POTENTIALS FOR JAPAN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST SIBERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300250001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

15.
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Intelligence Memorandum
Potentials for Japan
in the Development of East Siberia
Secret
BGI GM 74-1
December 1973
25X1
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Potentials for Japan
in the Development of East Siberia
For more than a decade the USSR has sought to involve
the Japanese in the exploitation of East Siberian re-
sources and in the improvement and use of Soviet trans-
port and communication facilities.* Agreements thus far
have been restricted to cooperation in the forest products
industry and in port construction. Recent official ex-
changes, however, culminating in the October 1973 talks
in Moscow between Premier Tanaka and Kosygin and
Brezhnev, suggest that further Japanese involvement
may be in the offing. Furthermore, Western interest in
East Siberian resources, particularly natural gas and
copper, has caused Japan-which imports up to 90
percent of its basic industrial resources-to reconsider
the potential advantages of all the joint development
proposals thus far advanced.
COOPERATION:
PRECEDENT AND RATIONALE
Foreign involvement in the economic development of
eastern Siberia is not without ample precedent, Western
entrepreneurs having penetrated the area well before
the outbreak of the American Civil War. By the turn
of the century, in fact, U.S. businessmen had gained
control over much of East Siberia's retail trade and
finance, and the British and French had become deeply
involved in mining and transport, respectively. The
Bolshevik Revolution signaled a halt to such develop-
ments, however, and in the two decades preceding the
outbreak of World War II, foreign influence over the
East Siberian economy was effectively nullified.
Soviet acceptance of foreign participation in the devel-
opment of Siberian resources, during a period in which
Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated precipitously, is
at least partially motivated by a deep-seated concern
about the vulnerability of East Siberia-a vast, remote,
and sparsely populated storehouse of natural wealth.
Foreign investment in selected development projects,
in the Soviet view, would hasten the economic advance-
ment of the area and lead to the strengthening of trans-
port and communication ties that now link it to the
seat of Soviet power in the west, thus enhancing its
security.
Industrially strong but resource-poor, Japan must ex-
change capital and know-how for essential raw materials.
The exploitation of valuable mineral fuels, ferrous and
nonferrous ores, and various forest products in Siberia
has therefore been looked upon with interest by many
Japanese businessmen. Noting that proposed production
sites in Siberia are nearer Japan than most sources now
being tapped, they have expressed a willingness to pro-
ceed given the support of their Government, acceptable
development costs, and the prospect of attaining re-
munerative profit levels within reasonable periods of
time.
EAST SIBERIA-HARDSHIP POST
Unfavorable living conditions have limited the popu-
lation of the Eastern USSR and slowed the pace of
economic development. Only some 4 percent of the total
USSR population now lives in this vast territory, which
is slightly larger than the 48 contiguous states of the
*In this memorandum the terms East Siberia and Eastern USSR
are used interchangeably to designate all of the USSR east of the
western boundaries of the Yakut ASSR and Irkutsk Oblast.
United States. Furthermore, the population is so highly
concentrated-along the route of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad and in a few major river valleys-that most of
this frontier land is empty.
Life here is Spartan at best, and the USSR, despite an
attractive system of wage differentials and increments,
has had difficulty in expanding the labor force of the
area. People in the European USSR generally have not
accepted the hardships of existence in East Siberia,
thousands of miles from home. Nor are they apt to do so
willingly until the standard of living more closely ap-
proximates that prevailing in the west. Winters are long
and cold, summers short, and permafrost-underlying
most of the area-makes the construction of housing and
transport more difficult than elsewhere in the USSR.
As a result, dissatisfaction with life is commonplace, and
labor turnover is high. Coping with problems such as
these substantially increases the cost of development,
thus making the sharing of the risks involved even more
desirable to the Soviet Government.
THE JOINT COMMITTEE
To provide a forum in which proposed joint economic
undertakings, trade, and technical cooperation exchanges
could be discussed, the USSR and Japan established in
1966 the joint Japan-USSR Economic Committee (Joint
Committee). Members of the Japanese delegations have
been leading businessmen, government officials having
remained in an advisory capacity. Their Soviet counter-
parts, however, have all been high-ranking officials of
ministries involved in international trade or the economic
development of Siberia.
This committee, which by agreement should meet
once each year, has been convened five times. At the
first meeting there was discussion of the development
of natural gas deposits on Sakhalin Island and the ex-
ploitation of mainland resources-gas and oil, copper,
and forests, including the construction of pipelines and
port facilities. At the second meeting agreement was
reached on the development of forest resources, and a
pattern for future bilateral agreements was established.
The third and fourth meetings continued the discussion
of a number of proposals, with the two sides agreeing
at the fourth session to speed up the negotiation of con-
tracts for the development of Vrangel Bay (Bukhta
Vrangelya) ; expedite research leading to the deve V ,~
ment of natural gas reserves on Sakhalin Island an ifi^
Yakutia; accelerate the exchange of information concern-
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ing the supplying of Soviet coal and iron ore to Japan;
expedite the negotiation of agreements concerning the
production and shipment to Japan of chips, timber, and
pulp derived from broadleaf trees; and encourage Japa-
nese-Soviet scientific and technical exchanges. A joint
communique at the conclusion of the twice-postponed
fifth meeting indicated that much of the talk hinged
around the proposed Tyumen'-Irkutsk-Nakhodka oil pipe-
line. The sixth meeting of the joint Committee, already
delayed, will undoubtedly continue to explore proposals
previously advanced.
AGREEMENTS REACHED
Timber and Forest Products. The first of the joint
development agreements to be reached called for the
exploitation of forest resources in the Sikhote-Alin' Moun-
tains. Parties to this 1968 agreement included an official
Soviet foreign trade corporation and a private Japanese
trading concern, the K. S. Sangyo Company of Tokyo,
created especially for the venture by 14 Japanese firms.
A second agreement on forest products followed in De-
cember 1971; by it Japan was to exchange equipment,
machinery, and consumer goods worth $50 million for
the delivery, starting in 1972, of 8,050,000 cubic meters
of wood chips and 4,700,000 cubic meters of wood and
pulp over a 10-year period. This agreement was signed
by the All-Soviet Export Corporation of the USSR and
the Japan Chip Trading Company, Ltd., a consortium
comprised of 27 paper and pulp companies.
In view of the abundance of forest resources in East
Siberia, the modest investments required for their ex-
ploitation, and the mushrooming demand for wood and
wood products in Japan, further agreements may be
forthcoming. The unexploited forest reserves of East
Siberia are so large that current operations could be
greatly expanded without adversely affecting the balance
between the rate of cutting and the rate of forest
regrowth.
Port Development. Early recognition of the need to
improve and expand Soviet ports in the Far East led to
the only other Soviet-Japanese agreements. By the time
of the first session of the joint Committee in 1966 the
principal Soviet commercial port in the area, Nakhodka,
had already approached its cargo handling limit, and it
seemed unlikely that its capacity could be expanded
sufficiently to cope with proposed tonnage increases in
RURAL POPULATION
Persons per square mile
0 3 26 65
0 1 10 25
Persons per square kilometer
URBAN POPULATION
o 300,000 to 1,000,000
? 100,000 to 300,000
fuel, ores, and forest products. Turnaround time in the
congested port continued to mount, and by 1970 the
500-mile trip from Japan to Nakhodka and return re-
quired as much as 30 days to complete.
Following the examination of a number of alternative
port development possibilities, the USSR and a 14-mem-
ber Japanese consortium agreed in December 1970 to
cooperate in the construction of a new, $350-million
port on Vrangel Bay at a location some 8 miles from
Nakhodka. By this agreement the Japanese were to pro-
vide technical assistance, engineering designs, equip-
ment, and $80 million in credits. Subsequently, in No-
vember 1972, the Japanese made available an additional
credit of $7 million to be used for the construction of
a wood-chip loading system.
Work on Vostochnyy Port, as the development is now
known, began in 1971. When complete, it will provide
facilities for the annual shipment of 10 million tons of
coal, 800,000 tons of wood chips, and the handling of
120,000 to 140,000 containers, Although a 10-year con-
struction period was originally planned, parts of all major
sectors of the port are slated to become operational by
1975. The dredging of critical harbor areas is well ad-
vanced, as is work on the coal and wood-chip piers.
Land transport inland from the port is developing satis-
factorily, and a critical rail-highway bridge over the
Partizansk (formerly Suchan) River is now scheduled
to open in early 1974.
Vostochnyy Port, slated to become the largest Soviet
port in the Far East in terms of capacity, should have
great significance in furthering Japanese-Soviet coopera-
tion in East Siberia. In addition to facilitating the ship-
ment of fuels and forest products, it may induce the
Japanese to place greater reliance on container ship-
ments to Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, These
developments would necessitate modernization of Si-
berian rail facilities, improvement of railroad operating
efficiency, and the provision of a large number of addi-
tional freight cars.
PROPOSALS UNDER DISCUSSION
Chul'man Coal. Completion of new facilities at Vos-
tochnyy Port could accelerate the development of the
South Yakut coalfields in the Chul'man area, 270 miles
north of the nearest terminal on the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road. The most promising of the deposits is the one
situated near Neryungra, 20 miles south-southwest of
Chul'man; it contains 350 million tons of premium grade
coking coal according to Soviet officials. Coal deposits
of lesser worth in the area are huge, estimates of total
reserves of all grades ranging upwards to some 20 billion
tons. At the present time only one mine at Neryungra,
producing 200,000 tons of coal a year, is in operation, all
of its output apparently being used to supply a small
local power station.
USSR-Japanese coal negotiations date from the second
meeting of the joint Committee in 1967. Currently im-
porting about 50 million tons of coking coal per annum
for her steel industry, now the third largest in the world,
Japan estimates that her requirements will probably ex-
ceed the 65-million-ton level by 1980. Should this occur,
the South Yakut coalfields could become a significant
source of supply for Japan. In 1972 a sample shipment
of Neryungra coking coal was dispatched to Japanese
steelmakers, who found it to be satisfactory but perhaps
inferior to the best grade of U.S. coking coal available.
On the basis of this sampling and a survey of the site
in June 1973, the Japanese indicated that they might
be willing to purchase 5 to 7 million tons of coal a year,
with delivery to begin in the early 1980's.
Exploitation of the coal deposits at Chul'man will re-
quire supplementation of the highway now linking the
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East Siberia: Joint Development Proposals
oPOc?
Siberian
umen'')
3asin
Yakutskaya
ASSR
(Yakutia)
`,. Lena-Aldan-
";Vilyuy Basin
Chul'man
Lervdtxtra
. Kirenskf ~Lw' i l dinski t
w.. Amurs
Tayshet Ust Kut~ Skovv inoXTAhta gda = \ Oblast
~. d'Ssb bbl .t'
Khabarov~kiy
Kray
Nikola r'ja
7 ~
Chiti skaya
Lake O last'
Baikal ht
an- do
OSPHAIEs
In Operation Proposed
Petroleum pipeline ----
Natural gas pipeline ---
]Oil and gas area
Railroad
Railroad under construction
Proposed railroad
mining area with centers of consumption to the south.
A railroad is presently under construction from the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to Tyndinskiy, and Moscow has in-
formed the Japanese that extension of this line to Chul'-
man will be completed by 1977. While short, this line
will prove relatively costly to construct. On the Skovoro-
dino-Tyndinskiy sector alone it will be necessary to erect
about 200 bridges and move more than 200 million cubic
feet of earth.
The latest Soviet-Japanese discussions about Chul'man
coal, concluded in April 1973, did not go well. In these
talks the USSR raised the amount of Japanese investment
capital they were seeking from $350 million to $585
million, $80 million of which was to be used to provide
consumer goods to help finance local development costs.
The Japanese were also disappointed to learn that de-
livery of coking coal could not begin before 1984 and
would not reach the 5-million-tons-per-year level until
1987. Finally, the Japanese and the Soviets were unable
to agree on either the interest rate or the price of the
coal. Discussion of these points will presumably continue
at the sixth session of the joint Committee.
Yakut Natural Gas. The development of the Nakhodka/
Vostochnyy Port area may also figure prominently in
the eventual joint development of the natural gas de-
posits of Yakutia, a subject of Soviet-Japanese discussions
since at least 1966 and of Soviet-American discussions
since 1971. At stake are the stores of natural gas in the
Lena-Aldan-Vilyuy Basin, hundreds of miles from the
Duki
/` Pivan
Chegdom
Karichatsl
Oblas
Sea of
Japan TOKYO *;'-
(6
'J
east coast of Siberia. The most likely of the several pipe-
lines proposed to tap these deposits would extend some
2,300 to 2,500 miles from the gasfields northwest of
Yakutsk to a liquefaction plant at Nakhodka-via Aldan,
Takhtamygda, Shimanovsk, and Khabarovsk. In a varia-
tion of this plan, Ol'ga has been proposed as an alternate
coastal terminal. Other proposals involve pipelines that
would terminate at Nikolayevsk-na-Amure and at Maga-
dan. Of the terminal ports under consideration, only
Nakhodka is open the year around.
The Japanese have been unable to come to terms w.ith
the USSR on the exploitation of Yakut gas deposits 'be-
cause with only limited exploration of this area com-
pleted, uncertainty exists about the size of the gas de-
posits and about the costs of development. Until rate
1972 the USSR had not begun to survey the area, and
in consequence the amount of gas available is still uin-
known, previous estimates having been based on inat3e-
quate evaluations; teams are now at work, howewer,
hopeful that proved recoverable gas reserves may, be
sufficiently enlarged by 1975 to justify exploitation. tCur-
rent negotiations are apparently proceeding on the
assumption that by 1975 proved recoverable reserves may
total about 300 billion cubic meters and potential', re-
sources about 700 billion cubic meters, with the li 'keli-
hood that subsequent discoveries will be of sufficient
magnitude to permit the uninterrupted flow of at least
56.6 million cubic meters (2 billion cubic feet) of gas
per day for a period of 20 years. I
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to European destinations. In 1972 approximately 12,000
containers moved over the route; traffic is expected to
increase to between 15,000 and 20,000 during 1973, to
about 57,000 in 1974, and to a full capacity of 120,000
to 140,000 containers when Vostochnyy Port is completed.
One of the problems to be overcome is the imbalance
in traffic flow; during 1972 the westbound flow of
containers was five times as great as that to the east.
The involvement of the Japanese in the development
of Eastern Siberia may depend most significantly on the
1,000-mile railroad proposed to link Ust'-Kut, on the Lena
northwest of Lake Baikal, with Duki, a railhead west
of Komsomol'sk. The completion of this longstanding,
costly, and much discussed project would make the
realization of other important proposals possible. While
the precise route has not yet been determined, the rail-
road would probably pass through Chul'man and north
of the Udokan deposits, thus serving the proposed mines
and generating international interest in the area as a
whole.
OUTLOOK
While USSR-Japanese joint development negotiations
have produced only modest agreements since their in-
ception in 1966, those which have been completed may
pave the way for more significant pacts. Particularly im-
portant is the agreement for the development of Vos-
tochnyy Port on Vrangcl Bay. Its completion will speed
up involvement in other, more costly projects. Further-
more, international issues that have complicated or im-
peded the cooperative development of major projects
now appear to be less critical than at any time in the
past, and the international competitive position of Si-
berian resources is improving. The Japanese Government
has recently assured the USSR of its interest in the joint
development of Siberia, and Japanese business and com-
mercial leaders have been urging foreign investors to
join them in these ventures. Should they be successful-
and recent manifestations of U.S. interest indicate that
they may be-a steady growth of Japanese-Soviet co-
operation in the exploitation of Siberian resources seems
likely.
The achievement of joint development goals will de-
pend in the last analysis on the improvement of local
living conditions. East Siberia is sparsely populated, a
reflection of the harshness of Siberian life, and in certain
of the proposed development areas-Chul'man and
Udokan, for example-the entire labor force would
need to be imported. To establish an acceptable standard
of living, unusually high investments in transport, hous-
ing, and services will be required. This is the unavoidable
price of joint development on the frontiers of East Siberia
today.
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The cost of the proposed pipeline, the associated lique-
faction plant, and distributional facilities has caused the
Japanese to negotiate with particular caution. Estimates
of total capital requirements for the project range from
$2 to $6 billion and possibly more, with as much as $3
billion being allocated to the land facilities and the
remainder to a fleet of 20 cryogenic tankers.
Because of the magnitude of the investment required
and the uncertainty of return at this time, the Japanese
have openly sought U.S. participation in the project,
arguing that American technology and support is essential
to success. This effort, supplemented by Soviet overtures,
has been optimistically viewed by the Western press. The
first tangible result was a "letter of intent" to develop
Yakut gas, signed on June 9, 1973, by the El Paso
Natural Gas Company, the Occidental Petroleum Cor-
poration, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. This
action, although not entirely unexpected, upset Japanese
businessmen, who feared that they might be excluded
from participation in the project. Moscow immediately
sought to assure them, however, that the Japanese role
in the development had not been diminished. In fact,
the Soviets are reported to have reaffirmed previous
pledges to the effect that the Japanese would be per-
mitted to approve the choice of U.S. firms involved in
the project. In the meantime final decisions must be
delayed until definitive information on the gasfields is
Early stage of construction of Vostochnyy Port in April 1971.
Nakhodka Area
Railroad
Road
Yekateri ovka
Vladimiro-
Aleksandrovskoye
T'm er berth
Container and
wood-chip berths
obtained through an exploration effort expected to cost
as much as $150 million, which by the Soviet proposal
would be financed jointly by the export-import banks of
Japan and the United States.
Tyumen' Petroleum Pipeline. Also slated to terminate
in the Nakhodka area is the long-discussed Tyumen'
petroleum pipeline. The Japanese were first invited to
participate in this project in 1961, when the USSR pro-
posed the extension of an existing pipeline from the
vicinity of Irkutsk to Nakhodka, some 2,500 miles to the
cast. The offer was repeated in essentially this form in
1963, 1965, and 1966. The proposal was expanded in
1967 when the USSR solicited Japanese involvement in
the construction of an entirely new 4,000-mile, 48-inch
Tyumen'-Nakhodka pipeline designed to transport about
50 million tons of petroleum to the coast annually. So-
viet commitment to the revised proposal, even in the
absence of tangible Japanese support, is indicated by
the USSR decision to make at least a start on the 1,480-
mile segment of the pipeline between Tyumen' and
Irkutsk. In consequence of this decision, a new 500-mile,
48-inch pipeline connecting the oilfields at Aleksandrov-
skoye with the existing pipeline at Anzhero-Sudzhensk
was completed in March 1972.
The total cost of the Tyumen'-Nakhodka pipeline,
which would parallel the route of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad eastward from Irkutsk, is estimated at approxi-
mately $3 billion by Soviet authorities. Of this total, the
USSR is seeking $1 to $1.5 billion from the United States
and Japan in the form of credits to be repaid in oil
at the rate of 25 million tons annually over a 20-year
period. These credits would be used, in part, for the
purchase in the United States and in Japan of some
1,700,000 tons of steel pipe and related equipment. The
remainder would be expended to provide essential ma-
chinery, tools, and consumer goods,
The fortunes of the pipeline proposal have ebbed and
flowed for several years, through the course of which
a number of complicating issues-economic and po-
litical-have been raised. Most of the former-which
have involved interest rates, repayment schedules, prod-
uct quality, and price-have been or probably can be
resolved through negotiation. The latter, however, have
been more difficult: until recently there was open dis-
agreement within the Government of Japan as to what
the national policy toward this project should be. Of
particular concern to the Japanese was the expressed
objection of the Chinese to construction of the pipeline
along the Sino-Soviet border. This question was settled
in March 1973, however, when Prime Minister Tanaka
expressed to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev the will-
ingness of the Government of Japan to participate in the
Tyumen' oil, Yakut gas, and Sakhalin offshore projects.
Although subject to freezing, approaches to Vostochnyy Port
can be kept open.
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During the past several months the Japanese have
been discussing the Tyumen' project with the USSR and
with the American firms Gulf Oil and Exxon, which
have been asked to collectively finance 20 percent of
Japan's $1 billion share of the project. The Occidental
Petroleum Corporation has also indicated an interest,
offering in July 1973 to assume 50 percent of the foreign
share of the development. American support is highly
desirable, if not indispensable, from the Japanese view-
point; a number of high Japanese sources have told
U.S. officials that the Japanese Government regards U.S.
participation as essential for political and economic
reasons. On the other hand the Japanese, wishing to
preserve a predominant role among foreign states in the
joint development projects of Siberia, have reflected
surprise and apprehension when confronted with the
expressed interest of Occidental Petroleum. Without
doubt the discussion of the Tyumen' pipeline will occupy
a prominent place on the agenda of the next meeting
of the joint Committee.
Udokan Copper. Of tremendous potential significance
are the copper deposits of northern Chitinskaya Oblast'.
These deposits, with a claimed average copper content
of about 2 percent, may constitute the richest single
source of copper in the world. Some sources estimate
the ore body to be 7 kilometers (4.3 miles) long, 5 kilo-
meters (3.1 miles) wide, and 200 meters (656 feet) thick;
if so, it could contain more than 200 million tons of
metallic copper, at least twice the amount available in
Chile. Unfortunately, it is situated some 400 miles from
the closest point on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
The Japanese were first invited to participate in the
exploitation of these deposits in 1966, but the normal
costs of development, complicated by the complete lack
of interregional transport, were too great for them to
assume. According to the most recent estimates available,
opening of the mines and the construction of a rail link
to the Trans-Siberian Railroad would involve the ex-
penditure of $2 billion, about 50 percent of which the
USSR would assume, Subsequent to the approach to the
Japanese, the USSR also discussed the exploitation of
Udokan copper with the British, French, West Germans,
and Americans, all apparently without success despite the
admitted richness of the beds.
Development of the deposits will involve the creation
of entirely new roads, railroads, electric power lines,
supply depots, and housing in the area. Furthermore,
this will have to be accomplished in an environment
"where the temperature varies by something like 90
degrees [Centigrade] from winter to summer, where
mud follows snow, and where the buzzing of great clouds
of flies follows the great white silence." It is generally
agreed that this project, as the Soviets envision it, is
probably beyond the means of any one of the countries
with which the USSR has-established contact; hence the
development will undoubtedly require the combined
efforts of several of the countries already involved. Given
such cooperation, however, including the provision of
essential heavy mining and construction equipment, it is
possible that some Udokan copper could be mined by
the end of this decade.
Sakhalin Island and the Continental Shelf. Japanese
interest in the natural gas of Sakhalin dates back to
January 1966, when a Soviet mission visited Tokyo to
propose the joint exploitation of deposits located in the
Okha area. Enthusiasm for this proposal gradually de-
veloped, and by the time of the 1970 meeting of the
Joint Committee, gas specialists in Japan looked forward
to the importation of Sakhalin gas during the 1970-75
period. Ready to sign an agreement at that time, they
were entirely unprepared for Premier Kosygin's declara-
tion that the proved recoverable natural gas reserves of
Sakhalin were closer to 16 billion than to the previously
declared 60 billion cubic meters, a statement that
precluded further effective discussion of the original
proposal.
In 1971 the USSR again turned the attention of the
Japanese to the Sakhalin Island area, this time suggesting
joint efforts on the continental shelf. This suggestion led
to talks in February and November 1972, with the Far
Eastern representatives of Gulf Oil participating in the
November meetings. As a result of the November talks
the USSR and Japan agreed in principle to jointly explore
the continental shelf around Sakhalin Island. The USSR
is reported to have asked the Japanese to provide $200
million worth of drilling rigs, survey vessels, and other
equipment, as well as $30 million worth of various con-
sumer goods. Reimbursement will undoubtedly be in
product, should the surveys lead to oil and gas pro-
duction.
The Sakhalin continental shelf is reputedly a highly
promising source of natural gas and petroleum. Some
38 individual oil- or gas-bearing structures were identified
by early 1972, and further evaluation by exploratory
drilling is the next step in the determination of the
potential of the area. On the strength of preliminary
information, the USSR has laid out a tentative explora-
tion schedule that extends through 1985. During this
period a series of large-scale geophysical surveys will
be completed, and test wells will be drilled. According
to Soviet estimates, the Sakhalin continental shelf has an
oil potential of 22 to 36.5 billion barrels. Japan's interest
in deposits of this potential magnitude is naturally keen,
and all exploratory work will certainly be closely moni-
tored by them.
Additional Joint Development Proposals. At various
times a number of lesser joint development proposals
have also been reported. They have called for coopera-
tion in the development of iron, zinc, tungsten, tin,
mercury and potassium salt deposits and in the genera-
tion of electric power. The provision of machinery for
fertilizer plants around Khabarovsk and equipment for
a steel mill at Tayshet have also been discussed. The
current status of these proposals is unknown, and they
may now be in abeyance, Three Soviet-Japanese scien-
tific and technical agreements were, however, concluded
in 1972, and the October 1973 visit of Tanaka to Moscow
resulted in the signing of art agreement on scientific
and technical cooperation, a letter on scientific and
cultural exchange, and a convention on the protection
of migratory and endangered birds.
Communications-Transport Ties. In the period during
which the joint development proposals have been under
negotiation-from 1966 to the present-a coaxial cable
between Naoetsu and Nakhodka joined the USSR and
Japan for the first time and a number of significant trans-
port agreements have been reached, including compacts
covering international air traffic. Although an air con-
nection between Tokyo and Moscow was established as
early as 1966, it was not until 1969 that Japan Airlines
(JAL) obtained permission to operate independent
flights on a Tokyo-Moscow service over Siberia. In
January 1972 an air link between Niigata, on Japan's
west coast, and Khabarovsk was created. It facilitated
the immediate movement of air cargo and, starting in
1973, of passengers as well. In June of this year a further
agreement was reached: Aeroflot and JAL now operate
international passenger flights between Japan and West-
ern Europe via Siberia.
Even more significant in linking the two countries
is the growing use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to
handle freight to or from Japan. This route, sometimes
designated the "Siberian Land Bridge," is being in-
creasingly used to transport containers of Japanese goods
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