INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of sec, %, f
Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
GI IPI 83-001
April 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
April 1983
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to
Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues,
Secret
GI IN 83-001
April 1983
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
odic, systematic, and thematic way through the consistent application of a set of
This is the first issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide timely warning
of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 January to 31 March 1983, ex-
amines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. It
is not intended to supply short-term warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is
designed to address the potential for instability during the next two years in a peri-
cluding more specific political and economic data.
The quarterly will include four parts:
? A brief overview of each country.
? A more detailed assessment of those countries in which there have been
developments of concern.
? A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and tables in-
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This first issue assesses 16 countries; subsequent issues will include a total of 26
countries that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests. The
countries are selected because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers,
key US friends or allies, or countries geographically close to the United States.
iii Secret
GI IN 83-001
April 1983
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Part 1.
Major Developments at a Glance
1
Part 2.
Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Concern
3
Mexico
3
Pakistan
7
Nigeria
9
Philippines
11
Part 3.
Grap
hic Indicators
13
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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
Guatemala' The government's timing in executing six alleged terrorists, handling of the
murder of three Guatemalan US Agency for International Development (USAID)
employees, and ending of the state of siege have angered some senior and junior
military officers. President Rios Montt has enacted new laws opening up the
possibility of increased political participation.
will soon face further hard economic decisions.
The political system remains basically sound, but austerity measures to resuscitate
the deteriorating economy are eroding support for President de la Madrid, who
greater turmoil ahead.
Dissatisfaction in the armed forces with the conduct of the war, increasing
aggressiveness by the insurgents, and a stepped-up election timetable suggest
Domestic terrorists, with major assistance from Salvadoran insurgents, Cuba, and
Nicaragua, appear determined to continue their campaign of violence and
subversion, but are not a serious immediate threat.
Brazil' Recent progress toward a more democratic society should help counteract a
moderate loss of confidence and unrest brought on by the deteriorating economy.
Overall prospects for political stability have improved during the socialist govern-
ment's first months in office, despite renewed terrorism in the Basque provinces
and a controversial government abortion proposal.
capital investment is expected to strengthen economic and political stability.
Prime Minister Papandreou is coping reasonably well with heightened economic
difficulties, a vociferous public debate over defense relations with the United
States, and some nascent dissatisfaction within the military.
Turkey Government legislation to streamline inefficient public enterprises and to stimulate
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' See part 2 for detailed discussion.
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President Mubarak, having enhanced his domestic standing by some recent
diplomatic activity, now faces a potential political backlash because of the need to
make tough decisions on domestic spending cuts and import restraints owing to the
decline in oil prices.
Saudi Arabia The government has arrested more Shia dissidents in Eastern Province because of
increasing concern over potential Iranian subversion; Shias are unlikely to respond
by increased antiregime agitation for fear of losing their jobs in the oilfields and
triggering reprisals by the security forces.
Pakistan' Serious communal rioting in Karachi has forced the government to deploy troops
to restore order, but while tensions remain high, the opposition has been unable to
capitalize on this or other issues.
Nigeria' President Shagari faces problems ahead because of a decline in oil earnings and
what may be a difficult and violent election this summer; his opposition, though,
remains fragmented and disorganized.
Kenya Large, influential tribes are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with President Moi,
but there are no signs yet that opponents of the regime are organizing effectively.
Zaire Despite recent economic reforms, spontaneous urban demonstrations m result
from food shortages and other economic hardships.
Philippines' Larger Communist insurgency operations, a poorly performing economy, and
deteriorating Church-state relations augur a more perilous future but do not
threaten short-term stability.
Indonesia President Soeharto has been reelected without incident, and, notwithstanding
societal tensions such as population pressures and unemployment, the security
forces remain fully capable of maintaining domestic order.
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Concern
? A drop in world oil prices cut heavily into export
earnings while triple-digit inflation and austerity
measures began to lower labor and middle class
living standards.
? Labor leaders have publicly accused the business
sector of violating a December agreement aimed at
limiting price hikes on recently decontrolled items in
exchange for modest wage increases.
? According to the Attorney General of Mexico City,
a dramatic increase in crime there appears linked to
rising unemployment and rampant inflation.
? Despite the increased economic hardships, a rally
called by leftist groups to oppose governmental
policies attracted far fewer participants than expect-
ed.
Comment
The deterioration of the economy remains the govern-
ment's overriding concern. Critical import shortages
continue to reduce industrial output, and bankruptcies
and unemployment are growing. Weak world demand
has slashed export earnings, further cutting import
capacity. In mid-March the government lowered its
oil price from an average $28.75 to $26 per barrel,
retroactive to 1 February. We believe a further cut of
$1 to $2 per barrel is necessary if Mexico is to
maintain its share of the world oil market. We judge
that a lower oil export volume or a reduction in oil
prices will further cut export revenues and limit
President de la Madrid's ability to keep the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization program on
course.
even under optimum conditions the government
will probably overshoot its budget and fail to meet
IMF austerity targets. In these circumstances we
believe that Mexico would be unlikely to obtain the
further credits it needs and reverse the steep decline in
the economy.
Although political repercussions have been limited so
far, the President will find it increasingly difficult to
retain labor and middle class support as inflation and
rising unemployment take their tolls. The traditional
honeymoon granted to new presidents has already
been cut short. We believe that de la Madrid's
January "victory" in holding down the minimum
wage was offset by labor-private-sector bickering and
a lack of dramatic progress in his anticorruption
campaign. The President will soon have to make
further hard decisions between policies that promote
short-term calm and the austerity measures needed to
strengthen the economy. We believe that he will shift
the balance away from austerity toward social and
economic programs that have historically ensured
domestic peace. He has already reversed commit-
ments to cut food and public transport subsidies and
launched a huge new public works program.
We see few signs that Mexicans are becoming disen-
chanted with their political system. National pride in
past stability and governmental institutions and hopes
for economic recovery soon ballast the system and
should continue to provide a cushion against economic
shocks for some time. The leadership, moreover, is
competent and flexible, and no strong alternative
leader has emerged to organize a cohesive opposition.
A breakdown in consensus would come about only
slowly and would be easily detectable in Mexico's
open, sophisticated society.
Leftist groups have been unable to agree on a strategy
to oppose the government's policies. They are current-
ly attempting to organize antiregime rallies focusing
We believe the government would use
force to suppress disorder if that became necessary.
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The President appears ready to deal quickly and 25X1
decisively with violence and has already warned those
planning protests to comply with the law.
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? The January rebellion by Colonel Ochoa generated
heavy pressure in the armed forces for the resigna-
tion of Defense Minister Garcia.
? Encouraged by armed forces disunity, the guerrillas
demonstrated an increasing ability to overrun small
towns and isolated military garrisons, inflicting
heavy losses.
? The government's weapons and manpower superior-
ity generally kept the guerrillas from advancing into
new areas, but the armed forces still suffer from
fundamental weaknesses.
? The government moved up the election from March
1984 to December 1983 and created a peace com-
mission to stimulate wider political participation.
Comment
Defense Minister Garcia has been a major force for
moderation, but his enforcement of agrarian and
other reforms has angered extreme rightists. Several
key military officers, including the commander of the
Air Force, Colonel Bustillo, also have criticized his
management of the war effort. Garcia retains a loyal
coterie of senior staff officers, however, and through
recent maneuvering appears to have strengthened his
position. Nevertheless, pressure by some elements of
the armed forces for his resignation continues, and
President Magana may still decide that Garcia's
continuing presence undermines institutional unity.
The strategic balance in the war remains unchanged,
with neither side having the capacity to inflict a
decisive single blow. Recent guerrilla successes in the
north, however, suggest they are making increasingly
effective use of local militia to complement their
4,000 to 6,000 full-time armed regulars. We expect
that insurgent activity throughout the country will
intensify soon, with a corresponding increase in gov-
ernment casualties, which now average 275 killed or
wounded per month.
In our judgment, the shortcomings of the Salvadoran
armed forces suggest that their prospects for conduct-
ing a more aggressive war strategy between now and
the elections are poor. According to US defense
attache reporting, during recent fighting the armed
forces demonstrated improved field communications,
greater willingness to conduct night operations, and a
new ability to infiltrate guerrilla lines with long-range
reconnaissance patrols. These improvements were off-
set, however, by continuing weaknesses in command
and control, poor tactical discipline, and disregard for
communications security-problems that are unlikely
We believe the government's decision to establish a
peace commission and hold elections in December is
designed to regain the political and psychological
initiative and undercut insurgent calls for negotiations
that could lead to a power-sharing arrangement.
Despite sharp ideological divisions, the major political
parties remain united in rejecting the guerrillas'
"peace proposals," which they view as attempts to buy
time and increase international support. By offering
security guarantees, the government also hopes to
encourage electoral participation by more moderate
elements in the insurgent alliance, thus undermining
guerrilla unity and prestige.
The stepped-up election timetable will intensify exist-
ing strains in the fragile provisional government.
Spurred by fears the government may repeat its
electoral success of March 1982, the guerrillas will
undoubtedly try to undercut the perceived legitimacy
of the electoral process by exposing governmental
divisions and demonstrating their own political and
military strength. Recent guerrilla troop movements
and resupply operations suggest that plans for a
spring offensive, including increased targeting of the
already damaged economic infrastructure, are well
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? Repercussions from the February execution of six
alleged terrorists three days before the Pope's visit
and the murders of three Guatemalan USAID
employees may strain relations between Rios Montt
and some of his senior military advisers and junior
officers.
? The state of siege has been ended and regulations
for organizing political parties have been relaxed.
? The military plans a reorganization to improve
counterinsurgency efforts, and the government has
announced another amnesty for insurgents; but civic
action programs could be hampered by the weaken-
ing economy and lack of foreign assistance.
Comment
The renewal of political activity will lend credibility to
Rios Montt's promise to eventually hold national
elections. It is likely to involve participation by new
groups and parties, including some representative of
previously underrepresented sectors such as workers,
Indians, and peasants. at
least 18 parties were being organized in February.
As many of the new groups will likely push hard for
reforms, we believe Rios Montt must establish clear
limits within which the groups can operate if the
political liberalization process is to succeed. If guide-
lines are not established and accepted, the new politi-
cal parties could be exploited and radicalized by the
armed left-which in turn might lead to a new wave
of repression from the right. Leaders of the new
political groups may in any case become targets of
ultrarightists, used to assassinating political rivals.
The February murders by the military of three Guate-
malan USAID employees-together with the govern-
ment's execution of six alleged terrorists only three
days before the Pope's visit-could result in repercus-
sions among some senior military advisers. On the
other hand, the government's stated intention to
punish a junior officer for the murders likely will
create unhappiness in the junior officer corps, whose
members probably believe the officer had correctly
followed orders. Although Rios Montt's opponents
may try to exploit this dissension by attempting a
coup, we do not believe that they have sufficient
support to remove him.
Insurgent activity was sporadic during the quarter,
but large pockets of guerrillas remain. The planned
armed forces reorganization will create smaller, more
manageable operational zones, which should improve
both command and control and the ability to respond
to insurgent activities. While the amnesty should
further deplete insurgent numbers, the guerrillas, who
have been in tactical retreat for the past six months,
may try to demonstrate their viability by stepping up
terrorist attacks and ambushes.
? President Figueiredo's political liberalization pro-
gram instituted last year has made demonstrable
progress toward a more open and democratic sys-
tem.
? The economy further deteriorated during the last
quarter of 1982, capping a year of no growth and
triple-digit inflation, and continued to decline this
past quarter.
? The tough austerity measures being implemented to
improve economic performance and qualify for IMF
financial support are increasing domestic discontent
and criticism of the government.
Comment
Public concern about governmental leadership, which
increased in the wake of Brazil's publicized financial
problems, has been offset by President Figueiredo's
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liberalization initiatives-particularly the 1982 na-
tionwide elections-which have reinforced his person-
al popularity. The military remains solidly behind the
We are concerned, though, about the future political
impact of the government's stringent austerity pro-
gram. Although drawing few initial protests, the
policies now being implemented will mean rising
unemployment, lower living standards, the phasing
out of subsidies, and reduced business profitability.
Brazil's lowest income workers will be particularly
hard hit. Strike activity has already increased, espe-
cially in Sao Paulo, and will heighten as austerity
begins to take hold. We also expect some violent cost-
of-living demonstrations, increased violent crime, and
growing complaints by the business community.
These types of protest, most of which have been
frequent since 1979, should not seriously threaten the
regime.2
We believe that the political liberalization process will
continue to ameliorate economic discontent, although
opposition groups are scrutinizing the government's
austerity program and criticizing it publicly. We
doubt that any major opposition party would risk
undermining the gains associated with liberalization
by going beyond the bounds of official tolerance in its
activities. We believe the opposition parties' recent
gains in the nationwide elections will further encour-
age them to work within the system.
The next several months will set the tone for govern-
ment and opposition relations between now and the
presidential election in 1984. In our view, one of the
most serious potential challenges to the regime is that
a charismatic leader, such as Rio de Janeiro governor-
elect Brizola, might unify and effectively organize the
opposition.
? Oil export prices were lowered three times during
the quarter by a total of $4.50 per barrel, down to
the current price of $26.75 per barrel for Gulf of
Suez crude, contrasted with a $40.50 peak only two
years ago; government officials have privately dis-
closed lower economic growth targets to US Embas-
sy officials.
? The press highlighted the fraud trial of Sadat's
brother, which also implicated three cabinet minis-
ters and led to the dismissal of two.
? Notwithstanding Libya's threat to Sudan, the gov-
ernment was embarrassed by the publicity given the
US military deployments aimed at deterring Tripoli
in mid-February.
? President Mubarak's recent diplomatic activity has
boosted his domestic standing.
Comment
The government is preparing the public for slower
economic growth and tough budget decisions this
spring by publicly discussing the potential adverse
effects of anticipated oil revenue shortfalls. We be-
lieve that the oil price decline will probably require
import. restraints and could force spending cuts in
politically sensitive government programs.
Mubarak contines to demonstrate his commitment to
root out corruption. Further corruption charges
against key members of the President's cabinet,
though, could weaken Mubarak's position, despite his
own apparent personal honesty.
Mubarak finds it difficult to justify overt displays of
strategic cooperation with the United States, particu-
larly while Israel keeps its troops in Lebanon. Unhap-
py with the mid-February press publicity, Mubarak is
likely to try to protect his domestic and regional
standing by maintaining a tough stance against per-
manent US basing rights in Egypt. He also may insist
on stricter limits to future strategic cooperation with
the United States as it concerns joint military exer-
cises and other highly visible military-related activi-
' We believe the violent labor protests that occurred in Sao Paulo in
early April in reaction to the austerity measures may recur and
even spread.
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Many Egyptian observers in and out of government
believe that Mubarak's foreign policy performance-
most recently on trips to the United States, Canada,
and Europe-is helping him establish a positive,
distinct presidential style that is strengthening his
domestic position. The President has been given par-
ticularly high marks for clarifying Arab positions on
Middle East issues while in Washington. His attend-
ance at the New Delhi Nonaligned Summit in early
March has further boosted his stock. The Palestine
National Council's endorsement of Egyptian opposi-
tion groups will likely prove only a temporary setback
to Mubarak's relationship with the moderate leader-
ship of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
? Fighting in Karachi between Sunni and Shia mobs
in February and again in March forced local au-
thorities to call in the military and prompted Presi-
dent Zia to question the effectiveness of his intelli-
gence services.
? Student demonstrations and fighting between left-
ists and rightists on campuses persisted, most seri-
ously in Karachi and Rawalpindi.
? Lahore police routed an early February procession
of prominent women lawyers protesting Zia's pro-
posals to bring Pakistan's legal system in line with
the Koran.
? Marri tribesmen opposing government highway con-
struction in Baluchistan ambushed a military patrol
in January, killing a local militia commander and
four soldiers
? Power reductions in January caused nationwide
urban blackouts; throughout the quarter strikes and
work stoppages occurred protesting price, tax, and
tariff increases.
Comment
Although social, political, and economic tensions in-
creased during the quarter, Zia maintained his image
as a strong leader and remains firmly in control.
During both outbreaks of sectarian violence in Kara-
chi, the military was able to restore order and prevent
the strife from spreading to other cities. The March
rioting had antipolice overtones, but religion remained
the dominant issue. Student clashes, notwithstanding
their challenge to public order, continue to relate
primarily to campus issues and do not seriously
threaten stability. Those protests arising out of eco-
nomic grievances and the proposed reduction in legal
protection for women so far have been easily con-
tained.
The danger to Zia in the event of further disorder is
that the public or senior military officers will dispar-
age his effectiveness or condemn him if he resorts to
Over the long haul, any major increase in sectarian
conflict in Pakistan's heterogeneous society could
seriously threaten stability. Although no separatist
movement is currently active, future threats could
arise from several real and potential problems.
Sindhi campus
radicals are trying to stir up anti-Punjabi sentiment;
the government's fragile rule in rural Baluchistan was
demonstrated by the recent ambush of the military
there, although the authorities appear determined to
continue the highway project; and we see signs that
radicals in the Iranian Government may be trying to
exploit Shia-Sunni enmity in Pakistan
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We do not believe that antiregime opposition has
begun to coalesce effectively. So far, neither the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)
nor the influential Jamiat-i-Islami has been able to
capitalize on popular discontent. We are concerned,
however, that the MRD is starting to condemn Zia's
ties to the United States. This could strike a respon-
sive chord if the benefits from the US relationship do
not meet Pakistani expectations.
? Continuing austerity measures resulted in sharp
rises in consumer prices, increased plant closings,
and growing unemployment.
? A fall in oil production to under 500,000 barrels per
day-one-fifth of capacity and about one-third of
December's average-led Nigeria to cut oil prices
by $5.50 per barrel.
? While foreign reserves dropped below $1 billion,
access to commercial credit has been severely cur-
tailed because of approximately $5 billion in over-
due debts.
? President Shagari was embarrassed in January by
the protests following a rash of suspicious fires in
government offices under investigation for corrup-
tion.
? Student protests led to the closing of universities in
Ibadan and Maiduguri.
? Shagari's expulsion of over 2 million foreign work-
ers, although heavily criticized in the international
media, enhanced his popular standing.
Comment
The government is preoccupied with the decline in oil
production, a consequent drop in urban living stand-
ards, and preparations for upcoming summer elec-
tions. The level of political violence has not risen
appreciably, however. Increased student protests in
opposition-controlled states have focused chiefly on
local issues and campus conditions and, while remain-
ing a constant irritant, show no sign of getting out of
La1\
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0 100 200 300
Kilometers
hand. Nevertheless, public confidence in the govern-
ment is being undermined by the continuing economic
deterioration,'Shagari's low-key leadership style, and
the increased visibility of governmental corruption.
Allegations of economic mismanagement, corruption,
and fiscal irresponsibility rose sharply following the
formal launching of the election campaign in January.
The opposition parties, nevertheless, have been unable
to put aside ethnic, personal, and political differences,
agree on a common presidential candidate and strate-
gy, or otherwise capitalize on the government's eco-
nomic and political difficulties.
We believe Shagari faces a difficult period ahead as
he tries to balance the continuing need for economic
austerity with his desire for reelection. Nigerian
election campaigns, traditionally raucous and often
violent, are characterized by wild accusations and
promises, political intimidation, and extensive fraud.
Should politically motivated violence escalate and
spread, Shagari will have little choice but to call on
the Army to assist the poorly trained and badly
undermanned police in restoring order, thus further
undermining the legitimacy of the civilian govern-
ment.
CAMEROON ll
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Philippines: Protests and Insurgent Activities
Luzon Strait
Babuyan
Islands
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extremely limited and local. Some Filipino army
generals now fear a more active and effective NPA-
Muslim insurgent alliance.
? Communist New People's Army (NPA) insurgents,
in numbers up to 200 strong, staged raids and
ambushes throughout eastern Mindanao.
he NPA received assistance
Mabini in January.
? Roman Catholic church bishops published a pasto-
ral letter strongly criticizing the government's eco-
nomic, political, and human rights policies.
? The $3.35 billion current account deficit estimated
by the Central Bank for 1982 was much worse than
most analysts had anticipated and led the govern-
ment to implement new austerity measures.
? The government completed negotiations with the
IMF for nearly $600 million in balance-of-payments
loans, thus paving the way for an additional, de-
layed $300 million loan from the World Bank.
Comment
NPA activity, which saw a marked increase from
previous squad-size operations, compelled the govern-
ment to redeploy troops from Muslim areas in the
southern Philippines. This could leave the military
vulnerable to renewed attacks from Muslim rebels in
southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
Military force levels in Muslim areas are at their
lowest since 1979.
Muslim
rebel leaders, weapons, and supplies have been infil-
trating into the Muslim areas from Sabah, Malaysia,
since late last year, possibly in preparation for re-
newed fighting. cooperation between
NPA and Muslim insurgents, if true, is a significant
new development; previously, such cooperation was
The continued deterioration of Church-state relations,
exemplified by the Catholic bishops' dissolution of the
Church-Military Liaison Committee, is of major con-
cern to us. The government's crackdown on radical
church workers as well as its continuing campaign to
muzzle the opposition press has resulted in strains
that will be slow to mend. Additional strains may
arise if Marcos fails to loosen his control over domes-
tic political activity before next year's scheduled
legislative elections. Marcos himself is now working
hard to broaden existing mechanisms for a dialogue
between the Church and the government.
Although the new IMF loans will improve the nation's
balance-of-payments position, they require the adop-
tion of unpopular measures-tightened credit, a re-
duced budget, and a devalued currency-that in the
short run will slow growth, contribute to inflation, and
increase unemployment. Continuing low export com-
modity prices will keep the economy in low gear in
1983, which is likely to add further fuel to the
Communist insurgency.
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Data utilized for the quantitative political indicators (pages 15-30) are derived
from open source press as well as classified materials. In some instances, they
represent only rough estimates.
These charts, therefore, should be viewed not as definitive but as complementary
to data presented in the text and Status of Key Indicators table.
Definitions of Government sanctions against the opposition.
quantitative Actions taken by the government to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate perceived
political indicators threats to the security of the regime. The actions may or may not involve the use of
used in charts force.
Armed attacks by the opposition. Acts of political violence carried out by an
organized group seeking to weaken or destroy the power of the government or
another organized group. Spontaneous and criminal violence is excluded.
Riots. Violent demonstrations or disturbances involving large numbers of people.
Riots are distinguished from armed attacks by the degree of spontaneity.
Demonstrations. These include both protest and regime support demonstrations.
They involve nonviolent gatherings of people organized for a specific political
purpose.
Deaths from armed attacks and riots. Deaths of government personnel, opposition
supporters, and civilian bystanders that occur chiefly in conjunction with armed
attacks and riots.
25X1
25X1
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 Economic
factors
Opposition
activities
External
factors
Regime
actions and
capabilities
?=developments not of concern,
or not applicable
C=developments of moderate concern
0=developments of serious concern
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or
price controls
Key export price index change
Per capita imports decrease
Increased organizational capabilities
Changes in external support for
government
Changes in external support for
opposition
Increased government hostility/
attacks on US
Increased opposition hostility/
attacks on US
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
C
0
C
?
C
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
C
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
C
?
C
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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?
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?
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?
C`
?
?
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?
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?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
is
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
C
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Status of Key Indicators
Social change/
conflict
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Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to
individual countries and should not be used for cross-
national comparisons with reference to individual
indicators.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Secret
number of instances 1 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV
Ddenotes a substantially above-normal
- number of instances 1980 1981 1982 1983
*denotes a normal number of
instances
(1 denotes a moderately above-normal
Government sanctions against opposition
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
Armed attacks by opposition
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
5
Riots
9
0
?
0
Demonstrations
?
0
0
0
S
S
?
S
S
?
S
0
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
9
0
10
0
5
5
5
5
.
5
5
0
10
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
40
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
1,500
Key Exports Price Index
l
boo
0
eum
Crude petro
1,200
Coffee
900
600
300
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
60
50
30
00
0
20
25
20
15
10
5
I
0
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
El Salvador: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
number o
nstances
denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
1 11 111 IV
1981
I 11 III IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 II 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
0
0
0
0
10
?
0
?
?
?
0
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
01
0
0
0
Riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
9
0
Demonstrations
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
f i
Economic Real per Capita Imports
US $
Dashed lines indicate
80
estimated data.
50
10
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
8
Key Exports Price Index 300
Coffee 250
Cotton
200
150
100
50
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
100
90
J
V
70
60
2
? denotes a normal number of
instances
0 denotes a moderately above-normal
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Honduras: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
denotes a normal number of
instances
O denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
Demonstrations
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
Population (millions)b
1980
I II III IV
1981
I II III IV
1982
1 11 III IV
1983
1 11 Ill IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Armed attacks by opposition
0
9
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
Riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Key Exports Price Index 350
Coffee 300
Bananas 250
200
150
100
50
50
40
30
20
10
to
8
6
2
0
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
a
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Guatemala: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
*denotes a normal number of
instances
0denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
l? denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
Economic Real per Capita imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0,
C/1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Key Exports Price Index 400
Coffee
Cotton 300
200
100
L I
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Secret
denotes a normal number of
instances
O denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
Ddenotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
1 11 111 IV
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 11 III IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Riots
Demonstrations
?
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic Real per Capita Imports
US $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
35
30
o a
25
20
15
25
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
350
Key Exports Price Index
Coffee
300
Soybeans
250
200
150
100
50
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
20
15
10
5
I _ I
0
0
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Spain: Seclected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
?denotes a normal number of
instances
0denotes it moderately above-normal
number of instances 1980
denotes a substantially above-normal
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
100
5
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
*101 S1.101?I*I?I?I?I?l0
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
589315 4-83
Secret
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Secret
Greece: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
denotes a normal number of
instances
0denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances 1980
)denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances 1 11
III IV
1981
1 11 III IV
1982
I II 111 IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
6
0
0
0
6
9
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
Armed attacks by opposition
Riots
*
s
e
e
*
0
0
6
01
6
0
0
Demonstrations
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
Population (millions)b
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
250
Too-
to
6
4
2
I
Key Exports Price Index 250
Tobacco 200
150
100
50
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
number of instances
? denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
1 II III IV
1981
1 II III IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 II 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
00
10
?
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0_
?
Riots
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
C
O
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic Real per Capita Imports 40
Us $
30
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data. 20
10
Consumer Price Increase 40
Percent
30
20
10
5denotes a normal number of
instances
Qdenotes a moderately above-normal
Key Exports Price Index 1,500
Cotton
1,200
900
600
300
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
0
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Secret
Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
*denotes a number mber of
instances
O denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances 1980
above-normal
) denotes a substantially
number of instances
1 11 111 IV
1981
I 11 III IV
1982
1 11 111 IV
1983
1 II Ill IV
Government sanctions against opposition
5
?
?
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
Armed attacks by opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
Riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations
0
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
S
S
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Key Exports Price Index
Crude petroleum
-2
400
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
I I I I I I I I INOO~ I X 1 1 1
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Secret
Saudi Arabia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators"
Demonstrations
(strations
Deaths from mill armed
ons)b attacks and riots
s
a
ces
.denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
I 11 III IV
1981
I II III IV
1982
1 II 111 IV
1983
1 lI 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Armed attacks by opposition
101
01
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Key Exports Price Index 400
Crude petroleum
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
cEstimated.Saudi population includes approximately
3 million foreign laborers.
.denotes a normal number of
instances
denotes a moderately above-normal
number of in
t
n
t- I
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Secret
Pakistan: Selected Political ad Economic Indicatorsa
*denotes a normal number of
instances
)denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances 1980
)denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances I II
1981
1982
1983
Ill IV
I 11 Ill IV
1 11 III IV
1 II 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
)
0
0
?
?
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
)
Riots
Demonstrations
)
)
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
C
?
9
9
11 ;
\1
0
0
0
?
?
?
)
Economic Real per Capita Imports 12
us $
9
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data. 6
3
Consumer Price Increase 8
Percent
6
4
2
I I
Key Exports Price Index 250
Cotton
200
150
I
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators a
*denotes a normal number of
instances
O denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
I II 111 IV
1981
I 11 III IV
1982
I 11 Ill IV
1983
1 11 III IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Riots
?
?
?
O
?
?
?
O
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Population (millions)b
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
35
Consumer Price Increase 10
Percent
8
6
4
2
n
-2
Key Exports Price Index
t
l
d
C
350
e pe
ro
ru
eum
325
300
275
250
225
a Base year is 1975.
200
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
cEstimated.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Secret
Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
*denotes a normal number of
instances
)denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
)denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
I II I11 IV
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
1 II III IV
1983
1 II Ill IV
Government sanctions against opposition
?
?
?
?
O
0
0
0
0
(P
0
0
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
?
Riots
61
0
0
Demonstrations
?
?
?
.
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
10
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Key Exports Price Index 350
Coffee 300
Tea
250
200
150
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Zaire: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
Political
number of instances
denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
*denotes a normal number of
instances
0 denotes a moderately above-normal
Economic Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Key Exports Price Index
Copper
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
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Secret
Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
denotes a normal number of
instances
0 denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
0 denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
1980
I II III IV
1981
I 11 III IV
1982
I 11 111 IV
1983
1 II 111 IV
Government sanctions against opposition
0
0
.
9
.
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
Armed attacks by opposition
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Riots
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations
?
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
*
0
0
0
0
Deaths from armed attacks and riots
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic Real per Capita Imports 40
Us $
30
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data. 20
10
Consumer Price Increase 8
Percent
6
A
A
4
W
\
A
2
I_ I
Key Exports Price Index 225
tt
C
o
on 200
Coconut oil
175
150
125
I I
?
a Base year is 1975.
In Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
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 Note scale change
Political ?denotes a normal number of'
instances
\ ')denotes a moderately above-normal
number of instances
*denotes a substantially above-normal
number of instances
Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Dashed lines indicate
estimated data.
Consumer Price Increase 8
Percent
Key Exports Price Index
Rubber
Crude petroleum
Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
Estimated.
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
s
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0191010191019419101010
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/21: CIA-RDP84-00894R000200320002-2