THE SINKING EXODUS OF 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
THE SINKIANG EXODUS OF 1962
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February 1967
CIA/BI GR 67-13
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized. person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
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dowoproding and
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25X1 C
This study is one of an informal series published by the Directorate of In-
telligence dealing with various aspects of internal dissidence and control in
Communist China. Others have been The Kwangtung Exodus of 1962, OCI
No. 0343/65, February 1965, S; Resistance in Ilonan, 1960, OCI No. 2508/65,
September 1965, S; Dissidence and the Potential for Resistance in Communist
China, OCI No. 3088/65, December 1965, S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON-
TROLLED DISSEM; and Assessment of 1965 Dissidence Levels in Five Prov-
inces of Southern China, CIA/BI GR 66-1, April 1966, C/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Although Sinkiang attracts much intelligence attention, the intelligence per-
spectives on the province are clouded by the spottiness of areal and topical
coverage and the dubious reliability of much of the reporting. Ethnic Russian
refugees who have come from northwestern Sinkiang to the Free World have
provided the most useful reports on the 1962 exodus that is the subject of this
study. Other miscellaneous sources include Chinese Communist propaganda
and Soviet propaganda; the latter generally has been the more informative. A
few reports from defectors, both Chinese and Soviet, from Western diplomats
and journalists, and from persons who had been given information through
Chinese Communist Party channels provide useful perspectives. This study
examines the Sinkiang exodus as an intelligence problem and, in the context
of Sino-Soviet relations, attempts to establish needed benchmarks for further
study of Chinese policies on security and on minority nationalities as observed
in the province.
This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared in the Office of
Basic Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence,
the Office of National Estimates, and the Research Staff of the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, CIA; and with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, De-
partment of State.
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Page
Introduction and Summary .............................................
1
I. Background ......................................................
3
A. Geographic Setting ............................................
3
B. Local Nationalism .............................................
3
1. Ethnic Groups Involved in the Exodus ........................
3
2. Historical Development .......................... ...........
4
C. Transborder Movement Before 1962 .............................
6
D. The Situation Early in 1962 ....................................
7
1. Plight of the Inhabitants .....................................
7
2. The Chinese Communist Position ............................
8
3. Sino-Soviet Relations ........................................
9
A. Emigrant Movements ........................... .............. 10
B. The I-ning Riot ................................................ 12
C. Post-riot Developments ....... ................................. 13
1. Chinese Concessions and Restrictions . ........................ 13
2. Deterioration of Sino-Soviet Relations ......................... 14
III. Implications of the Exodus ......................................... 15
A. Communist Chinese Policies on Minority Nationalities ............ 15
B. Security in Sinkiang .... ....................................... 16
MAP
(following page 17)
China-U.S.S.R. Border: Western Sector (52171)
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The Sinkiang Exodus of 1962
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Sinkiang exodus, which occurred in April and May 1962, was a move-
ment of 50,000 to 70,000 non-Chinese Muslims from Communist China into
the USSR. They were mostly Kazakhs and Uighurs from the T'a-ch'eng (Chug-
uchak) and I-ning (Kuldja) regions of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou
(IKAC) (see Map 52171). Local Chinese and Soviet authorities, long habitu-
ated to some intermittent illegal westward emigration associated with a legal
repatriation program, were suddenly confronted with a mass movement that
overtaxed available transportation and disrupted existing border control pro-
cedures. The exodus was climaxed by a riot in I-ning on 29 May. The actual
disorder was short lived, and controls were rapidly restored.
Strictly as a border problem, the exodus was not especially significant. Neither
country disputed the location of the boundary in the sectors involved. The
acrimony that developed grew out of mutual failure to control the recognized
border effectively. As a refugee movement, the exodus was of relatively
minor significance. Compared to other mideentury refugee movements, the
numbers involved were neither large nor especially costly to either side. The
USSR received no more people than it could conveniently handle and put to
work immediately. China lost few whom it valued highly as producers or
technicians, although some local economic impact was felt in parts of Sinkiang
as a consequence of the loss of large numbers of livestock that crossed into
the USSR with the emigrants. Unlike the Kwangtung exodus, which also oc-
curred in May 1962, the Sinkiang exodus was not costly in terms of Communist
China's prestige among the Overseas Chinese. Furthermore, reverberations that
might have been expected throughout the Muslim world were effectively
dampened by the tacit cooperation of China and the USSR at the time in sup-
pressing news of trouble in Sinkiang.
Sino-Soviet frictions were nonetheless aggravated by the exodus, and it prob-
ably was a factor in Peking's subsequent decision to order closure of Soviet
consulates not only in Sinkiang but elsewhere in China as well. The episode
almost certainly contributed to growing Chinese sensitivities concerning the
border with the USSR and particularly concerning Sinkiang because of the
presence there of strategic installations. Finally, it also led Peking to reexamine
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and later to retighten its policies on minority nationalities within China. The
exodus was subsequently exploited by the Communist parties of both China
and the USSR as a basis for recriminatory propaganda and official retaliation,
and thus it helped to deepen the Sino-Soviet split.
A mischievous implication of the episode remains. Despite increased Chinese
and Soviet sensitivities over Sinkiang and the frontier region, the very remote-
ness of the border and the comparative insignificance to either China or the
USSR of the interests of the indigenous population in northwestern Sinkiang
continue to make the area attractive as an arena for reciprocal provocation
by the two powers.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Geographic Setting
Sinkiang is physically part of the larger region of Central Asia-a region that
embraces vast desert basins, high mountains, and steppe lands politically di-
vided between China and the USSR. Ethnically, this region is neither Chinese
nor Russian but rather consists largely of Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples of
several groups-Kazakhs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, and others-including both seden-
tary agriculturalists and nomads. Historically, the region has been one of con-
tact and rivalry between China and Russia for political influence.
The I-ning and T'a-ch'eng regions of western Sinkiang lie north of the
Tien Shan, a great west-east aligned mountain mass that separates Sinkiang into
northern and southern halves. Subsidiary ranges north of the main range en-
close on three sides the I-ning region, which is drained by the upper I-li River
and its tributaries. The I-li flows westward in a widening valley comprised of
grasslands and agricultural land; this easy westward approach to the USSR
through the I-1i Valley contrasts sharply with the difficult access across high
mountains from other parts of Sinkiang. Still farther north the T'a-ch'eng re-
gion forms a similar physical pattern on a smaller scale; here the valley of the
westward flowing 0-min (Emel') River provides relatively easy access to the
USSR, and the mountains isolate the region from centers of Chinese control in
the Dzungarian Basin to the south and east.
B. Local Nationalism
1. ETHNIC GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE EXODUS
The participants in the exodus from Sinkiang in 1962 had a unique political
background-a nationalistic separatism that had frequently been in conflict with
Chinese and Soviet interests in the area. Within the last two generations the
non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, who comprise an estimated 85 percent of the
total population of the province, have become wedged increasingly tightly be-
tween Chinese and Soviet regimes that have been sometimes benevolent, some-
times repressive, and sometimes neglectful.. Their traditional independence,
which has tended to unite the several Muslim peoples and thus further separate
them from the Chinese, is called "local nationalism" by the Chinese Commu-
nists. The exodus came at a time when for about a decade "local nationalism"
had been under increasing Chinese pressure to conform to Communist concepts.
The "nationalism" of the Kazakhs and that of the Uighurs have been based
on different territorial origins and different traditions. The nomadic Kazakhs,
who are concentrated in the northwest and some other parts of northern Sinkiang,
represent a spillover from Central Asia under the pressure of Russian expansion,
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the spread of agriculture into formerly pastoral areas, and Soviet regimentation.
Traditionally, members of Kazakh families have enjoyed a large degree of per-
sonal independence within a paternalistic tribal structure suited to a mobile and
precarious way of life. The sedentary Uighurs, whose traditional homeland is
in southwestern Sinkiang, now occupy other parts of the province as well.
Those of the I-li Valley are mostly agricultural and consist of emigrants and
their offspring from southern Sinkiang, but they are more adventurous and
more self-reliant than the average Uighur of the south. They are concentrated in
the four counties that lie north of the I-li River between I-ning and the Soviet bor-
der, and they have been exposed continuously to transborder influences-especi-
ally those which have been transmitted by commercially active, politically aware,
and culturally influential Uzbeks and Tatars from the USSR. Uighur leadership
and experience have contributed significantly to local nationalism.
The Uzbeks, Tatars, and ethnic Russians-trading and farming peoples also
of non-Chinese origin-were likewise an important element in the population
of the I-li River region up to 1962. Uzbeks and Tatars may have joined the
1962 exodus to the USSR, but it is unlikely that any ethnic Russians were in-
cluded. Many Hui (T'ung-kan ), or Chinese Muslims, live in Sinkiang and
enjoy the goodwill of the non-Chinese Muslims. Although they were long a
truculent group, they have been suppressed and now have no significant po-
litical influence. Apparently, they were only minor participants in the exodus.
It is unlikely that the non-Muslim Hsi-po (Sibo), who predominate on the
south bank of the I-li River not far from I-ning, took any part in the exodus.
They are descendants of an old Manchurian people who were installed during
the Ch'ing Dynasty to stabilize the border. They have no transborder affinities
and are relatively uninvolved in provincial politics, and thus they still serve
to insulate this part of the border.
Rivalry for influence in Sinkiang has colored Sino-Russian relations for at
least a century, but prior to 1944 the attention given to Sinkiang by both Chi-
nese and Russian leaders was often interrupted and mitigated by more pressing
affairs elsewhere. This neglect, as well as geographic remoteness, permitted
the rise of separatist aspirations among the conservative Turkic Muslims. Though
incompatible with doctrinaire Communism, this spirit was tolerated intermit-
tently. The USSR, however, recognized that the nationalistic aspirations of
Sinkiang's Muslims, though a helpful counter to Chinese nationalism, would be
inimical to Soviet interest in Central Asia if allowed to flower into genuine
autonomy. Under Stalin the USSR had accordingly established a position of
strong influence in Sinkiang that lasted until 1942, when Soviet officials were
expelled by the governor of the province. Then briefly, until the establishment
of the autonomous East Turkestan People's Republic (ETAR) in 1944, the
non-Chinese people of Sinkiang paid allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists.
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The USSR had encouraged the ETAR movement, which began as an authentic
indigenous independence rebellion that had its own leaders, its own armed
forces, and a nascent mass party. When the USSR was able to reestablish its
influence in Sinkiang in 1944 the ETAR movement was developed into a Soviet-
controlled regime through the imposition of Soviet-trained leaders.
Although the ETAR was nominally Communist, it was unacceptable to the
Chinese Communists because it was thoroughly anti-Chinese; and when the
Communists took over control of the region in 1950, they dispersed or recruited
the former ETAR leaders. The ETAR armed forces were absorbed or con-
signed to farming. Fortuitously for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), three
of the top ETAR leaders were killed in 1950 in an airplane crash when they
were on their way to Peking. In northwestern Sinkiang in 1951 a purge initiated
the ongoing process of "rectification," and by 1954 all indigenous armed dissi-
dence had been suppressed and tame leadership had been installed. The Chi-
nese Communists initiated the philosophy that local "autonomy" for minorities
could not go beyond self-administration under central dictation. It was in line
with this philosophy that the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou (IKAC), encom-
passing the former ETAR territories, was established in 1955. The local Muslims,
however, tended to resist acceptance of subservient roles under the Chinese
Communists. They had an ingrained exclusiveness, a background of earlier
republican experience, and a familiarity with Soviet Communist practices. They
believed in the ideological legitimacy of local nationalism, were conservative
in their approach to economic and social reform, and were potential sinophobes.
Local nationalism came under direct attack from the Chinese in 1957-58 when
a severe purge was aimed at certain local leaders who still dared to favor re-
publicanism, Soviet style, as a better vehicle for political expression of local
nationalistic aspirations than local autonomy, Chinese style. Local Chinese
propaganda portrayed the Soviet consulate in I-ning as a source of sinister in-
fluence. Party spokesmen condemned the sinophobia of the defunct ETAR,
attacked Islam, and bluntly proclaimed to the dissident non-Chinese and their
supporters the CCP philosophy of eventual disappearance of differences among
minority nationalities.
During all of the political housecleaning of the 1950's in Sinkiang the old
ETAR territories were treated with especial sternness. The treatment, directed
at consolidating a new political base and eliminating the Russian-laid base as
soon as the old leaders could be displaced, included the imposition of a new
sinocentric system of language reform aimed at eliminating the use of both
Cyrillic and old Central Asian scripts. After the 1957-58 purge, there was
little left to sweeten the pill of Chinese Communist reform other than the promises
of better hygienic conditions, better education for children, extension of minor
economic privileges, and imported entertainment. The first decade of Chinese
Communist rule thus ended with a withering of the optimism that had been
engendered by the nominal bestowal of "autonomy" on minority nationalities
in 1955.
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C. Transborder Movement Before 1962
During the Russian Revolution refugees from the USSR moved into Sinkiang
in sizable numbers, and a part of later Soviet interest in Sinkiang was based
on the presence of Russian nationals and ex-nationals in the province. During
the great influx of Russian-born Muslims into Sinkiang in 1932-33, refugees esti-
mated variously to number from 100,000 to 250,000 fled from the harsh Soviet
collectivization policies of that day. The Kazakhs who participated in this
last influx were part of a larger border-straddling tribal system and considered
their homeland to be Soviet Central Asia. During the 1950's the Chinese Com-
munists collaborated with Soviet officials to repatriate Soviet nationals and ex-
nationals who because they had been born in the USSR qualified for Soviet
citizenship, together with their families (even if born and raised in China), if
they could be induced to leave. Thus, many non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang
qualified for dual citizenship.
Official tolerance of dual citizenship was a practice that served the interests
of non-Chinese Muslims in Sinkiang best, those of the USSR to a degree, and
those of China quite poorly. The clarification of dual citizenship status for
eligible individuals and families required keeping Soviet documentation up to
date. This began for some individuals and families during the ETAR period
(1944-49), when some people acquired valid Soviet citizenship and passports.
Interest in securing passports, however, was not widespread until a year or two
before the 1962 exodus.
Chinese Communist internal administrative policies added to the pressure on
Soviet consular officials for passports. Theoretically, communalization required
that the public security bureaus confirm Chinese citizenship for individuals
before they could formally belong to communes, even though virtually the entire
population was herded into the communes. In the late 1950's and early 1960's,
there was also a quickening trend toward use of individual instead of household
documentation, thus adding to the administrative task and to the complexity
of an individual's situation. "Voting" eligibility and rationing began to be ad-
ministered on an individual basis, while identity and residence documentation
could be either familial or individual, depending on personal occupation and on
the kind of documents an individual actually needed. In the 2 or 3 years before
the Sinkiang exodus such developments, originating in both local and. national
policies of the CCP, increased pressure for tighter administration of documenta-
tion controls and added to the accumulating nervousness and tension among
the non-Chinese people. More and more the non-Chinese were placed in the
position of having to choose one allegiance and renounce the other, thus losing
the advantages of dual citizenship.
As the volume of passport work grew, the Chinese police checked the validity
of Soviet passports and are reported to have marked some of them invalid. What
the Soviet consulates seem to have done was to issue passports to people whom
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they were already prepared to admit, solely to enable them to secure Chinese
exit permits. In issuing such documentation unilaterally the Soviet officials
circumvented existing Chinese Communist procedures.
D. The Situation Early in 1962
1. PLIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS
The letdown in economic expectations in Sinkiang between 1955 and 1962
was great, particularly in the northwest. As of 1955, the promise of "autonomy"
for the province was still a basis for optimism, a trans-Sinkiang railroad was
soon to be built to help make China rich and strong, the USSR was prepared
to continue its assistance to the province, and the petroleum prospects in north-
ern Sinkiang seemed promising. By 1962 this dream had faded. Hopes of a
petroleum bonanza at Karamai had evaporated, the trans-Sinkiang railroad had
not been completed and apparently would not be, originally splendid economic
goals had been reduced to a slow-paced and modest provincial plan, and the
economic and social basis of "autonomy" had been weakened by the shock of
the 1957-58 ideological "rectification" campaign and purge, by the 1958-59 com-
munalization and leap-forward campaigns, and by the depression of 1959-62.
The full weight of underemployment and unemployment in the towns and
cities reached the corners of the economically depressed province when the
nationwide lisia-fang, or down-to-the-country, campaign to send superfluous
urban inhabitants and industrial workers into rural communes or back to their
native settlements peaked in late 1961 and 1962. It meant that the native
families, who were already under pressure from Han Chinese immigrants and
had been deprived of traditional economic incentives by the imposition of com-
munalization, had to accept the burden of integrating into their struggling com-
munities not only their own people who were forced to return from the towns
but also some newcomers. The local Kazakhs and Uighurs suffered most as the
economy was reshaped to a form in which they would be less and less influential.
Kazakh pastoral life was especially disrupted by new Chinese land policies that
required Kazakh resettlement; this new kind of settled farming was unfamiliar
and disagreeable to the Kazakhs. The newly established communes were im-
poverished, and much expertise for stock raising in the communes was dis-
appearing with the departure of people who were experienced but who were
ideologically unacceptable. There was little or no work in the towns. The
continuing replacement of Russians, Uighurs, and Kazakhs by Han Chinese in
both urban and rural occupations cut through the community along ethnic lines,
thus nourishing sinophobia.
By 1962 the choices open to non-Chinese Muslims with transborder affinities
were few and the foreseeable future seemed hopeless. The argument for repatria-
tion to the USSR had previously been viewed with suspicion, since these people
had known Soviet political chicanery in the past and therefore cherished no
illusions about the motives of official Soviet propaganda. In 1961-62, however,
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prospects for a better life in the USSR seemed brighter. Far from being dis-
mayed by the "evils" of Soviet "revisionism" as portrayed by Chinese propa-
ganda, the potential emigrants were encouraged. For the first time there was
a general readiness to submit to legal repatriation to the USSR. Apparently,
these potential emigrants preferred the collectives of the USSR to the com-
munes of Communist China as the lesser of two evils; and in any case, they had
heard rumors that the Soviet collectives would soon be dissolved. The new
readiness of many of these people to return to the USSR was reinforced by the
fact that the inflowing tide of Chinese settlers had destroyed their isolation,
the last advantage that Sinkiang had once possessed for them, and also by the
impression that Islam, despite being under political control, was faring better
in the USSR than in Sinkiang. There had been no pilgrimage to Mecca from
the Ili region since 1946, most mosques were closed, religious teachers were
controlled or under detention, and many young people were attempting to con-
ceal Muslim origin for the sake of expediency.
2. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION
The exodus came near the end of 3 years of worsening internal troubles for the
Chinese Communist regime and also at a time when the regime was setting
out, under pressure of internal discontent and worsening foreign relations, to
reorient its internal policies in the direction of firmer ideological controls. Major
conferences were convened in Peking during the spring of 1962 as the regime
began to set the process going. The National People's Congress (NPC) and its
supporting popular-front group, the Chinese People's Political and Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), were both in session while the exodus was building up.
Within the NPC, which met from 27 March to 16 April, and also within the
CPPCC, which met from 23 March to 19 April, the equilibrium was precarious.
Heated discussions in both forums reflected disarray within the CCP. Some
party members and subordinate party organs were in open disagreement with
the central party organs and had slid into selective execution of party policies.
In order to restore vitality to party life after the economic catastrophes of 1959-61
the CCP had to reassert its infallibility? but the lack of consensus within the
party forced it to move slowly. The CCP leaders chose to emphasize the devel-
opment of intraparty "democracy" (a prudent policy of hearing critics out) and
the strengthening of centralization and unity (the reestablishment of efficient
intraparty controls).
The Chinese Communists were fully aware of the existing low state of popular
morale in Sinkiang. Their 1962 line for the cautious treatment of Sinkiang
Muslims was based on a policy of letting the pressures be valved off gradually
rather than tempting an explosion. According to Saifudin, then the governor of
Sinkiang, local nationalism was a continuing menace, Han and non-Chinese
party workers were not integrating themselves satisfactorily, party workers gen-
erally had inadequate bilingual capabilities, and minority nationality party
workers were exclusive in attitudes and mediocre in performance. The solutions
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proposed by the party for the problems of 1962, however, were little more than
familiar and relatively noncontroversial formulae, conservatively phrased. Noth-
ing more was demanded of the party workers than to persevere in being patient
with persons of "faulty class background" and to avoid antagonizing persons of
"nonpeasant origin" as well as those of "religious circles." The guidance was
worded so as to cover a retreat from the harsher measures previously in force
against Islam and to allow for considerable flexibility in enforcing "class struggle"
concepts.
3. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
China refrained from injecting new venom into the Sino-Soviet quarrel during
the precarious months of late winter and early spring 1962, and a weak detente
with the USSR took shape temporarily. The annual trade agreement with the
USSR, which was under negotiation in Moscow during the weeks prior to its
signing on 13 May, may have been a specific incentive to Chinese discretion in
dealing with the USSR over Sinkiang, since among matters under review was
the determination of new levels of petroleum imports and minerals exports,
both vital to the Sinkiang economy.
Whether the Chinese Communist regime was sufficiently prepared for possible
border trouble in western Sinkiang in 1962 is a question. Premonitory border
incidents had occurred as early as 1960, when in some sort of hot-pursuit situa-
tion Chinese troops violated the border of the Kirgiz SSR. This and perhaps
other unreported events had produced Sino-Soviet recriminations within the
closed international circle of Communist parties. The USSR was concerned
over uncontrolled border crossing and in 1961 began to increase surveillance
of the border through use of locally raised auxiliary troops. Early in 1962, how-
ever, neither side was fully prepared to seal all possible border crossing points
or to put large formations of well-trained troops along the border, although the
USSR was far ahead of China in border surveillance and patrols.
Soviet concern for Soviet citizens in Sinkiang ran deep throughout the buildup
to the exodus. From the Soviet point of view, the Chinese determination to
base citizenship on place of birth was unacceptable. The USSR accordingly
became oriented not only toward protecting Soviet sympathizers and citizens
from harassment but also toward preserving the Soviet image as the friend of
all irredentist peoples represented within the USSR. Situations in which these
prestige considerations mattered stood to multiply as the fever to leave spread.
Soviet officials were in a potentially embarrassing spot on the local scene in
I-niug at this time. With the consolidation of Chinese administration after
1955, direct Soviet influence had diminished; but the USSR had retained indirect
influence through sympathizers and persons of dual citizenship scattered through-
out the IKAC in party and government positions, including influential public
security and police posts. These people were destined for eventual elimination;
there was nothing intrinsically sinister in their dual role, but as former ETAR
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supporters, they were blacklisted by the Chinese. They and their Soviet con-
tacts had come under open attack as early as 1958, and after 1960 the CCP
had assumed more direct control of the province through the reassignment,
isolation, and removal of Soviet-oriented elements.
The remaining Soviet political influence in western Sinkiang was exercised in
large part through the Soviet consulate in I-ning and through the Society of
Soviet Citizens (OSG), which was controlled by the consulate. OSG had been
founded in 1950 to replace an earlier association for Russian emigres, and after
most of the ethnic Russians left during the 1950's the society had survived with
a membership of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims who held Soviet pass-
ports. It maintained organizational centers in many sizable settlements through-
out the province and conducted a program of ostensibly innocent activities re-
lated to health, education, and information.
The Soviet consulate in I-ning had come under direct attack in 1958, and the
consul had been forced to leave suddenly at that time. Although the consulate
was reopened later and early in 1962 was still involved in the last phases of the
legal repatriation program for Soviet citizens, its influence had been considerably
reduced. This consulate was the last Soviet listening post in western Sinkiang
and the last point of direct Soviet .contact within the IKAC for Soviet nationals
and persons of dual citizenship. Because it had become an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of Chinese Communist objectives, however, the Chinese had
greatly limited the consul's prerogatives and had placed his agents and friends
in the IKAC under scrutiny. They also banned the OSG, thus further limiting
Soviet influence. The Chinese Communist objectives included solidification of
economic and political control over the minorities, elimination of Soviet influence
over persons who wanted to retain dual citizenship, and elimination of the Soviet
image as competitive with that of Communist China. By the time of the exodus
and riot these objectives had been virtually attained.
A. Emigrant Movements
The exodus of 1962 was only the climactic episode of a westward flow of
unwanted or disaffected elements of Sinkiang's Muslim population that began
about 1951 and finally ended in 1963. During this 12-year period, some people
who had been born in Soviet Central Asia responded to Soviet inducements
and returned to the USSR voluntarily. Others who may have preferred to
remain in Sinkiang were either driven to accept repatriation to the USSR or
were simply arrested by local authorities and deported.
* Reports of the exodus, most of them from ethnic Russian refugees now in the Free World,
are secondhand and typically vague. The refugees themselves were incidental recipients of
information rather than eyewitnesses or participants in the exodus, and in reporting they were
dependent on their memories of what they had heard. Their accounts reflect these limitations
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The 1962 movement of emigrants from T'a-ch'eng hit its peak in the last
2 weeks of April, probably very shortly after the side roads became passable
and the Tarbagatai Mountain passes were open. There was probably more
than one large group movement. On or about 21 April emigrants originating
in the suburban Hsien-feng commune closest to the border went to Bakhty (on
the border) in groups of up to 200 persons, with carts, animals, families, and
personal effects. They were not hindered at the frontier by either the Chinese
guards or the Soviet guards, although some of them were persuaded by the
Chinese guards to turn back. Other groups crossed the Tarbagatai Mountains
north of T'a-ch'eng as soon as the passes were open and headed for the Zaysan
area in the Kara Irtish Valley. Without some advance planning these breaks
would have been difficult to accomplish, and it is scarcely likely that the Soviets
lacked advance knowledge of tentative plans. Some reports assert that the
break from the Hsien-feng commune was definitely prearranged. The exodus
caused genuine economic difficulty in T'a-ch'eng, where the local communes
lost at least 160,000 animals-cattle, sheep, horses, and camels. Such a loss,
though not catastrophic, represented possibly 10 percent of the flocks in the area.
In the I-ping area population concentrations were located somewhat farther
from the border than at T'a-ch'eng, and the 15-mile-wide frontier zone lying
west of Sui-ting was sparsely populated. Large-scale movements originated
mostly in the I-ning area itself and in the communes located west of I-ping and
north of the I-li River. The magnitude of movement from areas farther east
was probably not as great. The flow of emigrants appears to have been man-
ageable, even if increasingly heavy, until 3 to 5 days prior to 29 May, when
very large numbers picked up and left. They swamped the I-ning transport
office, which by 29 May had sold advance tickets for 3 months ahead. Most
emigrants had had to divest themselves of whatever property they still owned
in order to secure exit permits before departure. Large-scale breakouts of people
with mounts and herds from the I-ning region may have taken place close to
the border, as they did from T'a-ch'eng. Unless people seized riding animals
from their communes, however, most of the traffic to the border must have gone
afoot or in animal-drawn carts. Even 20 trucks a day, the number reportedly
provided by the transport authorities, could carry no more than a few thousand
people in a week.
and also leave out key elements of which the authors were unaware, particularly those that
concern the activity of local Chinese Communist authorities. Many refugees attributed the
exodus to Soviet meddling, but their reports do not limit the allegedly provocative activity
to early 1962. Instead, they date it back to 1959 or 1960, but they give no explanation of
the Chinese failure to put a stop to activities that must have been considered to be unusual
or even illegal. One refugee who firmly believed that the mass emigration from T'a-ch'eng
was arranged beforehand by the Soviets, for instance, reported that the emigration ended
because no more people wished to emigrate, not because the authorities stopped it. Despite
the size of the exodus, there have been literally no firsthand reports from any of the 50,000
to 70,000 non-Chinese participants in the exodus, and only three reports from Chinese
participants.
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Without Soviet documentation, people who wished to qualify for entry into
the USSR could not satisfy Chinese requirements for an exit permit. Those
who went to the border without documents in the hope of stealing across were
not likely to be shot by Soviet guards, but they ran the risks of pursuit by Chi-
nese guards, of being turned back by Soviet guards, and of being shot by Chi-
nese guards if they tried to return to China surreptitiously. The mounting size
of the movement exacerbated problems of control at the border. When the
Soviet officials accepted people even without Chinese exit permits, officials of
the Peking regime were irritated, this being an obvious diplomatic affront.
When the Chinese Communists failed to prevent such large numbers of these
people from reaching the border, the Soviets were annoyed.
Peking argued as the situation worsened and delayed closure of the border
on the Chinese side. Neither side, presumably, wanted casualties. A Soviet
request that Peking send people to help screen the T'a-ch'eng emigrants, and
possibly those in Ho-ch'eng as well, reportedly was refused. The Soviets also
asked the Chinese to regulate the movement within Sinkiang to keep people
from reaching the border. The Chinese replied that the Soviets should simply
close the border, shooting people if necessary.
The situation seems to have continued unresolved until 29 May, when the
Chinese took their first serious step to close the border by cutting off trans-
portation from I-ning. Whether the border actually was closed at Ho-ch'eng
is hard to determine from available information, but the measures to restrict
transportation from I-ning effectively stopped large-scale movement to the border.
On 31 May the Soviets closed the border at Bakhty. Illegal movement probably
tapered off quickly thereafter as stiffer border controls were imposed on both
sides, making it no longer possible for large groups to swamp border guards.
B. The 1-ning Riot
When trouble broke out in I-ning on 29 May the senior government officials
on the scene were the vice governor of the Autonomous Region (Imiinov) at the
frontier and the regional IKAC governor (Kurban Ali) in I-Wing. Anvar Zhakulin,
a Kazakh and the director of the provincial party committee's political and legal
department, was at the local CCP office. He had won his party spurs in a
1951-53 purge in the 1-ning region and was one of the few renegade Muslims
in high party posts. He was probably supported by the regional party secretary,
a Han Chinese, who kept in the background, as did all Chinese authorities.
A rumor had been abroad that as of midnight on 28 May the Soviet authorities,
under Chinese pressure, would no longer accept any more would-he emigrants
without valid Soviet citizenship papers-presumably papers that had gone the
full circuit of review and authentication in I-ping. On 29 May, some 40 persons
who had applied to the CCP committee for permission to leave were refused
a hearing. Meanwhile, at the transport office, people waiting in a long queue
learned that the sale of tickets for transportation by truck to Ho-ch'eng had
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ceased, that no more tickets for transportation to the border would be sold, and
that people holding advance tickets would have to surrender them.
These rebuffs drove a crowd to break into the IKAC government offices and
demand help from the governor, Kurban Ali, whom they assaulted while tearing
up his office. Attempting to placate the crowd, Kurban Ali telephoned the
provincial vice governor at the frontier and secured immediate approval to
resume transportation services. Ile gave the informal leaders of the crowd a
paper to that effect, thus saving himself from further beating. However, at
the CCP office, where the leaders of the crowd then went to get the endorse-
ment of the party authorities attached to their paper, they found the gates barred.
Infuriated, they stormed the compound, but gunfire from guards stationed at
the building and across the street prevented them from rampaging through the
CCP offices. The crowd was unarmed and unled, and it yielded quickly under
fire. Approximately 300 persons had gathered at the CCP headquarters, but
only some 50 tried to break in. The riot ended in about 20 minutes, with 20
or more people killed and perhaps 50 wounded. Although it was not a big
riot, it could have become more serious, as many hundred spectators watched
from a safe distance. The streets were quickly cleared and cleaned up and
were heavily patrolled by police and troops that night and for several weeks
thereafter. A roundup of rioters naturally resulted in investigations and punish-
ments. A curfew was immediately imposed, fully advertised to the population
through rediffusion, and was relaxed by stages over the ensuing weeks only as
calm returned to I-ning.
Available reports indicate that communal barriers remained high throughout
the trouble. Although rumors flew swiftly, the indigenous minority peoples
did not communicate effectively with disaffected Han Chinese settlers in the
area; anti-Communist feelings they may have shared did not weaken the endur-
ing racial and cultural barriers dividing the population.
There is no conclusive evidence that the riot was an organized and deliberate
act of rebellion. Available accounts indicate that it was apparently spontaneous,
being sparked by the despair of people who were crowding the city in order
to leave the country and were suddenly blocked from doing so.
C. Post-riot Developments
After the Chinese authorities had recovered control, conspicuously visible
concessions were made to the local population. Although Russian goods dis-
appeared from the I-ping shops, supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods
began to increase. The most conspicuous concession to Muslims was the re-
opening of more mosques, although at the same time Muslims were being sent
from I-ping to country communes in increasing numbers. The lot of the rural
inhabitant was brightened by the granting of permission, from 1962 on, for
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families to till small private plots and to own small flocks of cattle and sheep.
The border restrictions did not interfere with legal repatriation or deportation.
These practices continued for a month or so after the riot and were resumed in
the first half of 1963 for an unspecified length of time.
During a period of several weeks after the riot, Peking strengthened public
security investigations and enforcement in northwestern Sinkiang and began
closer control of the border zone in order to prevent a recurrence of the trouble.
A publicity campaign was started by the Peking regime to show planning and
deliberate incitement of the riot by the USSR. Youths as young as 15 who had
been onlookers were sentenced to labor reform. Reports of a wider security
sweep, though not substantiated, are credible. Fresh Han Chinese troops were
brought into the border areas. Han Chinese military colonists replaced local
nationals altogether on the lands near the border north of the I-li River. The
border zone west of the road junction at Sui-ting was restricted to entry, and
direct control of this zone may have been transferred from local to national
authorities.
2. DETERIORATION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Relations between the Chinese and the Soviets deteriorated at an accelerated
pace after the Sinkiang episode. Until the day of the riot, even the mounting
exodus had not broken the late winter lull in open controversy between the
Communist parties of China and the USSR-the CCP and the CPSU. The prob-
lems of control at the border were apparently papered over successfully. For
the riot, however, blame had to be assigned and scapegoats found. In the
recriminatory propaganda and official retaliation that followed, the Chinese
had the last word, beginning with the expulsion of the Soviet consuls from
I-ning and Urumchi and continuing, in September, with the termination of all
Sino-Soviet consular relations in China, except those maintained through the
USSR Embassy in Peking.
By mid-1963 the exodus episode had become a public scandal on a larger
scale, generating open recrimination between the USSR and Communist China
for propaganda advantage. Public utterances were marked by self-righteousness
on the Soviet side and exaggeration and pique on the Chinese side. The Soviets
charged the Chinese with 5,000 border violations in a context that placed most
of them in Manchuria. The Chinese, minimizing events in Manchuria and
maximizing the exodus, retorted that "tens of thousands" of "Chinese citizens"
had been "enticed and coerced" into going to the Soviet Union from Sinkiang.
The Chinese asserted that although China had lodged repeated protests and
made repeated representations, the USSR had refused to return these "Chinese
citizens," basing its position on a "sense of Soviet legality" and "humanitarianism."
In December 1964, 21/2 years after it happened, Chou En-lai branded the
exodus as a "traitorous counter-revolutionary armed rebellion ... [by] reactionary
protagonists of local nationalism ... under instigation and direct command of
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forces from abroad." Significantly, however, Chou exercised restraint in not
naming the USSR outright as the instigating element, and he implicitly admitted
that outside influence was secondary to the forces of local dissatisfaction..
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXODUS
A. Communist Chinese Policies on Minority Nationalities
Ultimately after the exodus, the CCP's "hard line" on minority nationalities
was reimposed; by June 1964, Red Flag articles were calling for more restrictive
policies toward minorities. In the early postexodus period, however, when re-
appraisal of earlier programs for Sinkiang was underway, the Peking regime was
cautious in its approach to reimposition of controls in Sinkiang and to tightening
of the temporary relatively permissive CCP line on local nationalism. The regime
undoubtedly was aware that the CCP had indeed strengthened its overall su-
premacy in Sinkiang, as elsewhere, but that the province was not capable of
an immediate and lively recovery from the political and economic shocks of the
preceding 4 years. The CCP could only bear with the economic weakness and
the political weakness of provincial and regional organs of "self-government"-
self-administration under rigid central controls-that it had erected in 1955.
On the heels of the March-April 1962 NPC and CPPCC meetings in Peking
a nationalities work conference had been convened for cadres responsible for
the execution of minority nationalities policy. Circumspection prevailed in this
conference (which sat from 21 April to 29 May, the weeks when the exodus was
at its height, and coincidentally was adjourned on the day of the I-ning riot),
and no call for ideological or political "progress" was forthcoming. Instead, in-
junctions were to pursue existing objectives at a conservative pace, to avoid giv-
ing undue offense to "non-Chinese nationalists," and to be patient in. party work.
Any sudden cancellation of the policy of greater tolerance for Muslim ac-
tivities probably would have required study by party leaders from several prov-
inces and would have generated consultation at several levels. Although the
local authorities in Sinkiang spread reports that Muslim priests were the agita-
tors whose spreading of pro-USSR propaganda had sparked the exodus, national
authorities let the line stand that pressure on Muslim religious practices should
be moderated throughout China.
Excessive repression could have caused well-known non-Chinese leaders to
defect to the USSR, and had such defections materialized, drastic consequences
might have ensued. The discrediting of local non-Chinese authorities and a
new political housecleaning of local nationalists could easily have negated a
decade of party work in developing non-Chinese leadership for administration
and control in the province. Reconstitution of the facade of local self-govern-
ment might have been difficult and prolonged. The exposure of the Chinese
Communist structure of minority representation in government to unfavorable
popular comparison with the USSR's federal system would also have embarrassed
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the CCP. There was a real risk of weakening the ideological structure of
the state through failure to maintain the facade of autonomous government in
Sinkiang.
As matters worked out, the merits of the USSR system of republics as a
vehicle for political expression of nationalism did not come up publicly in 1962,
as it had in 1958. The hollowness of the facade of autonomy by which the
Chinese Communist regime could claim that its minorities were provided with
adequate means of political self-expression was not exposed. The Soviets in
their propaganda did not belabor the CCP on this long-recognized point of
weakness until September 1964, when Khrushchev, in rebutting censure by Mao
Tse-tung of Russian imperial conquests, praised the advantages of the Soviet
system especially for its recognition of the right of secession.
B. Security in Sinkiang
From one point of view the long-range security of Sinkiang was probably
weakened by the exodus, since the flight of large numbers of disaffected Kazakhs
and Uighurs to the USSR has potentially increased the Soviet subversive capa-
bility against Sinkiang. If and when it suits their purpose, the Soviets could
use these refugees to subvert the irredentists of northwestern Sinkiang toward
local nationalism once again. hi their eagerness to insure political stability in
a permanently Chinese mold, the Chinese Communists are rapidly populating
strategic parts of Sinkiang with a transplanted Chinese population. However,
they cannot entirely discount the Soviet potential to subvert restless Chinese
settlers as well as non-Chinese irredentists. The presence of at least a few
presumably well-indoctrinated Chinese youth among the 1962 emigrants, a fact
unremarked by both Soviet and Chinese protagonists, is an indication that Soviet
subversion of Chinese settlers themselves is a possibility. Reports of border
crossing forays in 1964 by armed rustlers from the USSR suggest another kind
of troublemaking of which the emigrants along with other elements of the
Kazakh SSR population. are capable, if their activities are tolerated by Soviet
authorities.
On the other hand, the exodus may have contributed to an improvement in
Communist China's control of internal security in Sinkiang, since it removed
25 to 35 percent of the unreconstructed portion of the IKAC population. Ac-
cording to Foreign Minister Ch'en I, more than 60,000 inhabitants, probably
6 to 8 percent of the IKAC minority population, left the Sinkiang border areas
for the USSR. The least tractable portion of the IKAC population-the partially
disaffected and potentially dissident-numbered about 150,000 to 190,000, or
almost 20 percent of the entire population, in 1956. By reducing this figure
the exodus, at least numerically, reduced the local security problem. The lead-
ership potential for dissidence was further reduced by the removal of persons
of dual citizenship from responsible positions in the governmental and police
organs of the IKAC and the province. Finally, closure of the Soviet consulates,
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the last Soviet listening posts in Sinkiang, was a substantial security gain for
the Chinese Communists. This was even more desirable in 1962 than in earlier
years, because of the imminence of nuclear testing in the province.
New political orientations and new lines of internal cleavage are in the making
in Sinkiang. The province is becoming more of a melting pot. Future re-
settlement of Han Chinese will tend to restructure the security situation. For
the existing vulnerabilities of its non-Chinese peoples to Soviet-style federalism
will be substituted the future vulnerabilities of Sinkiang's Chinese people to
Soviet "revisionism" seeping across the border. Unless the CCP's effort to make
Sinkiang more Communist than Muslim is finally successful, it may only have
succeeded in making the province more Chinese than Communist.
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NOTES ON DISTRIBUTION OF SINKIANG EXODUS
STATINTL
1. Classification is Secret/No'or3.
STATINTL
2. The Standard Distribution List for CIA/BI GR Series is satisfactory
providing the following additions are ma considered:
I White House through DD/I-= STATINTL
STATSPEC
STATINTL i
Force
STATINTL U ? a"~ ) STATINTL
STATINTL ' U - 2 Plus copies for various stations as they may wish to
DDI Area:
DDI/RS
CIA/DIA/JAG
DCS/Plans
OTR/SIC
- Coordinator of Academic Relations, lH1112, Hq., China Task
request
4 for special distribution to other interested
parties
STATINTL
3. It would be desirable for to get together
over soliciting the necessary interest from the above addressees
to justify getting them on the standard list. We shouldn-t
attach too much importance to previous failures of these potential
addressees to take the initiative in getting themselves on the
list, but should simply get their telephonic request or indication
of non-interest. (This does not apply to STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
A ``e_1Qa/.p5/31 41AfI'84-00825R000100690001-0
STATINTL
 pproved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100690001-0
STATINTL
. c~j.J~ , . 44 ~ S C~ .c,lrr'K
+-~~ 0r/F'; i~`-~ .. E
pprove
 aj4t
A
r v. Fpr;ReTease OD6 IA=R
P84=00825R00010069000
STATINTL
l(
i'1r1 'IM~A..L.. 1 I e s 4 ,. V.. i. l -,
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76 P-1 LT /I_-
T-0 -
 A 66
U dati of Sinkianr~Exodus of 1962 to be r c f
A 'FbK4Z4I~8e .ki :w 1~4R~ '84-8
t
STATINTL
- -- ---
6Ma
66
As _considered_before, _the Tibet and Sinkiang-studies will not be combined into one.
I
b
y
n a
eyance; analyst involved inCollation Pre ct.
1J
Considerable Aro tress -made on revision-of the Sinkiang Exodu_of 19.
1UJuried6
In work.
(Utin?f Si
ki
--
n
ang E~eodu~ of_.196
l -=-16Jun
- No work this week.- - -
20-2 J
-
No work this week.
^y_T,-----------
C.!
~?v-t_Q.S-'1~."` P.y 1..~ # h _, i L 1?. 1, f,,., - - _ -~--
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+
 21Se
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28Oct61i
21Jun65
1Ju16
ug65 --
23kug65
25Oct65
2Dec65
3Jan66
25Jan66
Feb66_
_- r66
PIM written- research under STATINTL
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Prelim.wrkdone in Sep; 11 to begin in earnest midOct
spending most of his time on'this now.
Draft has been finished and. turned over to OCI review people
Future work not decided. STATINTL
China Research Advisory Group says OBI to publish Sinkiang andTibet studies.
Brammell to consider this.
STATINTL STATINTL
No change so far as Sinkiang and Tibet studies concerned. has given
asst. to on summary paper on dissidence and control. Ch.GD/F will
proposed that OBI review the Sinkiang paper in Sep with view to publishing.
Sinkiang Exodus of 1962. - has this; will talk with _ about publishing.
Sinkiang to be given to _ shortly for determination as to kind of OBI issuance.
RAN covering Tibet to be submitted. STATINTL STATINTL STATINTL
Research on Tibet, which began in October, is proceeding. RAN???
Research on Tibet study delayed by 61.2275
considering doing a single study comparing Tibet and Sinkiang; however,
no work beli3g done currently.
Delayed by 2275.
STATINTL
Anupdated draft th S dd~ f~~ Eb~~ w . aced and will be
Ap 1 'eP2 ~J J ~S13" YC -f'~L~I" tl4-808?29 000100690001-0
61.2226
Dissidence/Disaffection--Com.China
DDI/Res.Staff
25X1A
 Appro 90001-0
STATINTL
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-01
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