THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE IN CHINA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Transformation of Nature in China
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-3
September 1973
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SUI X14 RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Good Earth? . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Man and Nature: Traditional Views 9
Man and Nature: Post - Z949 Developments . 13
Controlling the Huang Ho . . . . . . . 16
The Huai and Hai River Basin Prcjects 18
Afforestation . . . . . . . . . . 20
Nature in Transformation: Progress and .
Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chronology of Water Control Projects and . .
Problems in the Hai Ho Basin . . . . . . following text
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1973
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE IN CHINA
Agriculture is a critical element in China's present
and future. A key question -- and problem -- is the
ability of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to in-
crease agricultural output sufficiently to keep pace with
the annual rate of population increase. The answer is
complex, but an important factor is China's progress in
the protection, improvement, and management of its land
resources. Maximum benefits must be realized from
increased use of chemical fertilizers, larger supplies
and improved distribution of water for irrigation, new
crop varieties, and other technological advances. Although
the PRC's land area of 3.7 million square miles is exceeded
only by the USSR and Canada, its agricultural land resources
are subject to major limitations. Specifically:
The amount of cultivated land is virtually
static; a number of reasons, mostly physical,
suggest that this will continue to be true for
th?. foreseeable future.
Much land now cultivated is of average to
low productivity.
25X1A
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic InteZZigence "Coe
Z43, Extension 3057.
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Climatic conditions, particularly in North
China, are highly variable, specifically in the
amount, distribution, and intensity of rainfall,
with resultant serious effects upon agricultural
output.
A sizable proportion of the land now tilled
is subject to yearly damage from drought, flooding,
erosion, and waterlogging.
Environmental improvements were implicit in the major
river basin and other water conservancy programs begun in
the early years of PRC rule. Additionally, China's rural
labor was mobilized periodically to engage in local compaigns
of ditch digging, tree planting, and a host of other activities
designed to improve agricultural conditions through the up-
grading of environmental resources. Peking characterized
these menial tasks as an opportunity to "remake nature" and
to put an end to natural calamities. Nature, or the
physical environment, was labeled an "enemy" that caused
drought, floods, privation, and famine.
Mastery of nature has not been an easy task,..even to
those inspired and guided by Mao Thought.. Recent visitors
to China, however, returning after more than 20 years, have
been highly impressed by the altered appearance of the
countryside and have commented on the presence of trees and
shrubs on previously barren hillsides and extensive tree
plantings in cities -- the results of China's "greening"
campaign. Other observers have remarked about the greatly
increased water storage facilities and the expansion of
irrigated land.
The progress of environmental programs and their effect
upon agricultural production are speculative and based in
part on indirect evidence. The record is not complete but
at this time would include the following:
Enough environmental improvements have been
made to lessen the impact from either prolonged
rainfall or lengthy dry periods.
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Water impoundments , canal s , and rel aced
water control and storage facilities have been
built by the millions, though most are small
and many inadequate for intended needs.
The Huang Ho (Yellow River) project, the
most widely publicized and largest in scope of
the river basin projects, has been scaled back
drastically and altered -- principally because
of the lack of effective anti-erosion work.
Some improvements in the Huai and Hai basins
apparently have been made; serious flooding is
less likely and damage from waterlogging probably
reduced.
Millions of young saplings have been planted,
but results in terms of original goals have been
a patchwork of success and failure.
The PRC has not claimed complete victory in its battles
with nature, but some improver,--nts in the overall picture
are undeniah e . That more has not been accomplished and
initial goal have not been reached is due not to a lack of
incentive or official dedication to the tasks at hand, but
rather to the reliance upon mass labor, lack of technically
trained personnel , failure to coordinate related projects,
overall managerial weaknesses, and the immensity of the
problem.
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ap A
%,;e,-, . M
People's Republic of China
1ungarian
Basin
'Firrr,m..
E3i sin Kansu
The Good Earth?
W,N
Hti Iran
1. The amount of cultivated land in China is
relatively small -- approximately 11 percent of the
total area -- and no sizable tracts of good agricultural
land remain unused. The physical constraints that account
for this situation can be summarized simply but aptly:
most of China is too steep, too high, too cold, or too
dry to support intensive, Chinese-style agriculture.
2. Hills, mountains, and high plateaus comprise
more than two-thirds of the Chinese landscape -- land-
forms ill-suited to intensive, Chinese agricultural
practices (Map A).
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PRC: Elevation and Major Areas
of Cultivated Land
Feet Meters
9842 3000 Over 30%
3281 1000 ?
656 200 in cultivation
0 0
Map B
Much of China is at comparatively high elevations: about
one-third of the land is above 6,600 feet and two-thirds
exceeds 3,300 feet. The lower summer temperatures,
shortened growing season, and steep slopes sallmuch y found-
at these higher elevations combine to preclude
.culture (Map B). Nevertheless, the pressure for additional
agricultural land has been so severe in China that sizable
upland areas have been painstakingly and laboriously
terraced to obtain additional fragments of agricultural
land.
berainfall
3. Nearly half of China receives s~annotlittle
(15 inches or less annually) that crops
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PRC: Mean Annual Precipitation Map C
Inches
q 3 g 19 7 39.4 59.1
0 100 500 1000 1500
Millimeters
501824 7-73
unless under full irrigation (Map C). Areas of deficient
precipitation include almost all of western and northwest-
ern China, but they contain overall only about 4 percent
of China's total cultivated acreage. Although additional
supplies of underground water probably can be tapped, no
major areas of cultivated land are foreseen being developed
there.
4. Of greater agricultural importance is the seasonal
amount, variability, and intensity of rainfall in the major
grain producing provinces. In North and Northeast China,
where annual precipitation averages only 25 inches this
the same as central Kansas), 60
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PRC: Annual Precipitation Variability Map D
(in percent) 15
Precipitation variability data for
western China are not available.
is concentrated in only 3 summer months.* This concentration
in so short a period poses an annual threat that meager spring
and early summer rains will stunt the growth of spring-sown
crops or that too much summer rain in too short a period will
damage crops by local flooding and erosion.
5. The variability of rainfall also is a crucial factor
in the major grain growing areas (Map D). The most serious
In Kansas only about half the yearly rainfaZZ is recorded
during the May through August period; furthermore, average
daily rainfall intensity in July is Zess'than half of the
amount for North China stations.
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Map E
PRC: June Precipitation Variability
5,11, ilk", '.
'""
(in percent)
Precipitation variability data for
western China are not available.
conditions exist in North China, where annual variability
(departure from normal rainfall) ranges from 20 to 30 per-
cent -- in agricultural terms a high figure because crop
yields are considered unstable when departures from normal
exceed 20 percent.* Spring and summer variability is
especially critical and is extremely high on the North China
Plain (Map E). Absolute variation in rainfall amounts is
Variation is computed by averaging the absolute values of
departures from the average, dividing this figure (mean
variation) by the average, and multiplying by ZOO to arrive
at variation expressed as a percent.
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immense in North China: K'ai-feng has received as much as
19.5 inches of rain in July and as little as 1.6 inches,
and at Tientsin the range is from 15 inches to 1.6 inches.
Finally, how much rainfall occurs during any one "rain" is
another significant indicator of agricultural stability;
here again, North China is frequently subject to brief
gully-washing rains that cause flooding and erosion and
damage water control works. Many of the weather stations
in North China, for example, have recorded as much as 9 to
10 inches of rain during a single 24-hour period.*
6. Not only is most of China's land poorly suited
for agriculture because of terrain and climatic factors,
but even the presently cultivated area possesses inherent
physical liabilities. Only an estimated 31 percent of
China's cultivated land is classified by PRC officials as
"fertile," and of the remainder, 40 percent is "ordinary"
and 29 percent "low-yielding." Although the precise
meaning of these terms is unclear, they at least suggest
the shortage of good land and the predominance of ordinary
and relatively poor agricultural land. The Chinese also
have been explicit in stating that sizable percentages of
their cropped land are subject to a variety of environmental
hazards, all of which threaten yearly crop output and over-
all economic stability. Again, evaluation of these assertions
is difficult, but they do emphasize the necessity for the
careful management and control of China's physical resources.
Man and Nature: Traditional Views
Let there be no action contrary to
Nature, and there is nothing that
will not be well regulated.
--Taoist Commentary
* Average JuZy rainfall for most of North China is 6 to 9
inches recorded on 9 to 13 days per month; Washington, D.C.,
averages about the same number of days of recorded rainfall
but its total for the month is only 4.Z5 inches.
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7. Harmony between man and nature was a basic
philosophy of ancient China, originating in Chinese
folklore with elaborations from these philosophical-
ethical precepts of Taoism and Buddhism that !,.ere
assimilated into Chinese culture. Practical observations
of what happened when man tampered with his environment
undoubtedly helped strengthen these philosophical under-
pinnings, as suggested by the following memorial of
Ch'eng Hao to Enperor Shen-tsung, ca. A.D. 1075, which
stated:
It is not merely that the nature
of things has been violated, but
that the mountains from which
forests and woods grow have all
been laid bare by indiscriminate
cutting and burning. As these
depredations still go uncurbed,
the fish of the stream and the
beasts of the field are cut
short in their abundance and
the things of nature are be-
coming wasted and exhausted.
What can be done about it?
8. The belief that China had achieved a harmonious
relationship with the earth reinforced the belief of 18th
century Western humanists in the superiority of Oriental
culture in general and Chinese culture specifically.
Chinese philosophical views toward nature were contrasted
to those of Western man, conditioned by his Judeo-Christian
heritage: man is crew:ed i17 God's image, he has been given
dominion over the earth, and he shall subdue nature so that
progress will continue and a better tomorrow be realized.
9. In spite of official injunctions against actions
"contrary to nature," the Chinese in the course of more
than three millennia of intensive occupance of their land
probably altered their environment to a greater extent than
has any other civilization. This record is impressive
whether measured by the changed appearance of the Chinese
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landscape or by the inmense physical labor involved and
the massive amounts of earth materials removed and re-
shaped. The North China Plain, for example, has been
under intensive cultivation for so long that its "natural"
vegetation still is a subject of scholarly debate. Some
2,000 years ago almost all of the lower Yangtze Valley
was choked with thick forests and extensive swamps; several
centuries of clearing and drainage work were necessary
before the regulated, almost geometrical landscape of
the present day emerged. Although c.nntinued tillage and
expansion of cultivated land produced an often dramatic
physical modification, the process itself was viewed as
part of a never-ending cycle of life. The constant working
and reworking of the soil, with continual return to the
earth of its products in the form of compost and fertilizer,
renewed the soil's ability to produce again sustenance for
mankind.
10. Man thus was a much more active participant in
altering the physical landscape of China than Western
humanists realized. The Chinese recognized that environ-
mental mastery was not only a legacy of their legendary
founders but also a necessity. The manipulation and
management of the environment were viewed, however, not as
subjugation of nature but rather as cooperation with and
adjustment to natural conditions.
11. A significant change in man-land relationships
became apparent by the mid-19th century. The physical
resources upon which agriculture depended had been stretched
to the breaking point, and, increasingly, erosion and
flooding damaged cropland, famine became more common, and
the general standard of living of the peasantry declined
markedly.* Much of this breakdown can be traced directly
or indirectly to the rapid increase in population that had
taken place since the beginning of the 18th century --
from about 150 million to perhaps 430 million by 1850.
Other factors such as bureaucratic corruption and
inefficiency, military ineffectiveness, the impact of
the Western nations, and fiscal problems also played
important .roles.
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Although increased agricultural productivity was recorded
during this time span, -nuch new land was required to pro-
vide sufficient food for the rapidly growing population.
Most of thi s new land was in South China, where settlers
cleared forested uplands and planted mountain fields of
corn and sweet potatoes.* But careless tilling of the
uplands speeded erosion, which in turn led to more frequent
and serious flooding in the valleys and plains, as indicated
by a contemporary 19th century source:
Formerly the bed of the Hsiang River
[a tributary of the Han River located
in southwestern Honan and northern
Hupeh] was several tens of feet deep.
Ever since the systematic deforesta-
tion consequent upon maize growing,
the topsoil has been washed down by
torrential rains The further
upstream one goes, the shallower the
river bed becomes. Small wonder that
from 1821 to the present [ca.1838]
there has hardly been a year in which
the Hsiang River did not flood.
12. Pessimism permeated the reports of both Western
and Chinese earth scientists who in the 1912-1949 period
investigated the status of China's physical resources and
problems. The more striking and serious problems were in
North China. Although locally some progress had been made
to combat erosion through contour plowing of slope lands
and the construction of terraces, erosion was so widespread
and so little ground cover remained that improvement seemed
Corn and sweet potatoes, crops native to the Americas,
were introduced into China in the Zate Z6th century. They
soon were well established in the Chinese agricultural
system because of their high yields and adaptability to
environmental conditions unsuited to rice, wheat, and other
traditional staples.
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impossible without major capital-intensive projects under
government auspices. In contrast, management of land re-
sources in the lowlands of South China was more successful
principally because rice -- the dominant crop -- required
the leveling and diking of small parcels of land and a
carefully regulated flow of water into the fields (Figure 1).
Consequently, irrigated rice farming produced an agricultural
system that maximized the use of available land resources
and minimized damage to them. Reckless use of nearby upland
fields continued, however, and erosion often was so rapid
that some land had to be abandoned because of exhausted soil
fertility after no more than two or three seasons of culti-
vation. By the end of Manchu rule in 1911 and the opening
of China to wide-scale modernization, damage to the
environment had so worsened that traditional methods of
combating these problems no longer were effective. The
lack of technical knowledge of how best to combat environ-
mental difficulties remained a serious drawback, and the
lack of a truly effective national government prevented
the introduction of enough technical advisors and sufficient
capital to initiate large-scale land and water conservancy
programs.
Man and Nature: Post - 1949 Developments
No matter how big the hiZZs are
and how deep the gullies can be,
they are inanimate things. But
men are Ziving beings. We have
our hardworking h.~z: ads .
Mao Tse-tung -- "The Foolish Old Man Who
Removed the Mountain"
13. Since 1949 China's millions have been enjoined to
"conquer" and "transform" nature, to "harness" the deserts,
and in other ways to alter the physical environment for the
benefit of man. Chairman Mao, the oft-cited source and in-
spiration for these admonitions, over the years has issued
a series of exhortations demanding fulfillment of a variety
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Figure 1. North China landscapes (above) reflect dry field agriculture,
lack of protective upland vegetation, and severe erosion -- particularly
in loess areas. Rice landscapes of South China (below) maximize land re-
sources through elaborate water control measures and terracing.
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of environment-related tasks. Recently, the "changing
nature" theme has reappeared in the Chinese press, which
features articles centered around Mao's instructions, in-
dicating progress made and work currently underway.
14. The view of nature as an "enemy" and the
glorification of man as an instrument of change contrasts
with traditional Chinese views of adjustment to and
harmony with nature. The aggressive tone of the PRC
leaders' rhetoric is in keeping with Marxist-Maoist views
that conflict, contradiction, and the struggle are the
proper condition of society and, indeed, its most i ii--
portant dynamic. The emphasis in Chinese treatment of
its environmental problems has been on what man can do,
under the guidance of the Party, to initiate change and
bring about improvement.
15. Major Chinese efforts have focused on water
conservancy and protective afforestation, including both
large-scale state-directed and -financed projects and a
host of local works involving little investment but
massive amounts of rural labor. During the early years
of economic rehabilitation (1949-52), emphasis was on
repair of dikes, irrigation canals, locks, and similar
facilities. Additionally, work commenced almost im-
mediately on two major flood control projects, the Huai
River and the Ching -- the latter name applied to that
portion of the middle Yangtze River down to southern
Hupeh,* Later, when the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57)
was announced, a modest amount of state investment was
allocated to initiate major, long-term programs designed
to control the perennially unruly rivers of North China the Huang, the Huai, and the Hai (Map F).
The Ching project involved the construction of dikes
and sluice gates to provide a flood retention basin for
the Yangtze south of Slut-shih.
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PRC: North China River Basins
16. More specific plans relating to protection and
improvement of the physical environment were incorporated
in the Twelve-Year Plan (1956-67) of the National Agri-
cultural Development Program, adopted in 1958. These
included such basics as increased development of water
conservancy works, irrigation, and flood and drought
control projects, with emphasis upon small and medium-
sized projects, soil improvement, extension of soil and
water conservation practices, promotion of afforestation,
and expansion of the network of meteorological and
hydrological stations. Use of the commune and its
organizational structure to mobilize the rural masses
was the principal means specified to implement the
objectives of the Plan.
17. Planning and work on some early projects was
hampered by an inadequate data base and the lack of
scientifically trained personnel. To remedy the situation
China's scientists undertook, with some Soviet help, a
series of major surveys designed to inventory, describe,
and interpret physical conditions of key areas and their
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iuang.JRo
st ning 68 L n
Peking Munkcipa3lq
e
PEKING.:
fsingta,
Shant n9
Yellow
Sea
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specific problems. Priority was given to studies of the
loess areas of the middle Huang Ho (Yellow River) basin
and the extensive arid areas of western China. By the
late 1950's the results of some of these efforts were
beginning to be published in the form of major monographs
and articles in technical and professional journals.
More specific technical material undoubtedly was forwarded
to appropriate ministries in Peking for use in particular
projects.
Control l i ncl the Huang Ho
If you wait till the Huang Ho is
clear, how old will you be?
18. Matteo Ricci, the pioneer Jesuit missionary
to China in the late 16th century, remarked that: "The
Yellow River has no respect at all for Chinese law and
order. It cc?:;ies from a barbarous region and . fre-
quently ravages whole districts of the realm, silting
them up with sand, and changing its course at will."
Though news to Europeans, Father Ricci's description and
characterization of the river merely reiterated what the
Chinese had known since earliest times: control of the
turbulent Huang Ho was the most persistent and serious
environmental problem in all of China.
19. The PRC leadership placed a high priority on
a plan to permanently control the Huang, eliminating its
periodic floods and erratic changes in course and at the
same time more fully utilizing the river both for power
generation and as a source of irrigation water. Ac-
cordingly, in 1955 the "Report on the Multi-Purpose Plan
for the Permanent Control of the Yellow River and
Exploitation of Its Water Resources" was presented to the
National People's Congress. The plan, ambitious in concept
and massive in scope, was based upon earlier studies and
recommendations, plus post-1949 investigations. It called
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for construction of a series of multi-purpose dams desinn ed
for flood control, power generation, irrigation, and navi-
gation purposes. The most publicized project was the
building of a giant hydroelectric dam at San-men (Three
Gates), a point on the Huang upstream a few miles from
where the river and its valley widen before emerging on
the North China Plain (Nap F). Smaller dams were planned
upstream from San-men, including two on the upper Huang
near Lan-chou, plus a series of reservoirs on principal
tributaries. But the key to success was, in the words of
the plan, the necessity , . to develop at the same time
large-scale water and soil conservation works in Kansu,
Shensi, and Shansi Provinces and other loess regions."
Numerous soil and water conservancy targets were spelled
out in the plan (Figure 2).
20. It probably was inevitable that the massive
physical changes required to reduce soil erosion did not
in fact occur to any significant degree, given the short
time schedule for construction of the San-men project
(1957-61), the immense size of the soil and water conser-
vancy tasks (only 5 percent of the loess area was covered
by trees), and the dizzying rural organizational changes
of the period. The San-men Dam was essentially completed
in 1961 and a mammoth reservoir was to have been filled,
taking several hundred thousand hectares of cropland. out
of production (Figure 3). But it was soon discovered that
the silt load of the river had not been measurably reduced:
by 1963 the penstocks were clogged with mud. Since then
the gates have remained open and the Huang Ho continues as
before -- ti-nsporting its heavy burden of silt seaward.
21. Mention of the Huang Flo project, and particularly
of San-men Dam, virtually ceased in the PRC press after 1961.
In late 1963 and continuing until the advent of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, an occasional article appeared on proper
techniques to reduce erosion and soil and water losses in
the middle Huang Valley. Only recently have press items
reappeared commenting on the overall problem of the Huang.
Progress is related in general terms, usually tied to one
or more of Chairman Mao's statements, but specific references
are to small-scale local achievements rather than a review of
accomplishments throughout the Huang Ho basin. No mention,
for example, is made of the 1955 plan nor of the great mass
of concrete at San-men.
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(OUO)
(OUO)-
Figure 2. The key to control of the Huang Ho is minimizing erosion
from barren loess-covered uplands. Terracing and the planting of
protective vegetation on non-cultivated slopes are essential.
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Figure 3. San-men Dam, nearing completion
in 1961, was expected to prevent serious
flooding (as below), provide irrigation
water from its massive reservoir, and gen-
erate power. Only limited flood control
benefits have as yet been realized from
San-men.
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22. It is clear that Chinese planners grievously
underestimated the importance of systematic, lonq term
soil and water conservancy work in the loess-mantled
middle reaches (Shensi , Shansi , and eastern Kansu) of the
Huang, origin of almost nine-tenths of the sediment load
of the river. Press reports of 1963 and later clearly
indicated that diverse physical factors present in the
middle Huang Valley had not been taken into account. A
December 1963 People's Daily article stated that hence-
forth "geographical considerations based on actual practice"
would be the criteria to be followed in future local land
and water conservancy projects. Earlier, for example,
projects suitable for a particular physical environment had
been imposed on other areas with differing physical
conditions -- with predictable results. In the future,
according to the article, ". . preventive measures [soil
and water conservancy projects] should be geared exactly to
the problems as they exist."
The Huai and Hai River Basins Projects
Water Conservancy is the Lifeblood
of Agriculture
--Mao Tse-tung
23. Two other problem rivers, the Huai and Hai,
received early attention from PRC leaders. Both river
basins suffered from excessive loads of silt and from
their inability to discharge through their silt-clogged
channels a sufficient volume of water to prevent flooding
during periods of heavy rains. Although flood prevention
was the most immediate } oblem, other objectives included
water for irrigation and the generation of electricity.
24. Early work on the Huai consisted principally of
repair and rehabilitation of existing facilities. Because
considerable engineering data were available from pre-1949
studies on control of the Huai , the PRC was able to shift
quickly into a comprehensive program involving the building
of new outlets, straightening river courses, and the con-
struction of reservoirs. The pace, direction, and emphasis
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of the plans, however, frequently changed. Announced
successes were often followed by later admissions of
failure. Familiar problems arose -- uncoordinated efforts,
incompetent planning, hasty work, poor maintenance of com-
pleted works, and failure to complete basic erosion control
in headwater areas.
25. By late 1972 a Chinese article proclaimed that
the basin " . . . had been transformed."* The construction
work of over two decades certainly has superficially trans-
formed the Huai basin landscape with new reservoirs, new
river channels and outlets, and a host of lesser works
completed. Whether the transformation has completely
eliminated the chronic problems of the Huai awaits the test
of prolonged heavy rains and lengthy dry spells before a
final verdict can be reached (Figure 4).
26. The Hai River, a short but important stream in
the r,,rthern portion of the North China Plain, serves as
the outlet -For fi vr; major streams that wind across the
northern Plain and which unite just west of Tientsin. This
portion of the Plain long has been subject to serious
flooding and its agricultural potential limited by consider-
able amounts of waterlogged and alkalinized or salinized
land. Although some flood control projects were completed
during the 1954-1960 period, very serious flooding in 1963,
when all five rivers overflowed, prompted a decree from
Chairman Mao Tse-tung that "The Hai Ho must be brought under
permanent control." (See Chronology of Water Control
Projects and Problems . . . following text.)
27. A variety of projects were subsequently under-
taken, including major drainage projects that have involved
the digging of new channels and providing new outlets.
Neverthel ;, an April 2973 broadcast from i.nhoei told
of the "first stage" of a Huai project calling for a
Z23-km canal and the construction of bridg,,s, regulators,
and navigation locks to relieve some 400,000 hectares of
cultivated ZL.~.d from the threat of flooding.
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Figure 4. Major Huai and Hai River projects have been
carried out to reduce waterlogging through improved
drainage and leveling of individual fields and to less-
en flooding by construction of new channels and locks.
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Progress also has been made in relieving waterlogging and
saline conditions, thus improving existing cultivated land
and reclaiming additional land. The area of alkaline land,
according to recent reports, has been reduced by half.
Overall, the amount of work done in the Hai basin is
impressive (MMap G).
28. Although the probability of serious flooding in
the Hai basin certainly has been greatly reduced, the long
tee.'m success of the present programs will depend upon
efficient manageinient of the newly created control and
drainage systems. Dikes must be inspected and strengthened,
protective vegetation on the dikes maintained, water seepage
from streams to areas of sandy soil controlled, dredging
continued, and pumps continually maintained and repaired.
Improved crop yields can be expected over the next few years
from land that previously had been waterlogged, although
salinized soil must be leached for years before it becomes
fully productive. Some successes have been achieved in
reducing the area of alkaline land, but the complicated
network of new channels must he operatively synchronized
to prevent the development of additional problems of water-
logging and salinization following periods of above-normal
rainfall.
Afforestation
Develop forestry and clothe all possible
bare land with green.
--The National Program for Agricultural
Development
29. No aspect of present-day China has impressed
returnees to the Mainland more than the extensive planting
of trees on previously barren hillsides, along major roads,
and in the cities. Visible contrasts between pre-1949
conditions and the present are great (Map H). How much
has actually been accomplished is difficult to determine,
even though abundant statistics have been released on land
afforested -- particularly during the first decade of PRC
rule. It is clear that the yearly figures have contained
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PRC: The Hai Ho Basin
?Feng-feng
PEKING
Tient
,.g-hsin Ho
Major water control project
-Completed
Under construction
or planned
so
5
50 100 'O......
Map G
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PRC: Increase in Wooded Area
Central Shansi Province
Lin-fen
Wooded area, 1949
Wooded area, 1965
o 25 Mdes
LTrTi-ll
o 25 Kilometers
Area of Map
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some duplication, including sizahle areas where replanting
of afforested land previously had been reported as completed.
In addition, the trees in many areas reported as afforested
have had low survival rates, and the condition of the land
is not now markedly different than before. Still unreached
is the goal, originally targeted for 1967, of increasing
China's forested area from the 1957 base figure of 8 percent
to 19 percent of the total land area.
30. Afforestation projects serve several PRC objectives.
A major goal has been to ease a serious national timber shortage
and to redress the re' anal imbalance of wood resources.*
Equally important is the coordination of protective afforesta-
tion plans with water and soil conservancy work -- erosion
control, stabilization of sandy areas (particularly where
they threaten cultivated or cultivable land), and related
shelter belt plantings (Figure 5). The PRC also has stressed
extensive roadside plantings and the planting of trees and
shrubs in industrial and housing areas -- a program that has
been highly successful.
31. A widely publicized program begun during the late
1950's was the "great green wall," a series of protective
vegetative buffers designed to ward off the blowing sands of
the Inner Mongolian deserts. Although Chinese sources were
vague concerning precise locational details, the "wall,"
consisting of a series of shelter-belt systems, was planned
to extend from the Greater Khinghan Mountains in Northeast
China to northwestern Kansu Province.
32. Recent Chinese commentary has avoided discussion
of "green walls," and articles on shelter belts have been
confi nc.d to those in a few specific areas. The most ex-
tensive plantings reported and confirmed occur in the
Wu-wei -- Min-ch'in area, in the Kansu Corridor, some 250
kilometers north of Lan-chou. Here plantings of several
rows of trees to widths of about 100 meters occur in places;
As of 1963 approximately ZO percent of China was forested,
of which about 60 percent was located in Northeast China.
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Fiqure 5. Afforestation involves mass
labor campaigns. Preparation of sites,
care in planting, and proper post-
planting measures are essential to
insure success.
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more conlron are i rrcqul ar plots of t-rees, a situation most
likely caused by planning and planting at different ti tees
by separate groups. Single rows of trees usually line
roads, irrigation canals, and dry stream channels. In other
areas occasional plantings have been started, but evidence
is lacking elsewhere in the Kansu Corridor of large-scale
shelter belts cornensurate with the publicity over the
"green wall."
33. The gap between plans and accompl i shn,ents has been
caused by a combination of physical, political, and economic
factors. Much of the area to be afforested consists of poor
lane; deficient in soil nutrients. Careful preparation of
sites and use of fertilizers is required to insure a high
survival rate. The prolonged periods of dry weather that
characterize the northern half of China pose additional sur-
vi val probl ems . Qualified observers al so have commented
that in some cases species that are unsuited to the
particular environment have been planted, with a consequent
low survival rate.
34. Another key obstacle to a successful afforestation
program has been the lack of trained personnel to oversee the
managerial and technical aspects of the programs and the
widespread use of rural and untrained labor to undertake the
actual pl anti . Con hionl y , afforestation drives are mounted
in late wint,, and early spring under the direction of local
rural administrative units that mobilize hundreds or even
thousands of laborers to plant young saplings. A New Zealand
forester, S.D. Richardson, commented after train travel in
China in 1963 that very dissimilar wooded plots could be
found adjoining one another. The explanation was that dif-
ferent production teams were involved in planting and
maintenance, and that the care and knowledge of those in
charge of the tree planting was the major factor relating
to success or failure. In some areas, Richardson speculated,
poor tree survival might be related to the inadequate supply
of fuel and to regulations that permit individuals to harvest
dead trees for local use. This suggested, commented Richardson,
"a vested interest in early mortality."
35. A 1963 editorial in People's Daily stated the
need to change the idea that trees, once planted, will grow
naturally without anything further being done. The editorial
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also stressed the need for idealogical and educational
work so that individuals understand " . . . the important
relationships of forests with state construction and
people's livelihood." Some progress is suggested by a
1972 report from Kiangsu that praised the cadres and
masses in a certain locality for "heightening their con-
sciousness of the struggle" so that "better results" in
afforestation had been achieved compared to past years.
The key word is "better"; quite likely, work in early years
was done poorly and extensive replanting was necessary.
Better management and education continue to be highlighted
in press reports (Figure 6). A 1972 report from Anhwei
comments that "the importance of developing forestry is
not fully appreciated . . . [and] . . . they [referring
to people in "some localities"] have no time to attend to
forestry because their grain production is not yet up to
the quota." The final paragraph of the article stressed
anew the key point of management:
One of the present important tasks
in afforestation is to strengthen
forestry management . In some lo-
calities there is still a serious
tendency to stress planting and
neglect managem,.nt. Therefore all
localities must combine the mass
afforestation movement, as a crash
program, with constant management
and protection. They must at the
same tir,,e carefully train and de-
velop a contingent of professional
workers for afforestation, and set
up and perfect the system for forest
protection along with its required
rules and regulations. They must
pay equal attention to planting and
managing so as to raise the quality
of afforestation and consolidate
its gains.
36. A recent issue of Peking Review reported that a
hsien (county) located in a coastal region of Fukien
Province had afforested nearly 40,000 hectares during the
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Figure 6. A hillside in South China five years after its afforestation (top);
a patchwork of young plantings adjacent to the Great Wall; and (bottom) a suc-
cessfully afforested tract.
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past two decades, pl anted 500 kilometers of wi ndbreaks , and
started orchards where none had existed before.* Although
intelligence sources confirm the existence of orchards,
tree-lined roads, and numerous windbreaks between fields
and in beach areas, many low hills near the lo'-,,lands still
remain ravine and barren. Some hills and patches of up-
lands have been planted with varying degrees of success,
but evidence of a systematic program is lacking and plantings
seem to be on a hit-or-miss basis.
Nature in Transformation: Progress and Prospects
To transform nature we must r,,?Zy
on ourselves...
--China Reconstructs
37. According to a recent article in China
Reconstructs, ". . . nature in old China became more
unkind with each year," but in recent times the
picture has changed greatly." Although visible
changes in the landscape and environmental modifications
have occurred since 1949, questions arise as to the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the changes:
How much change actually has taken place?
How has change been effected?
How successful have these changes been
in the context of PRC goals?
38. Victory has not been claimed by the PRC in its
battles with nature. Reports of environmental damage
caused by flooding, waterlogged soils, and excessive
erosion L till continue in the press. For example, grain
output in the PRC is estimated to have declined by about
The 40, 000 hectares figvre seems irrrpZausibZy high since
it would amount to at least a third to possibly two-fifths
of the total area of the hsien.
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10 million tons in 1972 (a drop of about 4 percent), and
the blame for the shortfall has been attributed pri i,nari ly
to drought, floods, and other environnl2ntal conditions.
Almost certainly, however, recent crop losses would have
been grr' e r had it not been for the two decades of effort
to contt,ui floods, extend irrigation, and lessen erosion.
39. Water conservancy programs have played a key role
in PRC planning toward control and modification of the en-
vironment. Early and ambitious projects to control the
major rivers of North China produced mixed results. Initial
objectives were not achieved because of lack of planning and
coordination, high costs, and limited technical resources.
A major problem was a lack of appreciation by PRC planners
of the importance, massive scope, and complexity of the soil
conservation and afforestation work required -- particularly
that needed in the Huang Ho basin (Nap I).
40. Publicity on the Huang Ho project recently has
resumed to the effect that flooding is basically under
control, though use of the word "basically" strongly im-
pl ic.s that some but not all required work is done. In a
word, flooding now is less likely -- but it still could
occur. This likelihood is given added emphasis by the
recent admission that insufficient attention has been paid
to silting and that only now is an active study of that
problem being carried out. The dimensions of the task
confronting the Chinese leadership in the Huang Ho basin
are best reflected in a 1971 article in China Reconstructs:
The success in harnessing the Yellow
River over the past 20 years or so is
only the first step in a long, long
march. Advancing along Chairman Mao's
proletarian revolutionary line, the
people living in the Yellow River
valley are continuing their efforts
to harness it further._jEmphasis added.)
More evidence of the scope of "continuing efforts" is re-
ported in a 1972 radio broadcast from Shensi Providence
that in 20 years of work only 20 percent of the Huang Ho
basin [in Shensi] had benefited from soil erosion measures.
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PRC: Middle Huang Ho Valley Vegetation
Map I
Grass and scrub with
scattered sparse stands
of forest
Mixed scrub and open forest
with occasional stands of
moderate to dense forest on
sheltered and north-facing
slopes
Both vegetation categories
include varying amounts of
cultivated land.
A
Major afforestation/
reforestation project
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.0 11652
Exemption category 5B i1 U21A3)
Ooclassitcetion data impassibe to determine
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41. China's rural landscape has been altered markedly
by the construction of vast numbers of water impoundments
ranging in size from small ponds to a few large reservoirs.*
A visual impression of the increase in size and number of
these ponds and reservoirs, based upon a comparison of maps
compiled prior to 1949 and after 1965, is shown on Map J.**
Most of these areas had few if any significant t'aater storage
facilities prior to 1949. However, an impoundment, though
it has some intrinsic value in regulating waterflow:-1, does
not guarantee use of water in adjacent agricultural lands.
Many of the smaller storage facilities l aci: sufficient
capacity to be of use during dry spells when irrigation
needs are greatest. Other facilities are of limited use
because of the lack of pumping equipment and distribution
systems or both.
42. Water conservancy projects have enabled the PRC
to increase the amount of irrigated land substantially over
pre-1949 levels and, in recent years, to embark upon a
rapid enlargement of high-yield farmland -- land under con-
trolled irrigation and drainage and capable of producing
a crop in spite of either drought or floods.*** Water
%F
In the 1949-59 decade, some 29 million projects reportedly
were completed including 56 large reservoirs, about Z9 million
small and medium-sized projects other than wells, and about
ZO million wells. The small size of the vast majority of
these is indicated by the statistic that on the average each
could irrigate slightly less than 2 hectares of farmland.
Only those impoundments that back up at least one-half mile
or more of water are shown because of the scale limitations of
the source map used. For this reason the more numerous small
reservoirs and farm ponds that range downward to only a few
acres in extent are not depicted.
*** For recent estimates of land under irrigation and extent
of high-yield farmland, see China: Control of Water Resources
in Agriculture, 1949-7Z, ER IR 72-5, May 2972 (C).
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PRC: Reservoirs Constructed 1949-70
Central Hupeh Province
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conservancy gains have been made at a cost -- staggering
use of labor; profligate construction of impoundments,
canals, and other projects; and frequent ignorance or
disregard for basic physical conditions, needs, and the
interrelationship of projects. These shortcomings have
plagued water conservancy programs from the very beginning
and continue today. A coientary in the Peool e's Dai l v of
23 March 1973 summarized the current situation as follows:
I n evaluating the achievements of 4 rater
conservation projects, we do not merely
count their number but consider their
role in increasing agricultural production.
Constructing :dater conservation projects
only to net state targets in disregard
of efficiency; thinking that these projects
once built, will naturally play their
proper role; and only knowing how to open
sluice gates to discharge water without
paying attention to the output of agri -
cultural products -- are all erroneous
ideas and work styles.
The key to success is thus in management and technical
knowledge. But as before, as acknowledged in People's
Daily, reliance is placed upon ". . . the broad masses of
cor,uune and brigade members to properly manage water con-
servancy projects [and] do a good job in maintaining them."
43. Progress has been made in increasing the amount
of land covered by forests and other types of vegetation
that will slow erosion. Although reliable data on the
extent of progress are lacking, undoubtedly more of China
is now "green" than has been the case for many decades if
not longer. Crude comparisions for one area of North China
using maps of identical scale but compiled from pre-1949 and
post-1965 data provide rough indications of gains made (Map H).
Familiar problems affect the PRC's afforestation schemes:
proper management and technical knowledge are often limited
or lacking; investment in fertilizers and pesticides usually
is inadequate; reliance upon annual mass labor drives to
reach targets results in a patchwork approach to a problem
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CONHHDENTL L
where coordinated efforts are needed: and the result all
too frequently is a low survival rate of the saplings and
the consequent necessity for the work to be redone.
44. Programs to protect and improve China's physical
environment have involved both major capital-intensive
projects and local projects using China's vast, untrained
pool of rural labor to dig, build, and plant -- making use
of local resources, simple tools; and strong backs. Early
environment-related programs stressed the major projects,
such as the comprehensive plan for development of the
Huang Ho. Later, Chinese planners began to place greater
emphasis upon small-scale projects in which little i nves t-
men't other than manpower would he required. During the
past decade emphasis increasingly has been on Maoist views
that individual r.tivation and social organization are the
keys to environmental improvement.
45. The most widely publicized example of this approach
has been at Ta-chai, the model brigade tucked aw,.y in a loess-
covered and mountain-ri nn>ed pocket of central Shansi, which
long has played the role of exemplar for rural China (Map F).
Dedication and sacrifice have been exalted, together with
self-reliance, as the key to material advance. The successes
attained at Ta-chai have been propagandized throughout rural
China (and groups from all parts of the country as well as
foreign visitors have visited this Maoist model) in an effort
to persuade the individual that handicaps and difficulties
can he overcome without waiting for the distant promise of
technology to modernize agriculture (Figure 7). The "war"
against the "ene:y," nature, also further emphasizes in
Chinese minds the revolutionary nature of the struggle and
the break against the old ways of the past with their passive
acceptance of the environmental status quo.
46. Not all that has been done at Ta-chai seems worthy
of emulation. The dam from whose reservoir Ta-chai draws
its water -- conveyed in a spectacular rock-lined aqueduct --
has no spilltwray; a period of extensive rain could lead to its
destruction. Local officials recently admitted too that the
reservoir will be filled with silt in a dozen years if erosion
continues at its present rate. This official comment from a
model area urn''e-rscores both the problem and the difficulty of
successfully applying known remedies.
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Figure 7. Transforming nature requires enor-
mous amounts of labor. Building dry-wall
stone terraces at Ta-chai; improving ordinary
fields to high-yield fields by providing de-
pendable supplies of water; elaborate earth-
walled terraces to combat erosion in North
China.
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47. It is not possible to measure accurately how
successful the PRC has been in harnessing its environmental
assets and lessening damage to them. The objective has been
to improve the physical base upon which agriculture rests.
Food output, except in the disaster years of 1959-51, has
kept pace wi th .population growth; and in the 1965-71 period
grain production increased at a somewhat faster rate. Many
factors are responsible for increasing agricultural produc-
tion, but certainly the environment-related measures of the
past two decades have reversed the trend of environmental
degradation and helped avert calamities of flood and drought.
48. The press in early 1973 reported renewed efforts
to overcoite natural calamities, as the PRC was forced to
increase grain and cotton imports and to intensify efforts
to conserve food. Chou Fn-lai, interviewed in December 1972,
blamed last year's grain shortfall on drought and flood
though, he added, other reasons exist related to the dif-
ficulty of implementing "plans in practice" and the need
to cor, ect ri thods. Nature still remains a critical element,
however, in the Chinese economy. "ran can master nature,"
stated a recent editorial in People's Daily, and good harvests
are possible if "full preparations as regards morale, measures,
and material" have been made.
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Chronology of later Control Projects and
Problems in the Hai Flo Basin
1954
1954
& 56
1957
- 58
1958
1958
- 59
1959
1959
- 60
Year Project Problems
Kuang-ting reservoir completed.
(An 85 sq. mi. reservoir on the
Yung-tine Ho, 45 mi. northwest
of Peki nn, serving flood control,
irrigation, and power generation.)
Very serious floods; Yung-tinq,
Ta-ch'ing, Tzu-ya and South Grand
Canal streams all flooded.
Peasants mobilized on small
projects; small ponds and
canals dug to store and con-
vey water to the fields.
Six large reservoirs com-
pleted in Hai Basin.
Worst drought in 30 years.
Severe rainstorms showed the
reservoirs to be inadequate.
Most of the labor shifted
fr;im construction of more
large reservoi s to the dig-
ging of "checkerboard" canals.
1960 (January) Construction of new water
conservancy projects terminated.
1963 (August)
1963 - 65
All 5 tributaries of the Hai Flo
overflowed; Mao's directive
issued that "The Hai Ho must be
brought under pc..-nanent control
Extensive and detailed surveys,
especially of the Hei-lung-
kann (in southern part of Hai
Flo basin) area; ovcrall plan
for Hei-lung--kanq area was made.
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Chronology Continued -
Year Project
1965 - 66 Hei-lung-kang project: discharge
capacity of the streams increased
by dredging silt, building new
dikes. Ta--ch' i ng and Tzu-ya
rivers improved, and given new
sewcard outlet in order to bypass
the Hai Ho at Tientsin; 400,000
workers were mobilized for the
tasks.
19-72 Extensive land reclamation con-
tinued in the Hei -lung-kang area
digging ditches, leaching salts
from the land, building raised
fields, and applying organic
fertilizer.
1970 - 72 Major drainage improvement in the
northern part of the Hai Ho basin
(in the Peking-Tientsin area):
channels now lead water directly
to the sea instead of into the
Hai Ho at Tientsin. Discharge
capacity of Hai Ho system re-
portedly increased 8 times.
New Yung-ting River cut.
Kang-kou River improved.
New Chao-pai River cut.
Problem
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Confidential
Confidential
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on Iderrtlal
The Transformation of Nature in China
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-3
September 1973
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Classified by 019641. Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, ex-
emption category: 56(1),(2),(3). Declassifica-
tion date impossible to determine.
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The Good Earth? . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Man and Nature: Traditional Views . . . . . 9
Man and Nature: Post - 1949 Developments . 13
Controlling the Huang Ho . . . . . . . 16
The Huai and Hai River Basin Projects 18
Afforestation 20
Nature in Transformation: Progress and . . .
Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chronology of Water Control Projects and . .
Problems in the Hai Ho Basin . . . . . . following text
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1973
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE IN CHINA
Agriculture is a critical element in China's present
and future. A key question -- and problem -- is the
ability of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to in-
crease agricultural output sufficiently to keep pace with
the annual rate of population increase. The answer is
complex, but an important factor is China's progress in
the protection, improvement, and management of its land
resources. Maximum benefits must be realized from
increased use of chemical fertilizers, larger supplies
and improved distribution of water for irrigation, new
crop varieties, and other technological advances. Although
the PRC's land area of 3.7 million square miles is exceeded
only by the USSR and Canada, its agricultural land resources
are subject to major limitations. Specifically:
The amount of cultivated land is virtually
static; a number of reasons, mostly physical,
suggest that this will continue to be true for
the foreseeable future.
Much land now cultivated is of average to
low productivity.
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic InteZZigence, Co e
Z43, Extension 3057.
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25X1A
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Climatic conditions, particularly in North
China, are highly variable, specifically in the
amount, distribution, and intensity of rainfall,
with resultant serious effects upon agricultural
output.
A sizable proportion of the land now tilled
is subject to yearly damage from drought, flooding,
erosion, and waterlogging.
Environmental improvements were implicit in the major
river basin and other water conservancy programs begun in
the early years of PRC rule. Additionally, China's rural
labor was mobilized periodically to engage in local compaigns
of ditch digging, tree planting, and a host of other activities
designed to improve agricultural conditions through the up-
grading of environmental resources. Peking characterized
these menial tasks as an opportunity to "remake nature" and
to put an end to natural calamities. Nature, or the
physical environment, was labeled an "enemy" that caused
drought, floods, privation, and famine.
Mastery of nature has not been an easy task, even to
those inspired and guided by Mao Thought, Recent visitors
to China, however, returning after more than 20 years, have
been highly impressed by the altered appearance of the
countryside and have commented on the presence of trees and
shrubs on previously barren hillsides and extensive tree
plantings in cities -- the results of China's "greening"
campaign. Other observers have remarked about the greatly
increased water storage facilities and the expansion of
irrigated land.
The progress of environmental programs and their effect
upon agricultural production are speculative and based in
part on indirect evidence. The record is not complete but
at this time would include the following:
Enough environmental improvements have been
made to lessen the impact from either prolonged
rainfall or lengthy dry periods.
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Water impoundments, canals, and related
water control and storage facilities have been
built by the millions, though most are small
and many inadequate for intended needs.
The Huang Ho (Yellow River) project, the
most widely publicized and largest in scope of
the river basin projects, has been scaled back
drastically and altered -- principally because
of the lack of effective anti-erosion work.
Some improvements in the Huai and Hai basins
apparently have been made; serious flooding is
less likely and damage from waterlogging probably
reduced.
Millions of young saplings have been planted,
but results in terms of original goals have been
a patchwork of success and failure.
The PRC has not claimed complete victory in its battles
with nature, but some improvements in the overall picture
are undeniable. That more has not been accomplished and
initial goals have not been reached is due not to a lack of
incentive or official dedication to the tasks at hand, but
rather to the reliance upon mass labor, lack of technically
trained personnel, failure to coordinate related projects,
overall managerial weaknesses, and the immensity of the
problem.
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The Good Earth?
1. The amount of cultivated land in China is
relatively small -- approximately 11 percent of the
total area -- and no sizable tracts of good agricultural
land remain unused. The physical constraints that account
for this situation can be summarized simply but aptly:
most of China is too steep, too high, too cold, or too
dry to support intensive, Chinese-style agriculture.
2. Hills, mountains, and high plateaus comprise
more than two-thirds of the Chinese landscape -- land-
forms ill-suited to intensive, Chinese agricultural
practices (Map A).
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Much of China is at comparatively high elevations: about
one-third of the land is above 6,600 feet and two-thirds
exceeds 3,300 feet. The lower summer temperatures,
shortened growing season, and steep slopes usually found
at these higher elevations combine to preclude much agri-
culture (Map B). Nevertheless, the pressure for additional
agricultural land has been so severe in China that sizable
upland areas have been painstakingly and laboriously
terraced to obtain additional fragments of agricultural
land.
3. Nearly half of China receives so little rainfall
(15 inches or less annually) that crops cannot be grown
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unless under full irrigation (Map C). Areas of deficient
precipitation include almost all of western and northwest-
ern China, but they contain overall only about 4 percent
of China's total cultivated acreage. Although additional
supplies of underground water probably can be tapped, no
major areas of cultivated land are foreseen being developed
there.
4. Of greater agricultural importance is the seasonal
amount, variability, and intensity of rainfall in the major
grain producing provinces. In North and Northeast China,
where annual precipitation averages only 25 inches (about
the same as central Kansas), 60 to 75 percent of this total
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is concentrated in only 3 summer months.* This concentration
in so short a period poses an annual threat that meager spring
and early summer rains will stunt the growth of spring-sown
crops or that too much summer rain in too short a period will
damage crops by local flooding and erosion.
5. The variability of rainfall also is a crucial factor
in the major grain growing areas (Map D). The most serious
In Kansas only about half the yearly rainfall is recorded
during the May through August period; furthermore, average
daily rainfall intensity in July is Zess'than half of the
amount for North China stations.
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conditions exist in North China, where annual variability
(departure from normal rainfall) ranges from 20 to 30 per-
cent -- in agricultural terms a high figure because crop
yields are considered unstable when departures from normal
exceed 20 percent.* Spring and sunnier variability is
especially critical and is extremely high on the North China
Plain (Map E). Absolute variation in rainfall amounts is
Variation is computed by averaging the absolute values of
departures from the average, dividing this figure (mean
variation) by the average, and multiplying by Z00 to arrive
at variation expressed as a percent.
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immense in North China: K'ai-feng has received as much as
19.5 inches of rain in July and as little as 1.6 inches,
and at Tientsin the range is from 15 inches to 1.6 inches.
Finally, how much rainfall occurs during any one "rain" is
another significant indicator of agricultural stability;
here again, North China is frequently subject to brief
gully-washing rains that cause flooding and erosion and
damage water control works. Many of the weather stations
in North China, for example, have recorded as much as 9 to
10 inches of rain during a single 24-hour period.*
6. Not only is most of China's land poorly suited
for agriculture because of terrain and climatic factors,
but even the presently cultivated area possesses inherent
physical liabilities. Only an estimated 31 percent of
China's cultivated land is classified by PRC officials as
"fertile," and of the remainder, 40 percent is "ordinary"
and 29 percent "low-yielding." Although the precise
meaning of these terms is unclear, they at least suggest
the shortage of good land and the predominance of ordinary
and relatively poor agricultural land. The Chinese also
have been explicit in stating that sizable percentages of
their cropped land are subject to a variety of environmental
hazards, all of which threaten yearly crop output and over-
all economic stability. Again, evaluation of these assertions
is difficult, but they do emphasize the necessity for the
careful management and control of China's physical resources.
Man and Nature: Traditional Views
Let there be no action contrary to
Nature, and there is nothing that
will not be well regulated.
--Taoist Commentary
Average July rainfall for most of North China is 6 to 9
inches recorded on 9 to l3 days per month; Washington, D.C.,
averages about the same number of days of recorded rainfall
but its total for the month is only 4.Z5 inches.
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7. Harmony between man and nature was a basic
philosophy of ancient China, originating in Chinese
folklore with elaborations from those philosophical-
ethical precepts of Taoism and Buddhism that were
assimilated into Chinese culture. Practical observations
of what happened when man tampered with his environment
undoubtedly helped strengthen these philosophical under-
pinnings, as suggested by the following memorial of
Ch'eng Hao to Emperor Shen-tsung, ca. A.D. 1075, which
stated:
It is not merely that the nature
of things has been violated, but
that the mountains from which
forests and woods grow have all
been laid bare by indiscriminate
cutting and burning. As these
depredations still go uncurbed,
the fish of the stream and the
beasts of the field are cut
short in their abundance and
the things of nature are be-
coming wasted and exhausted.
What can be done about it?
8. The belief that China had achieved a harmonious
relationship with the earth reinforced the belief of 18th
century Western humanists in the superiority of Oriental
culture in general and Chinese culture specifically.
Chinese philosophical views toward nature were contrasted
to those of Western man, conditioned by his Judeo-Christian
heritage: man is created in God's image, he has been given
dominion over the earth, and he shall subdue nature so that
progress will continue and a better tomorrow be realized.
9. In spite of official injunctions against actions
"contrary to nature," the Chinese in the course of more
than three millennia of intensive occupance of their land
probably altered their environment to a greater extent than
has any other civilization. This record is impressive
whether measured by the changed appearance of the Chinese
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landscape or by the immense physical labor involved and
the massive amounts of earth materials removed and re-
shaped. The North China Plain, for example, has been
under intensive cultivation for so long that its "natural"
vegetation still is a subject of scholarly debate. Some
2,000 years ago almost all of the lower Yangtze Valley
was choked with thick forests and extensive swamps; several
centuries of clearing and drainage work were necessary
before the regulated, almost geometrical landscape of
the present day emerged. Although continued tillage and
expansion of cultivated land produced an often dramatic
physical modification, the process itself was viewed as
part of a never-ending cycle of life. The constant working
and reworking of the soil, with continual return to the
earth of its products in the form of compost and fertilizer,
renewed the soil's ability to produce again sustenance for
mankind.
10. Man thus was a much more active participant in
altering the physical landscape of China than Western
humanists realized. The Chinese recognized that environ-
mental mastery was not only a legacy of their legendary
founders but also a necessity. The manipulation and
management of the environment were viewed, however, not as
subjugation of nature but rather as cooperation with and
adjustment to natural conditions.
11. A significant change in man-land relationships
became apparent by the mid-19th century. The physical
resources upon which agriculture depended had been stretched
to the breaking point, and, increasingly, erosion and
flooding damaged cropland, famine became more common, and
the general standard of living of the peasantry declined
markedly.* Much of this breakdown can be traced directly
or indirectly to the rapid increase in population that had
taken place since the beginning of the 18th century --
from about 150 million to perhaps 430 million by 1850.
Other factors such as bureaucratic corruption and
inefficiency, military ineffectiveness, the impact of
the Western nations, and fiscal problems also p Zayed
important roles.
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Although increased agricultural productivity was recorded
during this time span, much new land was required to pro-
vide sufficient food for the rapidly growing population.
Most of this new land was in South China, where settlers
cleared forested uplands and planted mountain fields of
corn and sweet potatoes.* But careless tilling of the
uplands speeded erosion, which in turn led to more frequent
and serious flooding in the valleys and plains, as indicated
by a contemporary 19th century source:
Formerly the bed of the Hsiang River
[a tributary of the Han River located
in southwestern Honan and northern
Hupeh] was several tens of feet deep.
Ever since the systematic deforesta-
tion consequent upon maize growing,
the topsoil has been washed down by
torrential rains The further
upstream one goes, the shallower the
river bed becomes. Small wonder that
from 1821 to the present [ca.1838]
there has hardly been a year in which
the Hsiang River did not flood.
12. Pessimism permeated the reports of both Western
and Chinese earth scientists who in the 1912-1949 period
investigated the status of China's physical resources and
problems. The more striking and serious problems were in
North China. Although locally some progress had been made
to combat erosion through contour plowing of slope lands
and the construction of terraces, erosion was so widespread
and so little ground cover remained that improvement seemed
Corn and sweet potatoes, crops native to the Americas,
were introduced into China in the Zate Z6th century. They
soon were well established in the Chinese agricultural
system because of their high yields and adaptability to
environmental conditions unsuited to rice, wheat, and other
traditional staples.
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impossible without major capital-intensive projects under
government auspices. In contrast, management of land re-
sources in the lowlands of South China was more successful
principally because rice -- the dominant crop -- required
the leveling and diking of small parcels of land and a
carefully regulated flow of water into the fields (Figure 1).
Consequently, irrigated rice farming produced an agricultural
system that maximized the use of available land resources
and minimized damage to them. Reckless use of nearby upland
fields continued, however, and erosion often was so rapid
that some land had to be abandoned because of exhausted soil
fertility after no more than two or three seasons of culti-
vation. By the end of Manchu rule in 1911 and the opening
of China to wide-scale modernization, damage to.the
environment had so worsened that traditional methods of
combating these problems no longer were effective. The
lack of technical knowledge of how best to combat environ-
mental difficulties remained a serious drawback, and the
lack of a truly effective national government prevented
the introduction of enough technical advisors and sufficient
capital to initiate large-scale land and water conservancy
programs.
Man and Nature: Post - 1949 Developments
No matter how big the hiZZs are
and how deep the guZZies can be,
they are inanimate things. But
men are Ziving beings. We have
our hardworking hands.
Mao Tse-tung -- "The Foolish Old Man Who
Removed the Mountain"
13. Since 1949 China's millions have been enjoined to
"conquer" and "transform" nature, to "harness" the deserts,
and in other ways to alter the physical environment for the
benefit of man. Chairman Mao, the oft-cited source and in-
spiration for these admonitions, over the years has issued
a series of exhortations demanding fulfillment of a variety
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Figure 1. North. China landscapes (above) reflect dry field agriculture,
lack of protective upland vegetation, and severe erosion -- particularly
in loess areas. Rice landscapes of South China (below) maximize land re-
sources through elaborate water control measures and terracing.
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of environment-related tasks. Recently, the "changing
nature" theme has reappeared in the Chinese press, which
features articles centered around Mao's instructions, in-
dicating progress made and work currently underway.
14. The view of nature as an "enemy" and the
glorification of man as an instrument of change contrasts
with traditional Chinese views of adjustment to and
harmony with nature. The aggressive tone of the PRC
leaders' rhetoric is in keeping with Marxist-Maoist views
that conflict, contradiction, and the struggle are the
proper condition of society and, indeed, its most im-
portant dynamic. The emphasis in Chinese treatment of
its environmental problems has been on what man can do,
under the guidance of the Party, to initiate change and
bring about improvement.
15. Major Chinese efforts have focused on water
conservancy and protective afforestation, including both
large-scale state-directed and -financed projects and a
host of local works involving little investment but
massive amounts of rural labor. During the early years
of economic rehabilitation (1949-52), emphasis was on
repair of dikes, irrigation canals, locks, and similar
facilities. Additionally, work commenced almost im-
mediately on two major flood control projects, the Huai
River and the Ching -- the latter name applied to that
portion of the middle Yangtze River down to southern
Hupeh.* Later, when the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57)
was announced, a modest amount of state investment was
allocated to initiate major, long-term programs designed
to control the perennially unruly rivers of North China the Huang, the Huai, and the Hai (Map F).
The Ching project involved the construction of dikes
and sluice gates to provide a flood retention basin for
the Yangtze south of Sha-shih.
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16. More specific plans relating to protection and
improvement of the physical environment were incorporated
in the Twelve-Year Plan (1956-67) of the National Agri-
cultural Development Program, adopted in 1958. These
included such basics as increased development of water
conservancy works, irrigation, and flood and drought
control projects, with emphasis upon small and medium-
sized projects, soil improvement, extension of soil and
water conservation practices, promotion of afforestation,
and expansion of the network of meteorological and
hydrological stations. Use of the commune and its
organizational structure to mobilize the rural masses
was the principal means specified to implement the
objectives of the Plan.
17. Planning and work on some early projects was
hampered by an inadequate data base and the lack of
scientifically trained personnel. To remedy the situation
China's scientists undertook, with some Soviet help, a
series of major surveys designed to inventory, describe,
and interpret physical conditions of key areas and their
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specific problems. Priority was given to studies of the
loess areas of the middle Huang Ho (Yellow River) basin
and the extensive arid areas of western China. By the
late 1950's the results of some of these efforts were
beginning to be published in the form of major monographs
and articles in technical and professional journals.
More specific technical material undoubtedly was forwarded
to appropriate ministries in Peking for use in particular
projects.
Controlling the Huang Ho
If you wait till the Huang Ho is
clear, how old will you be?
--Chinese Proverb
18. Matteo Ricci, the pioneer Jesuit missionary
to China in the late 16th century, remarked that: "The
Yellow River has no respect at all for Chinese law and
order. It comes from a barbarous region and . fre-
quently ravages whole districts of the realm, silting
them up with sand, and changing its course at will."
Though news to Europeans, Father Ricci's description and
characterization of the river merely reiterated what the
Chinese had known since earliest times: control of the
turbulent Huang Ho was the most persistent and serious
environmental problem in all of China.
19. The PRC leadership placed a high priority on
a plan to permanently control the Huang, eliminating its
periodic floods and erratic changes in course and at the
same time more fully utilizing the river both for power
generation and as a source of irrigation water. Ac-
cordingly, in 1955 the "Report on the Multi-Purpose Plan
for the Permanent Control of the Yellow River and
Exploitation of Its Water Resources" was presented to the
National People's Congress. The plan, ambitious in concept
and massive in scope, was based upon earlier studies and
recommendations, plus post-1949 investigations. It called
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for construction of a series of multi-purpose dams designed
for flood control, power generation, irrigation, and navi-
gation purposes. The most publicized project was the
building of a giant hydroelectric dam at San-men (Three
Gates), a point on the Huang upstream a few miles from
where the river and its valley widen before emerging on
the North China Plain (Map F). Smaller dams were planned
upstream from San-men, including two on the upper Huang
near Lan-chou, plus a series of reservoirs on principal
tributaries. But the key to success was, in the words of
the plan, the necessity ". . . to develop at the same time
large-scale water and soil conservation works in Kansu,
Shensi, and Shansi Provinces and other loess regions."
Numerous soil and water conservancy targets were spelled
out in the plan (Figure 2).
20. It probably was inevitable that the massive
physical changes required to reduce soil erosion did not
in fact occur to any significant degree, given the short
time schedule for construction of the San-men project
(1957-61), the immense size of the soil and water conser-
vancy tasks (only 5 percent of the loess area was covered
by trees), and the dizzying rural organizational changes
of the period. The San-men Dam was essentially completed
in 1961 and a mammoth reservoir was to have been filled,
taking several hundred thousand hectares of cropland out
of production (Figure 3). But it was soon discovered that
the silt load of the river had not been measurably reduced:
by 1963 the penstocks were clogged with mud. Since then
the gates have remained open and the Huang Ho continues as
before -- transporting its heavy burden of silt seaward.
21. Mention of the Huang Ho project, and particularly
of San-men Dam, virtually ceased in the PRC press after 1961.
In late 1963 and continuing until the advent of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, an occasional article appeared on proper
techniques to reduce erosion and soil and water losses in
the middle Huang Valley. Only recently have press items
reappeared commenting on the overall problem of the Huang.
Progress is related in general terms, usually tied to one
or more of Chairman Mao's statements, but specific references
are to small-scale local achievements rather than a review of
accomplishments throughout the Huang Ho basin. No mention,
for example, is made of the 1955 plan nor of the great mass
of concrete at San-men.
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(OUO)
(OUO)
Figure 2. The key to control of the Huang Ho is minimizing erosion
from barren loess-covered uplands. Terracing and the planting of
protective vegetation on non-cultivated slopes are essential.
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Figure 3. San-men Dam, nearing completion
in 1961, was expected to prevent serious
flooding (as below), provide irrigation
water from its massive reservoir, and gen-
erate power. Only limited flood control
benefits have as yet been realized from
San-men.
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22. It is clear that Chinese planners grievously
underestimated the importance of systematic, long term
soil and water conservancy work in the loess-mantled
middle reaches (Shensi, Shansi, and eastern Kansu) of the
Huang, origin of almost nine-tenths of the sediment load
of the river. Press reports of 1963 and later clearly
indicated that diverse physical factors present in the
middle Huang Valley had not been taken into account. A
December 1963 People's Daily article stated that hence-
forth "geographical considerations based on actual practice"
would be the criteria to be followed in future local land
and water conservancy projects. Earlier, for example,
projects suitable for a particular physical environment had
been imposed on other areas with differing physical
conditions -- with predictable results. In the future,
according to the article, . preventive measures [soil
and water conservancy projects] should be geared exactly to
the problems as they exist."
The Huai and Hai River Basins Projects
Water Conservancy is the Lifeblood
of Agriculture
--Mao Tse-tung
23. Two other problem rivers, the Huai and Hai,
received early attention from PRC leaders. Both river
basins suffered from excessive loads of silt and from
their inability to discharge through their silt-clogged
channels a sufficient volume of water to prevent flooding
during periods of heavy rains. Although flood prevention
was the most immediate problem, other objectives included
water for irrigation and the generation of electricity.
24. Early work on the Huai consisted principally of
repair and rehabilitation of existing facilities. Because
considerable engineering data were available from pre-1949
studies on control of the Huai, the PRC was able to shift
quickly into a comprehensive program involving the building
of new outlets, straightening river courses, and the con-
struction of reservoirs. The pace, direction, and emphasis
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of the plans, however, frequently changed. Announced
successes were often followed by later admissions of
failure. Familiar problems arose -- uncoordinated efforts,
incompetent planning, hasty work, poor maintenance of com-
pleted works, and failure to complete basic erosion control
in headwater areas.
25. By late 1972 a Chinese article proclaimed that
the basin " . . . had been transformed."* The construction
work of over two decades certainly has superficially trans-
formed the Huai basin landscape with new reservoirs, new
river channels and outlets, and a host of lesser works
completed. Whether the transformation has completely
eliminated the chronic problems of the Huai awaits the test
of prolonged heavy rains and lengthy dry spells before a
final verdict can be reached (Figure 4).
26. The Hai River, a short but important stream in
the northern portion of the North China Plain, serves as
the outlet for five major streams that wind across the
northern Plain and which unite just west of Tientsin. This
portion of the Plain long has been subject to serious
flooding and its agricultural potential limited by consider-
able amounts of waterlogged and alkalinized or salinized
land. Although some flood control projects were completed
during the 1954-1960 period, very serious flooding in 1963,
when all five rivers overflowed, prompted a decree from
Chairman Mao Tse-tung that "The Hai Ho must be brought under
permanent control." (See Chronology of Water Control
Projects and Problems . . . following text.)
27. A variety of projects were subsequently under-
taken, including major drainage projects that have involved
the digging of new channels and providing new outlets.
Nevertheless, an April 2973 broadcast from An1v ei told
of the "first stage" of a Huai project calling for a
123-km canal and the construction of bridges, regulators,
and navigation locks to relieve some 400,000 hectares of
cultivated land from the threat of flooding.
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Figure. 4. Major Huai and Hai River projects have been
carried out to reduce waterlogging through improved
drainage and leveling of individual fields and to less-
en flooding by construction of new channels and locks.
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Progress also has been made in relieving waterlogging and
saline conditions, thus improving existing cultivated land
and reclaiming additional land. The area of alkaline land,
according to recent reports, has been reduced by half.
Overall, the amount of work done in the Hai basin is
impressive (Map G).
28. Although the probability of serious flooding in
the Hai basin certainly has been greatly reduced, the long
term success of the present programs will depend upon
efficient management of the newly created control and
drainage systems. Dikes must be inspected and strengthened,
protective vegetation on the dikes maintained, water seepage
from streams to areas of sandy soil controlled, dredging
continued, and pumps continually maintained and repaired.
Improved crop yields can be expected over the next few years
from land that previously had been waterlogged, although
salinized soil must be leached for years before it becomes
fully productive. Some successes have been achieved in
reducing the area of alkaline land, but the complicated
network of new channels must be operatively synchronized
to prevent the development of additional problems of water-
logging and salinization following periods of above-normal
rainfall.
Afforestation
Develop forestry and clothe all possible
bare Zand with green.
--The National Program for Agricultural
Development
29. No aspect of present-day China has impressed
returnees to the Mainland more than the extensive planting
of trees on previously barren hillsides, along major roads,
and in the cities. Visible contrasts between pre-1949
conditions and the present are great (Map H). How much
has actually been accomplished is difficult to determine,
even though abundant statistics have been released on land
afforested -- particularly during the first decade of PRC
rule. It is clear that the yearly figures have contained
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some duplication, including sizable areas where replanting
of afforested land previously had been reported as completed.
In addition, the trees in many areas reported as afforested
have had low survival rates, and the condition of the land
is not now markedly different than before. Still unreached
is the goal, originally targeted for 1967, of increasing
China's forested area from the 1957 base figure of 8 percent
to 19 percent of the total land area.
30. Afforestation projects serve several PRC objectives.
A major goal has been to ease a serious national timber shortage
and to redress the regional imbalance of wood resources.*
Equally important is the coordination of protective afforesta-
tion plans with water and soil conservancy work -- erosion
control, stabilization of sandy areas (particularly where
they threaten cultivated or cultivable land), and related
shelter belt plantings (Figure 5). The PRC also has stressed
extensive roadside. plantings and the planting of trees and
shrubs in industrial and housing areas -- a program that has
been highly successful.
31. A widely publicized program begun during the late
1950's was the "great green wall," a series of protective
vegetative buffers designed to ward off the blowing sands of
the Inner Mongolian deserts. Although Chinese sources were
vague concerning precise locational details, the "wall,"
consisting of a series of shelter-belt systems, was planned
to extend from the Greater Khinghan Mountains in Northeast
China to northwestern Kansu Province.
32. Recent Chinese commentary has avoided discussion
of "green walls," and articles on shelter belts have been
confined to those in a few specific areas. The most ex-
tensive plantings reported and confirmed occur in the
Wu-wei -- Min-chin area, in the Kansu Corridor, some 250
kilometers north of Lan-chou. Here plantings of several
rows of trees to widths of about 100 meters occur in places;
As of 2963 approximately Z0 percent of China was forested,
of which about 60 percent was Located in Northeast China.
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Figure 5. Afforestation involves mass
labor campaigns. Preparation of sites,
care in planting, and proper post-
planting measures are essential to
insure success.
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more common are irregular plots of trees, a situation most
likely caused by planning and planting at different times
by separate groups. Single rows of trees usually line
roads, irrigation canals, and dry stream channels. In other
areas occasional plantings have been started, but evidence
is lacking elsewhere in the Kansu Corridor of large-scale
shelter belts commensurate with the publicity over the
"green wall."
33. The gap between plans and accomplishments has been
caused by a combination of physical, political, and economic
factors. Much of the area to be afforested consists of poor
land deficient in soil nutrients. Careful preparation of
sites and use of fertilizers is required to insure a high
survival rate. The prolonged periods of dry weather that
characterize the northern half of China pose additional sur-
vival problems. Qualified observers also have commented
that in some cases species that are unsuited to the
particular environment have been planted, with a consequent
low survival rate.
34. Another key obstacle to a successful afforestation
program has been the lack of trained personnel to oversee the
managerial and technical aspects of the programs and the
widespread use of rural and untrained labor to undertake the
actual planting. Commonly, afforestation drives are mounted
in late winter and early spring under the direction of local
rural administrative units that mobilize hundreds or even
thousands of laborers to plant young saplings. A New Zealand
forester, S.D. Richardson, commented after train travel in
China in 1963 that very dissimilar wooded plots could be
found adjoining one another. The explanation was that dif-
ferent production teams were involved in planting and
maintenance, and that the care and knowledge of those in
charge of the tree planting was the major factor relating
to success or failure. In some areas, Richardson speculated,
poor tree survival might be related to the inadequate supply
of fuel and to regulations that permit individuals to harvest
dead trees for local use. This suggested, commented Richardson
"a vested interest in early mortality."
35. A 1963 editorial in People's Dai y stated the
need to change the idea that trees, once planted, will grow
naturally without anything further being done. The editorial
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also stressed the need for idealogical and educational
work so that individuals understand " . . . the important
relationships of forests with state construction and
people's livelihood." Some progress is suggested by a
1972 report from Kiangsu that praised the cadres and
masses in a certain locality for "heightening their con-
sciousness of the struggle" so that "better results" in
afforestation had been achieved compared to past years.
The key word is "better"; quite likely, work in early years
was done poorly and extensive replanting was necessary.
Better management and education continue to be highlighted
in press reports (Figure 6). A 1972 report from Anhwei
comments that "the importance of developing forestry is
not fully appreciated . . [and] . . . they [referring
to people in "some localities"] have no time to attend to
forestry because their grain production is not yet up to
the quota." The final paragraph of the article stressed
anew the key point of management:
One of the present important tasks
in afforestation is to strengthen
forestry management. In some lo-
calities there is still a serious
tendency to stress planting and
neglect management. Therefore all
localities must combine the mass
afforestation movement, as a crash
program, with constant management
and protection. They must at the
same time carefully train and de-
velop a contingent of professional
workers for afforestation, and set
up and perfect the system for forest
protection along with its required
rules and regulations. They must
pay equal attention to planting and
managing so as to raise the quality
of afforestation and consolidate
its gains.
36. A recent issue of Peking Review reported that a
hsien (county) located in a coastal region of Fukien
Province had afforested nearly 40,000 hectares during the
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Figure 6. A hillside in South China five years after its afforestation (top);
a patchwork of young plantings adjacent to the Great Wall; and (bottom) a suc-
cessfully afforested tract.
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past two decades, planted 500 kilometers of windbreaks, and
started orchards where none had existed before.* Although
intelligence sources confirm the existence of orchards,
tree-lined roads, and numerous windbreaks between fields
and in beach areas, many low hills near the lowlands still
remain ravined and barren. Some hills and patches of up-
lands have been planted with varying degrees of success,
but evidence of a systematic program is lacking and plantings
seem to be on a hit-or-miss basis.
Nature in Transformation: Progress and Prospects
To transform nature we must rely
on ourselves...
--China Reconstructs
37. According to a recent article in China
Reconstructs, ". . . nature in old China became more
unkind with each year," but in recent times the
" picture has changed greatly." Although visible
changes in the landscape and environmental modifications
have occurred since 1949, questions arise as to the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the changes:
How much change actually has taken place?
How has change been effected?
How successful have these changes been
in the context of PRC goals?
38. Victory has not been claimed by the PRC in its
battles with nature. Reports of environmental damage
caused by flooding, waterlogged soils, and excessive
erosion still continue in the press. For example, grain
output in the PRC is estimated to have declined by about
The 40,000 hectares figure seems implausibly high since
it would amount to at least a third to possibly two-fifths
of the total-area of the hsien.
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10 million tons in 1972 (a drop of about 4 percent), and
the blame for the shortfall has been attributed primarily
to drought, floods, and other environmental conditions.
Almost certainly, however, recent crop losses would have
been greater had it not been for the two decades of effort
to control floods, extend irrigation, and lessen erosion.
39. Water conservancy programs have played a key role
in PRC planning toward control and modification of the en-
vironment. Early and ambitious projects to control the
major rivers of North China produced mixed results. Initial
objectives were not achieved because of lack of planning and
coordination, high costs, and limited technical resources.
A major problem was a lack of appreciation by PRC planners
of the importance, massive scope, and complexity of the soil
conservation and afforestation work required -- particularly
that needed in the Huang Ho basin (Map I).
40. Publicity on the Huang Ho project recently has
resumed to the effect that flooding is basically under
control, though use of the word "basically" strongly im-
plies that some but not all required work is done. In a
word, flooding now is less likely -- but it still could
occur. This likelihood is given added emphasis by the
recent admission that insufficient attention has been paid
to silting and that only now is an active study of that
problem being carried out. The dimensions of the task
confronting the Chinese leadership in the Huang Ho basin
are best reflected in a 1971 article in China Reconstructs:
The success in harnessing the Yellow
River over the past 20 years or so is
only the first step in a long, long
march. Advancing along Chairman Mao's
proletarian revolutionary line, the
people living in the Yellow River
valley are continuing their efforts
to harness it further. (Emphasis added.)
More evidence of the scope of "continuing efforts" is re-
ported in a 1972 radio broadcast from Shensi Providence
that in 20 years of work only 20 percent of the Huang Ho
basin [in Shensi] had benefited from soil erosion measures.
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41. China's rural landscape has been altered markedly
by the construction of vast numbers of water impoundments
ranging in size from small ponds to a few large reservoirs.*
A visual impression of the increase in size and number of
these ponds and reservoirs, based upon a comparison of maps
compiled prior to 1949 and after 1965, is shown on Map J.**
Most of these areas had few if any significant water storage
facilities prior to 1949. However, an. impoundment, though
it has some intrinsic value in regulating waterflow, does
not guarantee use of water in adjacent agricultural lands.
Many of the smaller storage facilities lack sufficient
capacity to be of use during dry spells when irrigation
needs are greatest. Other facilities are of limited use
because of the lack of pumping equipment and distribution
systems or both.
42. Water conservancy projects have enabled the PRC
to increase the amount of irrigated land substantially over
pre-1949 levels and, in recent years, to embark upon a
rapid enlargement of high-yield farmland -- land under con-
trolled irrigation and drainage and capable of producing
a crop in spite of either drought or floods.*** Water
* In the Z949-59 decade, some 29 million projects reportedly
were completed including 56 large reservoirs, about Z9 million
small and radium-sized projects other than wells, and about
ZO million wells. The small size of the vast majority of
these is indicated by the statistic that on the average each
could irrigate slightly less than 2 hectares of farmland.
* Only those impoundments that back up at least one-half mile
or more of water are shown because of the scale limitations of
the source map used. For this reason the more numerous small
reservoirs and farm ponds that range downward to only a few
acres in extent are not depicted.
*** For recent estimates of land under irrigation and extent
of high-yield farmland, see China: Control of Water Resources
in Agriculture, 2949-7Z, ER IR 72-5, May Z972 (C).
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conservancy gains have been made at a cost -- staggering
use of labor; profligate construction of impoundments,
canals, and other projects; and frequent ignorance or
disregard for basic physical conditions, needs, and the
interrelationship of projects. These shortcomings have
plagued water conservancy programs from the very beginning
and continue today. A commentary in the Peo le's Dail of
23 March 1973 summarized the current situation as fo lows:
In evaluating the achievements of water
conservation projects, we do not merely
count their number but consider their
role in increasing agricultural production.
Constructing water conservation projects
only to meet state targets in disregard
of efficiency; thinking that these projects
once built, will naturally play their
proper role; and only knowing how to open
sluice gates to discharge water without
paying attention to the output of agri-
cultural products -- are all erroneous
ideas and work styles.
The key to success is thus in management and. technical
knowledge. But as before, as acknowledged in People's
Daily, reliance is placed upon ". . . the broa masses of
commune and brigade members to properly manage water con-
servancy projects [and] do a good job in maintaining them."
43. Progress has been made in increasing the amount
of land covered by forests and other types of vegetation
that will slow erosion. Although reliable data on the
extent of progress are lacking, undoubtedly more of China
is now "green" than has been the case for many decades if
not longer. Crude comparisions for one area of North China
using maps of identical scale but compiled from pre-1949 and
post-1965 data provide rough indications of gains made (Map H).
Familiar problems affect the PRC's afforestation schemes:
proper management and technical knowledge are often limited
or lacking; investment in fertilizers and pesticides usually
is inadequate; reliance upon annual mass labor drives to
reach targets results in a patchwork approach to a problem
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where coordinated efforts are needed; and the result all
too frequently is a low survival rate of the saplings and
the consequent necessity for the work to be redone.
44. Programs to protect and improve China's physical
environment have involved both major capital-intensive
projects and local projects using China's vast, untrained
pool of rural labor to dig, build, and plant -- making use
of local resources, simple tools, and strong backs. Early
environment-related programs stressed the major projects,
such as the comprehensive plan for development of the
Huang Ho. Later, Chinese planners began to place greater
emphasis upon small-scale projects in which little invest-
ment other than manpower would be required. During the
past decade emphasis increasingly has been on Maoist views
that individual motivation and social organization are the
keys to environmental improvement.
45. The most widely publicized example of this approach
has been at Ta-chai, the model brigade tucked away in a loess-
covered and mountain-rimmed pocket of central Shansi, which
long has played the role of exemplar for rural China (Map F).
Dedication and sacrifice have been exalted, together with
self-reliance, as the key to material advance. The successes
attained at Ta-chai have been propagandized throughout rural
China (and groups from all parts of the country as well as
foreign visitors have visited this Maoist model) in an effort
to persuade the individual that handicaps and difficulties
can be overcome without waiting for the distant promise of
technology to modernize agriculture (Figure 7). The "war"
against the "enemy," nature, also further emphasizes in
Chinese minds the revolutionary nature of the struggle and
the break against the old ways of the past with their passive
acceptance of the environmental status quo.
46. Not all that has been done at Ta-chai seems worthy
of emulation. The dam from whose reservoir Ta-chai draws
its water -- conveyed in a spectacular rock-lined aqueduct --
has no spillway; a period of extensive rain could lead to its
destruction. Local officials recently admitted too that the
reservoir will be filled with silt in a dozen years if erosion
continues at its present rate. This official comment from a
model area underscores both the problem and the difficulty of
successfully applying known remedies.
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 Approved For Release
Uiqure 7. Transforming nature requires enor-
mous amounts of labor. Building dry-wall
atone terraces at Ta-chai; improving ordinary
fields to high-yield fields by providing de-
pendable supplies of water; elaborate earth-
walled terraces to combat erosion in North
China.
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47. It is not possible to measure accurately how
successful the PRC has been in harnessing its environmental
assets and lessening damage to them. The objective has been
to improve the physical-base upon which agriculture rests.
Food output, except in the disaster years of 1959-61, has
kept pace with population growth; and in the 1965-71 period
grain production increased at a somewhat faster rate. Many
factors are responsible for increasing agricultural produc-
tion, but certainly the environment-related measures of the
past two decades have reversed the trend of environmental
degradation and helped avert calamities of flood and drought.
48. The press in early 1973 reported renewed efforts
to overcome natural calamities, as the PRC was forced to
increase grain and cotton imports and to intensify efforts
to conserve food. Chou En-lai, interviewed in December 1972,
blamed last year's grain shortfall on drought and flood
though, he added, other reasons exist related to the dif-
ficulty of implementing "plans in practice" and the need
to correct methods. Nature still remains a critical element,
however, in the Chinese economy. "Man can master nature,"
stated a recent editorial in People's Daily, and good harvests
are possible if "full preparations as regards morale, measures,
and material" have been made.
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Chronology of Water Control Projects and
Problems in the Hai Ho Basin
Year Project Problems
1954
1954
& 56
1957
- 58
1958
1958
- 59
1959
1959
- 60
Kuang-ting reservoir completed.
(An 85 sq. mi. reservoir on the
Yung-ting Ho, 45 mi. northwest
of Peking, serving flood control,
irrigation, and power generation.)
Very serious floods; Yung-ting,
Ta-ch'ing, Tzu-ya and South Grand
Canal streams all flooded.
Peasants mobilized on small
projects; small ponds and
canals dug to store and con-
vey water to the fields.
Worst drought in 30 years.
Six large reservoirs com-
pleted in Hai Basin.
Severe rainstorms showed the
reservoirs to be inadequate.
Most of the labor shifted
from construction of more
large reservoirs to the dig-
ging of "checkerboard" canals.
1960 (January)
1963 (August)
Construction of new water
conservancy projects terminated.
All 5 tributaries of the Hai Ho
overflowed; Mao's directive
issued that "The Hai Ho must be
brought under perm anent control."
Extensive and detailed surveys,
especially of the Hei-lung-
kang (in southern part of Hai
Ho basin) area; overall plan
for Hei-lung-kang area was made.
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Chronology Continued -
Year Project
1965 - 66 Hei-lung-kang project: discharge
capacity of the streams increased
by dredging silt, building new
dikes. Ta-ch"ing and Tzu-ya
rivers improved, and given new
seaward outlet in order to bypass
the Hai Ho at Tientsin; 400,000
workers were mobilized for the
tasks.
1966-72 Extensive land reclamation con-
tinued in the Hei-lung-kang area
digging ditches, leaching salts
from the land, building raised
fields, and applying organic
fertilizer.
1970 - 72 Major drainage improvement in the
northern part of the Hai Ho basin
(in the Peking-Tientsin area):
channels now lead water directly
to the sea instead of into the
Hai Ho at Tientsin. Discharge
capacity of Hai Ho system re-
portedly increased 8 times.
New Yung-ting River cut.
Kang-kou River improved.
New Chao-pai River cut.
Problem
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FORM
US10.101
AUGN 54 ?Q WHICH CMAY FORM
ED.
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 Approved For Rel a 2000/04/14 :ELI4 RIYP84-00 0 ?9 r 1973
21 September 1973
Dissemination List for PN 61.2641(RP 74-3)
The Transformation of Nature in China
INTERNAL
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CIA/BGI RP 74-3 (Cont.)
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Proposed Dissemination List for PN 61.2641
The Transformation of Nature in China
EXTERNAL
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STATINTL
Total Copies 57
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As~
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GEOGRAPHY DIVISION Record of Classification Decision
18 September 1973
(Date)
1.
Title of report, study, or map:
The Transformation of Nature in China
2.
Project No. and Report No. or Map No.:
PN 61.2641. CIA/BGI RP 74-3
3.
Classification, control, and exempt category:
CONFIDENTIAL 5B 1, 2, 3
4.
Name of classifier: 2
5X1A
5.
Rationale for classification and e
Discusses PRC efforts in fields o
afforestation designed to protect
agriculture is based; evaluates d
to claims made by PRC.
xemption:
f water and soil conservancy and
and improve environment on which
egree of success obtained, as opposed
6.
Sources used in report, study or m
classification and exemption:
ap which have a bearing on
1. CIA Report, China: Control of Water Resources in Agriculture,
ER IR 72-5, May 1972. CONFIDENTIAL
25X1 C
NOTE: Prepare in triplicate -- one copy
for Branch Project File and two copies
for Division Front Office.
CONTROL or CLASSIFY, according to
content of entries.
Approved For Release 20 ' % .KRDP8 -~ & P O 0001, 3
 CIA INTERNAL ' ~" +,
Approved For ,lease 2000/04/18: 6fiA-k i 84-W8 R ABP7~RQ1-3
^ SECRET
{
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY NOTICE
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
Conquering Nature in China: An Evaluation of Chinese
2641
61
Efforts to Control and Transform its Physical
.
Environment
SUBJECT CODE
REQUESTER
REQUESTING OFFICE
Self-initiated
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
TARGET DATE STA
The relationships between China's physical environment,
agricultural output, and achievement of national goals are
Autumn, 1972
obvious and important. Because of a restricted and limited
ANALYST/BRANCH
physical environment that has been seriouslyCLffected over
d h
and
GD/F
GD/F Staff
uman
long periods of time by a combination of physical an
,
factors, the PRC leadership early began a series of well
EST. ANALYST MANHOURS
publicized programs in soil and water conservancy, reforestation,
and in related fields to protect and improve its physical
350
resources. An assessment of these programs is the object of this
study based upon analysis of PRC statements, observations by
round observers, and use of recent and comprehensive
STATINTL
STATINTL
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : An undetermined number of maps.
OTHER CIA: OER, ONE, OCI STATINTL
NON-CIA : --
1-Aug I1' 2
DATE - - - i CHIEF, Geography Di vi s on
DATE /
STATINTL
REPORT RECORD
TITLE
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
AREA CODE
SUBJECT CODE
PUBLICATION DATE
ANALYST/BRANCH
INITIAL NO. OF COPIES
MANHOURS EXPENDED
CLASSIFICATION
DISTRIBUTION
EDITOR
TYPIST
TS
C
STANDARD
ANALYST
Approve
For Release 20
00/04/18 : CIA-
I E
FOR
2594 !Td TNTRN USE ONLY F1 CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET (5,
 Approved For=Releases 910Q!04jS. GIA-R,.RP8440825R000300070001-3
^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL
PROJECT PROPOSAL RESEARCH ACTIVITY
NOTICE
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
Conquering Nature in China: An Evaluation of Chinese
2641
61
Efforts to Control and Transform its Physical
.
Environment
SUBJECT CODE
STATINTL
UESTING OFFICE
REQUESTING
Self-initiated
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
TARGET DATE
The relationships between China's physical environment,
agricultural output, and achievement of national goals are
Autumn, 1972
obvious and important. Because of a restricted and limited
been seriously effected over
t h
t th
ANALYST/BRANCH
and
as
a
physical environmen
an
d h
GD/F
GD/F Staff
um
long periods of time by a combination of physical an
,
factors, the PRC leadership early began a series of well
EST. ANALYST MANHOURS
publicized programs in soil and water conservancy, reforestation,
and in related fields to protect and improve its physical
350
resources. An assessment of these programs is the object of this
study. based upon analysis of PRC statements, observations b
round observers, and use of recent and comprehensive
STATINTL
STATINTL
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : An undetermined number of maps.
OTHER CIA: OER, ONE, OCI
STATINTL
NON-CIA. : --
APPR
1 Aug 1972
y OBI DATE
DIRECTOR OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE DATE CHIEF, Ge0 rah D
STATINTL
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
RL)
 Approved Fer
STATINTL
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