TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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NASTER FIEF COPY I
Terrorism
Review
GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983
Copy 4 4 0
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7 Book Review: Violence as Communication
(OGI)
9 Special Analysis-Rightest Terrorism in Western Europe
(EURA)
Review
Group Profile: West Germany's Revolutionary Cells
(OGI)
Chronology
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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25X1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Secret
Group Profile: West Germany's
Revolutionary Cells
Along with the West German security authorities, we
believe that the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), a leftwing
West German terrorist group, is a more serious threat
to both US and German interests than are other, more
notorious German terrorist groups. Although German
authorities have recently had significant success
against the notable terrorist group the Red Army
Faction (RAF), they have not been able to penetrate
the RZ or conduct successful counterterrorism actions
In its exploitation of the popular issue of the US
presence in Germany, the RZ has been responsible for
the greatest number of attacks against US military
installations in West Germany. The scheduled deploy-
ment of intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) sys-
tems to Germany in late 1983 will provide the RZ
with yet another opportunity to exploit the existing
25X1 anti-NATO and the increasing antinuclear sentiment
of a sizable segment of the German populace.F_
25X1
25X1
25X1
The RZ, which conducted its first attacks in late
1973, emerged from the student protest movements of
the late 1960s. Although all West German terrorist
groups maintained that violence was necessary, the
RZ made distinctions between violence directed
25X1 against individuals and that directed against property.
25X1
,25X1
25X1
25X1
The RZ claims to seek adoption of a Marxist-Leninist
system in Germany.
These goals have apparently changed little in the
intervening years:
? To attack alleged US imperialism and Zionism.
? To support workers, youth, and women.
? To free imprisoned comrades.
? To punish "enemies of the people" and "exploiters,"
including government bureaucrats, police officers25X1
judges, traffic controllers, nuclear plant guards,
property owners, and doctors.
The RZ seeks to exploit popular local issues. Under
this strategy-termed the "connection strategy" by
German authorities-RZ targets change with public
concerns. For example, RZ antinuclear activity in the
late 1970s paralleled growing domestic concern over
nuclear issues. 25X1
Based on statements of former RZ member Hermann
Feiling and subsequent investigations, we believe the
RZ is organized into three- to five-member cells. We
concur with West German authorities that no nation-
al-level structure exists.
Duesseldorf, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Mainz, and Bo-
chum. 25X1
Despite the compartmented structure of the RZ, we
agree with German authorities that there is some
coordination of cell activities. Regional coordination
was obviously required for the RZ bombing of four
widely separated US military installations within a
few hours on 1 June 1982. Moreover, Roman Herzog,
Interior Minister of Land Baden-Wuerttemberg, has
said that the RZ is conducting coordinated operations
throughout West Germany, and, according to a fall
1982 BKA report, the RZ sometimes shares logistic
bases. 25X1
Secret
GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983
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Muelheim an der Ruhr CJe11 S' t
Hamm r -C
Du j bur ?Dortmund f ;
Krefeld .~'
Kassel
Berg isch-GladbaoP 2
2
f. r.~ HESSEN
Koblenz
rr~
Giessen % -% , / ?
- r . r _ _ -
`.... 39 ' V L rl t J
1 BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG ?
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J Ludwigsha)bn
Attacks by the
Revolutionary Cells (RZ)
in West Germany,
1973-82a
1973-77 =1978-82
includes attempts
West Berlin
22
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Maintaining compartmented units enhances RZ secu-
rity and makes penetration by German authorities
almost impossible. Unit members know little about
the work or identity of persons in other cells. RZ
members meet informally and briefly when planning
operations, which unlike those of the RAF, require
little preparation.~
The relative unsophistication of RZ operations-
bombings and arson are its primary modes of at-
tack-means that operating costs are minimal. The
small funding requirements are probably met by the
earnings of RZ members, many of whom hold regular
jobs, and donations from sympathizers. Typical of the
low cost of operations is the February 1982 bombing
of the Neu-Isenburg construction company, Holz-
mann AG, in which the explosive device was a 2-
kilogram fire extinguisher filled with a homemade
explosive mixture of sodium chlorate and sugar; an
electric alarm clock was used as the timer.
Germaneestimates of hardcore membership
range from 30 to 60, with perhaps as many as 60
supporters, who probably contribute little beyond
moral support, agitation against policies of "enemies
of the people," and occasional funds.
Although all RZ operations have been conducted in
West Germany, 24 percent of the attacks were direct-
ed against foreign diplomatic, military, and commer-
cial establishments-particularly American-or
against facilities believed by the RZ to represent
foreign interests. The RZ has also bombed many
government buildings in West Germany.
The attacks claimed by the RZ since its inception in
1973 suggest that the Frankfurt cell (or cells) is the
heartbeat of the movement. The Revolutionary
Wrath newsletter is probably published in this city.
Overall, the states of Hessen-where Frankfurt is
located-and Nordrhein-Westfalen have witnessed
the largest number of RZ attacks. Frankfurt was the
site of the first known anti-US military activity by the
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RZ. Since January 1982, 33 percent of the RZ-
claimed attacks occurred within a 45-mile radius of
Frankfurt and 25 percent were perpetrated within a
25-mile radius of Duesseldorf, in Nordrhein-Westfa-
Given the focus on anti-NATO issues in its recent
publicity, we expect increases in RZ attacks in opposi-
tion to NATO policy but few changes in RZ targets
and areas of operation. The group will continue to
attack American facilities, particularly as the sched-
uled 1983 deployment of INF systems will offer
opportunities to exploit anti-US, anti-NATO, and
antinuclear sentiments. The Frankfurt area will al-
most certainly sustain the bulk of attacks, given the
concentration of RZ terrorist activity in the region
and large US presence. Recent US military reporting
links an RZ member to targeting and collection
activities against 18 separate US military facilities in
the nearby Mainz/Wiesbaden area. The Frankfurt
area cell (or cells) is also likely to continue its attacks
on construction companies working to build the new
runway at Frankfurt airport, which the RZ has linked
to NATO. We believe that RZ attacks on German
Government facilities will also continue. In the ab-
sence of a negotiated settlement between Israel and
the Palestinians, RZ actions probably will be under-
taken against US facilities because of US support for
Israel. We expect the RZ to continue its attacks on
nuclear-related targets, particularly in Land Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, where more than half of such at-
tacks, including all of those perpetrated in 1982, have
taken place. 25X1
We concur with the Interior Ministry's recent assess-
ment that the RZ is West Germany's most dangerous
leftist terrorist group and believe it will remain so at
least over the next several years. 25X1
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June Frankfurt Explosive US Army V Corps Headquarters; 16 injured.
December Frankfurt Explosive US Air Force Officers' Club at Rhein-Main Airbase (Washington Post,
3 December 1976, reports 18 injured).
March
Berlin
Unknown
September
Garlstedt
Explosive
1979
October
Wiesbaden
Arson
November
Ahaus
Explosive
1980
May
Osterholz- Explosive
Scharmbeck
Company vehicle of Hochtief firm, contractor for a nuclear power plant.
Weather tower of a planned interim storage depot for nuclear waste.
US Army installation.
October Frankfurt Explosive Premises of Bratengeier construction firm, contractors to extend Runway
West at Frankfurt airport.
December Wiesbaden Explosive (attempt) Land Hessen Ministry for Economy and Technology.
1982
Bamberg
Frankfurt
Gelnhausen
Hanau
Berlin Explosive (attempt) Armed Forces Network radio transmission tower.
Cologne Explosive Near building housing offices of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (confessor letter
identified company as prominent manufacturer of military aircraft, such as
those used by Israelis in attack on Palestinians in Lebanon).
July Frankfurt Explosive Between two communications vans outside Abrams Building, Headquarters
of the US Army V Corps. (US responsibility for "Israeli massacre in
Lebanon.")
October Cologne Explosive Office related to nuclear energy, the Company for (Nuclear) Reactor
Safety.
Bergisch- Explosive Office related to nuclear energy, Interatom.
Gladbach
November Kalkar Explosive Support tower of powerline supplying electrical energy to nuclear power
plant.
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Secret
Book Review El 25X1
Violence as Communication, by Alex P. Schmid and One caveat should be noted. The authors are undis-
Janny de Grad/; London, Sage Publications, 1982. (u) guised in their defense of the "people" whose griev-
ances they contend are ignored by those who domi-
After a dramatic hijacking by the Popular Front for nate the media until they do something dramatic,
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in September novel, or violent enough to fulfill the criteria for
1970, a PFLP spokesman noted that the act "was a coverage. Although such polemics detract from the
direct assault on the consciousness of international core paradigm of this work, this book is worth your
opinion. What mattered most to us is that one pays reading.
attention to us." Schmid and de Graaf's Violence as
Communication postulates that modern terrorism is 25X1
primarily a form of communication through which a
message is conveyed via violence or the threat of
violence to a target audience broader than the victims
of the threat or act. This attempt to communicate via
victims who are merely the instruments of the mes-
sage is what distinguishes terrorism from ordinary
criminal violence.
Violence as Communication provides a comprehensive
and well-organized treatment of the controversial
relationship between the mass media and terrorism. It
explores the potential influence media treatment can
have on the terrorist act itself, discusses the various
techniques of media manipulation terrorists have em-
ployed, and speculates regarding the possible effects
of censorship on terrorism. Each subject is treated
with attention to detail and respect for the complexity
of the subject. The book's second chapter also presents
a useful multidimensional typology of politically moti-
vated terrorism. This typology incorporates a range of
actors (political, criminal, and pathological); it differ-
entiates between terrorism directed against the power
holders within a state and state repressive terrorism;
and it encompasses various motivational justifications
including single-issue terrorism, separatist or nation-
alist terrorism, and social revolutionary or insurgent
terrorism.
7 Secret
GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983
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Secret
Special Analysis
Rightist Terrorism in
Western Europe
This is the first offive articles on the subject of
rightist terrorism in Western Europe. Future issues
will take an in-depth look at the situations in Italy,
West Germany, France, and Spain.
The attention devoted over the past decade to leftist
terrorism in Western Europe has obscured all but the
most spectacular instances of rightist political vio-
lence, such as the Bologna train station massacre in
1980. In acts of this sort and in attacks against
specific individuals, however, rightist groups often
achieve much greater loss of life than those on the
left.
Neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups exhibit many of the
traits of the extreme rightist movements that swept
Europe in the period between the two world wars.
Like their predecessors who hastened the collapse of
constitutional government in several European coun-
tries in that period, contemporary rightist terrorists
continue to attack socialist and Communist parties,
Jewish communities, labor unions, and symbols of
parliamentary democracy in countries such as Italy,
West Germany, France, and Spain.
Historically, fascist movements generally have been a
response to the rise on the left of mass political parties
and labor movements that have seriously challenged
traditional social, political, and economic institutions.
Their ranks have included some big businessmen and
selected nongovernmental organizations
financiers, but rightist extremism has mainly repre-
sented the revolt of the propertied middle class
against the twin forces of economic modernization
and leftist advance. It is members of the downwardly
mobile class of small shopkeepers and artisans and
their children-once the backbone of an urban Euro-
pean society that no longer has much use for them-
-125X1
ali
that have found fascism most a
ppe
ng
A close look at the social composition of the West
European extreme right suggests that. this downward-
ly mobile class continues to be represented in contem-
porary extreme rightist political parties and terrorist
groups. Since the World War II legacy of the extreme
right in Western Europe is even more odious than that
of the far left, however, neo-fascist groups are increas-
ingly attracting a greater number of misfits, mentally
disturbed, and common criminals, especially at the
rank-and-file level. With the possible exception of
those in Spain, neo-fascist groups are less the repre-
sentatives of a social or even a political force than
they are gangs of thugs intent on lashing out at groups
and institutions-including governments-perceived
to be responsible for their plight.FI 25X1
Because of the poor quality of their recruits, contem-
porary extreme rightist groups tend to be ideologically
sterile, badly organized, and random in their violence.
With the exception of Spain's still fledgling democra-
cy, we do not believe they pose a threat to democratic
systems. Still, their penchant for violence and indis-
criminate killing gives them at least the potential to
destabilize particular governments and to endanger
Secret
GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983
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A Profile of Rightist Terrorism
Ideology. Increasingly, in our judgment, both leftist
and rightist terrorist groups are driven by a mindless
nihilism. To the extent that they still adhere to an
ideology, however, the two types diverge significantly.
Based on their professed goals, leftist groups are
usually committed to complex idea systems such as
Marxism or Maoism and cast themselves as seekers of
a new and more just proletarian order; the goals of
rightist groups are more simplistic.
Typically, rightists aim at reestablishing a reassur-
ing-and often mythical-past in which they enjoyed
a higher status. Hence, they favor church, family,
patriotism, and primitive capitalism against such per-
ceived modern menaces as Communism, democracy,
secularism, pornography, abortion, and divorce.
Rightist terrorist groups seek a governmental and
societal catharsis to clear the way for a return to the
old order. The 1980 bombing of Bologna's railroad
station with its multiple deaths and injuries, for
example, may have sought to raise the question of the
Communist city administration's ability to protect
ordinary citizens. The rightists also tend to be chau-
vinistic and racist. Some even continue to believe they
are the vanguard of a super race. This "biological-
historical" view of society lends itself to anti-Semi-
tism and a general dislike of anyone or anything
foreign, as underscored by the West German right's
frequent attacks against Turkish guestworkers and
French rightist attacks against Jews. Consistent with
its simplistic and dramatic view of the world is the
ultraright's love of folk symbols, uniforms, and milita-
rism, all of which emphasize a larger entity into which
the individual can merge.
Operational Code. The divergence in belief systems
has made for differences in how the two extremes
operate.
use of tracts or public statements and seldom claim
responsibility for attacks, whereas leftists try to ex-
ploit the attention drawn to their attacks by dissemi-
nating ideological treatises. More important, leftist
and rightist terrorists differ in their choice of targets.
Leftist groups usually strike selectively, trying to hit
only individuals whom they regard as guilty of oppos-
ing proletarian causes. Hence, no bystanders were
harmed in the Red Brigade's kidnaping of former
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The right, when it
has any coherent political purpose at all, seeks to
create enough despair to make society eager for
authoritarian law and order, as in the case of the 1980
random slaughter at the Munich Oktoberfest
Organizational Features. The differences in far left
and far right ideology have also influenced their
organizational practices. Marxist ideology provides a
natural basis for cooperation across national bound-
aries, while the nationalism and xenophobia of most
rightists create a barrier to such collaboration
The leftist emphasis on commitment to a cause also
places a premium on carefully structured organiza-
tions and systematic campaigns of action. Rightist
groups rely more on emotional involvement and are
often commanded by a single individual who depends
on blind obedience to his orders. Captured rightist
terrorists often talk more freely than leftists once they
have been separated from their leader.
Member Characteristics. The differing ideologies,
operational codes, and organizational characteristics
of far left and far right groups have attracted distinct
personality and social class types who in turn have
reinforced the ideological differences. Information on
suggests that leftist terrorists tend to
come rom traditional traditional middle class families of com-
fortable circumstances, good education, and religious
affiliation. As youngsters, many leftists enjoyed rela-
tively privileged environments, were good students,
participated in church activities, and appeared to be
model citizens. They were typical or above-average
youth who rarely roused suspicion or controversy. In
rebelling against the political system, they are often in
fact rebelling against their parents or expiating the
guilt they feel as members of a privileged class.
Despite fanatical- commitment to their cause and
readiness to employ violence, leftist terrorists do not
demonstrate serious pathological personality disor-
ders.
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Secret
The profile for rank-and-file rightists is different.
Extreme rightists continue to be drawn from social
groups that have suffered a progressive loss of social
or economic status, such as the old aristocracy and the
small shopkeeper class. Increasingly, however, the
typical rightist terrorist is characterized by a dis-
advantaged background, including a broken home,
economic adversity, limited education, and little disci-
pline
He often appears uncertain of his place in contempo-
rary society and reflects his alienation in intense
identity problems. His relations with colleagues are
more likely to be stormy and violent, and he often
does not function well even within his own paramili-
tary organization. Brutality and murder are reported
within the rightist terrorist groups of most countries.
Imprisoned rightists do not hold up well in the stress
of confinement and are more prone to suicide. Right-
ists also have a high incidence of sexual identity and
drug abuse problems.
The more limited educational and cultural back-
ground of most rightist terrorists and their sense of
alienation affect their behavior. Rather than seeing
the issues of the world in terms of an idea system, as
their leftist counterparts tend to do, rightists perceive
a contest between good and evil and more often
respond with emotion rather than reason. Their limit-
ed educational development probably helps explain
their tendency not to think through the implications of
their deeds or to plan effective, coordinated, and
sustained campaigns. Their narrow intellectual hori-
zons probably also account for their failure to exploit
the opportunity created by their violence for propagat-
ing ideological statements.
These are alienated and anomic individuals who,
rather than pursuing solutions in idea systems, prefer
to follow a "superman's" lead into violent action. The
ideas and symbols promoted by the leader are second-
ary in practice. When a rightist leader is captured or
killed, his group tends to disintegrate, as in the case of
the Action Committee of National Socialists in West
Germany. With leftists, leadership is more often
subservient to the realization of the group's political
goals, and leftist groups are more likely to reconstitute
themselves and return to the battle after losing a
leader.F__1 25X1
Rightist Terrorism in Individual Countries
Rightist terrorists are most prominent in countries
with a fascist or Nazi past such as Italy, West
Germany, and Spain, and in countries like France
that have deep historical cleavages between left and
right.2 One common feature of rightist terrorist
groups in these countries is their close link with
archconservative parties. Although this connection is
obscure and difficult to document, evidence-such as
overlapping memberships-suggests various forms of
collaboration or liaison between far right parties and
rightist terrorist groups.F____1 25X1
Rightists typically venerate their own nation's experi-
ence as a central element of their outlook, and there is
much less ground for common cause among them
across country lines. For instance, anti-Semitism and
xenophobia are leading themes of West German
rightist terrorism, reflecting past Nazi hostility to
Jews and the growing resentment of foreign
guestworkers today. By contrast, Italy's rightists,
faced with Western Europe's largest Communist par-
ty, often strike at the PCI or engage in random acts of
violence designed to embarrass a government they see
as too accommodating toward the Communists.
French rightist terrorist groups are inspired both by
anti-Semitism and anti-Communism. In Spain, right-
ist terrorism is fueled by the broader concerns of pro-
Franco forces who fear they are losing their status in
the new democratic system. 25X1
In contrast to leftist extremism, the few principal
unifying links of rightist extremists across national
' Rightist terrorism has also appeared on a lesser scale in the
smaller West European countries. Its perpetrators include the
Flemish Militant Order in Belgium, the New Right Action in
Austria, and the New Order in Greece. Small terrorist organiza-
tions also exist in the Netherlands and Portugal, while others have
been cited by the press in the United Kingdom and in the
Scandinavian countries. Although Turkey has a formidable rightist
terrorist problem, we believe its dynamics are substantially differ-
ent than those elsewhere in Western Europe, and it is thus not
discussed in this study.F I 25X1
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Electoral Showing of Extreme Rightist Parties
in National Elections
1972
2,869,792
8.7
56
1976
2,245,376
6.1
35
1979
1,927,233
5.3
31
West Germany
NPD (National Democratic
Party)
1969
1,422,010
4.3
0
1972
207,465
0.6
0
1976
122,661
0.3
0
1980
67,798
0.2
0
1983
79,000
0.2
0
France
FN/PFN (National Front/New
Forces Party)
1968
28,736
0.1
0
1973
679,684
2.8
0
1978
270,409
1.0
0
1981
90,422
0.4
0
Presidential
1965 (Tixier-Vignancour)
1,260,208
5.2
1974 (Le Pen)
190,291
0.8
Spain
FN (New Force)
1977
63,501
0.4
0
1979
378,964
2.1
1
1982
100,899
0.5
0
lines are essentially abstract. Rightist terrorism has
brought together people who fear that either they or
the institutions with which they intimately identify
are in jeopardy. Although there is some evidence of
contacts between rightist groups across national
boundaries, we believe it is sporadic and limited to
occasional tactical cooperation. In short, we do not
believe there is a "black international" composed of
rightist extremist groups
Outlook
Given the economic distress and social volatility in
West European society, we believe conditions exist
that could produce growing numbers of the down-
wardly mobile, alienated, and disturbed individuals
who have traditionally joined rightist terrorist and
political groups. Moreover, the pervasive presence in
Western Europe of the extreme right's traditional
objects of hate-leftist parties, labor movements,
foreigners, Jews, and democratic institutions-en-
sures that rightist terrorist groups will have ample
targets against which to vent their rage. Their activi-
ties, however, will vary in frequency and intensity
according to the interplay'of factors such as student
and labor unrest, economic difficulties, and leftist
party activity. We further believe that the relative
success or failure of rightist terrorism will vary ac-
cording to the attitude toward it adopted by national
governments and security services. Except for the
potential danger they pose to democratic institutions
in Spain, however, we do not expect the contemporary
extreme right to pose a direct threat to West Europe-
an political stability:
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Secret
Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982-April 1983 a
Diplomats
36
47
29 35
Military .
8
10
9 13
Business
13
13
4 2
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
19
6
11
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982-April 1983 a
73
90
49
57
42
46
54
57
6
8
2
7
0
4
3
5
Western Europe
25
37
24
22
20
21
18
25
USSR/Eastern Europe
1
2
3
3
3
0
1
1
Sub-Saharan Africa
1
2
1
1
1
0
0
3
Middle East and North Africa
13
24
5
3
2
4
12
6
70
56
594
5
2
42
29
13
234
3
0
17
3
1
13
12
18
99
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,
1981 and 1982/83
Bombing of US Embassy
in Lebanon killed 57,
wounded 120.
1981/82
1982/83
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Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Assassination and bombing
in Greece killed 2, wounded
70; bomb in Central
African Republic.
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Secret
Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications.F____1 25X1
1 March 1983 Portugal: Arrest of Portuguese Terrorists
In Porto, two members of the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) were arrested af-
ter a shootout, in which two policemen and three terrorists were wounded. Police
are searching for three other FP-25 members whose identities may have been
revealed by arrested terrorists. Confiscated weapons, tools, clothing, and sketches
indicated the group was planning a bank robbery.F____1 25X1
West Germany: Third Cache of Kexel Group Located
In Heusenstamm, security authorities uncovered a cache belonging to the right-
wing Kexel group. This cache, the third to be found since the February 1983 arrest
of five group members, contained various currencies, identification documents, and
other written material. The arrest of a Kexel group contact also resulted in the
confiscation of explosive ingredients, instructions for making explosives, identity
12 April 1983 Canada: Terrorists Charged in Litton Bombing
Five members of the Canadian Direct Action group, being held for a series of ter-
rorist activities in British Colombia, have been charged in connection with the
14 October 1982 bombing at the Litton Systems, Ltd., plant in Toronto. In a
communique following the attack Direct Action threatened Canadian contractors
working on US strategic systems. 25X1
Lebanon: Press Offices Targeted
Agence France-Presse (the French news service) offices in Beirut were the target of
an attempted bombing in mid-April. Following the discovery of a suspicious
suitcase by an AFP employee, Lebanese police defused a 45-pound TNT bomb
minutes before it was set to explode. No group has claimed credit.F____1 25X1
15 Secret
GI TR 83-010
12 May 1983
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15 April 1983 Spain: Incendiary Attack on US Air Force Vehicle
In Tudela, a small leftist radical group, Communist Movement, claimed credit for
an incendiary attack on a US Air Force truck; the attack caused only minor
damage. The Communist Movement also conducted a similar attack on a plaza in
Tudela on 14 April. This group is antigovernment and anti-American and
previously carried out minor attacks annually on 14 April to commemorate
Franco's defeat of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War. The group has only
attacked targets of opportunity, apparently without intent to cause personal injury.
year.
20 April 1983 Peru: Embassy Guard Wounded
Unidentified terrorists firing from an automobile wounded a Peruvian Civil Guard
on duty at the Costa Rican Embassy. According to the police, the Guard returned
fire, but the assailants fled. The attack was the third at an embassy in Lima this
operations against the Burmese Government
21 April 1983 Burma: Karen Insurgents Attempt Hijacking
An attempted hijacking of a Burma Airways domestic flight by three Karen
National Union (KNU) members was thwarted by Burmese authorities. The KNU
is an ethnic insurgent organization, which has conducted guerrilla and terrorist
South Africa: Fourth Bomb Attack in Pietermaritzburg
A bomb explosion near the old Supreme Court Building in Pietermaritzburg
caused extensive damage. Earlier in the day the Supreme Court had upheld a
conviction under the Terrorism Act. This was the fourth bomb attack on
Pietermaritzburg this year.
to reorganize the terrorist group in Italy.
22 April 1983 Italy: Arrest of Italian Terrorists
In Rome, two members of the extreme rightwing terrorist organization "Nuclei
Armati Rivoluzionari" (NAR) were arrested by Carabinieri. The subsequent
discovery of an NAR safehouse led to confiscation of weapons, blank identification
cards, and two police uniforms. Italian police believe one of the arrested NAR
members, Fabrizio Zani, who had recently returned from France, was attempting
France: Vandalism on Behalf of Direct Action
In Paris, a group described as "Anti-Imperialist Commando Unit" vandalized the
Museum of the Legion of Honor, causing considerable damage to exhibits. In a
communique the group demanded the release of Direct Action member Frederic
Oriach arrested in October 1982.
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23 April 1983 Malta: Off the Diplomatic Hook -
With the return of two Libyans responsible for the hijacking of a Libyan aircraft
to Malta in late February, Valletta has avoided Bonn Declaration antihijacking
sanctions. In an effort to bring the hijacking to a peaceful conclusion, Malta
initially guaranteed the hijackers temporary haven and safe passage out of the
country. The Libyans, however, were held incommunicado by the Maltese.
Diplomatic rumor had earlier suggested that Malta might try to arrange a deal
with Tripoli in exchange for the hijackers, but we believe Western pressure played
a role in the outcome of the case.F----] 25X1
The Middle East: Armenian Threat
A letter containing veiled threats against the US presence in the Middle East and
calling for US withdrawal from the region was delivered to the US Embassy in
Damascus by the Armenian Orthodox Bishop for Southern Syria. The letter was
written by an anonymous group of Syrian and Lebanese Armenian intellectuals.
We note the Armenian community has generated an intense media campaign in
the wake of the December 1982 disappearance of the Dashnag Party Intelligence
Chief in Beirut. This letter may be another example of the campaign to gain
publicity for the Armenian cause.F---] 25X1
26 April 1983 Ecuador: Honduran Embassy Seized
Approximately 20 persons identifying themselves as members of the Ruminahui
Solidarity Front took over the premises of the Honduran Embassy in Quito
demanding the withdrawal of the Ecuadorean Ambassador to Honduras and an
Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry statement in favor of a peaceful solution in Central
America. The group held three embassy employees hostage for 16 hours before
reaching agreement with Ecuadorean authorities that no arrests would be made.
25X1
27 April 1983 Denmark: Bomb Attacks Against US Firms
In Copenhagen, homemade bombs were thrown at two US firms, causing limited
property damage but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the
attacks, but police suspect that a local anarchist/squatter/youth group, "BZ,"
may have been responsible, acting in sympathy with a protest demonstration
against US policy in Central America.) 25X1
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Spain: Iraultza Claims Spanish Bombing
In San Sebastian, the Basque group Iraultza claimed responsibility for the
bombing of a computer firm, which caused considerable damage. A communique
to a Basque newspaper claimed the attack was to protest "Yankee imperialism."
Since the computer firm was wholly German owned, we suspect Iraultza lacks a
competent intelligence apparatus. The ability of the group to conduct bombings is
of concern, given its targeting of US firms.
Haiti: Officials Receive Letter Bombs
Three Haitian officials and a prominent Haitian businessman were mailed letter
bombs from the United States; all but one bore a Miami postmark. One letter
bomb was opened by its intended victim but failed to explode. Police immediately
initiated a search and found the remaining three. We believe the letter bombs were
probably mailed by the Hector Riobe Brigade, a Haitian terrorist organization
based in the United States, and may have been the Brigade's response to an
alleged assassination plot directed against a Brigade financier living in Jamaica.
28 April 1983 France: Arrest of FLNC Terrorists
In Paris, police arrested two Corsican FLNC members in possession of $480,000
in counterfeit US currency, apparently for use in terrorist operations.
29 April 1983 Spain: Bombing of US-Affiliated Company
In Pamplona, a bomb exploded outside the Rank Xerox office, resulting in minor
damage. Although no group has claimed credit, the Rank Xerox office in Bilbao
had been the target in February 1983 of,an attack claimed by the Basque terrorist
group. We suspect this attack may also be the work of Iraultza because to date
Iraultza has been the only Basque terrorist group targeting US interests.
Spain: Civil Guard Slain in Basque Country
In Laracha, a Civil Guard officer was killed in an ambush. No group has yet
claimed credit, but we suspect the Military Wing of the Basque separatist group
ETA was probably responsible.
France: Corsican Terrorism Spreads to France
In Marseilles, the Corsican separatist group Corsican National Liberation Front
(FLNC) spokesman called Agence France-Presse to claim responsibility for 15
bomb explosions in Paris, Marseilles, and Aix-en-Provence. The FLNC spokesman
also stated FLNC had ended its truce with the French Government and threatened
more attacks. Although the explosions caused considerable damage, there were no
injuries. The attacks on French mainland targets appear to be in response to the
French police crackdown on the terrorist group in Corsica.
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In a move that angered Pakistani intelligence and security officials, the Secretariat
of the Chief Martial Law Administrator-which reports directly to President
Zia-ordered the release of all remaining detainees in the case, despite their
confessed involvement. Authorities had initially arrested about 12 Iranian students
at the Karachi University on suspicion of involvement in the incident; seven were
freed shortly thereafter. Although Zia has been described as 25X1
extremely irritated by Iranian activities in Pakistan, he almost certainly approved
the release of the students. Islamabad's successful effort in late February to have
the Iranian consul general-who was also implicated by the students-recalled
might have prompted the release as a conciliatory move. 25X1
of French facilities in Karachi have been released,
most damaging blow yet struck at the FLNC by French authorities.
France: Arrest of FLNC Terrorists'
In Paris, French police arrested five FLNC members, including the Paris
representative of the banned FLNC, and discovered two arms caches containing
bomb-making equipment and counterfeit US currency. The latest arrests are the
Italy: Arrest of Prima Linea Terrorists
In Rome, Italian antiterrorist police arrested three Prima Linea (PL) terrorists,
including most wanted escaped prisoner Massimo Carafara, who masterminded
the Ronconi Prison break several months ago. Police recovered weapons, disguise
kits, and documents listing names and titles of Italian police, political figures, and
public officials. 25X1
Late April 1983 Pakistan: Iranian Terrorists Released .25X1
Several Iranians held by Pakistan in connection with the mid-February bombings
Beirut: Heads Up at American University
Press reports indicate that at least three small bombs have been discovered at the
American University in Beirut since the 18 April bombing of the US Embassy. All
were defused by Lebanese authorities. The most recent attempt occurred on
27 April when an explosive device was found set to detonate with the opening of a
restroom door at AUB. No group claimed credit for the bombs, which were most
likely inspired by the attack on the Embassy a few days earlier.F___1 25X1
1 May 1983 United States-Cuba: US Aircraft Hijacked
A Capitol Airlines flight en route from San Juan to Miami with 212 persons
aboard was hijacked to Cuba by a man claiming. to have a weapon and explosives.
The hijacker was later identified as Rigoberto Gonzalez Sanchez, a Cuban exile
with a record of at least two prior hijacking attempts in the United States. The hi-
jacker was taken into custody by Cuban authorities, and the plane and passengers
proceeded on to Miami without further incident. 25X1
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conducted the attack on General Kroesen
West Germany: Sentencing of RAF Terrorist
In Stuttgart, RAF terrorist Helga Roos was sentenced to four years and nine
months in prison for her part in the RAF-attempted assassination of a US Army
commander in Europe in 1981. Roos provided support for the RAF members who
Spain: Bombings in Basque Country
In Irun and Bilbao, Basque terrorists bombed three shops. An anonymous caller
gave a warning, which probably prevented any injuries, in one of the attacks.
Although no group has claimed credit for the attacks, we believe these bombings
are a continuation of ETA's attempts to fund operations through the extortion of
"revolutionary taxes" by threatened violence.
groups and possible cooperation on terrorist attacks.
Italy: Italian Terrorist Attack
In Rome, two members of a Red Brigades (RB) subgroup shot and wounded a uni-
versity professor. In a later telephone call, a spokesman claimed credit for the
attack in the name of the Partito Communist Combattente, a known subgroup of
the RB militarist column. The targeting was uncharacteristic of Red Brigades
operations; the professor may have been attacked because of his association with
the Italian Socialist Party, or as part of a terrorist effort to disrupt national
elections in June. this PCC group is in
touch with three Prima Linea terrorists arrested 30 April (see item). These
contacts may indicate an attempted reorganization within various Italian terrorist
Spain: Basque Terrorists Suspected in Triple Slaying
In Bilbao, three people were slain in an apparently botched kidnap attempt. Two of
the victims were police officers-the third, the pregnant wife of one of the men.
Basque terrorists are suspected of the killings because they have frequently
targeted the police and Civil Guard.
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5 May 1983
Brazil: US Consulate Receives Bomb Threat
A caller identifying himself as Habib Rashid, a Lebanese member of the Black
September Organization living in Rio de Janeiro, advised the US Consulate in
Recife that a bomb had been placed on the premises and that Secretary Shultz
would "be eliminated." In a subsequent call, Rashid demanded that the Consulate
release a statement to the local media repudiating US Middle East foreign policy.
A search of the premises revealed no bomb 25X1
seeking political asylum; the penalty for hijacking in China is death
South Korea-China: Hijacking
Six people hijacked a domestic Chinese flight to South Korea, wounding two crew
members before the hijackers surrendered to authorities. The hijackers were
25X1
25X1
Spain: Continuing Basque Violence
In Vitoria, two grenade attacks and a machinegun attack severely wounded a Civil
Guard in Guernica, prior to the 8 May municipal elections in Spain.
ETA will hurt the election chances of the Herri Batasuna, the political arm of
ETA. 25X1
the increased violence by the Basque separatist group
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