Pacific
Ocean
0 300 Kilometers
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
Boundary reorasantatlon I,
not 0aoesaarily authoritative
8 September was held to a moderate level should
permit the resumption of talks with the democratic
opposition that were initiated in mid-August. Al-
though in his speech Pinochet defended the 1980
Constitution's timetable for a return to civilian rule in
1989, he went on to state that the government is
considering amending the Constitution to permit the
earlier election of a congress. He also expressed
support for conservative Interior Minister Jarpa's
dialogue with the moderate opposition Democratic
Alliance.
All of Pinochet's critics are dissatisfied with his
concessions and continue to demand his resignation.
But while moderate opposition leaders want to main-
tain a dialogue with the government in the hope of
extracting significant concessions, the Communist
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Gen. Augusto Pinochet is shrewd and politically
savvy, and can make propitiating gestures, such as
the appointment of the commission to study the
return of exiles. But as pressure mounts, his basic
inclination is to crack down. A decisive person,
Pinochet is tenacious once he makes a decision and
rarely changes his mind. The magnitude of unrest
recently has led to the uncharacteristic appearance of
uncertainty and floundering. We do not believe this
signifies a fundamental change in his leadership
style, but rather a temporary response to stress. We
Santiago police use water cannons against anti-
government demonstrators during the 8 Septem-
Party and the Movement. of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR) are likely to take every advantage of the dismal
economic situation and increasing public desire for
civilian rule in order to provoke further turbulence,
although they may hold off from encouraging violence
during future days of protest because of their failure
to provoke the security forces into overreacting during
the protest on 8 September. In our view, an escalation
of violence would polarize the country and delay
progress toward the restoration of civilian govern-
ment.
The troubled economy-in severe decline since
mid-1981 because of the falling price of copper,
heightened competition for export markets, high in-
ternational interest rates, and a sharp decline in the
believe that as disorder mounts his basic disposition
to control and control ruthlessly will again come to
the fore. Human rights violations would not especial-
ly bother him because he rationalizes these excesses
as necessary to maintaining stability. Although he
could make conciliatory gestures to the opposition,
this tack would be cosmetic, for he is not capable of
genuinely opening up and sharing power. He is con-
vinced his own survival is critical to Chile's survival
and will do whatever he deems necessary to stay in
power.
availability of foreign loans-has caused considerable
hardship for a broad cross section of Chileans. Gov-
ernment employment programs and debt rescheduling
agreements reached with the IMF and other external
lenders are helping to stimulate a modest recovery.
Continuing improvement will depend on an upturn in
the world economy, a rising demand for copper, and a
stable domestic environment
? Criticism by senior military commanders of Pino-
chet's policies or personal behavior.
? Persisting opposition protests calling for Pinochet's
immediate resignation.
? Further pressure for a more specific timetable for an
earlier transition to civilian rule.
? Increased terrorism from the right or left, especially
assassinations of key government or opposition lead-
ers, that undermines talks aimed at an earlier return
to civilian rule.
? More brutal military enforcement of internal securi-
ty laws and heavier punishments of violators.
Jarpa.
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Iraq
? Super Etendard aircraft and antiship missiles-
which Saddam Husayn may use against internation-
al oil carriers in the Gulf if he becomes desperate
enough-are being obtained from France.
? Iran has opened a second front in Iraqi Kurdistan
and captured a base there from which it can supply
anti-Baghdad Kurdish guerrillas.
? The largest Iraqi Kurdish dissident group, the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), is now spear-
heading the Iranian incursion.
? Ankara fears that the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq may
spill over into Turkey and may be preparing another
raid into Iraq to weaken the rebels.
? The economy is deteriorating rapidly as a result of
falling oil revenues, import cuts, and food and
energy shortages.
Comment
Baghdad's use of five Super Etendard aircraft-
promised but not yet delivered by France-against
Iranian oil exports could precipitate further develop-
ments resulting in serious instability in Iraq. Baghdad
already has threatened to use the aircraft, equipped
with Exocet missiles, against international oil carriers
using Khark Island.
such a move would prompt swift Iranian
retaliation, including the destruction of Iraq's oil
pipeline through Turkey. Interdiction of the pipe-
line-Iraq's sole remaining export outlet-for an ex-
tended period would have a devastating impact on the
economy, enough to threaten the survival of the
regime.
Baghdad's economy is already in desperate shape.
Oil revenues for 1983 are projected to reach only
$7 billion, as compared with $9 billion in 1982 and
$25 billion in 1981. During the past year Baghdad has
been increasingly unable to procure foreign loans,
imports have been cut drastically, shortages of fresh
food have begun to develop, and long lines to buy
gasoline are a regular scene. So far the Iraqi people
have been able to accommodate inconveniences. We
find it impossible to determine whether such incon-
viences and shortages are perceived as serious hard-
ship by Iraqis. We have seen no signs of public
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protests, and most Iraqi Arabs still seem to support 25X1
the regime. We do not believe the population could
tolerate the hardships resulting from a total cutoff of
the country's oil exports, however.
Meanwhile, Iraq will find it difficult to put down the
Kurdish rebellion and counter Iran's successful pene-
tration in the north. The KDP guerrillas have an
intimate knowledge of the topography and are backed
up by regular Iranian forces, who are supplying the 25X1
rebels from Haj Umran, a border post seized in late 25X1
July. If the Iraqi Army, which is highly mechanized
and hence less effective in the rugged northern moun-
tain terrain, fails to rid the area of enemy forces
before winter, we anticipate that the Kurds with
Iranian support will be able to consolidate their new
positions and expand offensive operations next spring. 25X1
Ankara has expressed deep concern to US officials
over the changing security situation in Iraqi Kurdi-
stan. It fears that the rebellion will spill over into
Turkey's southeastern provinces where 8 million
Turkish Kurds reside. Last May Ankara sent two
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Iraqi prisoners of war captured
on 22 July near HaJ Umran
during the Iranian offensive
Army brigades into Iraqi Kurdistan to root out rebel-
lious Turkish Kurds who were using Iraq as a safe-
haven. Ankara has threatened to stage another cross-
border raid
? Acts provocative to Turkey, such as attempts to
sabotage the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline, or attacks
by Kurdish rebels on Turkish trucks traveling the
highway south of the Iraqi-Turkish border.
Turkey also believes the Iran-Iraq war is escalating
dangerously; the Turkish Ambassador to Washingtorr
has said that if Iran blows up the Iraqi-Turkish oil
pipeline, Turkey would retaliate against Iran with
armed force.
? Delivery of the Super Etendard aircraft and their
deployment to an airfield in southern Iraq.
? Failure by the Iraqi military to defeat Kurdish and
Iranian forces in Iraqi Kurdistan before the onset of
winter.
? Major acts of sabotage in Baghdad committed by
Iranian-supported opposition groups.
? The establishment of an Iranian-backed Iraqi pup-
pet government in Iraqi Kurdistan.
? Demonstrations protesting economic shortages.
? Baghdad's inability to borrow further from abroad.
? A new drop in oil revenues.
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? Despite increased oil revenues and imports, popular
and largely spontaneous demonstrations protesting
commodity shortages, price increases, unemploy-
ment, and poor living conditions broke out in July
and August in 14 cities throughout the country.
? Conservative senior clerics who are rivals of Ayatol-
lah Khomeini sponsored antiregime demonstrations
in Esfahan in July and in Mashhad in August
protesting radical governmental policies.
? Clerics who support radical domestic policies have
sought to exploit the unrest and move against their
conservative rivals.
? Several exile and other opposition groups are seek-
ing to use the protests to further their antiregime
activities
? The regime has responded to the unrest by attempt-
ing to impose price controls, prevent stockpiling, and
ensure that goods are distributed more effectively.
Comment
The economic and religious protests that occurred
over the summer indicate that popular discontent with
the regime is growing but has not reached the level of
an immediate threat. Although oil revenues increased
during the quarter, economic conditions for the ma-
jority of Iranians have not improved because of
disruptive government policies and inefficient proce-
dures for the distribution of goods.
Most demonstrations appear to reflect the economic
unhappiness of urban workers and others whose ex-
pectations were aroused by decrees Khomeini issued
in December that implied political repression and
severe social behavior codes would be eased. The
protesters, however, have avoided direct criticism of
Khomeini, who continues to retain the support and
loyalty of the lower classes.
A more serious challenge to the regime are the
demonstrations sponsored by senior clerics attacking
the government's radical economic and social policies
and sheer inefficiency. In July, one cleric publicly
shredded a picture of Khomeini and labeled regime
policies "un-Islamic."
Exiled opposition groups are attempting to exploit the
lower class's discontent and have called for more
demonstrations. Concurrently, posters of the Shah's
son have appeared in several cities. We believe the
exiles will be unable to take advantage of the situation
unless they unify, coordinate their actions, and devise
a strategy for turning key urban groups against
Khomeini.
The government's generally restrained response to the
protests appears to have been seen as a sign of
weakness and has encouraged criticism. We believe
there is not much the regime can do to end peaceful
demonstrations led by respected conservative clerics,
particularly because Khomeini has appealed to clerics
to become more politically involved. The government
may also believe that forceful official action to break
up lower class protests could result in bloodshed and a
cycle of unrest similar to the one that overthrew the
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Shah. Faced with this threat, the government is
attempting to distribute goods more effectively and to
keep prices down. The cabinet also has been reshuf-
fled in an effort to make it more efficient in dealing
with economic problems. We think the challenge from
conservative clerics might compel the regime to mod-
erate policies, such as extensive land reform and
nationalization of foreign trade, although factional
rivalries will make this difficult.
Behind the scenes, radicals and conservatives within
the government continue to battle over power and
position. Radical clerics have exploited the unrest to
oust rivals and garner new positions for themselves. It
was in part radical pressure, for example, that forced
the Commerce and Labor Ministers, who supported a
freer economy, to resign in early August. We do not
believe the radical-conservative power struggle is like-
ly to be won by either side soon.
In response to worker and peasant grumbling over
heavy casualties and lack of battlefield successes in
the war with Iraq, the regime has lowered the scale of
the fighting by adopting a strategy of attrition. The
fighting that has occurred during the Iranian Army's
campaign across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan has
been less heavy than in previous offensives further
south. However, Khomeini still opposes any negotiat-
ed settlement
If Iranian oil exports were to be suspended as a
consequence of military attacks by Iraqi Super Eten-
dard aircraft, which are being acquired from France,
Tehran's economic situation would not significantly
deteriorate in the short term. Tehran undoubtedly
would retaliate against Iraq, but we do not expect it to
block the Strait of Hormuz, as this would hurt Iran as
much as Iraq. Tehran's financial reserves would en-
able it to continue essential imports at present levels
for up to a year. Some austerity measures, however,
would need to be taken, and nonessential imports
would have to be reduced. Although the population
might blame ensuing hardships on the regime because
of its insistence on continuing the war, we believe that
Tehran would be able to deflect the blame onto Iraq.
? Further demonstrations in major cities, especially
any violence or direct attacks on Khomeini.
? A harsh regime crackdown on the protesters.
? The government's failure to modify radical econom-
ic policies or otherwise improve economic
conditions.
? Further conflict over economic and social policies
between conservative and radical clerics that
hinders the regime's ability to make decisions.
? Antiregime activities by senior conservative ayatol-
lahs unhappy with the government's radical eco-
nomic and social policies and a growth of popular
support for their positions.
? Increased unity and coordination of activities by
exiled opposition groups that makes them better
able to exploit antiregime discontent.
? Major destruction of Iranian oil facilities by Iraqi
Super Etendard aircraft.
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thereby retain power.
? President Zia's announcement on 12 August that
civilian rule will be restored by March 1985 pre-
pares the way for him to run for president and
oust him from office.
? The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD), a coalition of eight left-center parties led by
the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), has rejected Zia's
plans and begun a civil disobedience campaign to
Punjabi-dominated military government.
? The MRD campaign has been effective only in Sind
Province, where widespread disturbances that began
in August reflect serious Sindhi discontent with the
MRD campaigns
Karachi
Arabian Sea
o 125 Kilometers
n inc uii
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
? Conservative and religious party leaders, although
also critical of Zia's plans, have disavowed the
? The economy has been growing steadily.
extensive powers.
Comment
Besides providing for his retention of the presidency,
Zia's proposals could give the military a constitutional
role in politics, including the right to veto legislation.
The plan also contains a protracted timetable for the
return to civilian government and gives the president
The proposals have evoked strong criticism from the
civilian opposition ands
e e ieve that
the consequent violent protests have led some top
miliary commanders to try to persuade Zia to begin a
dialogue with his civilian opponents, including PPP
moderates. Rather than make concessions to the
political parties or amend his proposals so as to limit
the new president's authority, Zia is now trying to
contain the Sind disturbances by co-opting individual
politicians and pressuring traditional Sindhi leaders.
Although the military so far has been able to control
the Sind unrest, the MRD-sponsored demonstrations
and related political violence that have erupted in
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Sind Province represent the most serious challenge to
the military regime since it assumed power in 1977. 25X1
The protests have drawn support from a broad coali-
tion of Sindhi society, including landlords, clergy,
local elected officials, provincial civil servants, and
students. Most ethnic Sindhis have long been alienat-
ed from the martial law regime. They believe Zia has
abrogated former Prime Minister Bhutto's plan to
develop the province, they remain angered by the
ouster and execution of Bhutto-himself a Sindhi, 25X1
they resent domination by the largely Punjabi Army,
and they believe their long-term interests are endan-
gered by the growing economic encroachment of 2.5X1
outsiders in their province. It is no coincidence that 25X1
the worst violence occurred in central and northern
Sind where newly irrigated land is being given to
Punjabi settlers, including many former Army offi-
The USSR and India have publicly criticized the
prospect of continued military rule in Pakistan and
expressed sympathy for Zia's foes. 25X1
of oscow 25X1
an New Delhi may have played a role in the Sind 25X1
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Lawyers march in Karachi in
August with placards demand-
ing an end to martial law.F_
disturbances. Opposition leaders have previously told
US diplomats that leftists are receiving substantial
Soviet funds. Such external interference could exacer-
bate Zia's problems in Sind but is likely to work to his
advantage elsewhere by permitting him to exploit the
strong anti-Indian and anti-Soviet sentiments of many
Pakistanis
Zia retains considerable popular support in the key
province of Punjab, notwithstanding strong pockets of
opposition. Punjabi bazaar merchants and Muslim
clergymen-who we believe could play leading roles
in organizing urban unrest-as well as the rightwing
and religious parties apparently consider Zia prefera-
ble to a PPP-dominated government and refuse to
support the opposition campaign. Students and labor
groups generally hold civilian politicians in low regard
and are unlikely to join the protest movement unless it
gathers considerably more steam or Zia pursues plans
attacking their interests, such as banning college
student unions. Although Punjab's urban and rural
poor still support Bhutto's PPP, Bhutto's widow, who
is seriously ill in Europe, and his daughter, who has
been under house arrest since 1981, are in no position
We do not believe the military regime will be serious-
ly threatened so long as it retains Punjabi military,
merchant, and religious support, the opposition parties
remain fragmented, and the economy stays healthy.
Zia himself, though, could be unseated by other senior
generals if persisting unrest in Sind appears to be the
result of his mishandling of the situation, or if the
violence spreads to Punjab Province and the Army is
called on to suppress fellow Punjabis. Over the long
haul, we believe that Sindhi demands for a separate
state are likely to grow and seriously threaten Paki-
stan's territorial integrity unless Zia co-opts the tradi-
tional Sindhi elites and provides for genuine Sindhi
representation in the proposed civilian government.
to galvanize them.
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? Participation of large numbers of non-Sindhis in
antigovernment violence in Sind Province, particu-
larly in the cities of Hyderabad and Karachi.
? The spread of serious anti-Zia protests to Punjab
Province.
? Growing support for the protest movement from
previously uncommitted conservative, religious, la-
bor, and student groups.
? Evidence of external financial and other support to
the opposition for the purpose of increasing the level
of protest against the regime.
? Military unwillingness to suppress protests.
? Senior military attempts to bypass Zia and negoti-
ate with opposition political leaders.
? A new serious economic downturn leading to price
increases and shortages of essential commodities.
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Nigeria
than 4 million votes.
? President Shagari won reelection, capturing almost
50 percent of the total vote and defeating his nearest
rival, Yoruba leader Obafemi Awolowo, by more
? In subsequent elections, Shagari's National Party
captured 11 of 19 governorships and a majority of
federal senate and house seats.
strations in several others.
? National Party victories in opposition party ethnic
strongholds sparked some violent outbreaks and
forced the beleaguered Federal Election Commis-
sion to announce an official inquiry, delay elections
in two states, and impose curfews and ban demon-
term debt of $6 billion.
? After protracted negotiations, the government ob-
tained the agreement of more than 20 international
banks to reschedule about a third of its total short-
their challenges.
Comment
Although the country's cumbersome national elec-
tions were completed on schedule, we believe that
opposition party allegations of rigging-which in fact
was indulged in by both the government and opposi-
tion parties-could undercut Shagari's legitimacy in
some areas of the country and thus weaken prospects
for long-term stability. Election-related violence was
modest by historical standards, but nonetheless about
100 people were killed-many by thugs hired by
various parties-and hundreds were arrested in riots
that followed controversial gubernatorial elections.
Thus far, however, most defeated candidates have
indicated a willingness to wait for the courts to decide
Despite the anger of the opposition parties, we see
little likelihood that they will soon overcome long-
standing personal and ethnic differences and form a
united front. Their allegations of rigging aside, we
estimate that neither the Yoruba-dominated Unity
Party nor the largely Ibo-dominated Nigerian Peo-
ple's Party attracted much support outside their tradi-
tional ethnic bases. Consequently, we believe that
pressure will now build in both parties for veteran
leaders Awolowo and Azikiwe to withdraw in favor of
younger politicians better able to bridge ethnic and
regional divisions.
The National Party's near sweep of the elections
carries problems in addition to the accusations of
fraud. Shagari's comfortable legislative majority
means he no longer can blame economic and political
difficulties on opposition obstructionism. We further
believe that Shagari will face some significant chal-
lenges to his control of the National Party during the
first few months of his second term, although we
expect him to remain dominant by virtue of his
increased mandate. Shagari's public image as a leader
able to put national interests ahead of sectional goals
and treat all ethnic groups evenhandedly would di-
minish if he gives in to northern pressure for increased
influence in national politics. At the same time,
southern National Party politicians will expect to be
rewarded for having increased party support in the
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Postelection violence on 15 Au-
gust by Yoruba supporters of
the Unity Party resulted in the
death of a progovernment Na-
south. Jockeying over the choice of a party successor
to Shagari-who is constitutionally barred from run-
ning for a third term- -also is likely to intensify as his
second term progresses.
especially in urban areas previously controlled by
opposition parties. Shagari also will probably find it
difficult to follow through on his commitments to
bring more efficient ministers into his cabinet, tackle
such highly charged issues as the creation of new
federal states, and attack endemic problems such as
We foresee continuing economic difficulties even if
Lagos continues to produce well over its OPEC-
mandated quota of 1.3 million barrels of oil per day.
Mounting evidence indicates that future commercial
bank loans for consumer imports and industrial goods
will depend largely on the government's ability to
reach agreement with the IMF for additional loans
and retain the Fund's confidence. Historically, Lagos
has had little success in systematically implementing
tough economic policies, and we believe it will find it
similarly difficult to adhere to the IMF conditions we
anticipate.
Although we do not foresee a dramatic slide into
political chaos, we believe Nigeria's still fragile civil-
ian political institutions will continue to be tested
during the next two years. The government's support
will be eroded if economic conditions deteriorate,
corruption.
The military provided only logistic support during the
recent elections and has remained aloof from politics
since 1979. Coming on top of the allegations of
election rigging, however, adverse political and eco-
nomic developments over the next two years could
increase ethnic and other tensions in the armed forces.
Southern middle and junior grade officers might enter
into coup plotting if the perception becomes wide-
spread that Shagari is tolerating excessive corruption
and northern influence and not making adequate
progress toward resolving the country's social and
economic problems.
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? An increase in competition for power and position
along ethnic lines within Shagari's National Party.
? Governmental actions especially favoring northern
or southern state interests.
? Opposition attempts to link economic difficulties
with ethnic issues.
? Heightening ethnic tensions as evidenced, for exam-
ple, by spontaneous group violence, communal dem-
onstrations, and population flight.
? Increased discontent among southern middle and
junior grade military officers over growing northern
influence in both the military and the government.
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Philippines
? Opposition leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated
on his arrival in Manila on 21 August while being
escorted by three government security guards.F_
? Violence following a massive antiregime rally in
Manila on 21 September resulted in more than 10
civilian and security personnel deaths and about 200
injured. Anti-Marcos rallies also were held on 21
September in Cebu and Zamboanga
? President Marcos has abandoned his policy of
"maximum restraint" and is now cracking down on
the mass demonstrations that have followed the 21
September rally.
the Philippines.
? The moderate opposition has renewed threats to
boycott the 1984 National Assembly election
? Marcos fears that Aquino's assassination and the
violence on 21 September will cause the US Con-
gress to alter the terms of the $900 million base
assistance package scheduled to begin next spring.
? Increasingly serious external financial problems
have led Manila to sound out the United States for
emergency financial assistance.
? Marcos suffered an acute bacterial infection in
early August, causing a flareup of his chronic
kidney ailment that required two dialysis proce-
duresF------]
? Marcos has tightened his control over the military
by further strengthening the position of Armed
Forces Chief of Staff General Ver, a longtime
loyalist
Comment
Public dissatisfaction with President Marcos's rule
appears to be growing, and we believe a combination
of not implausible developments could usher in a
period of prolonged instability, including the deposal
of Marcos from the presidency. These factors include
Zamboanga-1/
Philippine
Sea
an escalation or continuation of the sort of violence
that erupted on 21 September, a major external debt
crisis, the further withdrawal of support by influential
business leaders, increased unity among the moderate
opposition, open condemnation of Marcos by leading
Roman Catholic clerics such as Cardinal Sin, a
perception among senior military commanders that
Marcos is losing his grip, and further signs of Mar-
cos's ill health. A sustained series of spontaneous mass
demonstrations and the absence of conciliatory mea-
sures by Marcos would encourage important elites
previously loyal to Marcos-such as the military and
the President's business cronies-to consider alterna-
tives to his rule and thus further undermine his
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position. In the process, we are deeply concerned that
the existing good will felt by most Filipinos toward the
United States could be seriously eroded because of a
popular perception that the United States is propping
up the Marcos regime
The foreign media, most of the political opposition,
and probably a large majority of Filipinos believe that
the government was behind the assassination. Al-
though the government seems to be pressing its own
investigation, its statements and explanations have
convinced few that it is not responsible for the
assassination and it has failed to appoint credible
public figures to the investigating commission.
We believe the 1984 election could have been a major
watershed in the liberalization of post-martial-law
politics had the assassination not occurred. In the
wake of the Aquino murder, however, Marcos will
find it especially difficult to simultaneously appear
fair in setting election rules, induce the moderate
opposition to participate, and assure a victory by his
ruling party. We anticipate that a boycott of the
election by the moderate opposition would deny the
legitimacy of the electoral victory that Marcos's
ruling KBL party is likely to win. The boycott also
would make the moderate opposition-still fragment-
ed and without an outstanding leader in the absence
of Aquino-largely irrelevant to the country's politi-
cal future. The moderates' impotence, we believe,
would promote political polarization and play into the
hands of both the left and the right
The Communist Party of the Philippines is exploiting
the unsettled political situation, primarily through its
political arm, the National Democratic Front. Filipino
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officials claim Communists played a role in the 21
September riots; Communist front groups certainly
were prominent at the peaceful demonstrations early
that afternoon. The Communists also may be making
plans to encourage future violence. They undoubtedly
will step up their recruiting activities and could find
fertile ground in student and labor groups. The
.Communists' armed wing, the New People's Army,
which operates primarily in rural areas, has not yet
attempted to extend its military operations into urban
We believe Marcos is seriously concerned over the
potentially adverse effects of President Reagan's can-
cellation of his November visit. Marcos had hoped to
use the event to boost his international image as a
statesman and legitimize his post-martial-law political
system for domestic consumption. By contrast, Filip-
pinos may interpret the cancellation as implying a US
lack of confidence in Marcos's regime and despair or
draw encouragement depending on whether they sup-
port or oppose Marcos. Conversely, though, Commu-
nist and other opposition groups have been deprived of
a major event around which they had hoped to
organize major demonstrations and perhaps violence.
areas in the wake of the assassination
We believe a further sharp deterioration in Marcos's
precarious health could precipitate far-reaching
changes in the nature of the regime. Jockeying for
succession already appears to have intensified in the
wake of Marcos's August illness. Several of his most
influential associates assumed the worst and moved to
align themselves with Imelda Marcos, who many
ruling party politicians believe will succeed the Presi-
dent if he becomes incapacitated, notwithstanding
constitutional provisions providing for an interim gov-
ernment and recent protestations by Imelda that she
intends to withdraw from politics.
Infighting within the defense establishment, presaging
an enhanced role for the military in the post-Marcos
era, also has surfaced. Following an eruption of
longstanding tensions between civilian Defense Minis-
ter Enrile and General Ver-both of whom have been
touted as potential successors-Marcos came down
squarely on the side of Ver; who earlier had consoli-
iated his control over the military by placing loyal
officers in key command and staff positions. Marcos
summoned Enrile to his office, questioned his loyalty,
and told him the defense establishment was being
reorganized.
A disruption of the economy resulting from the
'financial crisis would further erode Marcos's credibil-
ity and make the coming election even more difficult
for him. The Central Bank's liquidity is seriously
strained, and repayments due on the short-term $2.2
billion debt may soon cause a foreign exchange crisis.
In the meantime, Manila is cutting back sharply on
fourth-quarter 1983 spending and plans a 34-percent
reduction in capital outlays in its 1984 budget. A 21-
percent devaluation imposed in early October prom-
ises to ease pressures on Central Bank reserves, but
the inflationary effects will add to Marcos's political
burdens.
International banks, which were considering curtail-
ing short-term lines of credit to the Philippines, in
be reassured by the devaluation in early October. I 25X1
Key Indicators To Watch
? A sharp deterioration in Marcos's health.
? The surfacing of strong evidence of governmental
complicity in the Aquino assassination.
? Foot-dragging or the deliberate suppression of evi-
dence by the independent commission of inquiry.
? Increased unity among the moderate opposition
parties and an announcement that they will boycott
next year's election.
? Intensified condemnation of Marcos by leading
Roman Catholic clerics or businessmen.
? Adverse reactions to the cancellation of President
Reagan's visit, including a loss of confidence in the
regime by international banks and a consequent
withdrawal of credit lines, capital flight, and signs
that Filipinos generally are beginning to believe that
Marcos is on his way out.
? Increasing success by the Communist Party of the
Philippines in recruiting Filipino youths and work-
ers either into its political wing, the National Demo-
cratic Front, or guerrilla arm, the New People's
Army.
? Signs of dissatisfaction with Marcos on the part of
senior military commanders.
25X1
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
Secret
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Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to individual countries
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
 L_ _L
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Secret
Mexico: Selected Political and Economic Indicators,
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
L developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
?
?
?
O
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
External factors
Regime actions and capabilities
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
LZ
3,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
__ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894ROO0200340007-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894ROO0200340007-5
El Salvador: Selected Political and Economic Indicators-,
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
developments of moderate
concern
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
US S
Consumer Price Increase 5
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
'Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
?
?
?
100 1
1981
40
?
III IV 1
1982
?
CA
0
IV 1
1983
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Secret
Guatemala: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
01
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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6
(9)
0
0
e
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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(0
0
(
0
@
@
0
0
0
0
0
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Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
-2
Exports to OECD Countries
250
US $
175
150
a Base year is 1975.
b Population Figures based on mid-)ear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Honduras: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
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?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
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?
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?
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?
0
?
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
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?
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?
?
Economico?e Real p:r Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase 5
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US S
0
250
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-s ear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
100 1
1981
III IV I
1982
IV 1
1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894ROO0200340007-5
Secret
Panama: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 II 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
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Opposition activities
?
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?
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?
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?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
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?
?
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
450
2.5
0
350
100 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Odevelopments of moderate
concern
(*developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
is
?
?
Economic factors
?
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?
?
?
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?
0
0
0
0
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0
0
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0
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0
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External factors
?
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0
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries 800
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on midyear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
500 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
Venezuela: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
) developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
Economic factors
5
5
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
)
0
Opposition activities
External factors
Regime actions and capabilities
5
5
5
5
5
0
)
)
)
0
0
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
100
4
0
3,4 00
3,2 00
3,000
2,800
2, 000
2,400
Nw~
2,2 00
2,000 I III IV I III IV I
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
1983
1981
1982
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
I 11 111 IV
1983
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
G
(1)
9
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
Economicd?e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-sear census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
'Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
750
500 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
Secret
Brazil: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Regime actions and capabilities
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
10
4,000
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country. conditions.
3,000 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
-TT-_-T--- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/14: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200340007-5
Argentina: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
Regime actions and capabilities
Population (millions)c
Economic" Real per Capita Imports
US $
concern
? developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
?
?
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?b
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
bThe Falklands/Malvinas Islands war.
C Population figures based on mid-year census.
dEstimated.
e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
f Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
III IV I
1982
II III IV I II III IV
1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
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Secret
Chile: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
.developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Odevelopments of moderate
concern
*developments of serious concern
1981
I II 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
0
?
S
?
0
0
Economic factors
4
4
0
O
!
?
O
?
?
O
Opposition activities
5
5
5
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
1*
External factors
5
?
5
?
5
?
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
5
5
5
5
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-Sear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
600 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Spain: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II Ill IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
0
?
?
?
?
? 0
?
0
?
0
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
Opposition activities
u
?
?
?
?
?
O
?
O
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
O
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
115
110
100
95
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-s ear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
2,500
2,000 1
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
O developments of moderate
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Secret
Greece: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0developments of moderate
concern
Odevelopments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
External factors
m
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
Economicd,e Real prr Capita Imports
US S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports t
o OECD Countries 1,000
us $
900
800
a Base year is 1975.
500
1 II III IV
I III IV
1
b Population figures based on
C Estimated.
mid-year census.
1981 1982 1983
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
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Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicators-
Regime
Population ( actions milli and ons)b capabilities
Economicd?e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
.developments not of concern,
or not applicable
o developments of moderate
concern
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-sear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
'Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
900
IV I
1982
I
1983
l developments of serious concern
1951
1 11 III IV
1982
1 II 111 IV
1983
1 11 III IV
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~i
~i
?
?
?
?
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?
?
?
?
Economic factors
J
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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Secret
Morocco: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
concern
C developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 III IV
1982
1 11 III IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
*1
0
0
?
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
Opposition activities
5
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
External factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
5
0
0
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
0
500
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
300 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
concern
z developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
O
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
G
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
External factors
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated,
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
600 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
.developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0developments of moderate
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Secret
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
O developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
External factors
Regime actions and capabilities
Population (millions)b
1981
I II III IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
Economic factors
?
Opposition activities
?
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real p. -r Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
800
2
-2
25,000
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-sear census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
8.5 8.5 8.5c
Saudi population includes approximately 3 million foreign laborers.
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Iraq: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I 11 111 IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
External factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Qb
0
Regime actions and capabilities
9
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
?
0
Population (millions)c
Economice,f Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Concern is with recent Turkish troop incursion into
Iraq and potential effect on Kurdish minority.
c Population figures based on mid-year census.
d Estimated.
eDashed lines indicate estimated data.
fScales vary according to differing country conditions.
500 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
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Secret
*developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Qdevelopments of moderate
concern
C developments of serious concern
1981
I Il III IV
1982
1 II III IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
Ob
Ob
?
Regime actions and capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economiceff Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Concern is with effects of war with Iraq.
c Population figures based on mid-year census.
d Estimated.
e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
Tales vary according to differing country conditions.
-4
7,000
3,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I II
1983
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concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II 111 IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
0
C J
External factors
i
0
0
0
0
0
a
Regime actions and capabilities
0
U
o
0
0
0
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
6.0
8
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
0
325
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on midyear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
200 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I II
1983
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
developments of moderate
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Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
concern
D developments of serious concern
1981
I 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
O
?
?
?
O
?
0
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
9
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
5
?
?
?
?
?
?
C j
0
?
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
2,000 1
1981
III IV 1
1982
III IV I
1983
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Somalia: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
O
O
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
-3
100
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
O developments of moderate
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorse
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
)developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
I II 111 IV
1983
1 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
)
)
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
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?
?
)
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
O
?
?
?
?
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?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
)
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-) ear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
200
100 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Zaire: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorse
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
Economic factors
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
US S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
200 1
1981
II III IV 1 11 111 IV I II III IV
1982 1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0developments of moderate
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Regime actions and capabilities
Population (millions)b
Economicd.e Real p.-r Capita Imports
Us $
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0 developments of moderate
concern
O developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
O
O
O
?
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
II V IV I II III IV
1983
0
2,200
1,600 1 11 III IV I
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Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II 111 IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
O
O
?
?
C)
O
0
0
Economic factors
?
?
0
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
O
0
O
0
C
0
O
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
, ?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
O
O
O
O
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on midyear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
1,000 1
III IV I
1982
IV I
1983
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
C)developments of moderate
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Secret
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Odevelopments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I ll III IV
1982
1 ll III IV
1983
1 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
O,
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
O
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
O
0
0
Economicd?e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
eScales vary according to differing country conditions.
2,000 1
1981
IV 1
1982
III IV 1
1983
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concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
Economic factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
?
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economicd?e Real par Capita Imports
Us S
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
0
4,000
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-dear census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
1,500 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
0developments of moderate
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Secret
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