ETHNIC MINORITIES AND INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100510001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP84-00825R000100510001-9
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Ethnic Minorities and Insurgency in Thailand
Secret
GROUP I
EXCLUDED EXD ~[LL9.,U .OM NCXADIXG
May 1968
CIA/BGI GM 68-4
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 Approved For Release 2 2/01/04: CIA-RDP84-008??5R0 90510ppl-9
Ethnic Minorities and Insurgency in at and
The major ethnic minorities of Thailand-the Chinese,
the Thai Malays, the hill tribes, and the Vietnamese--
recently have acquired an enhanced importance to the
nation's internal security. Their new significance derives
to a large extent from the fact that major concentrations
of the minority populations are found in the north, the
northeast, west-central Thailand, and the Thailand-Ma-
laysia border areas-where subversive insurgency move-
ments are continuing and, in some cases, appear to be
gaining strength.
These minorities together number about 6,200,000
people, about 19 percent of Thailand's estimated total
population of 32,939,000. The approximate ethnic com-
position of the population is indicated in the accompany-
ing Ethnolinguistic Summary; areas inhabited by the
major ethnic minorities and secondary ethnic components
are shown on the accompanying map.
Chinese
The ethnic Chinese are estimated to number almost
5 million people-about 15 percent of the total popula-
tion. They are concentrated chiefly in the Bangkok-Thon
Buri metropolitan area and in the tin- and rubber-
producing areas of peninsular Thailand. Elsewhere they
tend to live in towns along transportation arteries. In
general, this is the best assimilated Chinese minority in
Southeast Asia; friction with the "host" society is minimal,
and about 90 percent of all Chinese enjoy full Thai
citizenship. Like most Chinese in Southeast Asia, the
Chinese of Thailand are chiefly active in commerce, but
they also engage in many other endeavors, including
government service. Some leading Thai Government
personnel, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Thanat Khoman) and the Minister of National Develop-
ment (Pote Sarasin), are part Chinese. Chinese who
are not citizens of Thailand, however, are excluded from
certain jobs and by law they are also forbidden to grow
rice.
The Chinese residents of peninsular Thailand are prob-
ably the most vulnerable and possibly the most suscep-
tible to subversion. They are the targets of the Corn-
munist Terrorist Organization (CTO), the paramilitary
arm of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), a rem-
nant of the guerrilla force that provoked the Malayan
Emergency (1948-60). After retreating into the Thai
border area about 1958, the Communists launched a
campaign of intimidation mainly against the Chinese
rubber planters and workers and the Chinese village
residents in the Betong-Sadao border area. The Com-
munist campaign has quite effectively eliminated oppo-
sition in the rural and mountainous areas occupied by
the CTO. The 800- to 1,000-man CTO organization,
comprised largely of ethnic Chinese, is now attempting
to expand its recruitment and propaganda efforts among
border residents. CTO success with the older Chinese
is based mainly on the threat of coercion; its appeal to
youth, however, is more positive. To the latter it prom-
ises an appealing way of life, in which one is allowed
to rise above the occupational restrictions imposed by
the Government.
Another group of Thai Chinese, trained in Communist
China or North Vietnam, is active in the insurgency tak-
ing place in Nan Province of northern Thailand. Fur-
thermore, Chinese dominate the small illegal Communist
Party of Thailand (CPT).
This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated
with the Offices of Current Intelligence, National Estimates, and
Economic Research.
NORTH
V/ETNAM1i
Gulf
of
Siam.
`SIN DO7 SIA
Thai Malays 25X6
According to the 1960 census, there were 1,025,569
Muslims in Thailand (referred to as "Thai Islam" by the
Government). Eighty percent of them, about 820,500,
are ethnic Malays (Thai Malays) who reside in penin-
sular Thailand south of Ranong. The concentration of
Thai Malays in the five southernmost provinces represents
65 percent of Thailand's total Muslim population and 53
percent of the total population of those provinces. North
of the peninsular area the Muslim population includes
Pakistani immigrants and descendants of former ethnic
Malay slaves and prisoners of war who were moved from
the peninsula and resettled in areas chiefly north and
east of Bangkok. Smaller groups of Muslims are scat-
tered throughout the country.
The traditional Malay irredentism, the deteriorating
economic conditions of the region, and the presence of
the CTO in the border area are factors which may serve
to alienate some Thai Malays. Until conquered by the
Siamese in 1832, the southern provinces comprised the
Kingdom of Pattani, one of the largest and most impor-
tant of the Malay kingdoms. Many Malays in this region
are still psychologically oriented toward Malaysia despite
Thai Government efforts to achieve their assimilation.
Pan-Malay ideology is reinforced by differences in
language and religion. The 1960 census showed that
382,000 of the total population of 697,000, that is 55 per-
cent of the people in the three southernmost provinces,
could not speak Thai. Conversely, officers appointed to
this area by the Thai Government often cannot speak
Malay. Differences in religion are dramatized in the
educational field. A parallel system of schools-the Thai
public schools and the Muslim religious schools-exists
in much of peninsular Thailand. Attendance at the
former is resisted by conservative Muslim elements in
the villages, who believe that Malay students attending
public schools will be contaminated by alien (Buddhist)
ideas. A Thai Government program (assisted by the
Asia Foundation) to encourage the Muslim religious
schools to teach the Thai language and to qualify for
recognition by the Education Ministry as legitimate pri-
vate schools has had some success, and in recent years
the proportion of Muslim Malays who speak Thai has
been increasing.
Until recently the peninsular region had been a pros-
perous area, but its economy is now depressed, mainly
because of the declining prices of rubber. A large per-
HONG
KONG
SOUTH
CHINA
SFA
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 Ethnolinguistic Summary
Ethnic Group Population
TAI (THAI) b ....... ` .......................................... 26,231,300
SINO-TIBETAN .... :.......................................... 5,214,700
Chinese .. .................................................. 4,940,800
d
Karenc
.................................................... 162,000
Tibeto-Burmand ............................................. 41,800
Lahu (Mussuh)' .......................................... 15,000
Lahu Na (Black Lahu) 3,000
Lahu Nyi (Red Lahu)t ............................ 9,200
Lahu Shi ........................................ 600
Lahu Shehleh .................................... 2,200
Lisu (Lishaw, Lissaw) ..................................... 20,400
Akha (E-Kaw) ............................................ 6,400
Meo-Yao d .............................................,.... 70,100
Meo. .................................................... 54,000
H'moong Njua (Blue Meo) ......................... 31,200
H'moong Deaw (White Meo) ...................... 22,800
Yao ...................................................... 16,100
AUSTROASIATIC ............................................. 467,400
Mon-Khmer ................................................. 391,400
Mon ..................................................... 60,000
Khmer (Cambodians) ...................................... 200,000
Kha Mu (Khmu)" ........................................ 3,300
Htin (Kha Htin, T'in)" .................................... 18,900
Lawa (Luwa, L'wa)" ...................................... 9,000
Kui (Soai, Kuoy) .......................................... 100,000
Yumbri (Phi Tong Luang)" ................................. 200
Vietnamese ................................................. 75,000
Senoi-Semang ............................................... 1,000
Semang (Negrito, Ngok, Sakai)" ............................. 1,000
MALAYO-POLYNESIAN ...................................... na
Malay ...... ...... ........................................ na
Malays (Thai Malays) ..................................... 820,500 h
Chaonam (Moken) ........................................ na
Statistics are estimates from best available sources. All figures are rounded to the closest
hundred. Names in parentheses are alternatives.
'In some classifications, Tai- and Chinese-speaking peoples are grouped together under
the major category SINO-TIBETAN.
The main ethnic divisions of the Karen in northern Thailand are the P'wo (24,000), Skaw
or S'gaw (45,000), Taungthu (600), and B'ghwe or Ka Ya (1,300).
d Hill tribes.
"Mussuh," used by the Thai for the Lahu, is a Shan word meaning "hunter."
'The Lahu Nyi, or Southern Lahu, call themselves Lahu-ya, meaning "Lahu people"; they
resent the "Red" designation given them by the Thai, which denotes "rawness" rather than
the color of the women's skirts as popularly believed.
g The two main groups of Meo are termed Blue and White. The Blue Meo call themselves
H'moong Njua and are divided by the Thai into Meo Dawk, Meo Lai, and Meo Dam-Thai
for flowery, striped, and black Meo, respectively. The White Meo call themselves H'moong
Deaw and are known as Meo Khao by the Thai.
Based on 1960 Thai census.
tentage of the rubber trees in this area, where the nation's
rubber industry is concentrated, have been tapped for
30 years or more, and as most of them are of a low-
yielding variety the tappers' take no longer provides a
living wage. Many tappers are leaving their jobs and
looking for work elsewhere, but alternative employment
is hard to find. Currently one-third of the 3 million peo-
ple living in peninsular Thailand are directly dependent
on rubber for their livelihood. The economic situation
is further complicated by a regional deficiency in rice
and by the smuggling of some of the available rice into
the more profitable Malaysian market. As a conse-
quence, the rice supply is supplemented by costly imports
obtained mainly from central Thailand. Economic prob-
lems such as these may he capitalized upon by the CTO
in its drive to subvert the population.
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To date, however, the CTO apparently has had diffi-
culty enlisting a following among the Thai Malays. The
Malay irredentism, basically a movement that focuses
loyalty toward Malaysia, contrasts sharply with the CTO's
hostility to the Malaysian Government.
Hill Tribes
Hill tribesmen, probably numbering over 300,000, are
found chiefly in the largely isolated, remote mountainous
areas of northern and western Thailand. Ethnically, they
are related to peoples in neighboring countries. The
Meo of Thailand, for example, are of the same ethnic
group as the Meo in Laos, North Vietnam, and southern
China.
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Secret
Secret
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SELECTED
ETHNIC GROUPS
?1Udon Thani
Sakon Nakhon' '
Khon Kaen.
Phetchabun
Chumphon
Phra Nakhon
Si Ayutthaya
BANGKOK
, Rayon
Ban U Taphao
Karen
? Lahu
Lisu
Meo
? Chinese
AUSTROASIATIC
Khmer, Kul
The tribes are diverse and do not represent a unified
force. Primary loyalty is toward their villages; generally,
a larger loyalty that could unify and integrate them within
the Thai nation has been lacking. Relations between
the tribes, as well as with the lowland Thai, vary so much
that it is difficult to generalize about them. The size of
the respective hill tribes as shown on the Ethnolinguistic
Summary is not necessarily a valid indicator of insurgency
potential. Some tribes, such as the furtive Yumbri, re-
main quite aloof from other tribes and the lowland Thai;
others, such as the Lahu, have frequent contacts with the
Lisu, Akha, and Yao and live with them in reasonable
harmony. The Meo and Yao are bold and aggressive in
their contacts with the Thai and are frequently seen in
lowland towns.
Khmu, Lawa
Vietnamese
Malays
Chaonam (Moken)
None of the tribes have longstanding traditions of in-
surgency; rather, their history has been largely one of
isolation and minimum contact with the Central Govern-
ment. All, however, are imbued with the prowess of
good hunters and have an intimate knowledge of their
mountainous environment-factors that are invaluable
in guerrilla warfare. As shown by experience with the
Meo of Laos, the tribes fight best when their villages and
traditional ways of life are threatened. Over-reaction to
incidents of insurgency by Thai authorities, such as the
destruction of villages, could conceivably turn tribes
against the Bangkok Government, especially as such acts
are capitalized on by effective Communist propaganda.
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Thai-Malay kampong (village).
Houses in coastal kampongs are
characteristically built on pilings
as a precaution against excep-
tionally high seas. Coconut trees
provide shade, food, drink, and
the thatching material used for
roofs.
to discredit Hanoi. In the long perspective, attendance
of Vietnamese children at Thai public or Catholic paro-
chial schools may be the strongest force for countering
the influence of Hanoi. Both school systems are free
of Communist influence and instruct only in the Thai
language.
In west-central Thailand, successful insurgent am-
bushes have apparently not been followed up by active
recruitment among the local population. Nevertheless,
a continuation of hit-and-run tactics by the Communists
can probably be expected. Government efforts to thwart
insurgents in this area include the planned use of the
new Village Security Force (VSF) teams for socio-
economic work as well as the patrol of the coast in Pra-
chuap Khiri Khan Province by Thai Marine Police.
far more vigorous program of planting high-yielding
hybrid rubber trees is pursued and the quality of the
exportable product is improved. Instead of natural rub-
ber, which is increasingly threatened by synthetic rubber,
the Government could encourage the planting of coconut
and oil palms. Based on Malaysian experience this al-
ternative appears practical.
25X1 C
The Government's efforts to assimilate the Malays in
the peninsular area have been successful to a degree;
the well-coordinated Thai Army Mobile Development
Unit (MDU) programs appear to be the most promising.
(The MDU program is often followed by the Accelerated
Rural Development (ARD) program. Instituted in 1964,
ARD provides a vehicle for accelerated, sustained follow-
up to MDU area operations and represents a coordinated
and concentrated programing of all rural development
efforts in critical areas.) Generally, however, the Mus-
lims still live on the fringes of Thai society and have little
hope of advancing socially or economically beyond the
confines of their own villages. The rural Chinese are
even less assimilated. Furthermore, the Government as
yet has no real regional program to deal with the pen-
insula's growing economic problems; its attempts to in-
crease rice production in order to reduce the region's
dependence on outside sources have met with only par-
tial success. These projects are closed both to the alien
Chinese, who are forbidden by law to grow rice, and to
the Muslims, who cannot resettle in the parts of the
provinces of Narathiwat and Yala that are being devel-
oped for the ethnic Thai. Rubber planters will be unable
to compete successfully in international trade unless a
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White Meo woman collecting raw opium. A
tribal family that cultivates poppy typically
produces some 8 pounds of opium annually,
which is sold for about 3000 baht ($150 US).
Until relatively recent years the policy of the Thai Gov-
ernment has been to generally ignore the hill tribes. The
1960 census did not even include them. In turn, the
tribal people, especially those engaged in growing opium,
did not appreciate Government interference. However,
the border areas, particularly in the north, are important
strategically, and securing and maintaining the loyalty
of the hill tribes is vital to the Government's ability to
cope with increasingly aggressive Communist activities.
The longstanding antipathy between the hill tribes and
the lowland peoples, as well as certain traditional char-
acteristics of tribal agriculture (that is, the slash-and-burn
clearing of fields and cultivation of the opium poppy),
are impediments to the improvement of Government-
tribal relations. Tribal field-clearing techniques have de-
stroyed significant areas of forest, and this process, in
turn, has allegedly lowered the watertable in the rice-
growing lowlands. The cultivation of the opium poppy,
the chief source of cash for many tribes, was declared
illegal by the 1959 Opium Law. In September 1967, the
Director General of the Thai Department of Public Wel-
fare stated that the Government continued to advocate
the "preservation of forest resources and the elimination
of poppy cultivation." Cutting trees without permission
is a jailable offense. Thus, to the Government, deforesta-
tion is a crime, but to the bill tribes it is still a way of
life. In effect, the tribes are being told that their tradi-
tional customs are now illegal.
Communist propaganda cadres appeal to the Meo hill
tribes by promising that the Communists will establish a
"Meo Kingdom" in which the Meo will be equal and not
subservient to the Thai. They have also stated that the
Meo will be allowed to cut down as many trees as they
like to expand their ricefields and to cultivate as much
opium as they wish. The success of this propaganda
offensive is problematical. Mistreatment of the hill
tribes by Thai officials, as well as Communist propaganda,
has undoubtedly caused tribal disaffection. Whatever
the reason, Meo and other tribesmen have been attracted
in significant numbers to the Communist-controlled in-
surgency in Nan Province in northern Thailand. Also,
some Karen tribesmen are probably involved in the in-
surgent activity in west-central Thailand.
Vietnamese
The immigration of Vietnamese into Thailand has been
going on since the early 1800's. Those who arrived prior
to 1940 and their descendants are termed the "Old Viet-
namese." Most of these, descendants of Christians who
fled persecution in Vietnam, are in Chanthaburi and
Sakon Nakhon provinces and some are in the Bangkok
area. Many of the Old Vietnamese are Thai citizens.
Some 75,000 Vietnamese refugees, fleeing the Indochina
war, entered Thailand between 1946 and 1954. The
majority were welcomed by Thai authorities and settled
in the northeast provinces. Later, however, as the pro-
Communist character of their leadership became ap-
parent, the Thai Government became apprehensive and
decided to repatriate the group. In 1959, over 70,000
Vietnamese registered to return to North Vietnam, and
by the end of July 1962, almost 36,000 had been repa-
triated. The repatriation was halted in August 1964 at
the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with Hanoi
alleging that navigation in the gulf was no longer safe.
Provinces with
INSURGENCY ACTIVITY
Sustained insurgency
Insurgency incidents
Province (changwat) boundary
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25X6
Current estimates of the number of Vietnamese in Thai-
land vary from 40,000 to over 75,000. A 1967 estimate
by a Bangkok staff member of the Advanced Research
Projects Agency, US Department of Defense, indicates
the main groups comprising the Vietnamese community,
as follows:
Refugees still registered for repatriation ........... 36,437
Children born to refugee parents, 1964-67 (based on
assumption of 3 percent net increase per annum) .. 5,153
Registered aliens ............................... 3,160
Unregistered refugees and others who entered Thai-
land illegally (based on Thai press reports) ...... 10,000
Old Vietnamese ................................ 20,000
Total .................................... 74,750
Few of the Vietnamese residents of Thailand have been
directly involved in insurgency in the northeast (most of
the insurgents are ethnic Thai). However, some of the
key members of the outlawed CPT, who were arrested in
August 1967, were Thai citizens of Vietnamese descent.
One Vietnamese was believed to be the top coordinator
of Communist activities in northeast Thailand.
Communist cadres established early control over the
Vietnamese refugees by means of physical violence and
intimidation. Many Vietnamese, however, are volun-
tarily oriented toward Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh is revered
by them as a great patriot. The Communists also main-
tain control through a number of clandestine associations
within the Vietnamese community. Currently, these as-
sociations appear to be directed by the Lao Dong
(Workers) Party in North Vietnam. Orders originating
in Hanoi are apparently transmitted via the North Viet-
namese Embassy in Vientiane, Laos.
Trends and Counterinsurgency Efforts
All the major areas of insurgency in Thailand at present
are frontier regions that have significant concentrations
of non-Thai peoples. In northern Thailand, active in-
surgency prevails in the hill tribe areas of Nan and Chiang
Rai provinces. Sweep operations by the army in these
areas have apparently been ineffective, and little progress
has been made against insurgent bands. However,
casualties among Government forces have continued to
mount. In these actions the forced evacuation and oc-
casional destruction of villages have further exacerbated
Thai-tribal relations.
25X6
A comprehensive program of economic and social as-
sistance will be needed to prevent subversion of the
tribes over the long term. To this end, plans called for
the initiation of an "0910"-style operation in northern
Thailand in early February 1968. It was to be modeled
after the 0910 plan (name derived from the 1966-67
lunar calendar year 2509-10) developed and used orig-
inally in the northeast by the Counter Subversion Oper-
ations Command (CSOC), which was established in late
1965 to coordinate the countersubversion efforts of all
Thai Government agencies. The 1968 plan called for the
installation of joint police and Volunteer Defense Corps
(VDC) security teams, comprised of lowland Thai, in
Chiang Rai Province hill tribe villages, the objective
being to improve living conditions and deny Communist
access to the tribal population. These teams, however,
have been reassigned for the time being to duty outside
the immediate operational areas where Thai security
forces have initiated clearing actions.
Thedelay in using the teams as originally planned may
be due in part to a change in counterinsurgency respon-
sibility that has occurred within the Thai Government.
Initially, the senior command structure of CSOC in-
corporated extremely high-level Royal Thai Army (RTA)
and Ministry of Interior representation. At its lower
operational echelons, CSOC was in principle a civilian
entity. However, since December 1967, operational re-
sponsibility for counterinsurgency has been vested in the
RTA regional military commanders operating under con,
ditions of martial law. This has resulted in a noticeably
greater stress on the primacy of military suppression
operations. It is unlikely that civic action programs will
receive strong advocacy from the RTA.
Although the insurgency in northeast Thailand was
at a reduced level during late 1967 and early 1968, the
insurgent potential in this region is still the strongest in
the country. The Communists have an estimated hard
core strength of 1,500 guerrillas. To date, Thai military
operations have been unable either to destroy armed
insurgent units or to permanently displace them from
established base areas. The Communists, however, have
failed thus far to gain wide acceptance among the rural
population.
A number of suspected Vietnamese Communists have
been arrested in the northeast, and they are being de-
tained for possible "repatriation" to South Vietnam. Dur-
ing the recent "Tet" (New Year) season, the Thai Gov-
ernment launched its first Vietnamese-Thai language
radio broadcast information program in an effort designed
Clearing landing strip for lightaircraft in remote, mountainous
area of north Thailand. Such improvements in transportation
help the Government to carry out counterinsurgency programs
among the tribal minorities. Scars of tribal agricultural plots,
cleared by slash-and-burn techniques, are visible on the moun-
tains in the background.
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^ SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
X
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY NOTICE
M
il
li
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
61.2376
Thailand's Ethnic Minorities
SUBJECT CODE
REQUESTER
REQUESTING OFFICE
Self-initiated
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM TARGET DATE
To prepare a Geographic Intelligence Memorandum that will Feb 1968
present a concise treatment of essential background information ANALYST/BRANCH
concerning the significant ethnic minority groups within Thailand. W
This proposal is stimulated by the continuing U. S. policy-level GD F
interest in insurgency in Thailand -- not only in the Northeast, EST. ANALYST MANHOURS
which has been the subject of rather close attention for several 25X1A
years, but also in the increasingly active North and in the 100
Thailand - Malaysia border region. The proposed GM will treat
the Chinese, the Thai-Malays, the hill tribes, and the Vietnamese as ethnic
minorities within Thailand and will briefly discuss cultural and geo-economic
factors that might influence the potential participation of the respective groups
in insurgency/counterinsurgency activities. 25X1 C
It is planned to include a recompiled
ethnic map and a graphic ethnic summary, both already essentially completed;
these should be valuable complements to the most recent (1952) edition of NIS
Section 112 for Thailand.
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : Preparation of map.
OTHER CIA: DDP, OCI, ONE for coordination.
NON-CIA. : State for coordination
25X1 A
25X1 A
~/ . (p 8
Actin
A
CHIEF, eograp ivision ATE
REPORT RECORD
TITLE
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
AREA CODE
SUBJECT CODE
PUBLICATION DATE
ANALYST/BRANCH
INITIAL NO. OF COPIES
MANHOURS EXPENDED
CLASSIFICATION
DISTRIBUTION
ANALYST EDITOR
TYPIST
TS
C
STANDARD
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