MALAYSIA

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
March 1, 1962
Content Type: 
IM
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Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 CONFIDENTIAL Copy No. I9 7 GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM CIA/RR GM 62-2 March 1962 MALAYSIA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. STATE, NAVY review(s) completed. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 MALAYSIA Introduction The concept of a political entity of Malaysia, proposed in May 1961 by the Malayan prime minister, Tan/cu Abdul Rahman, is based on the earlier "Grand Design" advanced by Malcolm MacDonald in 1950 as a long-range objective for British pol- icy. Both concepts envision a federation that would include the 11 states of the Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, the crown colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak, and the sultanate of Brunei, a British protectorate.* The Feder- ation of Malaysia would have a land area of about 130,000 square miles and a population of almost 10 million. Once publicized, the current Malaysia concept rapidly reached the point of negotiation between the governments concerned and the British. To Malaya the plan offers an acceptable method of consummating what it deems to be a neces- sary merger with Singapore. In the new Federation the overwhelmingly Chinese population of Singapore would be counterbalanced by the predominantly non- Chinese populations of Malaya and British Borneo, thus precluding Chinese do- mination. Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, also favors the proposed federation but stipulates that Singapore should retain the right to maintain its own policies in the fields of labor and education. Should Singapore ac- quire complete independence, instead of becoming a part of the new Federation, Lee fears that it would become a left-wing Chinese political entity surrounded by Malays -- "the Israel of Southeast Asia." Britain favors the proposed Fed- eration, with some reservations, and will relinquish sovereignty over Singapore and British Borneo to Malaysia upon actual federation. Although none of the component states of Malaysia is a member of SEATO, the United Kingdom, which is a SEATO signatory, will retain the right to use the Singapore military base. Before the federation is consummated, however, and apparently chiefly as a pro forma act in keeping with the British policy of self-determination, a five-man. Commission of Inquiry is first to ascertain the views of the people of Sarawak and North Borneo towards the new Federation and to confer with the Sultan of Brunei. Many in British Borneo have reservations about joining the Federation although guarantees of a privileged position have been offered by the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, a representative body that is attempting to work out details of federation. From the Communist element, which views the Mhlaysia concept with alarm, dissension and possibly violence can be expected. Difficulties emanating from the underdeveloped economies as well an from the ethnic complexity of the components may affect the viability of the new Federation. Heavy dependence upon income from products of primary industry, particularly tin and rubber, will expose the economy of Malaysia to consider- able instability resulting from international price fluctuations. Furthermore, none of the component states is self-sufficient in its main food staple, rice, and all must depend upon imports of up to 50 percent of their needs, as in the case of Sarawak. Dynamics of Location Of paramount consideration is the location of Malaysia, no part of which is more than about 7 degrees from the Equator (see Map 35842A). Most of the ares has a tropical climate, with heavy rainfall and uniformly high temperatures. These characteristics have had a marked influence upon the development of the local economies, notably in the fields of agriculture, lumbering, and trans- portation. The specific locations of the component states have further significance. Singapore owes its importance chiefly to its position at the entrance to an interocean bottleneck, the Strait of Malacca, which has been likened to the man- made Sues and Panama Canals. Singapore thus controls the main east-west con- nection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (via the South China Sea), and along the north-south axis, it occupies a strategic position between mainland Asia and Australasia. As a consequence, international shipping transiting the area generally stops twice at Singapore -- once on the outgoing trip and once on the return trip -- thus doubling much of the port's trade. Should the much- discussed Kra Isthmus canal across peninsular Thailand from Victoria Point to Chumphon (see Map 35842A) be constructed, however, the strategic importance of Singapore's position might well decline, since the proposed canal would shorten the distance and sailing time between ports of East Asia and the Indian Ocean. . In this memorandum, the term "Malaysia" applies to the proposed Federation of Malaysia, "Malaya" to the present Federation of Malaya, and "Singapore" to the State of Singapore. "British Borneo" refers to the combination of North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. CONFIDENTIAL ?or Release 2003/08/f ? CIA_RDp84-0025R???1?1328?0?1- Namon /Ka alms rat AllA6113 Sonaknia OVERSEAS CHINESE IN MALAYSIA PERCENTAGE OF CHINESE IN TOTAL POPULATION 5 10 20 30 50 60 BO r 1E'. IllUn*M111101. D1VLSIONS OF MALAYA 1. Perks 2. Kedah 3. Penang 4. Perak 4 Kelantan 6. Trengganu 7. Pahang 8. Selangor 9. Negri SembiLan 10, Malacca 11. Johore JESSELTO INDIAN OCEAN 0 GREAT ? NATUNA ISLANDS GREAT MTUNA 3,2121 UN Benakal /.DO/ISIONSOF BRE1161413?RNE?, A SARAWAK 1. First Division 2. Second Division ' 3. Third DiVisMn Founh Division 5. Fifth DivftMn CA4 BRUNEI' .11.78. 6. BelGt District 7. Tutong DGnict 51,_ 28 8. Bnmei Dfttricr 9. Temburong OGG, NORTH BORNEO 10. Labuan and Inmrior Residency 0 11. West Coast ReGdency 12 East Coast ReGdzy r T A SI GAPORE SUMATRA .antene BORNE 5 I0 1511551.51 EIN OILFIELD AIMI OMOELD DIM-NM, aril,. 1 3.2?23 AND 313,31, ,21-313.23 3 221 ALT SOUTH CHINA Maffia2M.ftp, to55 Re / CELEBES SEA BRITISH BORNEO MALAYA and SINGAPORE MMMALS Tin p Iron eMMIIIIMUM ISLANDS or- CULTIVATED-CROPS Rubber RN Rice Coconuts (mare) - Road --- State boundary 1--1-4- Railroad 0 State capial la Airfield nalam SUMATRA CULTIVATED CROPS Ea Rubber NIG G... gacenuts (Gore) 01 Saaa 0 Swan ? Toalleco In:rrnel etigrirr:te - 5055 5--4-5 5,1,155d 1.? airfield c so o tOo 1,11.3melers 35842 1-62 Approved For Relea4 903/0311 ,84-008250 I' .9 Kit; 004000011-5 11111 1,f(jr., CONFIDENTIAL The position of British Borneo on the island of Borneo is noteworthy in the context of potential ambitions of a nationalistic Indonesia, which currently governs three-quarters of the island. The 900-mile international border on Borneo extends through a sparsely populated, generally densely forested, moun- tainous region; only a very small segment of the boundary in the area southwest of Kuching has been demarcated. When the primitive people of interior Borneo move across this border, they almost certainly do so in total ignorance of the existence of a boundary. The location of the Indonesian-owned Natuna Islands midway between British Borneo and Malaya may create further difficulties should Indonesian expansionist aspirations toward British Borneo materialise. Some reports also indicate that the Philippines may press an old claim to North Borneo that is based on a grant given to the Sultan of Sulu in 1704. Groups in North Borneo opposed to federation would probably seise upon any of these situations to further their attempt to block the formation of Malaysia. The proximity of Malaya to Sumatra, in conjunction with the ethnic and reli- gious affinities of their peoples -- most of whom are Malay stock and adherents of the Islamic religion -- suggests possible future relations between Malaysia and Sumatra. Malaysia would probably offer attractions for the Sumatrans, who are traditionally more conservative than the Javanese, Should the Indonesian Government move too far to the left politically. During the Japanese occupation, Sumatra was governed from Singapore. Terrain The terrain of much of Malaysia is not conducive to human occupance and eco- nomic development. The interiors of Malaya and British Borneo are mostly moun- tainous and densely forested; and the extensive coastal swamps, especially in Sarawak, not only are unsuited to settlement but also impede access to the inte- rior. Largely as a consequence of the restricting influence of the forests, the swamps, and the infertile lateritic soils, an estimated 80 percent of Malaysia is uninhabited and devoid of any form of productive economy. Population con- centrations and economic activity are chiefly in the foothills, along same of the valleys, and on the coastal plains. Transportation routes are restricted and inadequate. Where they exist, the routes not only serve as unifying ele- ments among the settlements but also set the pattern for future development, as in the case of the Malayan rubber plantations, which generally became estab- lished in areas that could be serviced by the existing tin-field rail lines. Economic Aspects The economies of the components of Malaysia are dominated by agriculture except for Singapore, which is dependent upon trade, and Brunei, which relies on petroleum production. Non-food commodities -- principally rubber, palm oil, and copra or coconut oil -- are the chief agricultural products of Malaya on the basis of both acreage and value. In British Borneo the same crops rank first in value but they are surpassed in acreage by food crops, chiefly rice. The major nonagricultural products are tin, petroleum, timber, iron ore, and bauxite (see Maps 35842B and 35842C). An indication of the relative importance of these products in the economies of the producing components of Malaysia is given below: Principal Exports (1960 Million Malayan Dollars 2/ Malaya North Borneo Brunei Sarawak Rubber 1,829.0 40.2 4.5 122.4 Tin 507.0 o o o Petroleum o o 240.1 2.0 Timber 55.0 91.0 Negl. Negl. Iron ore 140.0 o o o Copra and coconut oil 24.0 40.2 Negl. Negl. Palm oil 60.0 Negl. Negl. Negl. Pepper Negl. Negl. Negl. 17.2 Bauxite 6.5 o o 4.0 a. All monetary units in this memorandum are Malayan dollars, the common monetary unit established after World War II by the British for the Malaysia area; at official exchange rates one US dollar equals three Malayan dollars. Malaya obviously will be the main source of exports from the new Federation, and the chief exports, at least for the near future, will be rubber, tin, petroleum, timber, and iron ore. Currently, the economies of the Malaysian components are r,31ais Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 Eeconi of Man 'iours for Report Anai,.xst 41?,2 Pro3ect, 6 / Edi r'C'o(.7.r1inator 11;_!: which man ours. chArgeth ^ From, / r 6 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2003/08119 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 0 -)(INL-v1A-O c9,9 0--v-e 4 AUG 1962 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 25X1A 25X1 25X1 Cr71/ Fat-teivirj Approved For Release 2003/08WaaRDP84-00825R000100280001-5 Not g-1-(4'?-v.1.411141(4.1).47)2) "Malaysi 411. fa 014 62-2 statement Singapore as subset to rederation laeolare however, for Urly, in a ? Approved For Release 2003/ -RDP 0280001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 :e1A-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 5. A. This map shows great-circle distances, not those of scheduled s&r warier routes. "Airline" distances; in the legend, thus should have been "air" distance*. With regard to the questioned citation of direct flights from Singapore to Manila, the Official Airline Guide for April 1962 lists fear direct flights weekly by BOAC between Singapore and Manila. In addition, there were three flights weekly by Cathay Pacific Airways- tram Singapore to Manila via long Kong. We were wrong in showing direct flights to Sydney. 6. !fats, B, The omission fros this map of the main north-south road in Malaya hes its roots in en GU cartographic problem -- bow to show background detail without obscuring the main subject of the map. In this tie*, there were a nueber of design, complications which counseled omission of this road, as indeed waw others. Concerning the main root-Won route, you are right portrayal of a major section of the road was based on an obsolete coerce. Concerning the reed shown as entering Thailaud, our information has it trafficable, constructed of crumbed stone or blacktop all Cr: 1959; we would certainly lacculit a sore Molt report. In the case of the xeotorable route on the emit coast, we may "both be in error ?? a recheck here shows good evidence for the trafficability of all sections exempt that between Patti= and Itastuiv this possible op is to be closed by a new tool to be cooleted in 1963. 7. Ple, NNW on Map D we holdovers frosta conveniently available balm sap idatch *torte& namee only ter rough orientation and, in the process gaff* preference to those of town* on railroads. fit* name *election is admittedly arbitrary and improvable. I* view of short deadlines and the presence of' Map B as the pinery map of Melays, no recomilation of this **pest of Map D was deemed necessary. 25X1A Enclosure GM 62-2 2 Approved For Release 200 /0 1,9f1A-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 APMitE : Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 25X1A 4eogr*.yela Intelliemnle !loomed= on =1;4 1. lour Demount* oo ace4eyet report,. valet IAA prookmed on sheet iieoAltoft et OKVe regueet, beve '440* noted. The followint berhgrotele refer U., the sever61 palate of 4!..400tetlit eueetinned.,, " wgroe Viet tho Citt 62.2 stotommott -the retain the ri$kt to use the Aingaporv mtlitary home. *scald be regarded ee eubjeet to Vaderettes leseere' vereissivemeee lueel *dipolar attitude*. lime* it it however, 4.ipply to the Imitigh situation erceently -- the tiritisk vault, sot; for potamd', tae Sig00,Poro agelnet the inieneetenn Sew Guiana. ?.4tei1ar1y0 we felt that the restdeti isoveretgety peoneasod 4 the host =motel Is ii*i**1401g, on freedom LT sotto* that ha generally appreciated. The report Wye only inteedet to renmed the feet of agreement 00 um seg*ee .,v.errnoneed by Prime Aleieter hakeno . 4* *one that thia -,aepol4t tem, ''repreecatattve' vas geed la the enema that le . of repreeentatirce frusioll -uff the politicel ecemeoeute totereated to Veleyets The Pact or ite ''sten go ;44,440 nada woe capiteitA althOugh you will not* that the ,.: *entente intentionally Woe* to forentien of the Cebbold ;:erneteatorn as ki vrOtAhl* rE5 fprmo? met om the pert of the Britiell GOVItal" (t ia rttlidAly true that lAtta auto drive through ,Ialaya one . uitk the 'beetle and beetle% the 'mourner hes t-ireadly Improved SIM* the period. or the heerpeney. thy other band, 4,%.41,01, ea the preeent . ?:14 f:ewe* naturel raeoure,,,, we believe is unwarraatea tv ee rat sh$Omat "cagy =wart clAtervere' do, that th* rettersulim be" "very considerable *cowman potentials for the future.' Att attallett. ?~.144iotta t*t tho Yeatertatort's rve,ireotot!Ifi 'ts?aot kArt, moilloltast rooke-at* Approved For Release 2003/08/19 CLAI DINWQ0825R000100280001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 ci 14'026=44 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5 DATE TRANSMITTAL SLIP TO: ROOM NO. GH--08 BUILDING Headquarters REMARKS: For your files. FROM: ROOM NO. 14?F19 BUILDING Hd s. FORM NO. 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO .1957-0-439445 (47) 1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5