CHINA'S BORDER WITH THE USSR MANCHURIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
Copy No. 172
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM 65-3
May 1965
CHINA'S BORDER WITH THE USSR
MANCHURIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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SECRET
CHINA'S BORDER WITH THE USSR: MANCHURIA
The eastern 2,300-mile sector of the 4,150-mile China - USSR boundary* separates the Soviet Far East and
a portion of eastern Siberia from that part of China traditionally known as Manchuria.** Although much of
this long boundary passes through sparsely populated hills and desolate swamps, the frontier region has eco-
nomic and strategic importance: the Trans-Siberian Railroad parallels the border and serves as the vital
lifeline for the isolated economic areas and military installations of the Soviet Far East; rail connections
between the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese rail net in Manchuria provide an important link for trade in Chi-
nese goods; and sizable, though largely undeveloped, agricultural, mineral, forest, and water resources exist
in the frontier region.
The Manchuria - USSR boundary, except for the extreme western segment and the segment south of Lake Kha-
nka, near Vladivostok, follows the courses of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and certain of their tributaries.
The border terrain is relatively low, with generally forested hills that are interspersed with numerous marsh-
lined river valleys and poorly drained plains. Large plains with extensive marshes occur on the Soviet side
along the middle Amur and in China in the great triangular lowland formed by the lower Sungari and Ussuri
Rivers joining the Amur.
Chinese and Soviet maps differ slightly in their portrayal of certain
the Manchuria - USSR border commonly was regarded as stable, settled, and
between the two great powers. The deepening of the dispute between China
to a public airing of border issues and grievances, including the Chinese
the basis for the present delineation of the boundary. Border talks were
broken off after several months without settling the issue.
border sections, but until recently
unlikely to be a contentious issue
and the USSR, however, led in 1963
charge that "unequal treaties" were
initiated early in 1964 but were
Historical Background
Originally, the vast Amur-Ussuri forest-and-swamp country was sparsely populated by Tungusic peoples whose
livelihood depended on the products of forest and river. Early in the 17th century these scattered Amur-
Ussuri tribes, under the leadership of a chieftain named Nurhachi, were united with more numerous groups of
similar race and culture who inhabited central and southeastern Manchuria. Collectively termed the Manchus,
these Tungusic tribes in alliance with other groups overthrew the Ming dynasty of China and established the
Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty in 1644.
The rise of the Manchus coincided with Russian expansion eastward into the vast Siberian territories. By
1644 the Russians had entered and explored the Amur Valley, and soon after that they built forts and settled
colonists in the valley. Inevitably, conflict with the Manchus occurred; and it continued until the signing
of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. The treaty delimited the Russo-Chinese border so as to include within
the Manchu Empire most of the Amur Basin and all of the Ussuri territory. The Treaty of Kiakhta, signed in
1727, defined the remainder of the Manchuria border, the part west of the Argun headwaters.
The Amur-Ussuri region was part of Manchu China for 170 years, and conditions changed very little during
that time. Large areas remained unpopulated, and north of the Amur there were only a handful of Manchu set-
tlements. During much of the period the border defense was centered at Tsitsihar, well within present-day
Manchuria. The Russian czars continued to covet the Amur-Ussuri territories, but Manchu strength dictated
caution rather than confrontation. British victory in the Opium Wars (1839-82), however, exposed Manchu de-
cay and opened China to extensive sea trade, thus threatening the favored Russian overland trading relation-
ship with China. Russian expeditions into Manchu territory were organized, and by 1850, the Russian flag
had been hoisted on the Amur. Settlements were built soon after, and troops and officials moved in -- all
in clear violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The Manchus were in no position to oppose the audacious Rus-
sians, and the fait accompli was formalized in 1858 by the signing of the Treaty of Aigun, which allocated
to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur with the exception of an area of Manchu settlement south of
Blagoveshchensk that came to be known as the "64 villages." The territory east of the Ussuri was to be
under joint ownership until the boundary could be demarcated. This unclear status of the Ussuri territory
was resolved in 1860 by the Treaty of Peking, whereby the territory east of the Ussuri was ceded to the Rus-
sians. This additional territorial booty was extracted from the Manchus during the confused period of Anglo-
French attacks on China and the subsequent Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 1860. By the 1858 Treaty of
Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Peking the Russians acquired slightly more than 300,000 square miles of terri-
tory, including the valuable harbor of Vladivostok, as well as important trading concessions.
Russia was an enthusiastic participant in the dismemberment of the Manchu Empire in the decades following
the Treaty of Peking. The Russians obtained mining rights and lumber concessions in Manchuria; obtained the
right to build and operate a railroad across Chinese territory, thus shortening the trip to Vladivostok;
leased the Port Arthur - Dairen area; and for some time after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, militarily occupied
most of Manchuria. In retaliation for Manchu attacks on Blagoveshchensk, the Russians forced Manchu settlers
and their families in the "64 villages" to cross the Amur River, causing the death of most of them. Russian
designs in southern Manchuria were blocked by their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), but later
Russo-Japanese agreements, both open and secret, recognized a Russian sphere of influence in northern Man-
churia. After the Soviet regime came to power, czarist actions in Manchuria and Manchurian concessions ex-
tracted from China were formally renounced. Later, however, actions contradicted words. Frictions developed
which in 1929 erupted in military clashes that were generated by the inability to agree on the control of the
Chinese Eastern Railroad. Soviet ambitions were dampened by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931,
but after Japan's defeat in World War II, they were revived by the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement that established
Sino-Soviet joint ownership of the two main Manchurian railroads and joint use of the naval base at Port
Arthur.
* The western sector of the China - USSR border is discussed in CIA/RR GM 84-1, China's Border with the USSR:
Sinkiang, February 1964, S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
** Administratively, Manchuria is divided into an eastern portion comprised of three provinces (Heilungkiang,
Kirin, and Liaoning), collectively called "The Northeast" by the Chinese Communists, and a western portion
that is part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
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The triumph of the Chinese Communists in 1949 appeared to herald a new era of Sino-Russian relations in
Manchuria. Treaties between the USSR and Nationalist China that had been signed immediately after World
War II were abrogated, and new agreements that provided for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet influence in
Manchuria were signed. By 1955, Soviet troops had departed from the Port Arthur area, which they had occu-
pied since 1945; jointly operated Manchurian railroads were returned to sole Chinese administration; and
Soviet shares in joint stock companies set up in Manchuria were transferred to China. Potential causes for
border friction seemingly were lessened by an agreement reached in 1951, which concerned navigation regu-
lations and procedures on the Amur-Ussuri waterways, and by another agreement in 1958 that provided for free
navigation by merchant ships of boundary rivers, including the lower Amur and Sungari Rivers. Cooperation
in the border area was highlighted by the 1956 Sino-Soviet agreement on a joint survey of the resources and
development of the Amur Basin. During this first decade of the Chinese Communist regime the Soviet press
described the Amur and Ussuri as "rivers of friendship."
Economic Development
Development of the Manchuria - USSR frontier region has differed quite markedly on opposite sides of the
border, the differences relating, in part, to location and distance factors. The Soviet Far East, physi-
cally isolated by great distances from the major Soviet productive areas and strategically vulnerable to any
hostile power based in Manchuria, has been forced to develop some degree of economic self-sufficiency. In
contrast, the Manchurian borderlands are relatively undeveloped, largely because this area is peripheral to
the more productive and more accessible lands in central and southern Manchuria that even today are not fully
exploited.
Large-scale settlement of the frontier did not begin until after the completion in 1904 of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad and the Chinese Eastern Railroad across Manchuria. The population density now is notably
higher on most of the Soviet side of the border than on the Chinese side; in size the numerous towns and
cities strung along the Trans-Siberian Railroad range upward to about 300,000 inhabitants, the population of
Khabarovsk and of Vladivostok. Much of the reclaimable land on the Soviet side has been drained and cleared
and is under cultivation. On the Chinese side the population density is generally lower and relatively
little land is cultivated. Frontier towns are scattered and small, except for Man-chou-li, which has a popu-
lation of possibly 70,000. At greater distances from the border, however, several Chinese cities have grown
rapidly in recent years, principally because of mining and lumbering activities. Ethnically, the great ma-
jority of the inhabitants of the frontier region are either Chinese or Russian. Significant minority groups
include Mongols, who predominate within Manchuria from the upper Argun area west to the Mongolian border
-- although the two major cities in this region, Man-chou-li and Hailer, are solidly Chinese; Koreans, who
inhabit the lowlands near Hun-ch'un and Mi-shan in China and near Bikin in the USSR; and Jews in and around
Birobidzhan. Ukrainian settlements are scattered along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers on the Soviet side. A
few small pockets of Tungusic peoples of several different tribes are still found in the region, generally
located in isolated wooded areas. Most of these people make a living by hunting and fishing.
The Trans-Siberian Railroad has been and is now the vital surface-transportation link between the Soviet
Far East and other areas of the USSR. Along the Amur the railroad parallels the river at distances of 50
miles or less; and along the Ussuri south of Khabarovsk it is generally 10 miles or less from the river.
Waterways are important movers of freight, and shallow-draft vessels can use all of the Amur River and part
of its tributary, the Shilka. The shipping season on these rivers is relatively short (about 160 to 175 days),
normally lasting from late May till early November. The season on the Ussuri, which is not used as much, is
a little longer. Roads are few and serve mostly as feeders to rail and water transport. The Man-chou-li to
Sui-fen-ho railroad via Harbin, originally built as part of the Trans-Siberian system, is the most important
means of transportation serving the Chinese frontier. Several lines extend north or east from it, primarily
to serve mining or logging centers. Old lines to Ai-hun in the north and Hu-lin in the east that were built
by the Japanese are in the process of reconstruction. Most shipping on the boundary rivers is Russian; Chi-
nese shipping is confined largely to the Sungari River, with Harbin and Chia-mu-ssu the important rail trans-
shipment points for cargo moving to and from the Amur region. Since 1963, river ships reportedly have been
careful not to cross midchannel on the boundary rivers. As few good roads exist in the frontier area, water-
ways commonly serve as roads during winter. The thick ice makes sledging and the use of vehicles practicable.
The feeder roads also can handle greater amounts of traffic in winter than in summer, when many roads become
impassable at times because of mud and flooding.
Agriculture is locally important in the Soviet Far East, largely concentrated in the Zeya-Bureya and
Khanka-Ussuri lowlands, but production is insufficient to meet regional needs. In Manchuria only 2 or 3 per-
cent of the land in the hsien (counties) adjacent to the border is now cultivated, and the availability of
extensive areas of arable land has favored large-scale farming operations. During the past 10 years a number
of state farms, military resettlement farms, and a few tractor stations have been established in Manchuria.
The number of military resettlement farms set up near the border during the past 2 or 3 years suggests that
they may support border defense forces. Agricultural land in the entire frontier region could be expanded
greatly, particularly on the Manchurian side of the border, but most of it is poorly drained and considerable
investment would be needed to initiate drainage and reclamation projects. Other drawbacks to agricultural
expansion include long, bitterly cold winters, relatively short (100 to 150 days) frost-free seasons, precip-
itation that is often inadequate during periods of spring sowing and early crop growth, and occasional flood-
ing. Wheat and other grains, including a little rice, are the major food crops; soybeans are the principal
industrial crop. The presence of dairying and cattle raising as well as a greater emphasis on root crops
such as potatoes distinguishes agricultural patterns in the USSR from those in China. In the drier western
part of the frontier, farming is relatively unimportant and nomadic herding is the principal economic activity.
Most of the frontier region is forested with a mixture of needleleaf and broadleaf species. In China,
the extensive larch and pine forests in the remote parts of the Great and Lesser Khinghan Ranges are the
last major timber reserves. The timber cut in these areas serves both regional and national requirements.
In the timber-rich USSR, however, the frontier forests are only regionally important, sufficient for indus-
trial and other local needs and for export in small quantities.
Significant quantities of coal are mined by both countries, and recent surveys indicate that a variety
of other minerals and metals of importance occurs in the frontier region. Chinese production of coal in
Heilungkiang is 6 or 7 percent of the Chinese national total, and Soviet fields near Blagoveshchensk and
Vladivostok are regionally important to the relatively small but expanding Far East industrial district. Al-
though a little gold is mined, coal mining is the only mining activity of any significance in the Chinese
frontier region. In the USSR, however, a little iron ore and various nonferrous and alloy metals are mined
in the western part of the frontier region, and tin is mined at several locations in the east.
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A joint Sino-Soviet communique of August 1956 announced the undertaking of a cooperative investigation
and study of the resource base of the Amur Basin. The potential for power and navigation was assessed,
and other natural resources were surveyed and mapped and recommendations were made for their utilization.
As a result, several sites on the Amur have been selected for hydroelectric powerplants and plans have been
made for flood-control measures and the improvement and extension of navigation. The Sino-Soviet dispute,
however, apparently has halted implementation of any plans for joint development of resources in the basin.
Most of the immediate benefit from any development schemes along the Amur would accrue to the economically
more advanced USSR.
Territorial Issues
The Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) treaties left unsettled the ownership of the numerous islands in the
boundary rivers. Most troublesome is the large triangular island area called Hei-hsia-tzu (or San'tseyaochzhou)
located at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. At tines the area, about 25 miles long and some 15
miles wide at the western end, appears to be a single island, with a poorly drained surface and numerous chan-
nels or bayous. At high water, however, these channels cut completely across Hei-hsia-tzu, and the area can
more properly be described as consisting of several separate islands. The easternmost of such "islands" is
the site of a small shipyard that is believed to be a subsidiary of one of the Khabarovsk shipyards. Past and
present Chinese maps -- both Communist and Nationalist -- show Hei-hsia-tzu as part of China; Russian maps
show it as within the USSR and depict the boundary as following the Kazakevicheva Channel at the extreme west-
ern end of the island. Generslly, international river boundaries follow the deepest part of the main channel,
and the ownership of islands is decided accordingly. Such practice would appear to allocate Hei-hsia-tzu to
China. Whatever the legal merits of the dispute, the most important factor is the obvious strategic location
of the island in relation to Khabarovsk: non-Soviet control of the island Would be a threat to the security
of the city and nearby installations.
Another source of contention is the 60-mile boundary segment of the Argun headwaters. This area is stra-
tegically significant because the change-of-gauge facilities between the Russian and Chinese rail systems are
located at Man-chou-li, just inside the Chinese border. According to the Russian version of the boundary
alignment, the boundary lies from 5 to 10 miles south of the alignment depicted by the Chinese, leaving about
375 square miles of territory between the two lines. Chinese maps show the boundary as defined by the 1727
Treaty of Kiakhta; Soviet maps show it as defined by the Tsitsihar Agreement, which was signed early in De-
cember 1911, by a moribund Manchu government. The legality of the agreement is dubious in that it was never
ratified by any Chinese government. The Russian version of the boundary apparently has served as the de
facto boundary ever since the Tsitsihar Agreement.*
Other segments of the boundary do not appear to present serious problems. In the west, Chinese and Rus-
sian maps differ slightly in their portrayal of the boundary along the upper Argun. The river is braided
with numerous channels; Soviet maps show the boundary following the southernmost channel, and Chinese maps
align it along the northern channel. Luring periods of high water, shifts in the main channel are common
and problems arise. In the east, the Sino-Soviet border west and south of Lake Khanka follows various local
terrain features to the boundary terminus at the Tumen River a few miles above its mouth. Boundary markers
were erected in 1861 and again in 1886; plans to redemarcate the boundary during the 19205 were never im-
plemented. During the 1930's, disputes arose between Japan and the USSR over this border segment and resulted
in two border clashes. In part the clashes were due to the unclear location of the boundary on the ground.
In many areas the boundary follows no easily recognizable terrain features, and the boundary markers are
widely spaced; some may have disappeared. Thus, there is a possibility of differences arising in any re-
demarcation of the eastern and western segments of the boundary.
Recent Negotiations and Border Developments
The increasingly harsh polemical exchanges that in the early 1960's succeeded the euphoric phase of Sino-
Soviet relations at first contained no hint of disagreement over the border. The Soviet press, however,
since 1958 had occasionally made oblique references to border tension by publicizing "the work of the gallant
frontier guards in the Far East," "the need for vigilance," and "the apprehension of border violators." By
1962, defectors from China reported a tightening of border security and the establishment of restricted zones
along the frontier.
The first official publicity given to Sino-Soviet border issues occurred in an editorial in the Chinese
People's Daily of 8 March 1963, in which the Chinese charged that "unequal treaties," including the Aigun and
Peking treaties, had been forced on China. The Chinese also announced that at some unspecified future date
China might wish to recognize, repudiate, revise, or renegotiate these earlier agreements. Soviet rejoinders
claimed that the Chinese had been systematically violating the USSR border, citing some 5,000 violations in
1962 alone and specifically mentioning islands in the Amur and Ussuri. The USSR also accused the Chinese of
not accepting offers to hold consultations to define certain border sections and further warned China of the
dangers of inflaming nationalistic passions over territorial problems; Chinese retorts continued to stress
the "unequal" nature of the border agreements.
Although, the public diatribe continued throughout most of 1965, during that year the USSR and China agreed
privately that border talks would be initiated. The talks were begun quietly in February 1964 with the dis-
patch to Peking of a working-level Soviet delegation, but little specific information is available about the
discussions. Diplomatic sources indicate that the talks came to naught. They were broken off in August 1964,
ostensibly over the failure to agree as to the ownership of Hei-hsia-tzu. The Chinese case for ownership of
the island area appears to coincide with the intent of the treaties and with geographic logic. Strong Soviet
interests are involved, however, because of a Soviet installation on part of the island area and, more im-
portantly, because hostile control of Hei-hsia-tzu would have potentially serious military and security im-
plications.
* The difference between the alignment of the boundary according to the Treaty of Kiakhta and the alignment
according to the Tsitsihar Agreement is best shown on Sheet NM 50-8 of the Army Map Service Series L542,
scale 1:250,000. On this map the first alignment is indicated as that of the Abagutuy Treaty of 12 October
1727, which was confirmed by the Treaty of Kiakhta on 21 October 1727.
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The USSR has viewed the border talks as a means of solving a comparatively minor problem and as being
necessary only because certain ambiguous points of boundary definition needed clarification. In the Soviet
view, presumably, the end result would involve no significant territorial exchange but would prevent,
through modern surveys and the placing of new boundary markers, future misunderstandings concerning the
boundary alignment. In contrast, the Chinese view the talks and the border issue primarily in the larger
context of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The publicity given to Russian imperialism in the frontier region has
proven politically useful to the Chinese as an instrument to further their objectives in the continuing
polemical dispute. China hardly expects to regain through negotiation the extensive territories of the
Manchu Empire that were "lost" through treaty, nor have the Chinese yet made a serious claim to them, but
the Chinese apparently believe that publicizing the border issue is in their political interest.
There has been no evidence of a major military buildup along either side of the frontier, but border
security measures have been tightened since 1963 and a higher state of military readiness is believed to
prevail now. The USSR has maintained sizable military forces and installations, both ground and air, along
the frontier ever since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Several divisions are currently deployed in
the Vladivostok-Ussuriysk area, another division to the north near Belogorsk, and three divisions or so in
the vicinity of Borzya. The headquarters for the Transbaykal and Far East Military Districts are located
at Chita and Khabarovsk, respectively. Actual control of the border is handled by border security units,
which operate under the aegis of the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Recently the border guard units
have been strengthened by the addition of helicopters and tank units.
Large Chinese military forces are located in the Mukden Military Region, which includes most of Manchuria.
Three Chinese armies have their headquarters in the triangle formed by Gh'ang-chun, Harbin, and Mu-tan-chiang.
Other armies are located in southern Manchuria. During 1962-63, the Chinese greatly expanded the number of
border defense stations manned by Public Security troops that are part of the border security branch of the
Ministry of Public Security. The increased strength of the border security forces of both countries probably
is evidence not only of heightened concern but also of increased efforts to secure information about each
other's intentions.
Prospects
The initiative for reaching a border settlement appears to rest with the Chinese, who, in spite of their
stated desire to reach an agreement, continue to talk about unequal treaties and the loss of vast territories.
In similar situations -- for example, negotiations over the Burma - China border and the Pakistan - China
border, in which political gains could be foreseen -- the Chinese adopted a "reasonable" attitude, and bound-
ary settlements were reached quickly. In Manchuria, however, the territorial issue has provided valuable
polemical ammunition and has enabled the Chinese, both publicly and privately, to embarrass the USSR. The
USSR probably will try to confine any future border talks to clarifying minor discrepancies in boundary align-
ment and to countering Chinese statements by publicizing the unreasonableness of the Chinese, in the Soviet
view, and their apparent unwillingness to discuss the issues seriously. Given the current state of Sino-
Soviet relations, a continuation of the disagreement over the border appears to be likely.
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18 April 1966
approved release of CIA/RR GM 6-3M 196,
The information passed on to
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11').i,'OREIGN Ditstsad
CHINA'S BORDER WITH THE USSR
MANCHURIA
The eastern 2,:500-mile sector of the 1r,150-mi.e China - USSR boundary*
separates the Soviet ?ar East and a portion of eastern Siberia from that
port of China traditionally known as Manchuria.** Although much of this
eng boundary passes through sparsely populated hills and desolate swamps,
the frontier region has considerable economic and strategic importance:
;he Trans-Siberian Railroad parallels the border and serves as the vital
It-feline for the isolated economic areas and military installations of
the Soviet Far East; roil connections between the Trans-Siberian and the
Chinese rail net in Manchuria provide an important link for trade in
Chinese goods; and sizable, though largely undeveloped, agricultural,
mineral, forest, and water resources exist in the frontier region.
The Manchuria - USSR boundary, except for the extreme western segment
and the segment south of Lake Kbanka, near Vladivostok, follows the
courses of the Amur and Ussuri Jivers and certain of their tributaries.
The border cuts across terrain characterized by relatively low and
generally forested hills that are interspersed wi'h numerous marsh-lined
river valleys and noorly drained plains. Very large and generally
marshy plains occur on the Soviet side along the middle Amur and in
cnina in the great triangular lowlsnd formed by the lower Sungari and
Rivers joining the Amur.
Chinese and Soviet maps differ slightly in their portrayal of certain
border sections, but until recently the Manchuria - USSR border commonly
sss regarded as stable, settled. and unlikely to le a contentious issue
between the two great powers. The deepening of tle ideological dispute
e The western sector of the China - USSR border is discussed in CIA/RR
C-M 0,-1, China's Border with the USSR: Sinkiang, February l961.,
!TREIGN DISSEM.
Administratively, Mancharia is divided into or eastern portion
eomnrised of three provinces (Hejlungkiang, Kirin. and Liaoning), collectively
-tTed "The Northeast" by the Chinese Communists, and a western portion
that is part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Renion.
01) lellETGN DISSEN
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China and the USSR, however, led in. 1967.) to n bublic airing of
border issues anr. grievances, includina the Chinese charge that "unequal
treaties" were the basis for the present delineation of the boundary.
Porder talks were initiated earlv in 1964 but were broken off after several
wyriths without ?settling the issue.
.aistorical Backaround
.)riginaly, the vast lour-Ussuri forest-and-swamp country was abarsely
populated by Tungusc peoples whose livelihN)d depended on the products of
forest and. river. Early in the 1T1;n century these scattered Amur-Ussuri
unde2.r the londershin of n. chieftain named rurhachi, were united
.qith more numerous groups of sim.,T.lar race and cultre who inhabited
ntra),? and so.ot,heaste.rn, Manchuria. Co13.ec-",iively termed. the Manchus,
these Tmlgusic tribes in alliance with other group overthrew the Ming
:17.y..Jiasty and established_ the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynsty in 16)-
The
rise of the Nhnchus coincide& with TiusAar expansion eastward
the vast Siberian, territories, :By 164;:the RBsians had entered
on d. :,,x...-rdored the Amur Valley, and so