TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
00 ~J~Il1T
OR MARK ON
i Secret
Secret
GI TR 82-002
28 October 1982
Terrorism
Review
319
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F-
Organize for Terrorism
(OGI)
OGI)
ALA)
(OGI)
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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F
Overview International terrorism is affecting US security interests even in cases in which
terrorist operations do not directly involve Americans. F 25X1
US relations with Turkey, for instance, have been adversely affected by a
campaign conducted by two Armenian terrorist groups that has claimed the lives
of more than 20 Turkish nationals abroad. Two recent attacks, in the greater Los
Angeles and Boston areas, have resulted in strong Turkish pressure on Washing-
ton. The Turks have messed for increased protection for their diplomatic personnel
and for information on Armenian terrorist organizations. The
Turks also have implied that US negligence permitted ASALA terrorists to leave
West Beirut with the Palestinian fighters. 25X1
The attention focused on Armenian terrorism has also strained Turkish relations
with other NATO states, thus inhibiting NATO harmony. Public sentiment in
some areas of Western Europe tends to sympathize with Armenian grievances,
which have been highlighted by publicity given the terrorism problem, and is
mistrustful of the military government in Ankara 25X1
A second example involves US interests in the Middle East, which often have been
affected by terrorism. Several rejectionist Palestinian terrorist organizations,
which are outside the PLO umbrella, have conducted terrorist operations to
provoke the Israelis, to oppose US policy, and to undermine the moderate wing of
the PLO and moderate Arab regimes. The attempted assassination of the Israeli
Ambassador in London in June, conducted by the bitterly anti-PLO Black June
Organization, triggered the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and resulted in serious
Another recent illustration of the indirect impact of international terrorism on US
security interests was the Cichonero terrorist seizure of over 100 hostages in
Honduras in mid-September.
the terrorists sought to use the operation to press the Honduran Government to
loosen its ties with the United States. We believe subsequent terrorist attacks with
the same objective are likely in Honduras as long as the government cooperates
with US security programs in Central America.
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Moderate Palestinian Elements
in West Germany and West Berlin
Organize for Terrorism
moderate
Palestinians in West Germany and West Berlin have
organized new terrorist groups for operations against
US, Israeli, Syrian, and Gulf state targets as a result
of the mass killings in September at the Palestinian
camps in Lebanon.
Many of these Palestinian moderates in West Germa-
ny lost relatives during the
fighting in Beirut; some lost their entire families to
the subsequent massacres at Palestinian camps. This
has deepened their desperation and their conviction
that diplomacy will not provide early solutions to
Palestinian problems. This perception is reinforced by
the belief of many Palestinians that other Arabs had
not supported them in Lebanon. Many responsible
and heretofore moderate Palestinians are now discuss-
ing the possibility of starting a campaign of violence
in Western Europe. The objects of the campaign
would be to exact vengeance against those they
consider responsible for the events in Lebanon and to
keep the Palestinian problem at the forefront of the
world political agenda.
arrangements regarding
organization, operational techniques, logistics, tar-
gets, and financial support are being implemented. By
early October, groups of Palestinians in West Germa-
ny and West Berlin had formed three-man cells
capable of carrying out terrorist operations.
Usin weapons
obtained in East Berlin, the
terrorists plan hit-and-run attacks rather than the
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more complicated and logistically difficult hostage or
kidnaping operations, and initial attacks are likely to
be centered in West Berlin.
Al-
though the status of the logistic support of these
militants is not clear, it seems likely that they will be
able to obtain the necessary weapons. With careful
planning, hit-and-run assassination operations, espe-
cially against multiple targets, will be difficult for
local security forces to prevent.
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Terrorism and the
Spanish National Elections
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Major Spanish terrorist groups have stepped up at- October in eight different provinces, because of the
tacks in the final days prior to the 28 October national similarity of a defused bomb to those previously used
elections in an effort to provoke military intervention. by GRAPO
The Basque separatist organization, Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA), and the terrorist arm of the now illegal
Reconstituted Communist Party of Spain, the First of
October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO),
have been responsible for several assassinations,
bombings, and grenade attacks (see chronology). Dis-
contented military officers point to this surge of
violence as an indication that Spain's young demo-
cratic system cannot maintain order. These attitudes
play into the hands of both ETA and GRAPO, which
we believe seek to provoke military intervention in the
elections or even a military takeover. ETA and
GRAPO believe either of these actions would increase
their popular support.
Despite increased counterterrorist efforts, we antici-
pate more terrorist violence prior to the election.
Although we believe that the pains
antiterrorist police will be able to prevent any large-
scale operation by ETA or GRAPO, small-scale
attacks will probably continue unabated, particularly
in areas outside Madrid, and will increase preelection
Spanish counterterrorist efforts against ETA have
met with considerable success within the past month.
In San Sebastion a command unit leader, Fernando
Barrio Olano, was killed and other ETA members,
arms, ammunition, and documents were seized. On 20
September ETA was also stung by the voluntary
dissolution of the VII Assembly, an ETA subunit that
renounced violence in favor of participatory democra-
cy. Although ETA formed an VIII Assembly to
continue armed resistance, the new group was hard
hit by the 12 October arrest of its leader Jesus
Abriskita Korta in France, traditionally an area of
sanctuary for Spanish Basque guerrillas. Despite
these disruptions, ETA continues to conduct assassi-
nations, bombings, and rocket-grenade attacks.
tensions.
Despite the arrest of three members on 15 October,
GRAPO maintains the tempo of minor terrorist ac-
tions throughout Spain, to promote an "active boy-
cott" of the elections. Spanish police credit GRAPO
with the majority of 11 bombings, which occurred 17
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Venezuela:
Bandera Roja Setback)
A joint operation by Venezuelan military and intelli-
gence forces in the eastern part of the country has
crippled the last remaining insurgent group, the Ban-
dera Roja (Red Flag). The antiguerrilla campaign
during the week of 4 October reportedly resulted in 23
deaths-one-third of the estimated strength of the
insurgents.
Carlos Betancourt established the Bandera Roja in
1969, when he broke with the Cuban-sponsored Revo-
lutionary Left Movement (MIR) because it had re-
nounced violence in order to become a legal political
party. Recurring fragmentation over the years has
hampered the group's efforts to mount large-scale
terrorism. Since 1978 the most active component has
been the Americo Silva Front, which has concentrated
on acquiring equipment and engaging in small-scale
bank robberies, kidnapings, and harassment. Al-
though the group has generally avoided the kinds of
indiscriminate violence that would alienate the public,
it has not gained any popular base of support.
gence and Prevention had been closing in on the
insurgents since early this year. In April, security
forces arrested Bandera Roja's principal leader,
Gabriel Puerta Ayonte, and some of his followers.
The element of surprise, together with a rare instance
of effective coordination among the armed forces and
security services, was primarily responsible for the
highly successful operation this month. Cleanup oper-
ations in the area were still under way 10 days later,
as the Army attempted to round up remnants of the
group.
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Reactions in Venezuela have followed predictable
lines. Both the ruling Social Christians and the other
major party, Democratic Action, congratulated the
government and reaffirmed opposition to the insur-
gent movement.' Parties to the left, however, have
raised questions of human rights violations. Respond-
ing to these allegations, the government and the
Chamber of Deputies have named a commission to
investigate the incident.
The Bandera Roja has been dealt perhaps a fatal
blow. With only a few guerrillas left in the field,
isolated acts of terrorism are still possible, but the
return of any notable insurgency would probably
require a seriously deteriorating economy and in-
creased foreign and domestic support, none of which
appears likely
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Bolivian-Italian Cooperation
Against TerrorismF__-]
Italian security authorities traveled to the Western
Hemisphere early in October and, in collaboration
with Bolivian security authorities, brought back for
trial a rightist terrorist suspect wanted for involve-
ment in the August 1980 bombing of the Bologna
railway station-an attack that killed 85 people and
injured 200, the largest number of casualties caused
by a single terrorist incident in Europe since World
War II.
In an apparent effort to avoid the lengthy extradition
process, the Bolivian Government of President Her-
man Siles Zuazo-installed on 10 October-expelled
the Italian rightwing terrorist suspect Pierluigi
Pagliai, who had enjoyed the protection of the previ-
ous military regime. After being wounded and arrest-
ed in La Paz, Pagliai was tranported to Rome on an
Alitalia DC-10, which the Italian Ministry of the
Interior had requisitioned and dispatched to Bolivia
with Italian secret service officials and police on
board. These officials had also hoped to return with
another terrorist wanted for the Bologna bombing,
Stefano Delle Chiaie,' but he escaped capture.
Neither Bolivian nor Italian authorities are eager to
take public credit for this operation, which could
create diplomatic and political problems for both
governments. Pagliai's lawyer has already demanded
an inquiry into whether the arrest violated interna-
tional law and Italy's 1890 extradition treaty with
Bolivia.
Italian authorities suspect Pagliai and Delle Chiaie of
being members of an Italian rightist group known as
the National Vanguard, one of the numerous Italian
rightist groups whose terrorist activities seldom re-
ceive as much publicity as those of the Red Brigades,
Front Line, and lesser leftist groups. Rightist tactics
in Italy-as well as in other European countries-
differ from those of the left; rightist terrorists often
bomb targets with no apparent object except to cause
as much damage as possible. These groups have
shown an utter disregard for victims, who normally
have no significant connection with the political scene.
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Secret
Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982
6
1
6
6
6
8
8
10
7
58
11
12
11
13
9
35
13
13
2
119
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
8
5
3
9
2
5
7
2
3
44
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks
1981 and 1982
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Assassination and bombing
in Greece killed 2, wounded
70; bombing in Central
African Republic killed 4.
wounded 100.
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Chronology
? 23 September 1982 Colombia
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the National Liberation Army
(ELN) was responsible for the attack on the Israeli Ambassador's residence in
Bogota and not the M-19 group
terrorist activities.
Libyans residing abroad.
or face reprisal. The threat is similar to one Qadhafi made in 1980, which
preceded an 18-month campaign that resulted in the assassination of at least 12
7 October 1982 Libya
Qadhafi issues a public warning to dissident exiles to cease oppositionist activities
leading members of the dissident movement are primary targets. The
sweeping call for all Libyan citizens to initiate attacks could lead to random
killings not specifically authorized by the government.
Recent information that the ELN has rejected the
amnesty negotiations indicates ELN will continue its urban
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8 October 1982 Spain
ETA claims credit for two assassinations in the Basque country, and Spanish
authorities believe the group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is responsible for the
attempted assassination of a policeman in Bilbao
membe
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9 October 1982 Spain
In Irun, ETA claims responsibility for the assassination of a retired Civil Guard
West Germany
In Frankfurt, a bomb concealed inside a fire extinguisher explodes under a vehicle
parked in the US Army housing area. Although no group claimed credit for the at-
tack, the type of device is similar to those used by Revolutionary Cells in early at-
tacks against US military facilities in West Germany.
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future hostage situations.
Honduras
Members of the Honduran Cobra counterterrorist unit raid a safehouse on-the
outskirts of San Pedro Sula, freeing the 16-year-old daughter of prominent
Honduran businessman Jorge Larach and killing three of her captors. The
daughter has been held for 44 days by terrorists demanding $10 million ransom.
The Cobras, whose ability to mount such an operation was in doubt during the re-
cent Chamber of Commerce incident, may use this raid to press for intervention in
Mexico
The Honduran Embassy in Mexico City is briefly occupied by approximately 14
members of the PST Youth Cichonero Brigade who were protesting Honduran
collaboration with the United States in "harassment" of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua. After obtaining attention from the media, the group withdraws,
threatening similar protests in the future. 25X1
Marquina:
Spain
ETA is probably responsible for the wounding of two Civil Guard officers when a
remote-controlled bomb explodes under the truck in which they are riding in
ETA "revolutionary taxes" continue to be targets of ETA.
Spain
In Irun, ETA claims responsibility for the bombing of a bank. Banks failing to pay
this group is affiliated with the French group of. the same name.
Canada
In Canada, a dynamite bomb estimated to weigh 600 pounds explodes outside
Litton Systems of Canada causing eight injuries and considerable property
damage. A group called Direct Action subsequently claimed credit for the attack
in a confessor letter, which outlined the group's opposition to nuclear weapons.
Litton produces cruise missile components. We cannot determine at this time if
nade and machinegun attack on Civil Guard Headquarters in Navarra.
Spain
One civilian is killed and two Civil Guard officers wounded in an ETA rocket-gre-
Spain
ETA probably is responsible for the rocket-grenade attack on the official residence
of the government delegate in Vitoria in the Basque country.
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Secret
17 October 1982 Spain
We believe both the First of October Antifacist Resistance Group (GRAPO) and
ETA are involved in 11 bomb attacks in eight Spanish cities. Targets include
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Baader-Meinhof gang members in Stammheim Prison in October 1977.
18 October 1982 West Germany
Four automobiles belonging to US military personnel in a US Army housing area
in Frankfurt are the targets of arson. An anonymous group claiming solidarity
with the Red Army Faction (RAF) takes credit for the attack in a confessor letter.
The group claims the attacks are to commemorate the suicides of prominent
Spain
ETA claims credit for 21 attacks throughout Basque country, causing considerable
property damage and wounding three. These attacks coincide with the campaign
visit of Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez
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