EAST ASIAN CONTESTED ISLANDS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84-00825R000300160001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
58
Document Creation Date:
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 29, 1999
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 1, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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1-3
lecret
East Asian Contested Islands
Secret
BGI RP 74-12
February 1974
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SECRET
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Summary
l
Petroleum Prospects . . . . .
3
South China Sea Islands
5
ParaceZ Islands
6
Spratly Islands . . . . .
7
Pratas . .
10
Macclesfield and Scarborough Shoal
IL
Disputed Islands in the Gulf of Thailand .
12
Senkak us . . . . . . . . . .
Z 4
Seabed Jurisdictional Issues
Z6
Political Implications and outlook 20
Appendix . . . . . Following text
Following page:
A.
East Asian Contested Islands .
3
B.
Contested Islands in the South China Sea .
5
C.
Parace Z Is lands
6
D.
Spratly Islands
7
F.
Pratas Island
Z0
F.
Contested Islands in the Gulf of Thai land .
12
G.
Senkaku Islands
Z4
H.
Southeast Asia: Conflicting Continental
Shelf Claims . . . . . . .
Z6
TABLES
1. Parace1 Islands . . . . .
2. Spratly Islands . . . . .
3. Islands in the Gulf of Thailand 12
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SECRET
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1974
Recent clashes between the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) and South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands and the
rush to occupy some of the Spratly Islands by South
Vietnamese and Philippine troops relate to old disputes
but with a new twist -- oil. In the past 5 years,
preliminary geophysical exploration and a few drillings
along the margins of the East Asian Continental Shelf
have heightened expectations that sizable oil deposits
lie beneath the East and South China Seas. The Paracels,
Spratlys, and other islands off the East Asia mainland,
including those in the Gulf of Thailand and the East China
Sea, are now being contested, not for their intrinsic
worth but for their value in determining seabed jurisdiction.
... Almost all of the contested islands are without
an indigenous population, and their economic
value -- aside from extraction of guano phosphates
on some -- is virtually nil.
... Present international law provides inadequate
guidelines for determining the seaward extension
of land boundaries, either on the continental
shelf or into the deeper waters of semi-enclosed
seas. This shortcoming magnifies the confusion
in the jurisdictional picture of the South China
and East China Seas. The Third International
Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS), which
convenes in the summer of 1974, may resolve some
of these problems.
Comments and questions my be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Code
143, Extension 3057.
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If the upcoming LOS Conference adopts measures
to allocate seabed resources in semi-enclosed
seas, ownership of islands could be crucial in
determining which coastal state gets the largest
share of the seabed and its resources.
Ownership of the islands could become a major source
of friction among the claimants even if -- as seems likely --
there are no further military clashes on the Paracels
pattern. There is an obvious possibility for upset in
Sino-Japanese relations if Tokyo begins oil exploration
activity in the Senkakus sector without prior agreement
with the Chinese. There is also a potential for dis-
ruption of the Sino-US detente, particularly if Peking
attempts to move against the Nationalist garrison on
Pratas. Though China's problems with other claimants are
susceptible of negotiation in time, the current surge of
interest in oil exploration off the East Asian coast may
lead to precipitate and risky actions in some instances.
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1. Contested islands fringe the East Asian mainland,
extending north to south from the west coast of Korea to
the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand.* All of the
islands in dispute are small, most are uninhabited, and
only a few have any economic significance (Map AY In-
terest in them has risen and publicity over rival claims
has grown since 1970, following release of data indicating
the probability of petroleum resources in the East and
South China Seas. Although national prestige, military,
and strategic factors are significant elements in at least
some of the disputes, the seabed resources issue undoubtedly
is the motive that has fanned controversy and hastened
decisions to seize control of some of these islands.
Petroleum Prospects
2. There is oil beneath the seabed of the South China
and East China Seas. Oil and natural gas are today extracted
off the shores of Sarawak and Brunei, in the southern part
of the South China Sea.** Exploratory drilling in the past
year indicates the probability of deposits off the west
coast of Sabah in East Malaysia, the east coast of West
Malaysia, in the middle of the Gulf of Thailand (an arm of
the South China Sea), and on the continental shelf between
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Japan in
the East China Sea.
Islands contested but not treated here include the
Offshore Islands and other islands between Taiwan and
the mainland controlled by the Republic of China. A
recent background paper examines their present status
(Appendix I). The west coast-Korean Islands are treated
in a paper that examines the Law of the Sea and related
issues in the situation (Appendix I). North Korea has
recently challenged access to these five island groups,
occupied by South Korean forces. Take Shama, or the
Liancourt Rocks, midway between Japan and South Korea,
also is in dispute. South Korea maintains a garrison on
them.
'?The combined Sarawak and Brunei production is about
300, 000 barrels daily and is expected to double in the
next 2 years.
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East Asian Contested Islands
PC-+ pL
y nautical miles
BURMA"% aE tt
I) MfoNNG 2,00
MACAO (UK)
-- "
(Part.) Map E
IF Map I.
Map C
PARACEL
ISLANDS
Gulf of
f Huiland
GAM831-
NAM
4i)H
HNA
-A
BRUNEI,
Map A
SOUTH]
6r
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SECRET
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3. Assessment of the region's potential is premature.
Except for offshore Sarawak and Brunei, exploration has
been underway for only 2 years or so; years of seismic
surveys and drilling are needed to adequately estimate
reserves. South Vietnamese officials hope, for example,
that the probability of oil in the seabed southeast of
the Mekong delta can be determined by mid-1974. If
positive evidence is found, exploratory drilling could
begin by late 1974; but definitive answers would not be
obtained for several more years.
4. Oil prospects appear most promising in the
southwestern part of the South China Sea and in the Gulf
of Thailand, both entirely on the continental shelf.
Seismic surveys have determined that sediments there are
thick and particularly favorable for petroleum formation
and collection. Conditions are similar to those off the
eastern shore of Sumatra, in Indonesia, and oil company
geologists and government officials are hopeful that the
newly explored areas will prove to be as productive.*
5. In the northeastern two-thirds of the South China
Sea, which includes the Spratlys and Paracels, evidence
of oil is far more scanty. Because the continental shelf
in this sector is nowhere more than 150 miles wide and
much of the sea is deeper than 3,000 meters, the prospects
for discovering commercially exploitable oil deposits are
greatly reduced. The Nationalist Chinese are drilling 60
miles west of southern Taiwan. Elsewhere, the PRC has
embarked on exploration on its own continental shelf and
is engaged in exploratory drilling on one of the Paracel
islands; in addition, the North Vietnamese are doing some
seismic exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although most
depths beyond the continental shelf in this part of the
South China Sea exceed present drilling capabilities, the
seabed surrounding island groups such as the Paracels and
the Spratlys can assuredly be exploited by rapidly im-
proving drilling technology within the next few years.
' Indonesia produces about 2 percent of the world's crude
oil.; although only Z4 percent of her total production now
comes from offshore fields, this figure is rapidly increasing.
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6. Late 1973 Japanese press reports claimed that
oil reserves in the Gulf of Tonkin had been proven by
North Vietnam with Soviet technology; the most promising
area was reported to be near Haiphong. Even if the
reports are untrue, geologic conditions in the Gulf are
favorable for the accumulation of thick oil -bearing
sediments. North Vietnam reportedly agreed late in 1973
to permit a Japanese company to explore there. The
continental shelf boundary between North Vietnam and the
PRC has not yet been determined and the numerous small
islands off both coasts could make its delimitation difficult.
7. In the relatively shallow East China Sea, geologic
conditions are also favorable for the formation and collection
of petroleum. Exploration is still in its early stages,
however; and despite an early 1974 report of a promising
oil strike west of the Senkakus, oil company officials remain
guarded in their outlook.
South China Sea Islands
8. Current tensions in the South China Sea over
possession of the Paracel and Spratly Islands involves
well over 100 small islands, islets, reefs, and rocks of
seeming inconsequence (Map B). Although most of the islands
have been used for centuries by fishermen from the sur-
rounding states, and since the 19th century some have been
exploited for their guano phosphate deposits, none of the
islands is known to have supported a permanent settlement.
Prior to and during World War II Japan used a few of the
islands, principally for meteorological and communications
facilities and phosphate extraction. The signing of the
1951 Peace Treaty with Japan appears to have created a
legal vacuum since the Japanese claims were nullified by
terms of the Treaty. Subsequently, both Peking and Taipei
reasserted claims encompassing almost all of the South
China Sea, and South Vietnam claimed the Paracels and
Spratlys. More recently, the Philippines have recorded a
claim to some of the Spratly Islands. Although political
and military factors are significant in the dispute over
ownership, the increased interest and growing tensions of
the past few years undoubtedly reflect the possibility that
sizable petroleum resources underlie the South China Sea.
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Contested Islands in the South China Sea
PARACEL
ISLANDS
Macclesfield
Bank
Vereker
Banks
PRATAS
ISLAND
Scarborough
Shoal
100 00 nautical miles p
10Q 00 statute miles NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENT tiJNe Le S IA
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITA U E
REP.
OF
CHINA
Map B
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SECRET
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Paracel Islands
9. The fighting that erupted in January 1974 in the
Paracel Islands between South Vietnam and the PRC high-
lighted their long-smoldering dispute over possession of
these islands (Map C). Since at least the mid-1950's,
each country has been in continuous occupation of one of
the two groups of islands that comprise the Paracels --
the Chinese in the Amphitrite Group, and the Vietnamese in
the Crescent Group. The brief clash, apparently sparked
by Chinese occupation of the islands in the Crescent
Group, which the South Vietnamese attempted to thwart,
left the Chinese in control of all of the islands.
10. The potential seabed resources of the Paracels
undoubtedly are an important element in the events of
early 1974. The Chinese may have important information
about the underground resources of the Paracels since they
are making exploratory drillings on Woody Island. On
11 January 1974 Peking reiterated its claim to the Paracels,
the other island groups in the South China Sea, and the
seas around them. This may have been a reaction to renewed
claims by South Vietnam and also to concern over South
Vietnamese grants for exploratory concessions in the seas
near Vietnam, some of which slightly overlap Chinese claims.
Although the question of de jure sovereignty remains un-
settled, the PRC occupation makes this an academic question.*
11. The Paracels -- called by the Chinese, Hsi-sha
Ch'un-tao, or West Sand Islands and by the Vietnamese Dao
Hoang Sa -- are scattered over a 60 by 100 mile area on a
submerged platform surrounded by deep water. The two
groups -- Amphitrite and Crescent -- are about 40 miles
apart and together comprise some 16 small islands, plus
numerous islets, rocks, reefs, and banks (Table 1). The
islands and the shallow waters immediately surrounding them
could be used in drilling operations should petroleum
prospects appear likely.
* A full discussion of the various claimants and the
historical evidence of sovereignty is contained in
CIA/BGI GM 72-4, The Paracel Islands Dispute, April 1972.S.
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Paracel Islands
CRESCENT GROUP
(YUNG-LO CH'UN-TAO)
Pattie
(Shan-hu Tao),..25R00000160001-3
I
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I 'k 47
7. Name: WEST COAST KOREAN ISLANDS
Paengnyong Do, Taech'ong Do, Soch'ong Do,
Yonpy'ong Do, U Do)
Location & From approximately 38?OO1N, 124?40'E
Description: 37?36'N, 126?00'E
The five small, rocky island groups are scattered
in an 80-mile crescent pattern in the Yellow Sea
off the North Korean coastline.
Claimants: North Korea, South Korea
Occupation: South Korea maintains a civilian and military
presence under terms of the 1953 Armistice.
Available
OBGI Report: OBGI Research Paper in preparation.
8. Name: TAKE SHIMA
Other Names: Liancourt Rocks, Tokto, Tok Do
Location & Approximately 36?15'N, 131?50'E
Description: In the Sea of Japan, mid-way between Japan and
South Korea. Two small islands and several
islets comprise the group. They are barren,
unsuitable for settlement, and difficult to
land on except in the best of weather.
Claimants: South Korea, Japan
Occupation: The islands were uninhabited until 1954 when
the South Koreans established a lighthouse and
a small garrison.
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in the South China Sea
0
MACAO
(Port)
CHINA
5 PRA7AS
ISLAND
HAI-NAN
TAO
4. Scarborough
Reef
CHINS
SEA
2. PARACEL-3. Macclesfield Bank
ISLANDIS.
.Da Nang r
OU'T H
l . SPRATLY. /
ISLANDS /
r/
B 0 R N E 0
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People's Republic ?Ch'ang-ch'un
of China
North Korea
P yongyang.
West Coasta`I~orean p~ 1 71, Islands -~f~o~lll
Tsingtao
~'~ `e'arl{(lVti'
Tsushima Hiroshim&
Kitakyushu )..
Taiwnnl
~F2arpuhtic.
of China
f
Sea of Japan
East Asia
Sakhalin
Bonin
Island;;
Iwo
.lima
NAMES AND DOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSSARIt.YY AtITIIC)1ItATIVE
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`me
Proposed Dissemination List for RP 74-12
East .Asian Contested Islands
Internal
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6531
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intell.
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2E464
Pentagon
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intell.
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Captain Paul A. Yost
Department of Transportation
Special Assistant for LOS to the
Chief Counsel, USCG
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Otho Eskin
D/LOS/Department of State
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John Dugger
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I -U
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I May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
OPS/INT/RC/IE
SUBJECT Release of OBGI Report for Singapore
Station
REFERENCE
1. Enclosed are two sanitized copies of the ORGI Report RP 74-12,
East Asian Contested Islands, classified SECRET.
25X1 A
his re ort may be released
Attribyt m to CIA anti. 38 .1 has been
removed from the report.
Special Assistant to 'director
Basic and Geographic I ntel l i rlence
Attachment:
as stated (2 copies)
Distribution:
0&1 - Addressee with Attachments)
1O/DDI - (w/cy of incoming) 25X1A
v1 - Ch/GD/BGI w/cy of incomin )
2 - D/BGI w/orig. of incoming)
SA/D/BGI:"" mjc/3334(1 May 74)
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24 APR 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/D/BGI 25X1A
SUBJECT: Request for Permission for
25X1A BGI RP 74>12, "East
Asian Contested Islands" to Liaison
25X1A
REFERENCE:
1. Permission is requested
"East Asian Contested Islands"
BGI RP 74>12,
this, it is believed that
will result in a net benefit to the U.S.
3. If permission to pass this report is approved, please
provide us with (2) sanitized copies.
OPS/INT/RC/IE
25X1 C
2 I-MPDET CL BY 007384
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GEOGRAPHY DIVISION Record of Classification Decision
25 February 1974
(Date)
1.
Title of report, study, or map:
EastAsian Contested Islands
2.
Project i o. and Report No. or Map Ho.:
CTA/BGI RP 74-12 (PN 61.2707)
3.
Classification, control, and exempt category:
SECRET, 1, 2, 3
4.
Name of classifier:
(Analyst: and others)
5.
Rationale for classification and exem tion:
Some information came from
indirectly from
Some came
6.
Sources used in report, study or map which have a bearing on
classification and exemption:
Most information came from open sources, but cable messages (Confidential
and Secret) were needed to provide current information. DoD photos and
reports from Attaches were used.
The following basic reports were used: CIA/BGI QR 71-9 (May 1971, Secret
CIA/BGI GM 72-1 (Aug 1971, Secret
CIA/BGI GM 72-4 (Apr'1972, Secret)
H.O. publication 153, Dangeorus Ground in the South China Sea.
Following are State Cables:
!TOTE: Prepare in triplicate -- one copy
for Branch Project File and two copies
for Division Front Office.
CONTROL or CLASSIFY, according to
content of entries.
F 0 P, CIT.
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] SECRET ` ^ CONFIDENTIAL
11
1
111
11
X
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY NOTICE
1
11
1
111
0
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
61.2707
Contested East Asian Islands
SUBJECT CODE
REQUESTER 25X1A
REQUESTING OFFICE
NSC Staff
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM TARGET DATE
Recent PRC-South Vietnam fighting over the Paracel
Islands has focussed attention on other contested islands Mid-February 7
in the South China Seas and elsewhere in East Asia. We ANALYST/BRANCH
propose to update previously completed Branch reports on
the Paracels, Spratleys, and Senkakus, adding other to , GD/F
islands and island groups in the South China Seas and in EST, ANALYST MANHOURS
the Gulf of Siam. Updating will consist of brief treat-
ment of recent events and conditions, e.g., oil 250
exploration activities. Preliminary work has begun with
compilation of tables of disputed islands for D/BGI.
Although the individual islands groups will be prepared
separately and would be able to stand as typescript
memoranda, we propose to put them in a single package with
an opening "political ramifications" contribution by OCI.
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : Minimal updating of maps from earlier studies; 1 -or 2 addi-
OTHER CIA: tional maps
NON-CIA : OCI Co ion; OER coordination, if material requires
4 FEB 1974
DATE CHIEF. Geography Division DATE1Feb74
REPORT RECORD
TITLE
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
AREA CODE
SUBJECT CODE
PUBLICATION DATE
ANALYST/BRANCH
INITIAL NO. OF COPIES
MANHOURS EXPENDED
CLASSIFICATION
DISTRIBUTION
ANALYST
EDITOR
TYPIST
TS
C
STANDARD
S
U
LIMITED
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