THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Northern Sea Route
Secret
cxcwo[o rno GRO m.nc oowncxn
0 oECUSSivicnnon
June 1967
CIA/BI GM 67-4
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 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100040001-1
THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
The 1967 navigation season on the Northern Sea Route
(NSR) has been heralded by a Soviet announcement
that transit of the route by commercial vessels of for-
eign countries will be permitted this year for the first
time. Foreign vessels have previously been permitted
along only the western part of the route. Although the
prospects for greatly expanded use of the route for
through traffic this season appear to be dim, potential
foreign users are not entirely lacking. The principal sig-
nificance of the Soviet proposal may, however, be politi-
cal. Since commercial vessels transiting the NSR must
depend on the extensive Soviet icebreaking and weather
forecasting services, foreign use of the route could serve
to reinforce Soviet claims to sovereignty over the Arctic
seas north of the USSR. Even if use by foreign vessels
is limited, the announced opening of the route makes
good propaganda for the USSR since it can be inter-
preted in Japan and Europe as a Soviet willingness to
extend areas of mutual cooperation. Also, on the 50th
anniversary of Soviet rule it dramatically underscores
Communist scientific-economic achievements in the
polar regions.
Historical Background
graphic Institute. At the same time GUSMP also sought
to stimulate northern economic development by conduct-
ing geological explorations for minerals and operating
numerous mining, fishing, and agricultural enterprises.
GUSMP's empire expanded until 1938, when it extended
over more than a quarter of the USSR and controlled a
labor force of approximately 35,000 persons.
In following years, the Soviet Government gradually
dissolved the once omnipotent GUSMP by shifting its
many functions to appropriate ministries. Although
some of these changes have coincided with "bad" years
on the sea route, they more likely reflect an attitude
that the route had developed into a normal shipping
operation and hence should be managed in a routine
way. The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet is now re-
sponsible for overall operations on the NSR; its Ice-
breaker and Arctic Fleet Administration in Murmansk
has direct control of navigation on the route. Shipping
on the northern rivers is controlled by the Ministry of
the River Fleet. Weather and ice forecasting, as well
as Arctic scientific research, is the primary responsibility
of the Main Administration of the Hydrometeorological
Service. The Polar Department of the Ministry of Civil
Aviation is responsible for all nonmilitary air operations
in the Arctic.
The development of what is now the NSR dates back
to the quest for a Northeast Passage to the Orient in the
middle of the 16th century. Until the 1917 revolution
the only portions of the route that were used regularly
for navigation were largely in the hands of foreigners,
often acting on the basis of concessions granted by the
czarist government. The newly formed Soviet Govern-
ment was interested in developing an efficient transpor-
tation system along the northern Siberian coast for both
economic and strategic reasons. It was felt that the
resources of an enormous area of hitherto unexploitable
territory could be tapped if the river mouths along the
Siberian shore were made regularly accessible to mari-
time shipping. Furthermore, such a route would enable
Soviet ships to pass between European and Asiatic USSR
without crossing foreign, potentially hostile waters and
indeed almost without losing sight of the Soviet coast.
In 1920 a special committee for the NSR (Komsevero-
put') was created for the purpose of organizing and
supervising trading ventures through the Kara Sea to the
estuaries of the Ob' and Yeniscy rivers. These experi-
ments in commercial exploitation of the route, known as
the Kara Expeditions, were successful enough to en-
courage more extensive investment in the Arctic. As
part of the massive administrative reorganization that
occurred during the First Five Year Plan a new gov-
ernment department-the Chief Administration of the
Northern Sea Route (Clavsevmorput'-GUSMP) -was
created in 1932 to develop, equip, and maintain an
Arctic sealane. Carrying out its mission in the 1930's,
GUSMP constructed port facilities at 11 Arctic settle-
ments, formed an icebreaker fleet, established extensive
weather- and ice-forecasting facilities, and developed
staging, dispatching, and controlling procedures for
shipping. To increase its knowledge of the Arctic en-
vironment and to train Arctic specialists, GUSMP set
up its own research and training organizations, including
the Arctic Scientific Research Institute and the Hydro-
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Basic Intelligence and coordinated with
the Offices of Current Intelligence, National Estimates, and
Research and Reports.
Description of Route and Navigation Season
The NSR extends some 3,400 nautical miles* from the
Barents Sea in the west to the Bering Sea in the cast,
passing through a series of seas and straits but mostly
lying close to the barren Arctic mainland or the offshore
islands (see main map), Ships generally move from the
Barents Sea to the Kara Sea through the Kara Strait
(Proliv Karskiye Vorota), which is 18 miles wide. At
tinges the 1.5-mile-wide Yugorskiy Strait (Proliv Yugorskiy
Shar) to the south can also be used, and in some years
ships can go around the northern end of Novaya Zemlya.
Passage from the Kara Sea to the Laptev Sea is made
through the Vil'kitskiy Strait (Proliv Borisa Vil'kitskogo),
where four small islands restrict the width to 22 miles.
Between the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea, pas-
sage is through either the Laptev Strait (Proliv Dmitriya
Lapteva), 27 miles wide, near the mainland or the Sanni-
kov Strait (Proliv Sannikova), 31 miles wide, to the north.
From the East Siberian Sea, passage to the Chukchi Sea
is made via Long Strait (Proliv Longa)-at 58 miles,
the widest strait on the route-and thence through the
Bering Strait.
The eastern and western segments of the NSR are
generally navigable to merchant ships for about 4 months
annually, from early July through late October. Ice
conditions along the central portion of the route, how-
ever, limit the period during which transit of the NSR
is feasible to a maximum of 8 to 10 weeks, usually com-
mencing in August. Throughout the season, traffic is
heaviest at the eastern and western ends of the route;
relatively few Soviet cargo ships transit the entire route.
The warming influence of the Gulf Stream usually opens
the western end of the route first. Operations generally
begin in mid-June, with an icebreaker cutting a path
through the Kara Sea to the estuary of the Yenisey
River. Merchant ships follow in convoys of 2 to 10
vessels calling at the ports of Nar'yan-Mar, Novyy Port,
Dikson, Dudinka, and Igarka. Some go as far as Nord-
vik and Tiksi.
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The direct economic costs of all Arctic operations have
been high-three to four times more than costs of op-
erations in the developed areas to the south. To re-
tain personnel, wages must include special benefits and
area allowances and are about 1.5 to 2.5 times higher
than in developed areas. Machines and equipment are
also more expensive because they wear faster, even
though many are specially designed for operation at low
temperatures.
The Soviet decision to permit transit of the NSR by
foreign cargo vessels and simultaneously to initiate a
new Soviet cargo liner service between Europe and
Japan was undoubtedly motivated in part by the desire
to obtain some revenue from the enormous Soviet in-
vestment in polar operations. Prospects for any greatly
expanded foreign use of the NSR, however, appear to
be limited.
Although the distance between western Europe and
Far Eastern ports north of Hong Kong is shorter via the
NSR than via the Suez Canal, the route's trade potential
is greatly reduced by its short season and the physical dif-
ficulties of navigation in the Arctic. An example is the
trip between London and Yokohama, which is 3,500 miles
shorter via the NSR than via the Suez Canal (see map
and graph at right). The Soviets claim this distance ad-
vantage would effect a saving of 13 days' travel time be-
tween the two ports, but Norwegian shipowners feel that
the lower speeds through the ice would shorten the
run by only 8 days. Any savings would be substantially
offset by the high insurance rates that prevail for Arctic
navigation and by the icebreaker-aerial reconnaissance
service and pilotage fees that the Soviets intend to
charge. A preliminary figure quoted to the Japanese by
the Soviets for icebreaker services is $13,000 for a 7,000-
ton general cargo vessel. Such a vessel would pay a fee
of about $7,000 to transit the Suez Canal. Other fac-
tors partly offsetting the distance advantage of the
route include the short navigation season, the necessity
of following a long, dangerous shipping lane, the finan-
cial hazard of possible ice entrapment, and the insuffi-
cient service and repair facilities available. Vessels
using the NSR may have to carry additional reserve
stores, and some may require structural modifications
to withstand ice conditions. Furthermore, the NSR pro-
vides little or no opportunity for intermediate trade
stops, a major source of income for some shipowners.
Even with these drawbacks the new route might elicit
some interest in northern Europe, where distance savings
may be great enough to make the trip profitable. Ship-
ping between a port in northern Norway-Kirkenes for
example-and Japan would realize up to a 45 percent
saving in distance by using the NSR. For the Japanese,
whose economy depends so heavily on the import of
raw materials, the NSR may offer several trade oppor-
tunities. Items such as iron ore from northern Norway,
apatite from the USSR's Kola Peninsula, and coal from
Poland might be suitable bulk cargo for the route. The
NSR is unlikely to attract shipowners from southern Eu-
rope, because the distance to the Orient is about the
same as through the Suez Canal. Shipowners handling
the heavy volume of trade between the east coast of the
United States and Japan are also unlikely to be interested
in the minute reduction in distance afforded by using
the NSR rather than the Panama Canal.
In addition to providing a seasonal capability for
transferring naval vessels, the NSR carries cargo to and
from the Soviet Arctic. Freight turnover for the route
grew from 136,000 tons in 1933 to over 3,000,000 tons in
1966. The NSR has been instrumental in exploiting
timber reserves along the Yenisey and Lena rivers, nickel
deposits at Noril'sk, and tin deposits near Pevek. The
timber industry, which accounts for the major share of
Arctic exports, is centered at the Yenisey port of Igarka,
where Soviet as well as British and Scandinavian
timber ships call annually. A recent development in
the timber trade has been the export of timber from
the Lena River area to Japan in Soviet ships. Even
though tonnage on the route continues to increase,
domestic use alone probably cannot pay for the enormous
investment in supporting services.
The decreasing importance of the NSR relative to
other types of domestic transportation also may have in-
fluenced the decision to open the route to transit by
foreign vessels. The southward orientation of Siberian
trade and development has been accelerating during the
last decade or so. Settlements are being supplied and
resources are being exploited via a transport network
extending from the south into the subarctic. Major
navigable rivers and new rail lines and pipelines now
link the subarctic and Arctic with the core of economic
development along the Trans-Siberian railroad, which
operates the year round and handles in one week twice
the annual freight turnover on the NSR. As subarctic
complexes such as those centered on Bratsk, Mirnyy, and
Yakutsk continue to develop, they will expand the south-
ward-oriented trade area and afford more competition
to the NSR, particularly in the Laptev Sea and Yenisey
Gulf areas.
COMPARATIVE DISTANCES FROM EUROPEAN
TO FAR EASTERN PORTS
LONDON TO
YOKOHAMA
LONDON TO
HONG KONG
KIRKENES TO
YOKOHAMA
GENOA TO
YOKOHAMA
NEW YORK TO
YOKOHAMA
1 1 i
i i
10,100 nm (via Panama Canal)
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36
DAYS SAILING TIME (based on average speed of i5 knots)
Via Suez Canal =Via Northern Sea Route
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Arctic Sovereignty Problems
Implicit in the announcement of permission for foreign
use of the entire NSR is an assertion of Soviet authority
in the waters traversed. Like the czarist government
before it, the Soviet Government has advanced several
claims to sovereignty in the Arctic. In a 1926 decree
the USSR claimed all land and immovable ice forma-
tions within the triangular area bounded by the Soviet
Arctic coast on the south and the meridians 32?04'34"E
and 168?49'30"W. Excluded from the sector were the
easternmost islands of the Svalbard Archipelago in Eu-
rope and Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait,
which belong to Norway and the United States, respec-
tively. In 1928 and 1950, Soviet writers interpreted the
sector as extending to the open polar seas, including
drift ice. Although the Soviet Government has not ex-
cluded foreign vessels from this broad sector and has
not actively pushed the concept in recent years, it has
consistently demonstrated a strong proprietary interest in
the area. Moreover, it continues to keep the sector con-
cept alive by delimiting the sector on all Soviet maps
with a symbol defined as "Polar Domain [Vladeniye]
of the USSR."
Soviet territorial waters per se were defined in 1927
as a 12-mile zone bordering the entire Soviet coast. In
recent years the USSR has stated emphatically that the
NSR passes through Soviet "territorial" and "internal"
waters. Specifically mentioned are the straits leading
to the Kara Sea, which are described as "overlapped" by
Soviet territorial waters (see Enlargements A, B, and C;.
The Laptev and Sannikov straits, which unite the Laptev
and East Siberian seas, are said to belong "historically"
to the Soviet Union.
Although these claims have not been recognized offi-
cially by other nations, neither have they been chal-
lenged aggressively, because the route has not been vital
to world trade and because, in practice, transit of the
NSR is dependent on Soviet icebreaker and weather fore-
casting facilities. The United States recognizes terri-
torial waters to a 3-mile limit and officially rejects the
12-mile zone claimed by the USSR. In practice, how-
ever, it observes the Soviet 12-mile zone. The United
States has not recognized the Soviet claim to the Laptev
and Sannikov straits and has pointed out that the Soviet
Government has no right to interfere with passage
through the straits, because the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone guaran-
tees foreign vessels the right of innocent passage through
straits used for international navigation between two
parts of the high seas. The right of innocent passage
through straits and territorial waters is of critical im-
portance along the NSR, since ice can often force a
ship to navigate within 12 and even 3 nautical miles of
the shore.
In recent years the activities of US icebreakers, air-
craft, submarines, and drift stations in the Soviet polar
sector have put Soviet attitudes and intentions regarding
sovereignty in the polar sector to a practical test. The
Soviets have evinced no desire to push their broad sector
claim, but they seem resolute in maintaining their au-
thority over coastal waters. When US activity has
deeply penetrated the sector, the USSR has reacted
strongly. A serious incident occurred in July 1960 when
a Soviet fighter plane shot down a USAF RB-47 recon-
naissance plane over the Barents Sea. The USSR al-
leged that the plane had violated its airspace at a point
14 miles north of a cape on the northern side of the
Kola Peninsula, whereas the United States contended
that the plane did not come within 30 miles of Soviet
land or pass over sea areas ever claimed as territorial
waters of the USSR.
During the summers of 1963-65 US icebreakers con-
ducting oceanographic surveys of the Arctic seas
traveled through waters claimed by the USSR but did
not make a complete transit of the route. The Soviets
maintained close surveillance of the ships, and although
they did not forcibly repel the vessels, they did strongly
reaffirm Soviet authority in these waters through diplo-
matic notes. In 1963 the USCGC Northwind entered
the area from the east and traveled uncontested to the
Laptev Sea via the Sannikov Strait. During the follow-
ing summer the USS Burton Island, with a prior agree-
ment to receive ice data from the Soviet Ilydrometeoro-
logical Service, traveled westward along the NSR as far
as 71?23N 162?14'E. An exchange of diplomatic notes
during the voyage, however, resulted in a decision by
the United States not to transit the entire route at that
time. In 1965, after formally rejecting the Soviet claims
to Arctic straits made in these notes, the United States
again sent the Northwind into the region, this time from
the west with the intention of transiting the NSR. After
conducting extensive oceanographic surveys in the Kara
Sea and sailing to within 30 miles of the Vil'kitskiy Strait
the vessel was damaged by ice and forced to return.
Plans for the North ind to return to these waters in
1966 via the Sannikov Strait were canceled because of
the tense situation in Vietnam.
Prospects
The Soviet invitation to world commerce to use the
NSR reflects a distinct modification of earlier attitudes
and policies. For example, by opening the entire route
to foreign shipping the Soviets appear to have relaxed
their security over a sensitive area. The deploy-
ment of operational ICBM sites in the interior of the
country, however, has decreased the relative importance
of manned aircraft bases in the Arctic and the strategic
value of the Arctic area as a whole. Military activity
along the NSR is most sensitive in the western half,
where foreign ships were already permitted, although
under close Soviet control. The presence of foreign
ships cast of the Yenisey estuary thus constitutes only
a minor threat to Soviet security-the possibility of ob-
serving closed ports and monitoring communication
facilities.
There is no doubt that the Soviets expect to earn addi-
tional foreign exchange by the service fees charged to
foreign vessels and by their own new cargo service. At
the same time they will highlight their status as a grow-
ing maritime power. The possibility is good that some
Scandinavian or Japanese shippers will try the rcute
this season to see if any material savings can be realized.
Until this practical experience is gained, it is impossible
to estimate the real potential of the NSR as an inter-
national shipping lane. Similarly, the exact nature of
the transit agreement will have to be studied and the
extent of Soviet control over foreign shipping must be
observed in practice before the sovereignty implications
can be evaluated definitively.
Convoy assembling at Provideniya
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G THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
r~\
Stro~t\
Icebreaker MOSKVA escorting a merchant ship
Navigation Services and Scientific Research
To operate a reliable shipping route in the extremely
harsh Arctic environment the Soviets have made a huge
capital investment in supporting services. Most sig-
nificant has been the establishment of a powerful and
efficient fleet of icebreakers and icebreaker transports.
Twelve to fifteen icebreakers, including the 39,200-
horsepower nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin (which
was out of commission in 1966), are generally used on
the route to open sealanes and to convoy ships. This
fleet can cope with pack ice floes that during the sum-
mer may remain 10 or more feet thick. The Soviets
also plan to build two additional 30,000-horsepower
nuclear-powered icebreakers and three new conventional
icebreakers by 1971. Since 1962 six Amguema-class ice-
breaker transports have been put into operation in the
polar seas. These new vessels, as well as five older Lena-_
class vessels, can travel the NSR without continuous ice-
breaker support. In light ice they can act as icebreakers.
for other ships.
A large network of polar stations and weather stations
has been organized to provide essential current report-
ing and long-range forecasts of weather and ice condi-
tions, as well as to perform basic environmental research.
At present over 100 polar stations, including 5 observa-
tories, make meteorological, hydrological, and in some
cases geophysical observations on a regular basis. The
stations are located not only along the mainland coast
but also in the islands, as far north at 81?44'N.
Surveillance of ice conditions is accomplished both by
aircraft based at some 50 airfields and by helicopters
that operate directly off the decks of icebreakers. Air-
craft observers advise icebreakers and merchant ships
of local ice conditions and direct them to zones of mini-
mum ice concentration and leads through the ice. Re-
gional ice reports and charts are compiled at land bases
and transmitted by voice and photofacsimile to vessels
on the route. The ice-weather forecasting service, as
well as the icebreaker fleet, is administered from the,
three major ports-Dikson for the western sector, Tiksi
for the central sector, and Pevek for the eastern sector.
A hydrographic service has also been actively charting
shallow waters and providing lights and buoyage.
The USSR is conducting an ambitious program of
basic scientific research on the entire Arctic environ-
ment, largely under the direction of the Arctic and.
Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (originally the
Arctic Scientific Research Institute). This program in-
cludes maintenance of the much publicized drift ice
stations and high-latitude airborne expeditions in the
Polar Basin.. At the drift stations, teams of scientists
and workers carry out meteorological, oceanographic,
and geophysical investigations throughout the year.
Only one drift station, North Pole 15, is presently in
operation, but North Pole 16 is scheduled to be set up
in the autumn of 1967. The high-latitude airborne ex-
peditions annually resupply and reman the drift sta-
tions and also land parties to collect scientific data from
unmanned stations throughout the basin. Airborne and
icebreaker groups also set out Drifting Automatic Radio
Meteorological Stations (DARMS's) and Drifting Auto-
matic Radio Beacons (DARB's) on the icepack. During
recent winters long traverses have been made, on foot
and by vehicle, over the pack ice off the coast of central
and eastern Siberia to study both ice dynamics and
hydrological conditions. These programs of basic en-
vironmental research have been of practical value in
improving navigation on the NSR and in constructing
military facilities in the Arctic. Achievements of the
programs, as well as the operational experience gained
in the polar environment, have earned the Soviet scien-
tists world respect in various fields and have facilitated
their effective operations in the Antarctic.
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TIKSI ? Major port
Nordrik ? Minor port
? Polar station
--- Limit of Soviet
sector claim
NAVIGABILITY
(based on average ice conditions)
Navigable all year
Unnavigable all year
TERRITORIAL WATERS IN STRAITS ALON
At the eastern end of the route, where ice conditions
are generally more difficult, convoys assemble and start
out from Provideniya in late June. Pevek is the desti-
nation for most of these ships, although some traffic
reaches Ambarchik and points as far west as Tiksi. At
the port of Tiksi ocean cargo from the west and river
cargo from the south is transferred to lighters and
coastal vessels serving a number of smaller ports nearby.
At small ports at the mouths of navigable rivers, also,
cargo is transferred to river ships and barges. The
entire NSR is officially declared open sometime during
the first half of August when the major shipping lanes
have been cleared by either icebreakers or the reced-
ing of the pack ice. Navigation conditions usually are
optimum for 8 to 10 weeks, during which 100 to 150
ships are underway along the route. Sailing time from
Murmansk to Provideniya during this period ranges from
15 to 25 days, depending on ice conditions. Near the
end of the navigation season each year a convoy of
Soviet naval vessels transfers units eastward to the
Pacific -fleet. The naval convoy has occasionally been
hung up by the ice and forced to remain in the Arctic
over the winter.
The length of the navigation season, as well as the
movement of traffic on the route, is controlled by the
extent and thickness of sea ice, and this varies from year
to year. Within a navigation season, weather may de-
teriorate and bottlenecks may develop unexpectedly, usu-
ally in the narrow straits. Even in more open areas a
shift in wind and sea currents can quickly move large
concentrations of sea ice into shipping lanes and com-
pletely curtail navigation. Persistent fogs that are com-
mon during the summer, as well as scattered shows, fur-
ther hamper navigation.
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of
Fhe United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,
IISC, Seca. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
.n any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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 seE2AOQj
UNCLASSIFIED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
Remarks :
"This is a very interesting, useful and well
done item of intelligence. How many other
things of this sort do you have tucked away and
what topics do they cover?"
(Signed) T
App oved 1-1
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENT A " (40)
FORM NO. Use previous editions N.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587282
11
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(DATE
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1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.