MALAYSIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 1, 1962
Content Type:
IM
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Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No. I9 7
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM 62-2
March 1962
MALAYSIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
STATE, NAVY review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5
MALAYSIA
Introduction
The concept of a political entity of Malaysia, proposed in May 1961 by the
Malayan prime minister, Tan/cu Abdul Rahman, is based on the earlier "Grand Design"
advanced by Malcolm MacDonald in 1950 as a long-range objective for British pol-
icy. Both concepts envision a federation that would include the 11 states of the
Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, the crown colonies of North Borneo
and Sarawak, and the sultanate of Brunei, a British protectorate.* The Feder-
ation of Malaysia would have a land area of about 130,000 square miles and a
population of almost 10 million.
Once publicized, the current Malaysia concept rapidly reached the point of
negotiation between the governments concerned and the British. To Malaya the
plan offers an acceptable method of consummating what it deems to be a neces-
sary merger with Singapore. In the new Federation the overwhelmingly Chinese
population of Singapore would be counterbalanced by the predominantly non-
Chinese populations of Malaya and British Borneo, thus precluding Chinese do-
mination. Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, also favors the proposed
federation but stipulates that Singapore should retain the right to maintain
its own policies in the fields of labor and education. Should Singapore ac-
quire complete independence, instead of becoming a part of the new Federation,
Lee fears that it would become a left-wing Chinese political entity surrounded
by Malays -- "the Israel of Southeast Asia." Britain favors the proposed Fed-
eration, with some reservations, and will relinquish sovereignty over Singapore
and British Borneo to Malaysia upon actual federation. Although none of the
component states of Malaysia is a member of SEATO, the United Kingdom, which is
a SEATO signatory, will retain the right to use the Singapore military base.
Before the federation is consummated, however, and apparently chiefly as a pro
forma act in keeping with the British policy of self-determination, a five-man.
Commission of Inquiry is first to ascertain the views of the people of Sarawak
and North Borneo towards the new Federation and to confer with the Sultan of
Brunei. Many in British Borneo have reservations about joining the Federation
although guarantees of a privileged position have been offered by the Malaysia
Solidarity Consultative Committee, a representative body that is attempting to
work out details of federation. From the Communist element, which views the
Mhlaysia concept with alarm, dissension and possibly violence can be expected.
Difficulties emanating from the underdeveloped economies as well an from
the ethnic complexity of the components may affect the viability of the new
Federation. Heavy dependence upon income from products of primary industry,
particularly tin and rubber, will expose the economy of Malaysia to consider-
able instability resulting from international price fluctuations. Furthermore,
none of the component states is self-sufficient in its main food staple, rice,
and all must depend upon imports of up to 50 percent of their needs, as in the
case of Sarawak.
Dynamics of Location
Of paramount consideration is the location of Malaysia, no part of which is
more than about 7 degrees from the Equator (see Map 35842A). Most of the ares
has a tropical climate, with heavy rainfall and uniformly high temperatures.
These characteristics have had a marked influence upon the development of the
local economies, notably in the fields of agriculture, lumbering, and trans-
portation.
The specific locations of the component states have further significance.
Singapore owes its importance chiefly to its position at the entrance to an
interocean bottleneck, the Strait of Malacca, which has been likened to the man-
made Sues and Panama Canals. Singapore thus controls the main east-west con-
nection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (via the South China Sea), and
along the north-south axis, it occupies a strategic position between mainland
Asia and Australasia. As a consequence, international shipping transiting the
area generally stops twice at Singapore -- once on the outgoing trip and once
on the return trip -- thus doubling much of the port's trade. Should the much-
discussed Kra Isthmus canal across peninsular Thailand from Victoria Point to
Chumphon (see Map 35842A) be constructed, however, the strategic importance of
Singapore's position might well decline, since the proposed canal would shorten
the distance and sailing time between ports of East Asia and the Indian Ocean.
. In this memorandum, the term "Malaysia" applies to the proposed Federation
of Malaysia, "Malaya" to the present Federation of Malaya, and "Singapore" to
the State of Singapore. "British Borneo" refers to the combination of North
Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak.
CONFIDENTIAL
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OVERSEAS CHINESE IN MALAYSIA
PERCENTAGE OF CHINESE IN TOTAL POPULATION
5 10 20 30 50 60 BO
r 1E'. IllUn*M111101.
D1VLSIONS OF
MALAYA
1. Perks
2. Kedah
3. Penang
4. Perak
4 Kelantan
6. Trengganu
7. Pahang
8. Selangor
9. Negri SembiLan
10, Malacca
11. Johore
JESSELTO
INDIAN
OCEAN
0
GREAT ?
NATUNA ISLANDS
GREAT
MTUNA
3,2121 UN
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BRE1161413?RNE?,
A SARAWAK
1. First Division
2. Second Division
' 3. Third DiVisMn
Founh Division
5. Fifth DivftMn
CA4 BRUNEI' .11.78.
6. BelGt District
7. Tutong DGnict 51,_ 28
8. Bnmei Dfttricr
9. Temburong OGG,
NORTH BORNEO
10. Labuan and Inmrior Residency
0 11. West Coast ReGdency
12 East Coast ReGdzy
r T A
SI GAPORE
SUMATRA
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BORNE
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CELEBES
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BRITISH BORNEO
MALAYA and SINGAPORE
MMMALS
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ISLANDS
or-
CULTIVATED-CROPS
Rubber RN Rice
Coconuts (mare)
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1--1-4- Railroad 0 State capial
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nalam
SUMATRA
CULTIVATED CROPS
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35842 1-62
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CONFIDENTIAL
The position of British Borneo on the island of Borneo is noteworthy in the
context of potential ambitions of a nationalistic Indonesia, which currently
governs three-quarters of the island. The 900-mile international border on
Borneo extends through a sparsely populated, generally densely forested, moun-
tainous region; only a very small segment of the boundary in the area southwest
of Kuching has been demarcated. When the primitive people of interior Borneo
move across this border, they almost certainly do so in total ignorance of the
existence of a boundary. The location of the Indonesian-owned Natuna Islands
midway between British Borneo and Malaya may create further difficulties should
Indonesian expansionist aspirations toward British Borneo materialise. Some
reports also indicate that the Philippines may press an old claim to North Borneo
that is based on a grant given to the Sultan of Sulu in 1704. Groups in North
Borneo opposed to federation would probably seise upon any of these situations
to further their attempt to block the formation of Malaysia.
The proximity of Malaya to Sumatra, in conjunction with the ethnic and reli-
gious affinities of their peoples -- most of whom are Malay stock and adherents
of the Islamic religion -- suggests possible future relations between Malaysia
and Sumatra. Malaysia would probably offer attractions for the Sumatrans, who
are traditionally more conservative than the Javanese, Should the Indonesian
Government move too far to the left politically. During the Japanese occupation,
Sumatra was governed from Singapore.
Terrain
The terrain of much of Malaysia is not conducive to human occupance and eco-
nomic development. The interiors of Malaya and British Borneo are mostly moun-
tainous and densely forested; and the extensive coastal swamps, especially in
Sarawak, not only are unsuited to settlement but also impede access to the inte-
rior. Largely as a consequence of the restricting influence of the forests, the
swamps, and the infertile lateritic soils, an estimated 80 percent of Malaysia
is uninhabited and devoid of any form of productive economy. Population con-
centrations and economic activity are chiefly in the foothills, along same of
the valleys, and on the coastal plains. Transportation routes are restricted
and inadequate. Where they exist, the routes not only serve as unifying ele-
ments among the settlements but also set the pattern for future development, as
in the case of the Malayan rubber plantations, which generally became estab-
lished in areas that could be serviced by the existing tin-field rail lines.
Economic Aspects
The economies of the components of Malaysia are dominated by agriculture
except for Singapore, which is dependent upon trade, and Brunei, which relies
on petroleum production. Non-food commodities -- principally rubber, palm oil,
and copra or coconut oil -- are the chief agricultural products of Malaya on
the basis of both acreage and value. In British Borneo the same crops rank
first in value but they are surpassed in acreage by food crops, chiefly rice.
The major nonagricultural products are tin, petroleum, timber, iron ore, and
bauxite (see Maps 35842B and 35842C).
An indication of the relative importance of these products in the economies
of the producing components of Malaysia is given below:
Principal Exports
(1960
Million Malayan Dollars 2/
Malaya
North Borneo Brunei Sarawak
Rubber
1,829.0
40.2
4.5
122.4
Tin
507.0
o
o
o
Petroleum
o
o
240.1
2.0
Timber
55.0
91.0
Negl.
Negl.
Iron ore
140.0
o
o
o
Copra and coconut oil
24.0
40.2
Negl.
Negl.
Palm oil
60.0
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Pepper
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
17.2
Bauxite
6.5
o
o
4.0
a. All monetary units in this memorandum are Malayan dollars, the common
monetary unit established after World War II by the British for the Malaysia
area; at official exchange rates one US dollar equals three Malayan dollars.
Malaya obviously will be the main source of exports from the new Federation, and
the chief exports, at least for the near future, will be rubber, tin, petroleum,
timber, and iron ore. Currently, the economies of the Malaysian components are
r,31ais
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Eeconi of Man 'iours for Report
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411. fa
014 62-2 statement
Singapore
as subset to rederation laeolare
however,
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5. A. This map shows great-circle distances, not those of
scheduled s&r warier routes. "Airline" distances; in the legend, thus
should have been "air" distance*. With regard to the questioned citation
of direct flights from Singapore to Manila, the Official Airline Guide for
April 1962 lists fear direct flights weekly by BOAC between Singapore and
Manila. In addition, there were three flights weekly by Cathay Pacific
Airways- tram Singapore to Manila via long Kong. We were wrong in showing
direct flights to Sydney.
6. !fats, B, The omission fros this map of the main north-south road
in Malaya hes its roots in en GU cartographic problem -- bow to show
background detail without obscuring the main subject of the map. In this
tie*, there were a nueber of design, complications which counseled omission
of this road, as indeed waw others. Concerning the main root-Won route,
you are right portrayal of a major section of the road was based on an
obsolete coerce. Concerning the reed shown as entering Thailaud, our
information has it trafficable, constructed of crumbed stone or blacktop
all Cr: 1959; we would certainly lacculit a sore Molt report. In the case
of the xeotorable route on the emit coast, we may "both be in error ?? a
recheck here shows good evidence for the trafficability of all sections
exempt that between Patti= and Itastuiv this possible op is to be closed
by a new tool to be cooleted in 1963.
7. Ple, NNW on Map D we holdovers frosta conveniently
available balm sap idatch *torte& namee only ter rough orientation and,
in the process gaff* preference to those of town* on railroads. fit* name
*election is admittedly arbitrary and improvable. I* view of short deadlines
and the presence of' Map B as the pinery map of Melays, no recomilation of
this **pest of Map D was deemed necessary.
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Enclosure
GM 62-2
2
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1,9f1A-RDP84-00825R000100280001-5
APMitE
:
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4eogr*.yela Intelliemnle !loomed= on
=1;4
1. lour Demount* oo ace4eyet report,. valet IAA prookmed on sheet
iieoAltoft et OKVe regueet, beve '440* noted. The followint berhgrotele
refer U., the sever61 palate of 4!..400tetlit eueetinned.,,
" wgroe Viet tho Citt 62.2 stotommott
-the retain the ri$kt to use the Aingaporv
mtlitary home. *scald be regarded ee eubjeet to Vaderettes leseere'
vereissivemeee lueel *dipolar attitude*. lime* it it however,
4.ipply to the Imitigh situation erceently -- the tiritisk vault, sot; for
potamd', tae Sig00,Poro agelnet the inieneetenn Sew Guiana. ?.4tei1ar1y0
we felt that the restdeti isoveretgety peoneasod 4 the host =motel Is
ii*i**1401g, on freedom LT sotto* that ha generally appreciated. The report
Wye only inteedet to renmed the feet of agreement 00 um seg*ee
.,v.errnoneed by Prime Aleieter hakeno
. 4* *one that thia
-,aepol4t tem, ''repreecatattve'
vas geed la the enema that le . of repreeentatirce
frusioll -uff the politicel ecemeoeute totereated to Veleyets
The Pact or ite ''sten
go ;44,440 nada woe capiteitA althOugh you will not* that the
,.: *entente intentionally Woe* to forentien of the Cebbold
;:erneteatorn as ki vrOtAhl* rE5 fprmo? met om the pert of the Britiell GOVItal"
(t ia rttlidAly true that lAtta auto drive through
,Ialaya one . uitk the 'beetle and beetle% the 'mourner hes
t-ireadly Improved SIM* the period. or the heerpeney. thy other band,
4,%.41,01, ea the preeent
. ?:14 f:ewe* naturel raeoure,,,, we believe
is unwarraatea tv ee rat sh$Omat "cagy =wart clAtervere' do, that
th* rettersulim be" "very considerable *cowman potentials for the future.'
Att attallett. ?~.144iotta t*t tho Yeatertatort's rve,ireotot!Ifi 'ts?aot kArt, moilloltast
rooke-at*
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DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
ROOM NO.
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BUILDING
Headquarters
REMARKS:
For your files.
FROM:
ROOM NO.
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FORM NO. 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO .1957-0-439445 (47)
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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