(Sanitized) SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R006100150024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 8, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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OGC Has Reviewed
OGC 74-1153
8 July 1974
STAT
SUBJECT peech to the National
Classification Management Society
We have a few suggestions concerning the draft of the address
which has been prepared forl to present to the National
Classification Management Society on
a. I think it might be well to delete the reference to
protecting sources for 75 years,. which appears on the reverse
of page 2. Under the Executive Order, documents must be de-
classified in 30 years absent a determination by the Director
to the contrary. While the Director of course may refuse to
declassify some documents long after they have reached 30
years of age, the reference to a uniform 75-year period, which
does not contemplate declassifi cation decisions by the Director,
likely would cause questions concerning the extent of our
compliance with the Order.
b. I wonder if it is desirable to mention the name
"Jack Anderson" on page 3. It might invoke some reaction
by him and in any event gratuitously gives him publicity.
c. Should not the reference to Allen Dulles' The
Craft of Intelligence on page 3 include some praise for that
book?
d. I have some difficulty with the meaning and purpose
of the last sentence beginning on page 3. Does it mean that
the public has difficulty in obtaining authentic material on
post-World War II methodology because CIA protects that
information so thoroughly? This sentence seems to suggest
that this heavy protection unduly denies such material to the
public.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for
Management and Services
STAT
25
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e. The paraphrasing of McBundy's testimony
concerning covert activities abroad at the top of page 4,
I believe, somewhat mis-states the McBundy comments.
His testimony was that certain types of covert activities
abroad are out of tune with national sentiment and should
not exist, and other types should be governed by the
Congress through its share of the war power.
f. With reference to the statement on the reverse
of page 4 that the basic problem is whether a court could
overrule the Director's decision to protect sources and
methods perhaps is somewhat misleading. The major issue
concerning judicial review in the area of sources and
methods is whether the court may in effect substitute its
decision for that of the Director or is limited to determining
that the Director's decision in that area is or is not an
arbitrary and capricious decision. Also, the language
appears to state that a Director's decision that information
must remain classified is one which he takes under his
statutory responsibility. The fact is he makes his classi-
fication decisions under the authority of the Executive Order.
g. The language beginning "in part because the
volume", and continuing through the succeeding paragraph
on page 6, seems likely to invite declassification requests.
Perhaps all of those lines should be omitted.
h. Also on page 6, I would delete the reference to
the Inspector General report of the Bay of Pigs, not only
because that matter is not yet settled, but also because it
might invoke requests for Bay of Pigs documents or for
Inspector General documents, or indeed both.
i. I wonder if it is desirable to refer to the former
employee who testified against Mr. Colby's confirmation,
at the bottom of the reverse of page 6.
j. Is it desirable to indicate, on the reverse of page 7,
that the reason we are speeding up our action on mandatory
review requests is prospective Congressional action?
STAT
Acting Deputy General Counsel
STAT cc: I I C/ISAS
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 STAT
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 TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
8 July 19 74
TO: Associate Deputy Director for
Management and Services
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7D-18 Hdqs.
FROM: Acting Deputy General Counsel
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7D-01 Hdqs.
FORM
241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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SENDEF CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Assistant to the Directc
1F 94 H
r
/
a
qs
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
~/cd e29f~1~1r- '-
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
_ DATE,
Associate Deputy Director
Management and
for
z ~~~
UNCLASSIFIED CONFI ENTIAL
SECRET
Fli
e p R,1 A-
-
App 1-1-67
J
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DD/MFRS 74-2432
AT
MEMORANDUM FOR: .8sistant to the Director
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT Speech to the National Classification
Management Society
1. Attached herewith is a draft speech, "An Intelligence
Agency in an Open Society," which roposes STAT
to Rive to the National Classifica io anagemen ociety on
2. The Office of Security has interposed no objection
from a strict security standpoint, but does suggest referral
to OGC and OLC for information and review. The Management
and Services Directorate would appreciate your comments or
suggestions as soon as possible, most certainly by COB
9 July 1974.
John F. Blake
Asso + ate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
STAT
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DD/M&S 74-2432
Registry
I
4
AT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : Speech to the National Classification
Management Society
1. Attached herewith is a draft speech, "An Intelligence
Agency in an Open Society," whicif-
proposes STA
to give to the National a agement Society on
2. The Office of Security has interposed no objection
from a strict security standpoint, but does suggest referral
to OGC and OLC for information and review. The Management
and Services Directorate would appreciate your comments or
suggestions as soon as possible, most certainly by COB
9 July 3.974.
John F. Blake
Associate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
STAT EO-DD/M&S :0: kmg (28 Jun 74)
Orig - Asst to the DCI w/att
1 - GC w/att
1 - LC w/att
'- DD/M$S Subject w/att + DD/M&S 74-2410
1 - DD/M&S Chrono
1 - JFB Chrono
Distribution:
Att: Draft speech as stated
DD/M&S 74-2410: Memo dtd 27 Jun 74 to ADD/ fr D/Sec, subj:
Proposed Presentation byl Before the National
Classification ManageureA
STA
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 Approved 1 9 n$
1001 ~O9m4~~T y
2 7 JUN 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director
for Management $ Services
SUBJECT Proposed Presentation by
STAT
Management Society
Before
the National Classification
1. The attached paper entitled "An Intelligence
Agency in an Open Society" has been reviewed by representa-
tives of this Office and there is no security objection to
the presentation in its present form.
2. In view of the comments on pending legislation
and proposed methods of judicial review, it is suggested
STAT thati show those passages to the Offices of
the General Counsel and the Legislative Counsel for their
information and review.
STAT
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
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TAB
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 STAT
rought in the
a ac e or any comments
you might have.
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NATIONAL CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT SOCIETY
ST
AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
FOR THOSE OF YOU WHOSE MEMORIES INCLUDE SUCH FILM
STARS AS GAIL PATRICK, GAIL RUSSELL AND GAIL STORM AND WHO
JIHI SAW THE NAMEI IAND CAME TO HEAR ONE OF CIA's
SEXY FEMALE SPIES SPEAK TO YOU ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY
PRACTICES AT CIA, I MUST APOLOGIZE FOR DISAPPOINTING YOU.
BUT I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT YES, GAIL IS A BOY'S NAME SPELLED
THE WAY IT IS. THE DIRECTOR, MR. COLBY, HAS ASKED ME TO
EXTEND TO YOU HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE INVITATION TO MEET
WITH YOU AND TO DESCRIBE SOME OF OUR PROBLEMS. I MIGHT
BEGIN BY NOTING THAT OUR AGENCY HAS INTEGRATED THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF CLASSIFICATION PRACTICES INTO THE RECORDS MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM. OTHER AGENCIES HAVE SELECTED DIFFERENT OPTIONSS.
SOME HAVE INCLUDED IT IN PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS, OTHERS
IN SECURITY PROGRAMS. TO DATE, OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT IT
OPERATES QUITE EFFECTIVELY IN THE RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
BUT COULD OPERATE EQUALLY EFFECTIVELY IN ANY OF THE OTHER
PROGRAMS.
THE APPLICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AND THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSTULATES
A REAL CONTRADICTION IN DEFINITIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES. THE
CIA REFLECTS THE SOCIETY OF WHICH IT IS A PART; AND TO THAT
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EXTENT IT IS THE MOST OPEN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WORLD.
BUT THERE REMAINS THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN AN OPEN
SOCIETY WHICH WANTS ALL OFFICIAL INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE
TO MEMBERS OF THAT SOCIETY AND THE AIMS OF AN INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN THE COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION OF
INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM SOURCES WHICH CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED.
FOR THIS REASON, OUR APPLICATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER TAKES
PLACE IN A DICHOTOMY AND INVOLVES A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
TRAUMA AS A RESULT OF OUR PREVIOUS HISTORY. THE DIRECTOR IS
CHARGED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WITH THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. THIS LEGAL REQUIREMENT
IS CONSCIOUSLY AND UNCONSCIOUSLY INSTILLED IN EACH EMPLOYEE
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EVERY DAY OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
FOR THOSE OF US WHO HAVE BEEN WITH THE AGENCY FOR SOME TIME,
PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS HAS THUS BECOME INSTINCTIVE.
WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION, BECAUSE A MISTAKE
THE OTHER WAY COULD HAVE DIRE EFFECTS. PERHAPS THE MOST RECOGNIZABLE
EFFECT THAT COULD IMMEDIATELY RESULT IS THE LOSS OF A SOURCE;
SOMEONE WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION. BUT THIS
LOSS COULD GO EVEN FURTHER. RATHER THAN JUST THE INDIVIDUAL
DECIDING HE WOULD NO LONGER PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION, HE
COULD BE INCARCERATED OR EVEN LOSE HIS LIFE. BUT THE LOSS OF
THE PRIMARY SOURCE IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION;
HAVING LOST A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE THROUGH AN ERROR IN JUDGMENT
IN TERMS OF PROTECTING THAT SOURCE, WE THEN RUN THE RISK THAT
WE NO LONGER WILL BE ABLE TO ATTRACT ADDITIONAL SOURCES. IN
A SENSE, IN THE INTELLIGENCE WORLD, WE LOSE OUR CREDIBILITY;
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AND, HAVING LOST OUR CREDIBILITY, WE LOSE OUR CAPABILITY
TO ATTRACT. SO IT IS QUITE FAIR TO SAY THAT THE APPLICATION
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 GIVES US PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.
WE HAVE TO RE-THINK; WE NOW HAVE TO MAKE BETTER DECISIONS AS
WHAT ,
TO WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN SOURCE PROTECTION AND4ISN T. ALL
THIS IS SALUTARY AND I THINK NECESSARY AND PERHAPS OVERDUE.
THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH WE NOW ARE TRYING TO INSTILL IN
OUR EMPLOYEES IS THAT WE CAN BETTER PROTECT THOSE THINGS WHICH
NEED PROTECTION IF WE LIMIT OUR PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO THOSE
THINGS WHICH TRULY REQUIRE PROTECTION AND DO NOT APPLY THE SAME
MEASURES WILLY-NILLY ACROSS THE BOARD. OTHER INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES DO NOT OPERATE IN THE SAME ATMOSPHERE AS WE DO AND
HENCE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THIS GOVERNMENTS APPROACH
TO THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTERS. WE CAN ALREADY SENSE
AN EROSION OF CONFIDENCE ON THE PART OF SOME OF OUR FRIENDS.
NOW, SPECIFICALLY, AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON, A LITTLE HISTORY MIGHT
BE USEFUL TO SET THE STAGE FOR YOU. As YOU CAN APPRECIATE, THE
TRADITIONAL VIEW HAS SEEN OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES CLOAKED
IN EXTREME SECRECY TAKEN TO THE LIMITS OF NOT REVEALING NAMES
OF EMPLOYEES OR INFORMANTS FOR EVER AND EVER; INDEED, IF YOU
LIVED IN A PURE WORLD WHICH WAS DOMINATED ONLY BY THE INFLUENCES
AFFECTING INTELLIGENCE, THE IDEAL SITUATION WOULD BE THIS: A
COMPLETE AND FINAL REMOVAL OF INTELLIGENCE-RELATED MATTERS IN
TERMS OF INFORMANTS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES FROM ANY ASPECT
OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. BUT WE DON'T LIVE IN THAT KIND OF A WORLD.
WE DO, HOWEVER, CONCERN OURSELVES WITH PROTECTING THE SOURCES
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AFTER THEY HAVE STOPPED BEING SOURCES. WE THINK THAT 75
YEARS AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE SERVICES OF A SOURCE IS A
FAIRLY REASONABLE AND PROBABLY REALISTIC PERIOD OF TIME. ONE
OF THE QUESTIONS WE ARE ASKED IS, "WHY 75 YEARS?" THE ANSWER
IS THAT FREQUENTLY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FIRST GENERATION
INFORMANT COULD CARRY OVER TO A SECOND GENERATION; AND IF WE
DON'T PROTECT THAT FIRST GENERATION, WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO
ATTRACT THE SERVICES OF A SECOND GENERATION. OF COURSE, CLASSI-
FICATION AND SECURITY PROTECTION HAD NOT REALLY BEEN A MAJOR
PROBLEM TO THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL WORLD WAR II AND.I WOULD SAY
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THOUGH WE DID NEED TO PROTECT WAR PLANS,
OPERATIONAL PLANS AND SO FORTH, WE STILL HAD NOT DEVELOPED A
VERY COHERENT PHILOSOPHY OF CLASSIFICATION. THE SYSTEM THEN
WAS MODELED AFTER THE ENGLISH SYSTEM. THE MOST IMPORTANT
JUDGMENT EXERCISED SEEMED TO BE WHAT COLOR INK TO USE IN THE
STAMP PAD. CERTAINLY IN THE PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION TO CIA,
THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, THIS WAS TRUE. WE HAVE FOUND,
FOR EXAMPLE, IN REVIEWING OSS DOCUMENTS FOR DECLASSIFICATION,
THAT IN MANY CASES THE STAMP PUT ON THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT WAS
RECEIVED IN THE OSS MAIL ROOM CLASSIFIED THE DOCUMENT CONFIDENTIAL
WHEN IT PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN UNCLASSIFIED. THAT IS TO SAY, THE
RECEIPT ITSELF HAD A CLASSIFICATION BUILT RIGHT INTO IT. THIS
TYPE OF GENERIC OVERCLASSIFICATION IS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR
THE GENESIS OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON CLASSIFICATION AND A VALID
REASON FOR ATTEMPTING TO APPROVE ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS. I THINK
THAT THIS OVERCLASSIFICATION, THIS CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT THOUGHT,
PROBABLY HAS CONTRIBUTED IN ITS OWN WAY TO THE DEPLORABLE HABIT
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OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO DECIDE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS THAT
A PARTICULAR PIECE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NO LONGER MERITS
CLASSIFICATION, BECAUSE ITS RELEASE CAN PRODUCE A GIVEN EFFECT
THAT THEY WISH--SO IT APPEARS IN JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN OR IS
LEAKED SOME OTHER WAY. IT IS TRUE THAT OCCASIONALLY SUCH LEAKS
HAVE BEEN FOR PERSONAL GAIN, OR SIMPLY BECAUSE SOMEBODY WANTS
TO CAPITALIZE ON HIS OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AND BECOME THE
FIRST TO DECLASSIFY OR PUBLISH SOMETHING PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED.
IN THE PAST FIFTY YEARS THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASING AMOUNT
OF QUITE ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE TRADECRAFT AND METHODOLOGY
REVEALED IN FICTIONAL AND NON-FICTIONAL WORKS, USUALLY BY
AUTHORS WHO HAD HAD EXPERIENCE IN EITHER WARTIME OR PEACETIME
INTELLIGENCE WORK. THIS TREND WAS STARTED AFTER WORLD WAR I
WITH SOMERSET MAUGHAM'S DEL AND WAS BASED ON THE AUTHOR'S
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. IT DESCRIBES
THE FRUSTRATIONS AND FAILURES ENCOUNTERED IN SUCH WORK; IF
SOMETHING CAN GO WRONG, WHETHER FROM HUMAN WEAKNESS OR STROKE
OF FATE, IT USUALLY DOES. IN A MUCH DIFFERENT TONE, IAN FLEMING'S
JAMES BOND TENDS TO GLAMORIZE INTELLIGENCE WORK IN THE POST-
WORLD WAR II ERA, THOUGH HIS EXPLOITS DO CONTAIN A LEAVEN
OF TRADECRAFT IN REALISTIC DETAIL. JOHN LECARRE'S "THE SPY
WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD" IS A FINE EXAMPLE OF THE GRUBBY LIFE
OF AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT, PLAYED LIKE A PUPPET BY THOSE WHO HIRED
HIM. IN THE NON-FICTION FIELD I SHOULD MENTION ALLEN DULLES'
"THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE." THERE ARE ALSO GOOD BOOKS ON
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CODE-BREAKING, BUT IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY
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DIFFICULT TO GET MUCH AUTHENTIC MATERIAL ON POST-WORLD WAR
II METHODOLOGY, WITH ITS EXTENSIVE USE OF COMPUTERS, AS SUCH
INFORMATION REMAINS UNDER THE BEST PROTECTION WE CAN GIVE.
I HAVE COVERED THIS BACKGROUND MATERIAL, WHICH I'M SURE
IS FAMILIAR TO MOST OF YOU, IN ORDER TO LEAD UP TO THE QUESTION
OF WHAT WE IN THE CIA ARE TRYING TO PROTECT. IT INCLUDES:
(A) THE NAMES OF SOME OF OUR EMPLOYEES--THOSE WORKING OVERSEAS
(EVEN IF DISCLOSED TO HOST GOVERNMENTS) AND THOSE IN LINE FOR
SUCH ASSIGNMENTS IN THE FUTURE; (B) THE NAMES OF ALL OUR AGENTS--
FOR OBVIOUS REASONS; (C) THE CURRENT METHODS WE ARE USING TO
OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE--MAYBE YOU'VE READ ABOUT THEM IN JAMES BOND,
BUT PERHAPS THEY AREN'T IN ANYTHING YOU COULD HAVE READ; (D) ALL
INFORMATION DEALING WITH CODE-MAKING AND CODE-BREAKING; (E) THE
DETAILS OF THE PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION--
THE SOVIET'S WOULD LIKE THIS; AND (F) THE FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
PUBLICATIONS--BECAUSE THEY REVEAL WHAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE
DECISION MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT. THIS LIST IS BY NO MEANS
COMPLETE, BUT IT DOES INCLUDE THOSE OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE.
PERHAPS YOU HAVE NOT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ SOME
OF THE RECENT TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. MCGEORGE BUNDY, FORMERLY NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, TESTIFIED ON MAY 22, 1972, TO
THE SUBCOMMITTEE WHICH WAS INQUIRING INTO CLASSIFICATION PRAC-
TICES IN THE GOVERNMENT. MR. BUNDY IDENTIFIED WHAT HE CALLED
"REAL SECRETS" AND DIVIDED THESE INTO SIX CLASSES: (1) DEFENSE
INFORMATION, SUCH AS THE DETAILS OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING
AND THE DESIGN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS; (2) CURRENT DIPLOMATIC
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NEGOTIATIONS; (3) COVERT ACTIVITY ABROAD (INCIDENTALLY, HE
SUGGESTS THAT, SINCE SUCH ACTIVITY IS OUT OF TUNE WITH NATIONAL
SENTIMENT, IT EITHER SHOULD NOT EXIST OR SHOULD BE GOVERNED
BY THE CONGRESS THROUGH ITS SHARE OF THE WAR POWEFJ (4) THE
COVERT COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE--INCLUDING SECRET AGENTS,
INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS, AND SPACE VEHICLES,
THE REVELATION OF ANY OF WHICH ENABLES THE ENEMY TO TAKE COUNTER-
MEASURES; (5) MATERIAL WHOSE CAPACITY FOR INTERNATIONAL EMBARRASS-
MENT OUTWEIGHS ITS VALUES FOR ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE PUBLIC--HE
CITES CONFIDENTIAL ASSESSMENTS OF FOREIGN LEADERS COMING TO
MEET THE PRESIDENT; AND (6) LEGITIMATE SECRETS RELATING TO
THE PROCESS BY WHICH A PRESIDENT MAKES A DECISION,
As YOU KNOW, WHEN THE CIA WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947, THE DIRECTOR WAS GIVEN STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE METHODS AND SOURCES. THIS ACT, AND THE
SUCCESSIVE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON CLASSIFICATION, HAVE BEEN THE
FOUNDATION FOR OUR POLICIES IN PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION, WHETHER ORIGINATED BY US OR RECEIVED FROM OTHER
GOVERNMENT COMPONENTS OR FOREIGN SOURCES. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
TO PROTECT CERTAIN INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY THAT RELATING TO
NAMES AND NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES, WAS INCLUDED IN THE CIA ACT
OF 1.949. THESE ACTS HAVE IN NO WAY BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OF 1966. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE
THAT THERE IS A VERY STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THIS ACT WILL BE
AMENDED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND BOTH VERSIONS
PASSED BY THE HOUSE (IN MARCH) AND THE SENATE (IN MAY) CONTAIN
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STATUTORY AUTHORITIES MENTIONED A MOMENT AGO. THE MOST IMPORTANT
CHANGE LIES IN THE PROVISION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW BY A COURT IN
CASES WHERE THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF A
DOCUMENT OR MATERIAL IS CHALLENGED. LEAVING ASIDE, THE QUESTION
OF HOW TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHILE IN THE
POSSESSION OF A COURT, THE BASIC PROBLEM IS WHETHER A COURT
COULD OVERRULE THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION, TAKEN UNDER HIS STATUTORY
RESPONSIBILITY, THAT CERTAIN INFORMATION REQUIRED CLASSIFICATION.
LET ME NOW RETURN TO 1 JUNE 1972, WHEN EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
BECAME EFFECTIVE. As YOU REALIZE, THE ORDER REQUIRED AN UPDATE
OF OUR PROCEDURES IN SEVERAL AREAS. IT CALLED..FOR: (A) A SHARP
RESTRICTION IN THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED CLASSIFIERS; (B) THE
REFINING OF THE CRITERIA FOR MATERIALS TO BE CLASSIFIED, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF.CLASSIFIERS FOR THEIR ACTIONS; (C) THE
IDENTIFICATION OF CLASSIFIERS ON ANY MATERIALS CLASSIFIED;
(D) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE,
WHICH PERMITTED MUCH TOO BRIEF PERIODS OF PROTECTION FOR MOST
INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS; (E) THE EXEMPTION OF MATERIAL, IF
NECESSARY, FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE GDS. BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER ALL OF THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES COULD BE CONSIDERED
AS FALLING UNDER ONE OR MORE OF THE FOUR EXEMPTIONS; (F) THE.
DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS FOR MAN-
DATORY REVIEW.OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL,, LEAVING THE AGENCY WITH THE
QUESTION OF WHAT MANPOWER WOULD BE NEEDED; (G) THE AUTOMATIC.
REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 30 YEARS OLD, WITH DECLASSIFICATION
OF ALL SUCH MATERIAL EXCEPT THAT CONTINUED UNDER CLASSIFICATION
BY DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR; (H) THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
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PIECE OF INFORMATION MAY NOT REQUIRE PROTECTION, BUT HE IS
CONCERNED WITH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT AN ACCUMULATION OF SEPARATE
BITS OF INTELLIGENCE WILL LEAD BACK TO THE SOURCE. HENCE,
HIS TRAINING CONDITIONS HIM TO THINK OF A CONTINUING NEED TO
PROTECT INFORMATION NOT ONLY FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC BUT
EVEN FROM HIS COLLEAGUES WHO DO NOT NEED TO KNOW.
YOU CAN PERHAPS APPRECIATE, THEN, THE TRAUMATIC EFFECT OF
THE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SUCH
PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. NOT ONLY WAS HE ASKED
TO REVIEW INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS FOR POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE IN
RESPONSE TO MANDATORY REQUESTS; BUT, ON THE BASIC QUESTION OF
WHAT LEVEL OF CLASSIFICATION, IF ANY, A DOCUMENT REQUIRED, HE
WAS REQUIRED, WHEN IN DOUBT, TO USE THE LESS RESTRICTIVE TREATMENT.
HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOW LIVED WITH THE ORDER FOR MORE THAN
TWO YEARS WITHOUT THINGS GOING TO POT. THIS IS IN PART BECAUSE
OF THE HELPFUL AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE ICRC ON
SEVERAL PROCEDURAL MATTERS. IT IS DUE MUCH MORE TO MOST AGENCY
PEOPLE HAVING LEARNED TO FOLLOW THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW SYSTEM,
THOUGH SOMETIMES RELUCTANTLY; HAVING LEARNED THE REFINED BASIS FOR
CLASSIFICATION; AND NOW THINKING BEFORE ROUTINELY STAMPING A
CLASSIFICATION ON A DOCUMENT.
IN MONITORING OUR PROGRESS IN COMPLYING WITH THE ORDER,
WE FIND WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED SEVERAL THINGS, SUCH AS: (A)
GREATLY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CLASSIFIERS (AND THIS IS STILL
AN ON-GOING PROCESS); (B) SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE CURRENT
AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BEING PRODUCED, PARTICULARLY AS
CLASSIFIERS INCREASINGLY REALIZE THAT LITTLE ADMINISTRATIVE OR
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IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE--AND AGAIN THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF
MANPOWER; (I) THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM POSED BY THE APPARENT
AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY CLASSIFICATION REVIEW COMMITTEE
TO OVERRULE THE DIRECTOR IN APPEALS FROM DENIALS OF MANDATORY
REVIEW REQUESTS; (J) ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS BY APPROVED
HISTORICAL RESEARCHERS (NON-GOVERNMENT); AND (K) THE REQUIREMENT
TO PROVIDE QUARTERLY LISTS OF AUTHORIZED CLASSIFIERS TO THE ICRC.
PERHAPS I SHOULD EMPHASIZE HERE HOW THESE REQUIREMENTS
CONFLICTED WITH THE TRAINING AND PRACTICES ACQUIRED OVER THE
YEARS BY OUR PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE CASE OFFICERS AND ANALYSTS,
IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF INFORMATION
ITSELF, AND THE MEANS BY WHICH IT WAS OBTAINED. IT IS-OBVIOUS
THAT IF THE LEADERS OF A LESS THAN FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRY
KNOW WE HAVE LEARNED OF THEIR DEFENSE MECHANISMS, THEY WILL
MODIFY OR COMPLETELY CHANGE THEM. AND, IF THEY KNOW WE HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO INTERCEPT AND READ THEIR COMMUNICATIONS, THEY WILL NO
LONGER USE THOSE CHANNELS TO TRANSMIT INFORMATION HELPFUL-TO
US, OR THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD US WITH MIS-INFORMATION.
BUT, MORE-IMPORTANTLY, DISCLOSURE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE
CERTAIN PIECES OF INFORMATION COULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER THE
AGENT OR AGENTS WHO MADE THEM AVAILABLE TO US, RESULTING IN THE
TERMINATION OF ANY MORE INFORMATION FROM THAT CHANNEL, WHETHER
BECAUSE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE AGENT OR BECAUSE THE AGENT FEARS
THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PASSING FURTHER INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL
TO US,
THE INTELLIGENCE CASE OFFICER REALIZES THAT A PARTICULAR
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OR SUPPORT MATERIAL NEEDS PROTECTION; (C) BEGINNING THE
REVIEW OF 30-YEAR-OLD MATERIAL (AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE THE
SUCCESSORS TO THE OSS AND CIG); (D) KEEPING ABREAST OF THE
REQUESTS FOR MANDATORY REVIEW, IN PART BECAUSE THE VOLUME OF
SUCH REQUESTS HAS BEEN FAR BELOW THAT WHICH WE INITIALLY EXPECTED.
I WILL EXPAND A BIT ON THIS MATTER OF HANDLING MANDATORY
REVIEW REQUESTS, FOR THERE ARE POINTS HERE WHICH WILL LIKELY
BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. WE WERE INITIALLY APPREHENSIVE THAT WE
WOULD BE SWAMPED BY REQUESTS FROM THE NEWS MEDIA AND PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS, ESPECIALLY HISTORICAL RESEARCHERS, YET TWO YEARS
AFTER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER WENT INTO EFFECT, WE HAVE RECEIVED ONLY
REQUESTS.
AMONG THE FIRST OF THESE WAS THE REQUEST FROM ONE OF THE
MAJOR NEWS SERVICES FOR RECORDS RELATED TO THE GUATEMALAN
REVOLUTION OF 1954, IN WHICH THE AGENCY IS ALLEGED TO HAVE
PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. IT WAS QUITE A TASK TO IDENTIFY
AND RETRIEVE THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS; AND AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW,
IT WAS DETERMINED THAT MOST OF THEM COULD NOT BE DECLASSIFIED
BECAUSE SOURCES OF INFORMATION WERE IDENTIFIED. HOWEVER, IT
WAS POSSIBLE TO SANITIZE MANY OF THESE PAPERS AND THUS MEET
THE LARGER PART OF THE REQUESTER'S NEEDS.
A NEWS CORRESPONDENT FOR A SOUTHWESTERN NEWSPAPER HAS
BEEN TRYING TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS ON THE BAY OR PIGS FIASCO,
ESPECIALLY A POST-MORTEM REPORT PREPARED BY OUR INSPECTOR GENERAL.
THE REQUESTER APPEALED OUR INITIAL DENIAL AND THE CASE WENT
TO OUR INFORMATION REVIEW COMMITTEE, WHICH LED TO CONSIDERATION
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OF SANITIZATION. IT WAS DETERMINED AFTER A DETAILED REVIEW
THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE REPORT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXCISED.
WE ALSO CONSIDER ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF A REPORT BY THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL MAY BE KEPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER EXEMPTION
(B)(5) OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT; AND, TO DATE, WE
HAVE NOT RELEASED THE REPORT.
WE HAVE HAD AN OFT-REPEATED REQUEST FROM A WELL-KNOWN
HISTORIAN AND ACADEMICIAN, MAINLY FOR DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. THIS REQUEST WAS MADE INITIALLY
UNDER THE FOIA, BUT SINCE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS WERE INVOLVED,
IT HAS BEEN PROCESSED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE
ORDER. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO THE PROFESSOR THAT HE APPEARED
TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR APPROVAL AS A HISTORICAL RESEARCHER, BUT
HE DECLINED TO TAKE THIS ROUTE, PREFERRING TO USE ONLY
DECLASSIFIED SOURCE MATERIALS. IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO DECLASSIFY
SOME OF THE DOCUMENTS HE WANTS, BUT OTHERS CAN BE RELEASED
ONLY IN SANITIZED VERSIONS, IF AT ALL, AND HISTORIANS UNDER-
STANDABLY DON'T LIKE SANITIZED DOCUMENTS.
OCCASIONALLY WE HAVE HAD REQUESTS FOR DECLASSIFICATION
FROM FORMER EMPLOYEES (INCLUDING THE OSS). WE HAVE DECLASSIFIED
A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH OSS OPERATIONS
IN VIETNAM (THEN FRENCH INDOCHINA) FOR A FORMER OSS OFFICER
WHO SERVED THERE IN THE LATTER PART OF 1945 AND WHO KNEW Ho
CHI MINH. WE HAVE ALSO DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS FOR A FORMER
AGENCY EMPLOYEE WHO WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S VIETNAM
POLICY AND WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE THE ARMED FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
AGAINST THE CONFIRMATION OF MR. COLBY AS DCI. AND WE HAVE BEEN
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WILL HAVE INCREASING NUMBERS OF DOCUMENTS ELIGIBLE FOR REVIEW,
AND WE LL HAVE TO GEAR UP TO HANDLE THAT WORK LOAD,
AS A RESULT OF THE PROSPECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO
AMEND THE FOIA, WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO REDUCE THE AVERAGE
TIME OF RESPONDING TO MANDATORY REVIEW REQUESTS. YOUR PROBLEMS
IN THIS AREA MAY BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM OURS FOR WE MUST
FIRST SEARCH OUT THE DOCUMENTS AND THEN FIND BUSY OPERATIONS
PEOPLE TO REVIEW THEM IN TERMS OF CURRENT CLASSIFICATION
CRITERIA. BECAUSE OF OUR MANY INTERNAL REORGANIZATIONS OVER
THE YEARS, IT IS OFTEN NOT TOO CLEAR WHICH COMPONENT SHOULD
MAKE THE REVIEW, AND PERHAPS TWO OR THREE DIFFERENT OFFICES
SHOULD' TAKE'A LOOK. ALL THIS TAKES TIME; BUT, NEEDLESS TO SAY,
WE ARE DOING OUR'BEST TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE ANTICIPATED NEW
REQUIREMENTS, BOTH FOR REQUESTS AND APPEALS OF DENIALS.
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ABLE TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS ON OSS OPERATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA
FOR A FORMER OSS MAN WHO SERVED THERE AND IS WRITING A BOOK.
THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL CHALLENGES FOR THE AGENCY TO MEET
IN IMPLEMENTING VARIOUS FACETS OF THE CLASSIFICATION POLICIES
MANDATED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, AND-SOME OF THESE MAY WELL
BE THE SAME AS YOU ARE FACING. FOR EXAMPLE, YOU PROBABLY
SEE OCCASIONAL DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY OVERCLASSIFIED
OR ARE EXEMPTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON. IT'S CLEAR THAT
SOMEONE HASN'T GOTTEN THE WORD--OR HAS UNTHINKINGLY USED FORMER
PROCEDURES--OR SIGNED WHAT HIS SECRETARY PREPARED WITHOUT
REVIEWING IT FOR THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION.
THERE IS A CONTINUING NEED FOR BOTH INDOCTRINATION OF NEWLY
AUTHORIZED CLASSIFIERS AND RE-INDOCTRINATION PERIODICALLY OF
THE "OLD HANDS." WE ARE STILL WORKING TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE
MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.
A DIFFERENT PROBLEM WE FACE IS IN GETTING TOGETHER THE
NECESSARY RESOURCES TO GET CURRENT ON THE REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED
MATERIAL WHICH IS 30 YEARS OLD OR OLDER. WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS,
ALL OSS DOCUMENTS STILL ON FILE ARE CLASSIFIED, AND THE
REVIEW OF THESE HAS BEEN A CHALLENGE IN TERMS OF MAKING
QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DO THE JOB. IN FACT, AS
A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE RE-HIRED THREE RETIREES TO WORK ON THE
OSS RECORDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
TURNED OVER TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SOME TIME BACK, BUT THIS
IS ONLY A PART OF THE PROBLEM. FROM 1977 ON, WHEN WE PASS
THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AGENCY, WE
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28 June 1974
NOTE FOR: Mr. Blake
1. I very briefly mentioned the peech to Mr.
Brownman, who did not review the manuscript, ut i agree with the
position taken by D/Sec. In view of the possibility that this might
generate some publicity, I also took the liberty of including Angus
Thuermer on the distribution.
2. I don't know if you have had time to review the proposed
presentation, but it seems there are several statements that the
news media might focus on and/or misconstrue, even if accurate:
a. E.O. 11652 gives us "psychological problems."
b. We think "75 years after the termination of a source"
is a reasonable time re declassification.
c. Certain individuals decide on "political grounds" to
declassify or leak the information to columnists.
d. Reference to the former Agency employee who opposed
the "confirmation" of Mr. Colby.
e. Reference to declassification of the "IG" report on
the Bay of Pigs.
Atts: DD/M&S 74-2432, DD/MTS 74-2410
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ST