MEMORANDUN FOR: MR. HELMS FROM JOHN W. COFFEY
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CIA-RDP84-00780R004000050057-3
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Publication Date:
July 6, 1971
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL X SECRET'
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Director o Central Intelligence
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Deputy Director for Support
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Deputy Director for Su 26 HQS
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
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DD/S 71-2615
6 July 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms
Attached are two copies of the
transcription made from the tape recording of your State
of the Agency talk on 15 June. We would appreciate
instructions as to any desired distribution either here or
overseas.
V 0 0
SECRET
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DIRECTOR'S STATE, OF THE AGENCY SPEECH
15 June 1971
Good morning, if you can. ;3
This is the second so-called State of the Agency talk. A year ago when
I gave the first one I had planned to have a question and answer session after
my prepared remarks but at the last moment I was called to the White House
and the session had to be canceled. I am pleased to say that thus far at least
I haven't been summoned anywhere today. I look forward to answering a few
questions immediately following these comments.
I'd like to begin by taking a look at the Agency in historical perspective.
During the past several years a number of Agency officers have been engaged
in reviewing the record and writing our history. Their work.has underlined
the extent to which things have changed in CIA since the late 1940's and early
50's. In the perspective of historical inquiry the change has been a large one.
Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that in many areas a quiet revolu-
tion has taken place. l Those of us who were around take pride in the way the
Agency performed during the Cold War and particularly during the build-up in
the Pacific at the time of the Korean War. We were saddled with large new
responsibilities when Korea occurred. We had to improvise programs, hire
new people in large numbers, and organize support for assorted jobs that were
suddenly required. We did well, I believe, but there is no doubt that it was at
the cost of serious disruption to our young overseas organization. When we
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compare our activities at that time with our work during the last decade in
Southeast Asia, we find that the Agency learned a great deal from Korea
Again our responsibilities have expanded immensely. Hundreds of employees
have been called upon to accept separation from their families and to serve
under trying and exacting circumstances. The support elements of the Agency
have been tested severely and often. But this has all occurred smoothly without
serious disruption and without the crises in personnel management and morale
that we experienced in the 1950's
Another improvement, less spectacular but still of great significance, is
the increased professionalism of the Clandestine Service, When I speak of in-
creased professionalism, I mean a reliable Service, one that can be expected
to handle just about any challenge that occurs in the field. The kind of opera-
tion that ten years ago engaged the anxious attention of all concerned up to the
level of the Director is carried off today in an almost routine fashion. We
have come to expect that recommendations made by a Station Chief or quick
decisions made on the spot will stand up in the light of careful and professional
review it headquarters. Complicated operations involving coordination and
teamwork among several Stations overseas are carried off with the speed and
precision that would be the envy of any ball team in the last stages of a pennant
race. Let me assure you it was not always so.
I will not talk at length about the advances that have been made by the
Agency in technical intelligence collection; they are well known, at least in
a general way. It is worth saying, however, that many of us fail to appreciate
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the human qualities that are critical in all important technological develop-
ment. This is not a bloodless world in which a good idea moves smoothly
from the drafting board to the laboratory to production and then to use. Trial
and error, unexplained failures, improvisations, sleepless nights, and dogged
persistence are aspects of the human story that cannot be told, publicly. We
are again reminded that people make the Agency what it is.
Another significant change has occurred in the processing and analysis of
intelligence information. Our work originally was based on concepts that grew
out of the nation's experience in World War II. Some of these concepts remain
valid but others have fallen by the wayside'and much has been added. This is
the result of technological change and of changes that have occurred in the
U. S. strategic position. It is also the result of experience and new ideas.
It would be difficult to exaggerate how much the daily work of the Agency
has been affected by these changes. Fields of research that were once re-
garded as central to intelligence have now been dropped or significantly cut
back. Several years ago, for example, we had analysts working full0ime on
accumulating and ordering minute pieces of data on such things as the rail net-
work in the Soviet Union, In this age of overhead photography a component
like this is no longer necessary. As these changes have taken place, a whole
new breed of intelligence officer has come into being such as photo interpreters,
specialized military analysts, mathematicians, and highly specialized econo-
mists. They have had to fit in and mesh their expertise with the social scientists,
linguists, and area specialists to make one team.. It is a good team. The papers
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and briefings it produces have developed respect all over Washington. This
is the way it has to be if we are going to stay in business '/fIt should also be
noted that the greatly expanded flow of information from human and technical
sources has placed heavy demands on the management of analytical depart -
ments in the Agency. They have met these demands well, I believe. In the
process there has been greater contact among Agency Directorates and as
time goes on closer cooperation. A few years ago one could speak of a certain
tribalism, both among collectors and producers. The points of contact between
these tribes were often points of conflict. There was a good deal of one-
upmanship. This is no longer an important issue. The problems and mis-
understandings among the Directorates of the Agency are not all solved but
they are minor compared with those that beset us in its early years. I believe
that CIA today is purposeful and businesslike as never before.
I would like now to touch on a few important developments of the past year
and then to discuss some of the problems the Agency faces over the next few
years.
Last year as I was speaking to you, I noted that on that very day we had
launched a revolutionary satellite system. I described it as a far-out Rube
Goldberg contraption where you put a coffee bean in one end and you might
just get coffee out of the other. We are glad to say that the coffee we are
getting today permits us to analyze the characteristics of Soviet ICBM's and
ABM's just about as well as the Soviets can themselves--and even before the
missiles are launched. Quite by coincidence a new Agency-conceived and
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developed photographic system is being prepared for launch as I speak, literally
today. The advances of this new system over what we had a decade ago might
be roughly compared to the differences between the old Kodak Box Brownie and
your present-day Leicas and Nikons.
During the past year we have greatly expanded the size and scope of the
annual National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet military matters, The White
House requested that we provide a much more extended and detailed account
of the evidence and arguments on which judgments are based. They asked that
all differences of opinion be set forth at length with supporting details. They
wanted us to explore in depth all the various options open to the Soviets as
they decide on their future military programs. The preparation of these com-
prehensive papers requires much larger effort and input not only by the Office
of National Estimates but by specialists in our Directorates of Intelligence and
Science and Technology. The consumer appears to be pleased thus far with
the results o We have received a letter from the President commending us for
the first of the papers to be issued, that on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Attack.
A word should be said on Southeast Asia where the Agency has been so
extensively involved for several years. During the past year and a half the
Saigon Station has turned from a broad and costly commitment in support of
certain overt programs to a concentration on the classical covert and clan-
destine operations of the Agency. Such a change places a heavy burden on
Station management, The overt programs in which we had been involved were
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not cancelled; they were transferred to the military services. To do this,
while maintaining the effectiveness of the programs, required careful planning
and good teamwork between our people and the military servicesThe orienta-
tion of the Station back to classical operations called for strong leadership
and clear-cut directives. It also required a readiness at all levels to accept
change both in work assignments and in the structure of the Station ~he
Station did this, and did it well. In addition it distinguished itself in an area
that is of vital importance to the policy of Vietnamization,
7e record of the Saigon Station
had its counterpart here at headquarters. Operations officers and analysts
have produced reports and memoranda that have made important contributions
to decision-making in Washington. Our most severe testing ground are those
areas that have important political and policy implications. To have come
through well in handling the Vietnamese account is a satisfying achievement.
In sharing with you my reflections on the Agency's development over the
years, I do not want to give the impression that CIA has somehow made the
grade and that we can now cruise along comfortably. Every component of the
Agency is being tested and it will be each and every day. When we blow one,
it will do little good to trot out our list of past accomplishments o There's no
payoff for being wrong. Also we must recognize that in the next few years our
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activity is going to be conditioned by budget restrictions. As the budget re-
mains tight, we will be expected to get more for every dollar we spend. The
ceiling that has been placed on our budget reflects the Administration's
desire to make money available to meet the internal needs of the country
while at the same time carrying out the essential commitments that we have
overseas, I believe that the Agency has managed to do its job despite severe
budgetary constraints and substantial personnel adjustments and reductions.
But the matter will require constant attention and further adjustments in our
programs and by our people.
The present Administration feels that intelligence can be improved and
overall costs reduced by tightening up the organization of the intelligence
community as a whole. Many of you have no doubt noted that the President
has given certain recommendations for changes in structure and procedure
in the intelligence community. I do not feel I should comment on recommenda-
tions while under consideration by the President, but suffice it to say that I
believe CIA can adjust to new requirements if these are demanded. I have no
reason to believe that the President wishes to clip this Agency's wings in any
way.
As we look to the future, we need to give careful thought and planning to
how CIA can best continue to meet the exacting requirements for timely, re-
liable intelligence. How, for example, do we adjust to the ever-improving
collection techniques. We will soon be receiving an increasing amount of our
information on a more or less realtime basis. We will have information
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handling and communications facilities which will give us access to all kinds
of knowledge and information, open and secret. We will have the means to
display our intelligence assessments and production in more than black and
white print. We will be able to do this using photography, television, and
At the same time the substance of international problems
will change. Over the years we have moved from our virtually exclusive pre-
occupation with Communist powers and the possibility they might attack us or
any of our allies. We now concentrate on such matters as our role in imple-
menting a possible SALT agreement, the need to maintain a close check on
what the other side is up to, and whether or not an agreement is being honored
is a crucial one for us.We have moved, too, from the time when some of our
top concerns centered on the size and capability of foreign armies and the
military-industrial production to support them. We haven't lost our interest
in these topics, but we have developed a host of new ones of similar importance.
We're concerned about the availability, present and future, of scarce and es-
sential resources--energy, food, minerals. We're concerned about population
projections and the implications of all this for international politics. We are
watching and studying the economic aspects of newly grown giants of prosperity
Command an increasing
amount of our attention. Future concerns and priorities will undergo a con-
tinuing evolution and we must be prepared to handle new accounts with fresh
expertise.
Before closing I would like to turn to the role of the individual in CIA,
especially the role of the young officer. As I noted earlier, our country is
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focusing increasingly on internal problems such as social justice, minorities,
poverty, and ecology. Whole new departments of Government have been
created to wrestle with these issues and large sums of money are required
to deal with them. These problems and the new priorities are publicized
widely and there is a widespread interest in them. Much of this is accom-
panied by the feeling that national security matters, particularly Defense
programs, must get less emphasis or at least less money so that more at-
tention and resources can be applied to the new problems(?ortunately this
changed emphasis has not yet affected our ability to attract top young people.
We are not recruiting as many trainees as we once did but I can say that ap-
plications far exceed the number.of positions open. And they come to us from
the best universities and with more degrees than ever before. The number of
professional employees leaving the Agency to take up other careers is lower
than it has been in several years. This is encouraging. Indeed it is vital.
The information and advice that the Agency gives to policy-makers will con-
tinue to be absolutely essential to the conduct of American foreign policy.
It may be trite, but it is true that our national security in the age of rockets,
thermonuclear devices, and crisis spots, involves life or death issues. It re-
(7
quires the best talents of the best men and women we can find.( I recognize,
however, as do other senior officers in the Agency that some of our finest
young officers are concerned about the role of the Agency and about their re-
lationship to it. They ask themselves: how important is the Agency's work?
How does it fit in with other national priorities? What about my own role?
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Is it meaningful? I am sure that a, great deal of this type discussion occurs
from desk to desk, over lunch, among friends, among men and women who
have been in training together, between younger and older officers, and across
Directorate lines
Discussions on-matters like these, even that which takes
place within the four walls of the Agency, is more difficult than in any other
Government organization. The kind of work we do requires compartmentation,
the need-to-know principle, and a clear-cut command structure. We simply
cannot conduct our business like universities, businesses, or other elements
of Government. We cannot work in open forum where anyone is free to come
/ !I
and discuss a subject of his choice On the other hand, we know that the Agency
needs ways to insure that good ideas move up and down the command structure,
that they get up to the place in the Agency where they can be acted upon. This
has been the subject of considerable discussion in the senior councils of the
Agency. Each of our Deputy Directors is focusing on it and a number of actions
are being taken although they vary from Directorate to Directorate. We hope
these will be helpful. Meanwhile we expect that young officers with good ideas
will take the initiative to raise them with supervisors or more senior officers.
The Agency has never stood much on ceremony. Bright young professionals
here with reasonable proposals can obtain an audience, but let us not abuse the
privilege.
In a more formal sense, I believe one of the most promising approaches
to this problem the Management Advisory Group. This group known as MAG
was established two years. ago. It brings together officers from all components
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and ranging in age from 30 to 45. We have asked them to study problems of
their choice. We have undertaken to make available speakers and material
as necessary, to receive their recommendations, and to report back to them
on action taken. MAG has already done studies on several problems. They
include a study on the possibility of an increased role for younger officers,
the problem of the Agency's public image, the problem of promotions of young
officers, and a study which reviewed our Career Trainee Program. MAG is
a new group and it is probably still feeling its way in our bureaucracy. But it
is an experiment that is taken seriously by our senior officers. As I said
before, carefully researched and well presented proposals have always-re-
ceived a hearing in this Agency and this will continue to be the case.
In concluding my remarks this morning, I want you to know that I am very -
proud of the Agency which, of course, means the people in it--you. We have
all made our fair share of mistakes. This, I suppose, is life. But on the
whole we have built well. We have changed as time and circumstances dic-
tated. On the whole we have measured up to our responsibilities in a way
that I think we can look back on with satisfaction and pride "But there isn't
much profit these days in looking back. We must look to the challenges of
the future which may well be greater than those of the past. I am confident
that we are well staffed and adequately poised to meet them.
lid-now be glad"-to-take--some questions from the floor. - I say I'm glad to:.'
-take thei
rr-and stark-ove
Ah -ene?-o?-wry-gym -mnates'.
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QUESTION: Et rD r , Helms, one of theseer s nE roubling para-
doxes of our time is dezzrmibe4=as a-discrepancy between the true self
and its image. I know that your speech to the newspaper editors in April and
some very favorable coverage in The New York Times recently have done a
great deal to dispel some of this discrepancy in the case of Agency. But
do you think there% more that all of us as individuals and collectively, can do
to help Americans in public and private life better understand the true and the
overall functions of intelligence?
MR. HELMS: Yes, I think so. What we have had to deal with, at least as
seen from my vantage point, was a very bad patch starting in 1967 with the
problems on the campuses resulting from our identification with the National
Student Association, It became( (clear at that time that it didn't make
T/-)c (,z;sor.la-t ion
much difference what you said, nobody was interested in hearing ite t
~~15A
was regarded as a dastardly performance, traee j In addition
L4there were Jother peculiar stories )being passed around
about the Agency's activities which really soured our so-called image on the
college campuses./1I sought a great deal of advice- -from newspapermen, from
public relations experts, from advertising people, from pollsters, from
professors, from anybody I could think of. And the more they helped me
examine the problem, the more manifest it became that the
storm and the wind - blowing too hard and you knew you just weren't going
4
to get hearing. C
for was that over a period of time " ould blow out to sea. ems, there's the
E
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I
l't I tv
the only thing to hope
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satisfying fact that undergraduate courses in this country only last four years,
But I think that the time has now come where you dead right. I think
there is more that can be done to put intelligence in a better perspective in
the mind of our compatriots, and 'we're going .to be looking at this ,and checking
on ways to do this with increasing frequency. In point of fact, the speech to
which you refer was an effort to kick this thing off anddsee if we" et a
hearing -_.^-'-^--~and it was clear that we did. I think by and
large the. speech was relatively well accepted. we'd going to try and get
a quiet program together and`bver a period of weeks and months we'
do a better job of trying to convince Americans that they need intelligence,
which obviously they do, a little bit like castor oil, you know
J ,
u
jocularity aside, I couldn't be more conscious or
oncerns. It t so bad
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for those of us who work in the Agency. N s xst roug(on the kids, the cousins,
aunts, unc es, and so forth who read these thmgs in the newspapers and
why in the world any lady or gentleman, man or woman, or anybody else
work in that kind of an organization doing that kind of thing. I recognize that
makes life tough. All of you have been[7superior in the way that you've
lived through this last four years. It hasn't been easy from that standpoint,
But I am hoping that we can start to do some things and some of you may be
called on to help out-,-to make a small beech here, go back to the college
that you came from and address some honorary society, something of this
kind- -all of which helps in trying to adjust this difference between the image
we have in the country and what we, in fact, are like,
S yvv L
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it.
ee,= 1 was talk about Thc se ee iea1 fellowe An -
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, we see in the newspapers stories about our photo-
graphic and COMINT intelligence. Is there a general leaking or even collapse
of security within the intelligence community fight-nod?
MR. HELMS: One might think so. We sent to the White House and to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the
Director of the Arms Control Agency a memorandum the other day listing the
stories that had appeared in the press since-fir-s& January`1971 and We
dDL: lecP9sar hav t ,ll_that easy; =.--Yes`
. kind of thing. it was a pretty convincing story. I didn't mean to be flip
out in a low and balanced key the net and cumulative ettect or tnis
when you asked me the questio
way in which intelligence information has been used in recent months to-put
a point. ass though this stuff was free and it was in the air and there was
o make
water on the wheel of some program or other'o defend the budget
cr~, AA
nothing to it and it could never be lost and it was here to stay and all the rest
sense that anybody is on a cam-
paign to do this. !'do Mind either that these leaks and these problems exist
in the intelligence community as such??thr elsewhere . They'=re~ our cus -
4 Ori
tomers _who are doing this to us. But deeply concerned about it because
anything that can be turned on can be turned off. And it may, down the road,
have a very severe effect on our ability to collect the quality of information
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that we've been collecting IC-EM recently. So I share your concern I do what
I can about it, I will continue to do what I can about it; and I just can only hope
that the situation will get better.
series of article s~hat-a e u gin The New York Times ri ht now,
based_ o alt this _a.ccumulatio a?documents i the Pentago -Maybe-this-is-
-maybe it's-a bad-idea to put this out or to leak 'it -or-to dor at-
ever has been-done-. I have no interest in taking sides; you can all make up
your own minds about this. But I must honestly say that one thing that is very
poor indeed is when a single human being decides that he knows more about
the national interest than anybody else. And this is what arises in connection
with a lot of these leaks. There's some fellow tt just thinks that this is the
thing that's got to be put out and he's going to see to it. He knows what the
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it's this kind of behavior that I think is most reprehensible.
I mean, if there had been a decision to put out these documents, that's one thing;
but it was obvious that there was no decision made to put them out--they were
put out. C3 it might have been a different kind of document. There might have
been things in there different than there were aEa -ftrd-that -th3 et of
4eali.ug-in-our=T,ociety-these---days; There's a great deal of talk about morality
and who's moral and who isn't and so forth, but this morality business cuts
two or three different ways when one examines it. This question of tM higher
morality, namely what I personally believe to be right, is a very dubious con-
cept in my opinion.
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QUESTION: Mr. Helms, how in your opinion, ~keaf#ec is this Agency
by a problem that's common to most large businesses amely, an unimagina-
tive or inert middle management group?
MR, HELMS: , j , , I think this Agency is affected by it
the way all sizable organizations are., (at least to a certain extent) It's a
strange thing about human beings, but they tend to have behavior patterns and
organizations consisting of human beings also develop behavior patterns..'- I
think probably what you refer to is what a few years back I used to refer to as
the "Dead Wood Syndrome," Every time I went before a class or a seminar or
anything in the Agency, I always got one question about what was going to be
done about the dead wood in the Agency, And I find that it's a remarkably hard
thing to deal with because I've never had anybody walk in my office and say,
"Mr. Helms, I'm dead wood." the question,-*. _~er is how one identi-
fies this wood and how dead it is.
wouldsub}m!that every-
body is aware of this problem from the most junior officer in the Agency to
the most senior one, ~ Cat there is a tendency at the middle levels for people
to figure that maybe they've got about as far as they're going to go and there-
fore they better settle themselves in for the long haul. It'/only natural.
But on the other hand, I think you will agree that over the past few years we
have done what could humanly be done to keep motion in the Agency, to keep
things moving. As we
There been a lot of retirements, a
great many in the last couple of months. We have done what we could to try
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cut down on the total number of our people,, -t
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and break down that peak that seemed to build up in the middle levels and see
if we couldn.'t stretch it out, keep some promotion movement, and all of these
things. But, you know, there's nothing perfect, and it certainly isn't perfect
around here in that respect. But I think you will concede that we have all tried.
4r may I say in conclusion on this point~ __ See _thh3~ae or_ four-vacant ogres so there must-beat least-40Q peop]so t-!
QUESTION: This memo that you wrote, Mr. Helms, about the security leaks
over the past year or so, well, has anybody been hung?
MR. HELMS:
I know that arrivecidowntown because I
was told that it had, but other than that there has been a deathly quiet. As far
as anybody being hung is concerned, I haven't heard about that happening around
here for years. jvery once in a while I go over to the Pentagon and somebody
whispers in my ear that a fellow was fired the other day for leaking something.
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And I say, oh really, what was his name? Well, you know, you know, but
we took care of him, we took care of him. And theneome to find out, he was
transferred some place else inside the Department of Defense which doesn't
seem to be a very rough treatment under the circumstance fts. 7
But let us get back for just a moment to this question of the leaks. As far
as I know, our record in the Agency has been first class. I would genuinely
and warmly bespeak your continued assistance in this matter because it's im-
portant that we not be tagged with security violations of this kind or with giving
stories out to the newspapers or getting involved in some way which is under-
handed or against the law. One of the things I've discovered about the Agency
over the years is that there is no group of human beings who can take any more
credit than our group for their understanding of what morality and truth and
various things in our life turn out to be. The people in CIA understand morality
as very few American citizens will ever understand it. They know the difference
between truth and fiction. They know where the cut-off lines are and where the
fuzzy fringes are. We need to take a back seat to no one. One of the reasons
I get a little bit pained by all the moralizing in the newspapers is I think how do
some of those fellows have the right to do any moralizing, But I believe that we
do. I would not like to see us get sloppy or to get involved in any of these capers
around Washington because I can assure you that because the Agency is the kind
it is and because of the impression that it has left with the American people for
better or for worse, we would have a hell of a time living through it if we got
nailed, And I would hate to see us have to live through it because there's no
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reason to. We're not going to get a cent more in our budget by any of these
devices. We're not going to achieve one single thing by doing it. Therefore
if anybody feels under any constraints to talk too much to a newspaperman or
to a television broadcaster or an author or somebody, I wish that he'd just
come up and knock on the door of my office and submit his case and see if I
couldn't talk him out of it. I'd like to try. But in the meantime, let's hang
together here because this is one organization that we either hang together
or we're going to hang very separately indeed. I'm not trying to coin phrases;
I'm just trying to cite facts.
akara--
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, we have a capability, I think sometimes it's a curse
and sometimes a blessing, for quick reaction. I wonder if you expect many
more times in the future ala Southeast Asia that this will get us into trouble
on a continuing basis in activity where we don't rightfully belong/as far as mil
y action now)>
MR, HELMS: VEM~ I don't know how one predicts these things. I don't think
in 1960 one would have had any view of our involvement in Southeast Asia at
all. So in 1971 I don't know what the future holds. I think it is less likely in
this decade than it was in the last decade because the events of the last decade
have put some very clear strictures on American policy-makers and the extent
to which they're going to be able to involve the country in anything overseas.
What imore concernirW I think than the fact that we might get involved in
something is that the country may back up so far and get so inward looking in
its preoccupations that things happen in the world which we could have at least
guided or assisted and we stood aside and watched the car go over the cliff,
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This is not to say that I happen to be one of those people thM thinks we should
be the world's policeman or be digging our fingers into everybody's business
or going through the garbage cans in people's backyards and so forth, But I
do think that any rational person will agree that America.by and large in many
places in the world has been a source of good. At least we've certainly tried
to help the poor, the hungry, with health, with foreign aid, with all kinds of
things in the years since World War II, and have asked very, very little in
return if anything at all, Si I don't think the American record is one that has
to be looked on with shame. Part of the temper of the times is the rather
ridiculous way in which the American record overseas has been viewed by a
lot of citizens of this country. I can't figure out how they get that way. I don't
think they can possibly have read the history that's even now available about
these things and have arrived at these conclusions, SW I be that as it may, I
think that there is going to be a lot of inward turning, it's going to make
it more difficult for us to get our job done because there's going to be less
interest in the job, . that is not a pessimistic statement,'that is simply a
question of degree a little bit, not of kind. I don't want to leave you with the
impression that despite my remarks earlier this morning that we were going
to be out of business or something. There isn't any question of that. But
there is a question of emphasis, and as I did point out this emphasis is inward
looking rather than outward looking b In a strange way this is in the American
tradition. We have always been a nation since 1776 that has been preoccupied
pretty much with its own problems. It has been only for a very few years in
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our history that we've been heavily involved overseas. So it isn't hard to see
how we're sort of veering back now, What will pull us out of this, if anything
will, I don't know. But in this life things do go in trends and sweeps and the
pendulum goes back and forth and the dresses go up and the dresses go down
and so forth, 'fie t we're going to go through a period here when it looks
to me as though there was going to be less emphasis on the overseas commit-
ment and that in turn, I think, helps to answer your question,that there's prob-
ZT~
ably less for us to get involved in. But let me say that we're not out of Southeast
Asia by a long shot. American troops are. going to be out, but that doesn't mean
that we're going to be out. I think we've got a long row to hoe thereAre there
any other questions? Thank you,
Sp_ PL
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