TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Directorate of MASTER FILE COPY F-
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Terrorism
Review
9 December 1982
Secret
GI TR 82-005
9 December 1982
348
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Secret
Terrorism
Review
9 December 1982
iii Overview
(OGI)
Salah Khalaf Preparing Terrorist Apparat in Europe
(OGI)
3 Franco-Spanish Cooperation Against Basque Terrorists 25X1
(OGI)
5 New Developments in the Agca Case
(OGI)
7 Libyan Support for Terrorism
(NESA)
9 Group Study: The International Revolutionary Cells
(OGI)
13 Chronology
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
i Secret
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Terrorism
Review F_
Overview We believe conditions are ripe for an'increase of localized terrorism in Western
Europe during the next few weeks. 25X1
This would interrupt a relatively placid period of several weeks during which the
level of international terrorist incidents worldwide has been down by almost half
from the three-month period immediately following the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon. We have indicated in earlier editions of Terrorism Review that we
believe the reduction is largely due to law enforcement successes in West Germany
and Italy, to accommodations between major Palestinian groups and certain West
European governments, and to the accession to power of the Socialists in Spain.
This latter event has resulted in probes by Spanish terrorist groups for a temporary
truce and a disposition on the part of the French Government to assist the Spanish
Socialists by cracking down on Spanish Basques harbored in southern France.
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The 12th of December, the anniversary of NATO's decision to deploy modernized
nuclear weapons in Western Europe, is likely to be marked by widespread protests.
Leaders of the protests want to avoid violence because they recognize the
disastrous effect that it could have on public perceptions of the "peace" movement.
Nevertheless, terrorist groups-including the Revolutionary Cells and so-called
RAF legals in West Germany-will probably seek to exploit anti-NATO and anti-
US sentiments. The violence-prone Onkruit group in the Netherlands has increas-
ingly directed its antimilitary activities against the placement of nuclear weapons
in Holland and seems likely to seek opportunities to exploit protests.
iii Secret
GI TR 82-005
9 December 1982
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Salah Khalaf Preparing
Terrorist Apparat in Europe
Recent activity in Europe, particularly in West and
East Germany, indicates that Salah Khalaf is in-
volved in building up a terrorist network in Western
Europe.
Salah Khalaf, one of Arafat's chief deputies and the
head of PLO security, has been in Eastern Europe
trying to recruit former members of the Black Sep-
tember Organization (BSO) to revive that group,
In early August three Palestinians were arrested in
Istanbul while, according to Turkish authorities, pre-
paring an attack on Israeli interests. The terrorists
claimed that they were recruited by Fatah's Western
Sector office and were told that, if captured, they
were to claim to be members of Black September.
They also said that, while BSO was not yet back in
operation, they had heard that Khalaf was going to
revive it.
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on 7 November four terror-
ists claiming to be members of Fatah were arrested at
East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport carrying explosives
and weapons. 25X1
Khalaf is the leader of the radical faction within 25X1
Fatah and has often disagreed with Arafat, particu-
larly regarding Arafat's ban on international terrorist
attacks and his attempts to achieve a diplomatic
settlement of the Palestinian problem. Arafat's ban
dating from the mid-1970s is being adhered to by
PLO groups. In May 1981, however, probably in 25X1
response to pressure by radicals to resume interna-
tional terrorism, Arafat, 25X1
had agreed to contingency planning and gave
a a the go-ahead to recruit new members and 25X1
strengthen Fatah's terrorist apparat abroad. The re-
cent activity in Europe may be a continuation of this
planning. 25X1
new apparatus for international terrorism would be
set up to be activated if negotiations failed. We
believe that Khalaf, in his position as head of PLO
security, would be the logical person to set up such an
organization.
While it is possible that Khalaf is trying to organize
his own terrorist organization without Arafat's knowl-
edge, it seems unlikely that this much activity in
Europe could go undetected by Arafat. We believe
that it is more likely that Arafat has agreed to
demands by more radical members of Fatah and the
PLO to make contingency plans to conduct terrorism
in the event that negotiations fail.
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Franco-Spanish Cooperation
Against Basque Terrorists
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The election of a Spanish Socialist government has
spurred Spanish and French Socialists to limited
collaboration against the Basque terrorist organiza-
the Socialist election victory has solidified
Spanish democracy and removed any justification for
French protection of the Basque separatist organiza-
tions.
The PS has already begun to. put pressure on the
leadership of the violence-prone military wing of ETA
(ETA/M) now in France. A recent PS offer to act as
intermediary for negotiations between ETA/M and
the Spanish Government may be connected with
unconfirmed information circulating in ETA circles
that the PS has told ETA/M to dismantle its infra-
structure in France within two years
Both ETA/M and ETA Political/ Military
(ETA/PM) have approached the Spanish Government
seeking negotiations
both ETA/M and ETA/PM Eighth
Assembly are attempting to reach an accord with the
Spanish Government, employing different tactics.
ETA/M has decided to increase its terrorist activities
to force the Spanish Government to negotiate.
ETA/PM Eighth Assembly has chosen to exploit the
Revolutionary Party of Basque Workers to achieve its
political objectives.
The French Government also may be employing
another tactic to weaken ETA/M. In early Novem-
ber, PS First Secretary advised that the French
Government would release its imprisoned leader Do-
mingo Iturbe Abasolo, if negotiations with Spain were
successful. According to Jospin, the French Socialists
believe Iturbe's release would probably splinter
ETA/M. Iturbe, a member of the Executive commit-
tee, favors negotiations with the Spanish Government,
while the Marxist faction within ETA/M, led by
Eugenio Echeveste Arizguren, favors continuation of
the armed struggle.
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has already arisen within ETA/M over the negotia-25X1
tions issue. Any further split would seriously weaken
the support structure and shrink the operational area.
Despite recent French initiatives,
the French effort will 25X1
remain limited to harassment. The recently approved
French policy of easing extradition of alleged terror-
ists to democratic. countries will probably not be
implemented with regard to Spain. The French Con-
sul in Bilbao has stated the French Government will
not extradite ETA/M members, and at least one
ETA/M leader arrested in France has already been
released from custody, allegedly for lack of evidence.
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New Developments in the Agca Case
Although the confidentiality of the Italian magistrate
system inhibits the flow of information on the arrest
in Rome of Bulgarian airlines official Antonov
caution in connecting Antonov with would-be
papal assassin Mehmet Ali Agca. At the same time,
two other Bulgarian officials have been implicated in
the case.
undertook the investigation over a year ago with the
preconceived notion that the Bulgarians and Soviets
were involved with Aeca.
Martella presented Agca with
a list of Soviet and Bulgarian names and a stack of
photographs. When Agca identified Antonov,C
Martella ordered him arrested.
The Italian press has speculated that Antonov may be
released soon because of a lack of evidence.
the evidence against Antonov
is insufficient for conviction and that it may be
limited to Agca's identification of the photograph.
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the
Italian magistrate system gives investigators and pros-
ecutors independence and wide latitude and prohibi25X1
public release of information. This had led in at least
one instance to an abuse by a magistrate in terrorism
cases. Following the rescue of General Dozier in ear125X1
1982, the investigating magistrate fed to the Italian
press the story that the Red Brigades were supported25X1
by Israeli intelligence services
According to press reports, Judge Martella's research
on the Bulgarian angle of the Agca case has led to a
request by the Italian Foreign Ministry that Bulgaria
lift the diplomatic immunity of Bulgarian Embass25X1
employee Teodorov Akvasov, currently out of the
country. His position of cashier is, according to the
Embassy, not covered by diplomatic immunity, but he
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has "certain rights" (unspecified). In the meantime,
judicial sources in Italy have informed the press of an
international arrest warrant issued for another former
Bulgarian Embassy employee, Vassiliev Juelio Kolev,
who returned to Bulgaria some months ago. In view of
Buglaria's strong denials of possible complicity of
Sergei Ivanov Antonov in the Agca case, it is unrealis-
tic to anticipate cooperation with the Italians with
respect to Akvasov and Kolev.
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Secret .
Libyan Support for Terrorism
cern for his international image.
During the 13 years he has been-in power, Libyan
leader Qadhafi has gained a deserved reputation as a
principal patron of international terrorism. Active
Libyan support for terrorism has ebbed and flowed
over the years, however, and Qadhafi has demonstrat-
ed considerable sensitivity to public opinion and con-
Qadhafi's most recent activist phase dates back to
1979 when he was faced with mounting dissent at
home, a major foreign policy setback in Uganda, and
the example of a successful revolution in Iran that
prompted him to reassert his own revolutionary cre-
dentials. In 1980 Libyan hit teams began to murder
Libyan dissidents in Europe, killing 11 people and
wounding several others between March 1980 and
February 1981. Qadhafi put a stop to the murders
when the international outcry persuaded him that the
policy was counterproductive
Later in 1981 Qadhafi became convinced that the
United States was planning to have him assassinated.
Following the downing of two Libyan planes during a
US exercise in the Gulf of Sidra in August, Qadhafi
began to turn his terrorist capability against the
United States
erious consideration
was given to attacks against the President and Secre-
tary of State. Again, a flood of publicity, combined
with the withdrawal of US citizens from Libya and a
US boycott of Libyan oil exports, apparently persuad-
ed Qadhafi to moderate such high-visibility' activities.
Nevertheless, Qadhafi is continuing, and even acceler-
ating, activities aimed at undermining other govern-
ments. In contrast to the summer of 1981 when he
devoted himself to mending fences with a number of
his Arab colleagues, Qadhafi for the past several
months has been lashing out at his fellow Arabs.
Sudan's President Nimeiri has long been an important
Qadhafi target-initially because he stood with Sadat
after Camp David and was willing to cooperate with
the United States and more recently because of
personal antagonism. In August 1981, at the time of
the formation of the Tripartite Agreement among
Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, Qadhafi persuad.25X1
ed Ethiopia's Mengistu to join forces with Libya in
training Sudanese dissidents and in mounting anti-
Sudanese operations.[
Libya infiltrated a 22-man Suda- 25X1
nese "revolutionary committee," trained in Libya,
into Sudan to recruit and to plan terrorist and assassi-25X1
nation missions-one target being the US Embassy in
Khartoum.
npo i is also beaming ra io roa cast,25X1
at Saudi Arabia, giving details about the alleged
corruption of officials in an effort to stir up dissidence.
Qadhafi also has apparently turned his attention to'
overthrowing the smaller Gulf states and assassinat-
ing their leaders.
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Tunisia is another prime target of Libyan activity.
The Libyan-sponsored raid on the Tunisian mining
town of Gafsa in -January 1980 strained relations:
between the two countries. In early 1982
the Tunisians.
picked up a group of. 15 Libyan-trained commandos
attempting to infiltrate Tunisia.
Libyan tribes. Qadhafi has avoided more overt moves
against his neighbors since his withdrawal from Chad,
Where dissident movements do,not.already exist,
Qadhafi 'works to. create them. He recruits foreigners
working in Libya for his elaborate system of terrorist
training camps; he attempts to influence and ulti-
mately control Islamic movements and institutions in
neighboring.-countries; and he broadcasts propaganda
to potentially disaffected. groups-particularly the
Tuareg tribes in Mali and Niger, who have ties with
Although Qadafi seems to have singled out the United
States as the source of all his troubles-ultimately
responsible for the oil glut, the failure of the Tripoli
summit, the defeat of the Palestinians, internal dis-
sent, and the financing of Libyan exile organiza-
tions-current information does not indicate that
active Libyan planning for an anti-US campaign is
under way. Another direct confrontation such as the
Gulf of Sidra incident, however, would probably spark
a new campaign against US interests.
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Qadhafi: may. be on the verge of yet another upsurge
of terrorist activity. He has publicly warned Libyan
dissidents in exile that he will renew his assassination
campaign unless they "repent" and' return home. In a
speech .on17.October, he called on all Libyan people's
conferences to endorse the policy of carrying out
murder as a "war in. self-defense." He also declared
that the murder. operations will no longer be carried
out exclusively-by revolutionary committees or hit
squads; every Libyan who travels abroad will be
responsible for the elimination of enemies
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Group Study:
The International Revolutionary Cells
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The International Revolutionary Cells (IRZ), a shad-
owy, loosely organized association of West German
terrorists, has apparently lost much of its original
ideology and connections with the domestic Revolu-
tionary Cells while maintaining some ties with Pales-
tinian terrorist organizations and with "Carlos." F_
German officials describe the IRZ as an offshoot of
the West German Revolutionary Cells (RZ), a terror-
ist organization that has conducted more attacks
against US military installations in Germany than
any other group during the last decade. According to
the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) and the
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(BfV), the IRZ was formed in the mid-1970s by some
early RZ members who had trained in the Middle
East under the auspices of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and thereby became
oriented to international issues. The BKA and the
BfV believe that the IRZ has had no significant
contact with the indigenous RZ since the initial split.
We believe that the IRZ as an entity became relative-
ly inactive after Wadi Haddad's death in March 1978
but that individuals associated with it continued to
engage in terrorist activity. This is supported by an
incident in Paris in February 1982. Kopp and Breguet
were arrested in a parking garage by a policeman
suspicious of their behavior.
weapons and explosive materials were subse-
quen y confiscated from their car. During followup
interrogations by French Government officials, Kopp
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and Breguet declared themselves members of an
"Organization of International Revolutionaries." Bre-
guet stated that their targets were not French inter-
ests
Shortly thereafter, in a letter to the French Interior
Minister, Carlos demanded the release of Kopp and
Breguet and safe passage to a country of their choice,
threatening reprisals against French property and
high-level French Government officials. The ultima-
tum suggests that the two were involved in a Carlos- .
sponsored operation, and their continued imprison-
ment could well trigger additional efforts to secure
their release. Indeed, the spate of terrorist incidents in
France-such as the March 1982 explosion aboard
the Paris-Toulouse train-may be linked to the ulti-
matum.
Although lack of information precludes us from draw-
ing firm conclusions about the current configuration
of the IRZ, we believe that it has changed considera-
bly since the death of Wadi Haddad. Perhaps the
most striking difference between the Wadi Haddad-
era and the present-day IRZ is the apparent absence
of a strong ideological conviction. The IRZ now
appears to be a loosely organized association of
individuals rather than a closely knit terrorist organi-
zation. The West German authorities believe that the
IRZ, while influenced by Carlos, have become essen-
tially apolitical terrorists for hire.
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Total, 645
Of which: US targets, 335
Category of
International
Terrorist Incidents,
1982, by Month
ti
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Chronology
18 November 1982 Spain
An ETA/M communique claims responsibility for the killing.of one person and
severe wounding of two others, whom ETA/M describes as police informants.
Recent police successes in defusing bombs placed by ETA/M appear to lend 25X1
In Guernica, ETA/M claims credit for an attack on Civil Guard barracks and the
bombing of a bank in Bilbao.
19 November 1982 Azores
On Sao Miguel Island, the Popular Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of
the Azores (MPRLA) is suspected in the attempted bombing attack on a
Portuguese commercial transmitter. Although MPRLA has been active in Lisbon,
little is known about the group or its objectives. 25X1
Spain
In Tudela-Navarra, ETA/M is believed responsible for the bombing of the
National Labor Institute. In Bilbao, one bomb exploded at a local bank and a sec-
ond bomb at another bank was defused by Spanish police. ETA/M continues its
attempts to raise funds through extortion of "revolutionary taxes" from Basque
National Police motorpool. Severe damage and injury are averted when the rocket
explodes between two cars. ETA /M rocket grenade attacks indicate lack of
training with the weapon 25X1
21 November 1982 Spain
In San Sebastian, ETA/M is believed responsible for a rocket grenade attack on
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Italy
Nine Red Brigades members arrested in Turin, including BR leader Marcello
Ghiringhelli, whom Italian authorities believe is responsible for five murders: The
Italians believe the BR column in Turin is nearly destroyed.
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Italy
Italian police arrest Sergei Ivanov Antonov, Balkan: airlines official in Rome, in
connection with independent investigation of attempted assassination of the Pope
by investigating magistrate Ilario Martella.
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charges within week that two former employees of Bulgarian Embassy, in Rome
also involved in case. 25X1
Ecuador
Two policemen and a passerby are killed when a bomb explodes while being
removed from the Israeli Embassy in Quito. Ecuador has no active indigenous
terrorist group, and there has been no attempt from any group to claim credit,
United Kingdom
In London, a previously unknown group, Animal Rights Militia, claims responsi-
bility for a letter bomb sent to Prime Minister Thatcher. Only minor injury to one
person result. Police inte and defuse four additional letter bombs sent to
members of Parliament.
1 December 1982
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1 December 1982 Lebanon
In Beirut, an apparent attempt is made to assassinate Druze leader and prominent
leftist Walid Jumblatt. A car bomb explodes while Jumblatt is nearby. He is only
slightly injured.
detonates during an attempt to disarm it.
2 December 1982 Thailand
The Iraqi Consulate in Bangkok is destroyed by a bomb left in. a briefcase, which
the early 1970s, Luna's demise may permanently cripple GRAPO.
5 December 1982 Spain
In Barcelona, the suspected leader of the First of October Anti-Fascist Group
(GRAPO) Juan Martin Luna is killed in a shootout with Spanish antiterrorist
police. Considered the operational brains behind numerous terrorist attacks since
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Secret
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