TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of . eTC~
Intelligence MR NK{~n I UPY
10 N
OT GIYE OUT
OR MAR9 0111
Review
Terrorism
GI TR 83-008
14 April 1983
Copy 4 3 8
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Terrorism
Review F-
1 France: Terrorism on Corsica
(EURA)
3 The Legal Response to the Terrorist Challenge
(OGI)
Group Profile: 15 May Organization
(OGI)
13 Special Analysis-Spain: The Socialists Tackle ETA
(EURA)
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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France:
Terrorism on Corsica
The terrorist activities of the Corsican National Lib-
eration Front (FLNC) are likely to continue despite
French attempts to stem the violence on the island
The FLNC was formed in 1976 and operates as the
terrorist faction of the Corsican autonomist move-
ment. The FLNC initially directed its attacks against
businesses, a tactic that caused few casualties. The
imposition of a "revolutionary tax" on "foreigners" in
December 1982 marked a change in FLNC policy.
No longer satisfied with property destruction, the
FLNC has expanded its targets to include individuals
refusing to pay the tax.
The French Government banned the FLNC on
5 January 1983 following a violent wave of bombings
at the end of 1982..After his election in 1981,
President Francois Mitterrand attempted to appease
Corsican autonomists, promising to end police surveil-
lance and to cut back the French police force. The
upsurge in FLNC activities gave conservative critics
an opportunity to accuse the Socialist government of
being soft on terrorism and forced Mitterrand to
enact tough measures to reaffirm his opposition to
terrorism. In the course of this crackdown Mitterrand
fired the two senior law enforcement officials on
Corsica, sent in French police reinforcements, and
appointed a nationally known police official, Robert
Broussard, as coordinator of Corsican security forces.
An FLNC spokesman has stated that at least one
faction of the party is undeterred by French Govern-
ment actions and intends to continue its terrorist
activities, expanding them to the mainland if neces-
sary. We are not able to confirm widespread public
speculation that the FLNC is receiving outside sup-
port, which, if true, would be an important factor in
the group's ability to continue the attacks. There have
been public contacts between the FLNC and other
Secret
GI TR 83-008
14 April 1983
terrorist groups, among them the Irish, Basques,
Kurds, Catalonians, and Galicians. Speculation in the
press has centered on ties to Libya and the Middle
East, including the possibility that Corsicans have
been trained in Lebanon] 25X1
At present, most Corsicans are opposed to the meth-
ods, if not the aims, of the terrorists, and, while the
FLNC will almost certainly continue its terrorist
activities, it is highly improbable that the group will
gain broad support.
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The Legal Response to the
Terrorist Challenge '
The international community has enacted conventions
and agreements to counter skyjacking, extradition,
threats to diplomats, and hostage seizure; more effec-
tive remedies, however, have been taken by individual
nations that make the operational climate less hospi-
table for the terrorist by limiting, in specific circum-
stances, constitutional guarantees.
More than any other act, aircraft hijacking has
mobilized the international community which, under
the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation, adopted three international conventions-the
1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970 Hague Convention,
and the 1971 Montreal Convention. Although these
agreements provide a legal framework for dealing
with attacks against civil aviation and address impor-
tant jurisdictional issues, none compels compliance: In
1978 a major step was taken to rectify this weakness
when a declaration was formulated and signed in
Bonn by the heads of state 'of the Seven Summit
Countries.' This accord provides for the suspension of
service by the airlines of the signatory states to any
country refusing to return a hijacked aircraft or
failing to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijacker
(see table 1):
The effect of such agreements is difficult to gauge. A
precipitous drop in skyjacking occurred in 1973-
when the number of offenses fell to less than half the
1969-70 high-after the three conventions but some
five years before the Bonn Declaration. Open source
literature and terrorism experts ascribe the marked
decrease to improved airport security, diminished
2 Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and West Germany.
shock value, and a 1973 antiskyjacking agreement
with Cuba. A PLO declaration in 1975 that air piracy
would be treated as a crime served as a further
deterrent. F-----] 25X1
Like the three antiskyjacking conventions, other inter-
national antiterrorist agreements are also flawed.
Both the 1977 European Convention on the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism and the 1979 UN Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages permit a state to deny
extradition if it determines the act to have been a 25X1
political offense and, therefore, nonextraditable.' In
general such accords lack effective sanctions and
contain loopholes. They do, however, provide a legal
framework for action and put countries on record as
being prepared to take certain measures in response to
terrorism. 25X1
National-level antiterrorist or emergency legislation
complemented by vigorous enforcement have been
more effective than international accords in combat-
ing international terrorism. These measures are tai- 25X1
lored to specific legal, social, and security consider-
ations. They may limit freedom of speech, association,
and movement and also restrict access to counsel, bail,
and speedy trial (see table 2). 25X1
In 1968, to counter mounting leftwing student vio-.
lence, West Germany passed legislation that facilitat-
ed implementation of a state of emergency-thereby
providing the federal government special powers to
cope with a growing terrorist threat. The penal code
was amended in the early 1970s to permit exclusion
from a particular trial of a defense attorney for
involvement in activities that endangered the security
of the.state. In response to the kidnaping of German
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Table I
Antiskyjacking Agreements
Tokyo Convention (1963) Clarifies jurisdiction over alleged offender.
Provides legal principles for dealing with offenses
committed aboard an aircraft.
Provides for return of skyjacked aircraft to owners.
The Hague Convention Requires a contracting state to prosecute or extradite
(1970) an alleged offender and impose "severe" but unspeci-
fied penalties.
Montreal Convention Extends provisions of The Hague Convention to
(1971) sabotage and attacks against airports, navigation
facilities, and aircraft on the ground.
Bonn Declaration (1978) Asserts that when a country refuses to extradite or
prosecute an aircraft hijacker or to return the hijacked
aircraft, the airlines of the Seven Summit Countries
will halt service to the offending state.
Table 2
Selected European Countries: Key Provisions of
National Legislation Used to Counter Terrorism a
Association with a terrorist
deemed a criminal offense
Advocacy of terrorist acts deemed
a criminal offense
Detention without formal charges
for limited time
Temporary restriction or ban on
lawyer-client contact
ist/emergency legislation (A/EL).
Although this convention provides no effective means
to bring a skyjacker to justice, it established a
precedent for "multilateral action.
Established universal jurisdiction for skyjacking,
thereby allowing any country holding an alleged
skyjacker to try him, but did not establish priority of
jurisdiction in event of competing claims nor deal with
a hijacking initiated or attempted before takeoff or
after landing.
Employs The Hague extradite-or-prosecute formula,
but leaves the determination of "severe" penalties to
the state holding the fugitives, thereby providing a
loophole that enables a state to fulfill the letter but not
the spirit of the agreement.
Since the airlines of the signatory states carry an
estimated two-thirds of the non-Communist world's
air passenger traffic, the Bonn Declaration provides
the means to effectively punish countries that violate
the antiskyjacking conventions.
Nether-
lands
Spain
Switzer-
land
United
Kingdom
West
Germany
CC
CC
A/EL
A/EL
CC
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
CC
A/EL
A/EL
None
A/EL
None
None
Trial without defendant present PC A/EL A'/EL A/EL
a Cited in general provisions of the national criminal code (CC) or the
national procedural code (PC) or provided for by special antiterror-
A/EL. PC A/EL A/EL A/EL
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industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer in 1977, Germa-
ny passed a law that provided a two-week ban on
contact between a terrorist prisoner and the outside
world when such contact could facilitate terrorist
operations. Specifically designed to prevent attorneys
from using their access to imprisoned terrorists to
smuggle contraband or to serve as a covert communi-
cations link, this law remains particularly controver-
sial as it limits access to legal counsel. This law may
be amended to allow state-appointed attorneys to talk
with terrorist prisoners during the ban.
Italy, too, has enacted tough antiterrorist legislation
that permits search without warrant, detention up to
48 hours without charge, interrogation without pres-
ence of counsel, and pretrial detention for up to five
years. One of the most effective measures, passed in
1982 but since lapsed, provided reduced sentences for
repentant terrorists. Although Italian authorities had
obtained valuable information through plea bargain-
ing in the past, this law formalized such arrangements
and provided a legal basis for fulfilling prior promises.
term, and exercised with restraint
In our view, national law will continue to be the more
effective means to counter international terrorism. Its
most useful application, in our estimation, is to offer
security forces increased latitude and capabilities
without doing violence to constitutional guarantees or
cherished legal traditions. Experience has shown that
the public in a democratic society will support such
measures if they perceive them to be necessary, short
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Group Profile:
15 May Organization
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The radical Palestinian terrorist group 15 May is
based in Baghdad and specializes in the use of
sophisticated, hard-to-detect explosive devices.F_
The Arabic Organization of the 15th of May for the
Liberation of Palestine (15 May) ' was formed from a
remnant of Wadi Haddad's Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-Special Operations Group
(PFLP-SOG), one of the most effective terrorist
groups in the Near East and Europe, which splintered
after Haddad's death in March 1978. Abu Ibrahim
(the nom de guerre of Husayn al-Umari), an expert in
fabricating explosives and sabotage devices, an-
nounced the establishment of 15 May in early 1979
and has since headed the group.
The 15 May group is not affiliated with the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). It has conducted
international terrorist operations against Israeli and
Western interests since its formation. PLO-affiliated
groups have refrained from terrorist attacks outside
Israel and the occupied territories during this period.
To date all but two targets, US commercial aircraft,
have been,Israeli or Jewish interests. We believe that
some 15 May operations against Israeli interests in
Western Europe were undertaken, at Iraqi instigation,
to retaliate for the Israeli airstrike against the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in the summer of 1981
the group started a-bombing
campaign in the summer of 1982 to retaliate for the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
15 May operatives were dispatched to various citiee25X1
with bombs hidden in luggage. Such devices were
discovered on board two American airliners and in a
Geneva hotel. 25X1
Based on technical examinations, Abu Ibrahim ha:25X1
devised a means of passing plastic explosive devices
undetected, through airport security systems. Made of
pentareathirite tetrinitrate (petn) the explosives. have a
strong odor of cocoa butter. They neither register on
explosive detectors nor can be detected 'by bomb dogs.
The device discovered in a suitcase in.a Geneva hotel
by Swiss police included a sheet explosive sewed 25X1
behind the liner of a suitcase. At first glance the
plastique resembled a thick cardboard liner. A second
carry-on bag with explosives also contained a charge
and an electronic firing device in a plastic-encased
flap. The firing mechanism was further disguised by
being placed beneath a portable radio. When
X-rayed, the firing device components blend into the
radio circuitry. 25X1
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17 January London Bomb explosion in Mount Royal
Hotel.
21 April Zurich Explosive discovered in luggage
of an El Al passenger.
27 July Antwerp Two grenades thrown at Jewish
vacationers.
1981
16 May Rome
Istanbul
9 August Rome
10 August Athens
Vienna
20 December Haifa
1982
9 January Istanbul
15 January Berlin
11 August Tokyo
Bomb explosion at El Al office.
Bomb explosion at El Al office.
Bomb explosion at El Al office.
Israeli Embassy bombed.
Israeli Embassy bombed.
Orion sunk.
Bomb explosion on Pan Am
flight en route to Hawaii.
25 August Rio de Janeiro Bomb discovered on Pan Am
jetliner.
2 September Geneva Bomb discovered in Noga Hil-
ton Hotel.
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The following is the first of a series of monthly Several of the other articles that focus on key issue
reviews of books and articles concerning terrorism, areas-the Northern Ireland problem, hostage negoti-
which we believe are worth your attention. We intend ations, the relationship between terrorism and the
to be selective rather than comprehensive in our media, and the future of terrorism-may also be of
approach to the literature. some interest.
Terrorism: Theory and Practice, edited by Jonah
Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, West
View Press Incorporated, 1979.
This well-chosen collection of essays provides an
interesting overview of the terrorist problem. Its ini-
tial essay, entitled "Out-Inventing the Terrorist,"
suggests some important conceptual distinctions rele-
vant to the analysis of the terrorism problem. This
essay approaches the subject of terrorism from three
separate yet interrelated points of view. The first
approach, entitled," traditional analytical," is the ap-
proach of the intelligence analyst, which precedes
from known capabilities and intentions-a firm data
base-to projections of likely future behavior and
trends. The second approach, termed "speculative,"
reverses the capabilities-intentions progression and
begins by evaluating the optimum terrorist target.
The final approach focuses on "crisis management"
and those areas of information that must be provided
rapidly to support crisis decisionmaking in a terrorist
event.
Two articles by British social scientist Paul Wilkinson
are also worthy of note. The first-"Social Scientific
Theory in Civil Violence"-explores the rather thin
theoretical foundation in the social and behavioral
sciences for a comprehensive understanding of the
terrorism phenomena. Wilkinson's second piece-
"Terrorist Movements"-explores the origins of the
archetypical terrorist group that explicitly practices
terrorism as its primary weapon for certain professed
political ends.
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Special Analysis
Spain:
The Socialists Tackle ETA
The landslide victory by the Socialist Party (PSOE) in
the parliamentary election last year generated consid-
erable public speculation that the 24-year history of
ETA, the Basque terrorist organization, might be
drawing to a close. For nearly a quarter of a century
ETA-a Basque acronym for "Basque Fatherland
and Liberty"-has fought for an independent, and in
recent years Marxist, Basque state.
ETA's prestige has dropped sharply in the post-
Franco era. The restoration of democracy in 1977,
and especially the granting of extensive autonomy to
the Basque country and other regions, deprived the
terrorists of virtually all their popular support outside
Euskadi (the Basque region). Within Euskadi, support
for ETA also appears to have declined: in a 1982 poll
only 8 percent of Basques claimed to favor ETA,
down from 15 percent in 1981. Electoral results reveal
that ETA retains some credibility chiefly among the
roughly 15 percent of Basque voters who support
Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity-HB), the political
front of ETA's military wing.
Increasing isolation has exacerbated ETA's divisive
tendencies. The longstanding division between the
organization's political-military wing (ETA-PM) and
the originally more aggressive military faction
(ETA-M) has been supplemented in recent years by
schisms within ETA-PM itself. The need to replicate
support systems for a dwindling number of terrorists,
battle fatigue on the part of ETA militants, and
improved police efficiency have combined to lessen
the effectiveness of all segments of the organization in
recent years. Nevertheless, ETA remains a dangerous
and thoroughly professional terrorist group. The pos-
sibility of military reactions to its actions is a constant
threat to Spain's political stability: the abortive coup
of 23 February 1981 was above all justified by the
need to excise the so-called "separatist cancer" of
ETA. 25X1
The Socialists in Power 25X1
We believe that many Spaniards felt that only the
Socialists-who had sympathized with the anti-Fran-
co motives of the pre-19.75 ETA-could successfully
negotiate with the organization. Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez nourished these hopes indirectly by
citing the resolution of the Basque problem as one of
his government's top priorities and by making a
vague, but encouraging, public offer of comprehensive
negotiations to Carlos Garaicoechea, President of the
Basque regional government. 25X1
More. concrete developments also fueled speculation
about an end to the cycle of violence. HB publicly
announced that it was beginning an internal debate or25X1
the advisability of participating in provincial and
regional governments in the Basque country, which it
had previously boycotted as "illegitimate." ETA-M''25X1
political front also offered to hold open discussions
with the Socialists on a general solution to the Basque 25X1
problem-a move that could be interpreted only as an
offer by the terrorists themselves to negotiate.l
The time frame
envisaged for a settlement, however, was two years, 25X1
and the more lethal ETA-M was determined to stet,
up its terrorist activities in the short run in order to
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force Madrid to the negotiating table. ETA-PM, on
the other hand, was reportedly considering disbanding
and joining a far left Basque nationalist splinter party.
An Empty "Peace Table"
The post-electoral optimism was shattered by the
3 November. assassination by ETA-M of General
Victor Lago Roman, the Spanish Army's top field
commander. The spectacular murder revealed that
the PSOE could expect no favors from ETA-M.
Nevertheless, the attack, condemned by all parties
except HB, did not quash all talk of a negotiated
settlement. Garaicoechea, accepting Gonzalez's olive
branch, elaborated a plan for tripartite public negotia-
tions among his Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the
PSOE, and HB. HB accepted, and the PSOE af-
firmed its willingness to talk provided that ETA-M
maintained a de facto cease-fire during the negotia-
tions.
The Peace Table, however, was never constituted. An
attempt to bring all parties together failed in mid-
January when HB refused to participate unless the
press was permitted to cover the proceedings live.
ETA-M simultaneously launched a new round of
violence that claimed five victims. The PSOE then
pulled out of the stillborn talks, stating that it could
not talk with "murderers." Garaicoechea tried to
revive the discussions during early February, but the
PSOE now demanded an explicit truce with ETA-M
before talking. ETA responded with yet another
escalation of violence, and Garaicoechea pronounced
his proposal to be at present "unviable." After only a
few months, hopes for a peaceful solution to the
Basque problem had degenerated into bitter public
recriminations and a stepped-up cycle of terrorist
atrocities
ETA's Motives
We believe that the erratic behavior of both ETA-M
and HB during the Peace Table interlude was the
product of struggles between hardline and more con-
ciliatory elements in both organizations. HB's deci-
sion not to revise its policy of refusing to recognize
provincial and regional Basque institutions indicates
that party hardliners have reasserted control. HB,
however, has not been able to preserve its public
facade of total unanimity. According to press reports,
a top HB leader has recently submitted an "internal
paper" severely critical of the party and predicting a
setback in the May municipal election if HB does not
alter its "leftist, childish, mystical, and third-
worldish" policies
In our view, however, ETA-M dictates HB's actions.
HB probably demanded live press coverage of the
Peace Table talks in response to ETA-M's request to
stall the negotiations until the terrorists could com-
pletely torpedo them by breaking the de facto truce
demanded by the Socialists. The derailment by
ETA-M and HB of the discussions they themselves
had first proposed has, in our view, stripped both
groups of what little credibility they may have re-
tained as good faith negotiators.
ETA-PM's absence from the Peace Table negotia-
tions was as significant as HB's abortive presence.
The Political-Military branch was crippled last year
when one of its factions (the 7th Assembly) accepted
former Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson's clandes-
tinely negotiated offer of amnesty for militants not
suspected of blood crimes and resettlement in South
America for others. The 7th Assembly has since
dissolved itself, leaving the small 8th Assembly to
carry on alone. Weakened by defections and under
intensifying police pressure, elements of ETA-PM are
reconciling their differences with ETA-M and fusing
with the military wing. The press speculates that
ETA-PM is poised to dissolve itself,
the most radical of 8th Assembly
terrorists have already joined ETA-M, leaving only a
rump of several dozen individuals constituting a rap-
idly disintegrating ETA-PM
The Socialists' Strategy
We believe that the Socialists' experience at the Peace
Table has convinced them of the futility of open talks
with the terrorists. Txiki. Benegas, the top PSOE
leader in the Basque country, has publicly enunciated
the government's new strategy. After a period of
reorganization and reinforcement, the police will
stage an all-out offensive against the terrorists, in-
cluding the first thorough dragnet of the Basque
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provinces in years. If these police measures have a
telling effect, then the government might be prepared
to enter into secret negotiations regarding the surren-
der of the organization's remaining members
In our view the PSOE has good reason to adopt a
tough stance at this juncture. Popular resentment of
ETA in the Basque country is at an alltime high,
fueled by a series of particularly bloody attacks that
killed innocent bystanders. A recent anti-ETA march
in Bilbao drew a record number of demonstrators.
The government probably feels it can take advantage
of the backlash against ETA to introduce into the
Basque country without serious incident the higher
profile police presence that a massive antiterrorist
operation requires. Madrid has given the police strict
orders not to resort to torture-the persistence of
which has impeded full-scale public mobilization
against ETA in the past
Ithe government is cau-
tiously optimistic that the French will at least margin-
ally increase their cooperation with Spanish authori-
ties. Even minimal cooperation, such as the exchange
of information on terrorists' whereabouts, could sig-
nificantly enhance the Socialists' anti-ETA drive.
The Basque Government: Caught in the Middle
The collapse of Garaicoechea's peace plan has placed
the PNV-controlled Basque regional government in
an uncomfortable position. As fellow Basques who in
the past sympathized with the terrorists (ETA
emerged from a PNV youth group in the 1950s), the
PNV considers itself to be uniquely qualified to
broker a political compromise between Madrid and
ETA. The content of such an arrangement, however,
has never been clear. Madrid granted a blanket
amnesty for political crimes in 1977, and the Basque
country has attained the highest level of regional self-
government compatible with the constitution. Madrid
has little but symbolic gestures or generous rhetoric to
offer either the PNV or ETA. As long as the terrorists
refuse to accept the PSOE's demand for a truce,
chances for a resumption of talks are virtually nil.
Even if the PNV managed to lure ETA and the
government back to the negotiating table, we believe
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that no government in Madrid could accept even
ETA's minimum demands.
The Basque government has one trump card: its newly
created autonomous police force (Ertzaina). The Ert-
zaina is now restricted to ceremonial and traffic
functions.
IWe believe that
if the PNV's contacts and knowledge were exploited
jointly by the Ertzaina and the national police, consid-
erable headway would be made in the struggle against
ETA. A recent assault by ETA-M on an Ertzaina
barracks-resulting in no deaths but in the theft of
arms and ammunition-indicates that the terrorists
do not intend to treat the autonomous police as 25X1
"neutrals." If more such attacks take place, the
Basque government could begin to shift away from its
current position of ineffectual equidistance between
the warring parties and toward more forthright coop-
eration with Madrid.
Outlook
The collapse of Garaicoechea's peace initiative has
embittered political relations between regional and
national parties in Euskadi and ended the postelec-
toral honeymoon between the PNV and the PSOE.
government-mandated personnel shakeups in the
counterterrorist police units will probably lessen their
effectiveness over the near term. The apparent reuni-
fication of various ETA factions will in our view
temporarily strengthen the terrorists by enabling
them to pool resources. Thus we believe that the
prospects for a short-term settlement-whether politi-
cal or police centered-of the Basque problem are
exceedingly poor.
The longer term perspective, however, is not quite so
grim: Some of the government's structural changes in
the counterterrorist apparatus-such as moving the
command headquarters from Madrid to the Basque
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country-may enhance its long-term effectiveness. A
comprehensive dragnet operation in the region would
probably further deplete ETA's already dwindling
ranks. The arrests of a number of terrorists in recent
weeks may be the first fruits of the government's
hardline' tactics. Similar detentions across the border
are also evidence of a willingness on the part of the
French to cooperate in a restricted fashion with
Spanish security forces. Finally, the massive repudia-
tion of violence by the Basque populace after the
breakdown of the peace talks and ETA's particularly
gruesome recent attacks augur for a less hospitable
environment for the terrorists.
Whether the PSOE can quickly and effectively take
advantage of these potentially favorable circum-
stances will depend in part on its general public
support in the region. The municipal election sched-
uled for May will be an important bellwether in this
respect. A drop in the HB vote, combined with
stagnation for the PNV and a good showing for the
PSOE, would indicate that a substantial segment of
the population had at least grudgingly accepted the
government's resort to police methods.
and they know it will be long and difficult
Changes in the correlation of party forces, gestures by
Madrid or Vitoria, and political or negotiating meas-
ures in general, however, will in our view go only so
far toward eliminating Basque terrorism. The most
flexible and realistic of ETA terrorists have in large
part already given up the fight. What remains is a
hard core of fanatics, financed by an elaborate system
of extortion (the so-called revolutionary taxes) and
still enjoying, a relatively safe haven in France. This
nucleus resembles an organized crime syndicate more
than a classic ideologically motivated terrorist organi-
zation. Its final destruction will depend on the PSOE's
willingness to use tough and thorough police meas-
ures, accompanied by negotiations only when the
government has a position of unassailable strength.
Spain's Socialists are prepared to take this route-
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Statistical Overview
41 / AN.-,, Z.1~ __
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982-March 1983 a
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
73
90
50
57
45
46
54
57
64
4
5
1
0
2
2
6
2
3
36
47
30
35
22
22
27
33
32
8
10
9
13
6
10
9
2
10 .
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, July 1982-March 1983 a
Total
536
25
284
77
Total
73
90
50
57
45
46 54
57
64
536
North America
6
8
2
7
0
4 3
5
4
39
Latin America
17
11
11
18
13
8 14
9
15
116
Western Europe
25
37
24
22
20
21 18
25
26
218
USSR/Eastern Europe
1
2
3
3
3
0 1
1
3
17
Sub-Saharan Africa
1
2
1
1
1
0 0
3
3
12
Middle East and North Africa
13
24
5
3
4
4 12
6
11
82
Asia/other
10
6
4
3
4
9 6
8
2
52
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks
1981 and 1982/83
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9. wounded 70.
Assassination and bombing
in Greece killed 2, wounded
70; bomb in Central
African Republic
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications.
are under way.
Turkey: Terrorists Penetrate Police
A Turkish National Police (TNP) counterterrorist operation produced evidence
that Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) members had scheduled a bombing campaign
against the US Consulate and several Turkish businesses in Istanbul, to be
conducted by terrorists wearing stolen Turkish military uniforms. The TNP
believes the arrests of approximately 70 Dev Sol members and the confiscation of
weapons, explosives, and Turkish military, police, and telephone company uni-
forms have disrupted the campaign. Police interrogations have indicated that
several National Police personnel were supplying intelligence to Dev Sol terrorists.
Internal police investigations to identify terrorist sympathizers within TNP ranks
28 February 1983 West Germany: Bombing of US Subsidiary
We believe the fire extinguisher bombing of Standard Electric Lorenz (SEL) in
Dusseldorf, a subsidiary of. US-owned corporation ITT, was conducted by the
Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Despite the lack of a confessor letter, the type of device
used and the time of attack match previous RZ attacks. We note the RZ has be-
come increasingly active in the North Rhineland area. The group conducted and
claimed 13 attacks in 1982, compared with two attacks it claimed in 1981. F_
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4 March 1983 Switzerland: Expulsion of Libyan Diplomat
A Libyan intelligence officer has been expelled from Switzerland.
Muhammad Abd al-Malik, head of the Libyan People's
such support
Bureau in Bern, was deported following revelations that Malik had used an
American woman in intelligence operations directed at Swiss parliamentarians.
Evidence against Malik had also been established during the trial of two Swiss ter-
rorist sympathizers in late February indicating that weapons found in their
possession were brought into Switzerland from the United Kingdom by the Libyan
official. We believe the Libyans have provided weapons to terrorists in Europe
since at least the early 1970s, but this is one of the few well-documented cases of
France: Armenian Terrorist Plans
In a magazine interview, the French lawyer representing imprisoned Armenian
terrorists stated that Armenian terrorism in the future will be directed against
Turkish economic targets in the United States, particularly Turkish Airlines.
8 March 1983 Lebanon: Attempted Assassination of PLO Official
the Christian-led Lebanese Forces Militia was
Nonaligned Summit meeting in New Delhi.
responsible for the assassination attempt of a senior PLO official in Beirut, Tawfiq
Safadi PLO intelligence officials believe the militia
intended to undermine rapprochement between the Lebanese Government and the
PLO,. in light of the private meetings held between Arafat and Gemayel at the
17 March 1983 Afghanistan: Al Zulfiqar Leader Killed
Parvez Shinwari, the third-ranking official in Al Zulfiqar, was killed in Kabul,
possibly by Gallumulla Khan, who led the March .1981 hijacking of a Pakistani
airliner. the Afghan secret police may have
also been involved.
23 March 1983 United Kingdom: Parcel Bomb.
In London, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) headquarters received
a parcel bomb containing a confessor letter from the previously unknown "English
Peoples' Liberation Army." Police examination of the device after its deactivation
revealed no evidence to link this bomb with three letter bombs intercepted on 15
and 16 March in London.
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25 March 1983 Spain: Attack on Spanish National Police
In Oyarzun, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) splinter group Anti-
Capitalist Autonomous Command (CAA) claimed credit for the machinegun
ambush of a Spanish National Police patrol. One policeman was killed and two in-
jured. The CAA has also claimed responsibility for the 21 March kidnaping of a
Basque industrialist. 25X1
Spain: Second Basque Kidnaping
In Madrid, Basque Fatherland and Liberty. Military Wing (ETA/M) terrorists
have claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a wealthy Spanish businessman
with close links to the monarchy. The kidnaping was staged outside ETA/M's
usual territory by ETA/M members posing as plainclothes police. No ransom
demand has been received. The kidnaping occurred four days after another ETA
splinter group abducted a Basque businessman in northern Spain.
Republic of Ireland: Shooting of Prison Official
In Dublin, the chief prison officer at the jail holding more than 1,000 Irish
Republican Army (IRA) terrorists was shot and seriously wounded by two gunmen
on a motorcycle. No group has yet claimed credit for this attack-the first on a
prison officer in the Irish Republic-although IRA terrorists are likely suspects.
25X1
Turkey: Terrorist Shootout
In Istanbul, three security officials were killed in a shootout with members of the
Revolutionary Communist Union of Turkey. Two members of the group were
slain. Police confiscated weapons and ammunition, a significant quantity of
dynamite, and correspondence between imprisoned and at-large members. Despite
the martial law controls and continuing police sweeps against terrorists, the
potential for violence remains high throughout Turkey. 25X1
26-27 March 1983 Spain: Basque Terrorists Arrested
Spanish authorities arrested seven Basque Fatherland and Liberty, Political/Mili-
tary Wing-VIII Assembly (ETA/PM-VIII) members as they crossed the border
from France. Two are believed to be members of the-Director's Committee, which
coordinates terrorist operations. Police also seized several weapons, fake identifica-
tion, and plans for future activities: The arrests resulted from a tip from French
police, indicating continued French cooperation with the Spanish against Basque
terrorists.
27 March 1983 Spain: Police Officer Killed
In San Sebastian, one police officer was killed and another injured while
attempting to defuse a bomb. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the
bomb; we suspect Basque terrorists.
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31 March 1983 Republic of Ireland: Arrest of INLA Leaders
In Dublin, Irish police arrested 11 members of the outlawed Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA) in the first major police operation since the group was
outlawed. Police do not know if the arrested INLA members represent the entire
leadership.
Late March 1983 Syria: Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Activities
The intention of the Muslim Brotherhood-announced in West Gemany in late
March-to renew anti-Assad regime operations could spark a new round of
government terrorist attacks against the MB. The best organized and most
credible threat to the regime, the Brotherhood has led the effort to overthrow
Assad. The MB was responsible for a devastating car bombing in Damascus in
1981 and the Hamah rebellion in 1982. In response to these activities, the Syrian
security services since. 1980 have attacked Muslim Brotherhood objectives in
Western Europe and the Middle East, including at least five assassination
attempts against leading MB activists in West Germany.
Libya: Antiregime Activities
A series of anti-Libyan bombings and attempted bombings took place during late
March. Within a period of two weeks, at least five bombs were placed at Libyan-
associated facilities in Europe and the Middle East, including one that exploded at
Tripoli's Embassy in Madrid on 17 March; two that were successfully removed
from the Libyan Embassy in Beirut on 19 March; a third that exploded near the
offices of a pro-Libyan magazine in Nicosia on 26 March; and a fourth that was
found outside the wall of the Libyan cultural center in Nicosia on 26 March.
Another bomb was found in Nicosia on 27 March, and, although it had no
apparent connection with a Libyan target, it was described by the Cypriot press as
similar in design to the other devices. No groups as yet have claimed credit for the
attacks. Most, however, were almost certainly the work of Libyan exile elements
and may halm been the result of reported dissident meetings in early March.
Libyan leader Qadhafi has already publicly threatened exiled oppositionists to
cease antiregime activities, and attacks such as these could spark another dissident
assassination campaign similar to that of 1980-81.
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International: Armenian Terrorist Threat
The 24 April commemoration of "Martyrs Day," marking the Armenian genocide,
has resulted in Armenian terrorist threats against Turkish facilities throughout the
world. Both the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
and the Justice Commandos have declared April the "month of revenge" and have
threatened Turkish installations in Switzerland, West Germany, and the United
States. Also in the United States, the Justice Commandos have mailed death
threats to Turkish representatives to the 15-17 April Convention of the Turkish-
American Association in Atlanta. We believe the threat from Armenian terrorists
will remain at a high level throughout April as Armenians attempt to draw
attention to the grievances. 25X1
attack, which injured three people.
Greece: Hotel Bombing
In Alexandroupolis, four bombs exploded in a hotel following a speech by a Greek
opposition leader. Twenty suspects were reportedly arrested, but we do not yet
know if the explosions were terrorist related. No group has claimed credit for the
Peru: Shining Path Guerrillas Attack Villages
According to Peruvian authorities, approximately 200 Shining Path guerrillas
attacked two villages in Ayacucho, killing at least 70 peasants and looting houses
and businesses. Police quoted witnesses as saying that some villagers were
executed following "people's trials" but that others, including women and children,
were killed trying to escape into the mountains. It was the largest guerrilla action
since President Belaunde sent troops into the area. 25X1
gentina. The group is protesting British control over the Falkland Islands.
Argentina: Bomb Damages Buenos Aires School
A bomb exploded before dawn at an English-language school in suburban Buenos
Aires shattering windows but causing no injuries. The attack may have been
carried out by the April 2nd Command which, in a 16 March telephone call to a
local news agency, claimed credit for sending letter bombs to Prime Minister
Thatcher and the US Navy headquarters in London and threatened actions
against English-language schools and other "British-related institutions" in Ar-
amount was paid to secure the victim's release.
25X1
Spain: Release of Kidnap Victim
In San Sebastian, Basque terrorists released the Basque industrialist kidnaped
21 March. The Anti-Capitalist Autonomous Commandos, a radical splinter of the
Basque terrorist group ETA, claimed credit for the abduction. Although family
spokesmen declined to comment regarding the ransom payment, we believe some
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