DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060028-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 1, 1971
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/14: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004300060028-1
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
SUBJECT Disclosures of Classified Information and
Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements
1. In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject
as above, he directs that existing regulations and procedures designed to
safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where
necessary, and he calls for an adequate security review of all public
disclosures with important security connotations. I would hope that these
actions have been initiated and ;that any deficiencies which come to light
will be corrected.
2. The President, noting the statutory responsibilities of the
Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially
through the machinery of the intelligence community. I am submitting to
members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board proposed
guidance to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of
the President's directive. This guidance, a copy of which is attached, states,
in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of the intelligence chiefs of affected
departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and
methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests
ways in which this can be accomplished.
NSC review(s) completed.
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3. May I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security
officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an
advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your principal
officers may contemplate making and which might have security implications?
It is my hope that the proposed guidelines may be made applicable to all
affected departments and agencies even though some of them may not be
represented on the United States Intelligence Board.
4. It would be most helpful if you could let me have your reaction
to those proposals and any additional comments you wish to make, so that
I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing
to carry out his instructions.
Richard Helms
Director
Att: Guidance Governing Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence
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Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
As pointed out in the President's directive of December 21, 1970,
subject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and
Clearance of Official Statements, " machinery now exists to protect all
classified information. It is recognized that unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence may involve thoughtlessness in the application of
regulations and procedures already in effect. Further, with respect to
sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject, some of it
unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an impression
in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything, that is not
known to the public. The protection of intelligence sources and methods
continues to be of vital importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin
of many categories of intelligence information to be used in public release or
debate must be disguised and the use of all such information must be duly
authorized. The responsibility for authorizing release and for devising proper
disguise rests with the originating agency.
The President's directive of December 21, 1970, refers to the
statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. The National Security Act
of 1947 specifically states:
"... And provided further, That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;"
It is not to be expected that all consumers of intelligence, policy makers and
others would recognize or be fully alert to potential danger to intelligence
sources and methods resulting from release of intelligence. Consequently,
it is believed that the intelligence community should take the leading role
within their departments and agencies.
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Chiefs of all components of the intelligence cou unuuity should review
the existing regulations and impress one all concerned the necessity t-, abide
by them. The following specific actions should be taken:
1. Review existing departmental and agency regulaticaas
governing the control of classified information to make sure that
in every instance they meet the criteria required by the steadily
increasing volume and significance of classified intelligence,
particularly including sensitive compartmented intelligence.
Particular emphasis should be placed on assuring that the need-
to-know principle is strictly enforced.
2. Make sure that briefing and indoctrination procedures
are reviewed with the objectives of paragraph 1 above in view
These procedures should be so designed as to assure that newly
indoctrinated members of the intelligence community and other
newly indoctrinated officials of the Government fully understa ial
the differences which exist among various kinds of intelligenc.~,
with respect to danger to the source or method wl-i.:h would rc salt
from disclosure. It should also be the purpose of these procedures
to explain the way in which cleared individuals can readily ascertain
Ulu cloaiance status of others before discussil]g classified inbrala-
tion with them, and to make sure that they do so,
3. Provide for periodic reindoctrination anti continuing;
education in security practices and procedures, to include a program
for prompt debriefing of individuals who no longer t.iave a need-to-
know.
4. Review procedures for authorizing and controlling
disclosures and releases.
a. The responsibility of the intellig-:nce chief
for assessing the risk to intelligence sources and methods
involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated.
There should be a review and assessment by intelligence
authorities, whenever any classified intelligence is proposed
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for declassification or for use in briefings, testimony,
sylnposituns, seminars, speeches, w.ritilig: for
pul>licatioii, presentations, courses of instr iction,
press releases, formal and informal interviews with
press representatives, or other activities ii: the course,
of which there is a danger that intelligence : ourccs and
methods might be revealed. Each assessincut should
include methods by which such intelligence c an be
effectively and plausibly sanitized by or wit!: the approval
of the originating agency so as to Protect the source.
Sensitive intelligence to be disclosed should be Clearly
identified as such and the official disclosing it slioul.d he
so cautioned when appropriate. '1'liis can he particnlat_ly
important in dealing with public information officials who
cannot be expected to be fully familiar with the origins
of sensitive information. Records should be maintained
regarding any classified intelligence declassified or
authorized for disclosure.
b. The facts surrounding inadvertent disclosure
of classified intelligence to any person or persons not
authorized for access to such intelligence sh.iuld be
reported to the appropriate intelligence chile, who will
inform the originating agency in any potentially harmful
case.
c. Any person having knowledge of &iy disclosure
of classified intelligence made contrary to the regulations
and controls of the department or agency concerned should
promptly report it to the appropriate intelligence chief for
action. Such action may include (1) such steps as are
feasible to repair or limit the extent of the dimage; (2)
a request for investigation by appropriate auhorities; (3)
an assessment of the possible harm to intelligence sources
and methods and notification to all intelligence authorities
concerned;' and (4) prompt notification to all ~,)fficia.l
recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred,
together with advice of remedial action to be taken and
guidance for responses to inquiries from public media
representatives that may result from the compromise.
3 t. (trul.`i
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5. Take fully into account, in proposing the release of
any intelligence derived from a joint project in the untelligenc.!
community, the interests of any other members of the inteliil, rice
community which might be concerned. If it department or agency
authorizes the disclosure of sensitive intelligence from such a
source, that agency is responsible for informing other 1JS113
members of the action. Special attention should be given to
defining the precise limits of the disclosure and to cautioning
against inadvertent elaboration or extension beyond those limits.
6. Take disciplinary action where appropriate, in a just,
clear, and definite manner which will demonstrate i he extreme
seriousness with which unauthorized disclosures are viewed.
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UNiT;!,.., S'I'AT.ES 1NTE:L. lGl NCE i OAt~il
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
MEMORANDUM TOR USIB PRINCIPALS
SUBJECT ; Guidelines Governing Disclosures of Classified
Intelligence
1. The President has issued a ineinocandunn elated
I)cceinhcr 21, 1.970 entitled "Disclosures of Classified Infoxlnati.on
and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements". A ropy of
this is attached for your information and guidance, as well as a copy
of a memorandum I am sending to the other addressees of the President.'s
communication.
2. The President, noting the statutory r.esponsi biliti,.:s of the
Director of Central 111W.114, c!uce for iiw protection of int.ell.ig:lce Liourc:.zi
and inediods, charged me with providing guidance in this ficid, especially
through the machinery of the intell.tgence cociilnunity. In thi:_, conncctiOii
I would appreciate your giving personal attention to the attached draft
guidelines for the intelligence community. I plan to discuss these in
executive session at an early meeting of the USIB.
Richard i lelins
Chairman
Atts
Presidential Memo
DC I Memo
"Guidance"
SECRET
ExcI t7a 1r ii Dllil^,':,~ir
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December 21, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR;
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney Genre ral
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Ai;ency
The Chairman, JuiliL Chief:; of S La i'.1
The Director of Central IntelliI;ence
The Adrninistratob, National AeronJut:icu
and Space Administratior_
Disclosures of Classified Liformaticn
and Coordination and Clearance of
Official Statements
I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in
public media of classified information bearing upon important
aspects of national security, particularly that which tenc'.s to
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. ;uch disclosures
present a serious threat to our national interests and I ann
determined that the practice of releasing such information without
proper authorization will be brought to an end.
special systems of clearances.
Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended,
established regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified
information, while especially sensitive data are protected by
I direct that immediate steps be taken within the jurisdic tion of
each addressee .to ensure that existing, regulations and procedures
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SECRl~a'1' - 2
designed to safeguard classified inCornlation be reviewed and street;tii--
enecl where necessary. These regulations and procedures ::Mould
assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "nec_i-.to-know'
receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly
aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. They
should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and
documents made public on subjects with important security connota-
tions. Further, I wish responsible officials to take firm disciplinary
action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible
for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.
The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory respcunsibili.ty
for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly,
I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especi.d.ly thr.>ug11
the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to
keep me informed of developments and I wish department and agency
heads to cooperate fully with him.
I also reaffirm the following instructions which I Issued on September 1,
1970 concerning coordination and clearance of public statements and
press releases and the necessity for White House clearance of all
official communications having policy implications:
IPublic statements and press releases: Prior to release,
all public communications on matters of known or
potential Presidential interest must be cat?efully cleeared
by the White I-louse (Assistant to the Pres.adent for National
Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for
coordination with the departments and agencies who share
overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there
be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental
interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance.'
--"Official communications: All official communicati )ns with
policy implications must be cleared by th- White house.
When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared.
This procedure requires close and confidential staff rela-
tionships at all levels between the White Ilouse anc. your
department as well as among departments."
SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTLLL.IGENCL
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General.
The Director, U. S. Arras Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Sniff
The Administrator, National Aeronal,tics
and Space Administration
SUBJECT Disclosures of Classified lnformatio,4 and
Coordination and Clearance of Official Staten cuts
I.. Ill the Presidents luenloranduur of December 21, 1970, subJcct
as above, he directs that existing regulations and procedure c designed to
safeguard classified information he reviewed and strengthen (I where
necessary, and he calls for an adequate security review of all public
disclosures with important security connotations. 1 would itope that these
actions have been initiated and that any deficiencies which some to 1igiv.
will be corrected.
2. The President, noting the statutory responsibility?s of the
Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sourci,s
and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially
through the machinery of the intelligence community. I am .submitting -o
members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board propose=:i
guidance to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of
the President's directive. 'T'his guidance, a copy of which j., attached, :Mates,
in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of the intelligence chiefs of affected
departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and
methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests
ways in which this can be accomplished.
Approved For Release 2006/10114: dIA-R P84-00780R00 300060028-1
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3. May I urge that you use your principal intelligci ce or security
officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable then to assist ill an
advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your princTal
officers may contemplate making and ., i:ich might have sec.trity impliL;ations`l
It is my hope that the proposed guidelines may be made ap}.licable to ail
affected departments and agencies even though some of them may not 0e
represented on the United States Intelligence Board.
4. It would be most helpful if you could let me have your reac4ion
to these proposals and any additional comments you wish tc make, so that
I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing
to carry out his instructions.
Richard Helms
Director
Att: Guidance Governing Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence
Approved For Release 2006/10/14:: CIA- RDP84-00780 R004300060028-1
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12 i.I
SLL
Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
As pointed out in the President's directive of December 21, 1970,
,subject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and
Clearance of Official Statements, " machinery now exists to protect all
classified information. It is recognized that unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence may involve thoughtlessness in the application of
regulations and procedures already in effect. Further, with respect to
sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject, some of it
unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an impression
in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything, that Li not
known to the public. The protection of intelligence sources and methods
continues to be of vital importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin
of many categories of intelligence information to be used in public release or
debate must be disguised and the use of all such information must be duly
authorized. The responsibility for authorizing release and for devising proper
disguise rests with the originating agency.
The President's directive of December 21, 1970, refers to the
statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. The National Security Act
of 1947 specifically states:
"... And provided further, That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;"
it is believed that the intelligence community should take the leading role
It is not to be expected that all consumers of intelligence, policy makers and
others would recognize or be fully alert to potential danger to intelligence
sources and methods resulting from release of intelligence. Consequeatly,
wiuun weir aepartmen
Approved For Release 2006/14-) Glik-R. Pa4-0078ORO04300060028-1
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them. The following specific actions should be taken:
Chiefs of all components of the intelligence community should review
the existing regulations and impress on all concerned the necessity to abide
,r.
1. Review existing departmental and agency regulations
governing the control of classified information to make sure that
in every instance they meet the criteria required by the steadily'
increasing volume and significance of classified intelligence,
particularly including sensitive compartmented intelligence.
i Particular emphasis should be placed on assuring that the need-
L. iviaKe sure that Drienng ana inaoctrina.tion procea nee
are reviewed with the objectives of paragraph 1 above in view.
These procedures should be so designed as to assure that newly
indoctrinated members of the intelligence conimul ity and other
newly indoctrinated officials of the Government fully underst,wnd
the differences which exist among various kinds of intelligence,
with respect to danger to the source or method which would result
from disclosure. It should also be the purpose of these proccLlures
to explain the way in which cleared individuals can readily ascertain
die cloaa.'ance status of other before discussing classified in on u-
' 4. Review procedures for authorizing and controlling
isclosures and releases.
~ `P,~~ir~V'ed'.~'ar~~R~Jed~r~~2~t76%'I'(X11`4,':(~t7~QP8{~-0d78~ROt7430QQ'60028-1
Lion with them, and to make sure that they do so,
3. Provide for periodic reindoctrination and continuing
education in security practices and procedures, to include a progranz
for prompt debriefing of individuals who no longer have a need-to-
OW'
a. The responsibility of the intelligence chief
for assessing the risk to intelligence sources and methods
involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated.
..-There should be a review and assessment by intelligence
authorities whenever 'any classified intelligence is proposed
 Approved For Release 2006/10/14: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004300060028-1
Approved for Release 2006/10/14,;,CIA-.RpI?a,4 70780R0O41300060028-1
for declassification or for use in briefings, testimony,
symposiums, seminars, speeches, writings for
publication, presentations, courses of instruction,
press releases, formal and informal interviews with
press representatives, or other activities in the course
of which there is a danger that intelligence sources and
methods might be revealed. Each assessment should
include methods by which such intelligence can be
effectively and plausibly sanitized by or with the approval
of the originating agency so as to protect the source.
Sensitive intelligence to be disclosed should be clearly
identified as such and the official disclosing it should 1,e
so cautioned when appropriate. This can be particularly
important in dealing with public information officials who
cannot be expected to be fully familiar with the origins
of sensitive information. Records should bi maintained
regarding any classified intelligence declassified or
authorized for disclosure.
b. The facts surrounding inadvertent disclosure
of classified intelligence to any person or persons not
authorized for access to such intelligence should be
reported to the appropriate intelligence chief, who will.
inform the originating agency in any potentially harmful
cases
c. Any person having knowledge of any disclosure
of classified intelligence made contrary to We regulations
and controls of the department or agency concerned should
promptly report it to the appropriate intelligence chief for
action. Such action may include (1) such steps as are
feasible to repair or limit the extent of the damage; (21
a request for investigation by appropriate authorities; (3)
an assessment of the possible harm to intelligence sources
and methods and notification to all intelligence authorities
concerned;' and (4) prompt notification to all official
together with advice of remedial action to be taken and
guidance for responses to. inquiries from public media
representatives that,may result from the compromise.
 Approved For Release 2006/10/14: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004300060028-1