NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R001800140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 13, 1967
• Content Type: NIE

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A Script Treatment
for a
30 Minute Color
Motion Picture.
"NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES"
(Product of the Intelligence Canmunity)
Office of National Estimates
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I
July 13, 1967
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Contract Scriptwriter
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The effectiveness of motion pictures
to communicate an important, complex
body of information is well established,
In fact, some would go so far as to
say that this medium is potentially
the most effective way to communicate
because of its inherent qualities.
Certainly, the fact that the motion
picture produces an impression of
itself quite apart from its substan-
tive content is worth noting. And if
you add the impact of motion pictures
and its ability to deliver its message
totally, it suggests a valid method
of telling your intended audience how
National Intelligence Estimates are
produced.
Of course, everything about such a
motion picture must be to high stand-
ards. We would do well to design a
picture that is technically excellent,
accurate in content and that is free
of artificiality. This suggests that
your film should seek to give a true
impression by having people play them-
selves, doing what they naturally do
and performing their tasks in the
environment in which they are familiar.
What this script/treatment proposes to
do is to suggest a film format not
unlike the best of network television
documentaries where the responses are
real, the situations as they exist
and people speaking their own lines,
not those imposed on them.
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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES MOTION PICTURE
Specifications
We will produce a 30 minute, sound, color motion picture
in 16mm Ektachrome utilizing a combination of synchronous
sound and voice over narration.
The film will be a factual documentation of the process
of producing National Intelligence Estimates utilizing
personnel in their real roles in their actual surroundings.
ase
The purpose of the project is to produce a motion picture
document for showings to high level Government officials
and CIA personnel in order to explain the way in which the
Board of National Estimates utilizes a variety of resources
to produce a document that is unique, accurate and credible.
Further, the film will present the philosophy behind the
process, the basic concepts involved in national intelligence
and how the Boar rd elates to USIB and the rest of the
intelligence community.
AT "high level Government officials" we mean those who
are in the position of dictating or influencing policy
which determines the size and organization of the intel-
ligence community.. As an example, members of Congress or
the Executive Branch would constitute a part of this prime
audience.
A secondary audience would consist of CIA personnel who
need a better understanding of National Estimates. It is
anticipated that trainees would benefit from exposure to
the film.
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Audience (continued)
We might characterize the several audiences as having a
high interest in the subject area, being of superior in-
tellect and having a recognized need for the information.
However, our audience may or may not have a background
of information on the subject, so we should not antici-
pate any substantial information level.
In view of the stated purpose for the film and the varied
information level of the audience, the content should, in
addition to fulfill the purpose, define national intelligence,
differentiate institutional (departmental) intelligence from
national intelligence and characterize "estimate". In
short, the film content will explain the product of our
intelligence efforts.
The basic reference for this content and the "theme" of
the motion picture will be the basic concepts and the
philosophy expressed by Sherman Kent.
The motion picture will be serious, factual, authoritative
and direct. We will use a fast pace, a logical continuity
and simple organization of the ideas presented. We will do
well to adapt the concise and factual style of the NIEs
themselves.
Classification
our motion picture will be classified SECRET.
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Following is a proposed script/
treatment. It is not intended as
final script form but, rather the
broad development or plan for the
motion picture. Please bear in mind
that the dialogue and answers to the
narrator's questions are not intended
as lines to be read but are included
only to suggest the general nature
of actual expressions which will.
be filmed extemporaneously.
Your Film Begins. . . .
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TITLE "A"
Clean color background
and standard classification
title:
"SECRET"
TITLE "B"
Same background, hot
press title:
"WARNING"
This material contains
information affecting the
National Defense of the
United States...", etc.
FREE OUT MUSIC: In and up for titles
TITLE "C"
A textured color background
showing round seals for each
of the USIB agencies. Then
zoon up CIA seal and super-
impose:
The Central Intelligence
Agency-- presents
TITLE "D" (Main Title)
Artwork background of line
drawing showing several
thoughtful men in conference.
Superimpose:
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES
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TITLE "E" (Sub-title)
Artwork background featuring
soft tone type like that in a
typical estimate (just the
suggestion of words, more
like texture than words to be
read and at angle so as not to
confuse overlay title. Title
reads:
"Product of the
Intelligence Commun-
ity"
MUSIC: Down and out.
FADE IN SYNCHRONOUS SOUND
SCENE # 1 INT DAY
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CU Board Member No. 1 as he BOARD MEMBER NO. 1 (PerhapsI I:
emphatically stresses a point.
His attitude is one of polite . . . but the point is, exactly what
and friendly difference with
a respected colleague. The set- is the Soviet intention in the Near
ting is a Board conference on
a draft estimate concerning the East? I believe the pattern of events
Near East.
indicates a definite goal of develop-
ing Russian military bases in the area!
SCENE # 2 INT DAY BOM MEMBER NO. 2 (Perhaps : 25X1
YOU Board Member No. 2. He
smiles but determinedly de- John, it just doesn't follow. It's
bates the point.
influence the Soviets want, not mili-
tary control. Why would they risk a
danger of confrontation with us?
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SCENE # 3 INT DAY
MCU Feature Board Member
No. 1 as he speaks to the
point but show both men.
In the background can be
seen the interested faces
of several other Board
members who are following
the comments.
SCENE # 4 INT DAY
MIS The Board as the two
members continue to debate.
A third member leans for-
ward to interject a comment.
BOARD MEMBER NO. 1:
They'll take big risks for one good
reason -- eventual control or aiacess
to Near Eastern oil. Besides, they
have continually underestimated our
resolve to . . . . .
NARRATOR:
The friendly debate you are witnessing
may sound like any informed discussion
on world affairs. But it is much more.
This group of distinguished gentlemen
constitutes CIA's Board of National
Estimates. They are charged with the
creation of this nation's highest
form of finished intelligence, the
National Intelligence Estimate.
As the executive agents for the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, this
Board has the prime responsibility
for utilizing all the resources of
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SCENE # 5 INT DAY
MS Sharp angle (wide angle
lens) looking down row of
members' faces as they fol-
low the debate. They look
serious and deterrained.
SCENE # 6 MONTAGE
Various scenes which suggest
variety of resources: men at
exotic electronic boards, the
computers working, a military
attache collecting information,
etc.
the total j elligenee community in
the production of an end product for
use by the elite policy makers in our
highest echelons of Governiient.
The importance of their task is not
taken lightly. They strive for learn-
ed, objective judgment. Each brings
a wealth of experience and knowledge
to each subject and uses these in con-
cert with impressive, resources:
intelligence collectors, civilian and
military, all over the world; exotic
intelligence collection methods, draw-
ing on vast scientific and industrial
resources; research and analysis organ-
izations with the best social and phy-
sical science techniques and unmatched
storage and retrieval facilities.
Board members may speak with authority.
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SCENE # 7 INT DAY
MCU Board Member No. 2 as
he pulls out the reference
from a neat folder. He reads.
SCENE # 8 INT DAY
CU Board Member No. 2 as
he reads from source. He
raises finger in gesture
to emphasize point of the
corollary statement.
He picks up neatly typed
reference to clipping or
a news cable.
Approved
BOARD MRWR NO. 2:
. . . . this written contribution from
the Director of Intelligence and Re-
search at State reinforces the posi-
tion I have stated. That report made
for "The Arab-Israeli Dispute" Esti-
mate 30-67, made this statement, and
I quote, "The Soviet attitude in the
Arab-Israeli dispute is a function
of Soviet policy in the area as a
whole. In its simplest form that
policy is to reduce and eventual:y
eliminate Western influence. But a
corollary to this is that it should
be done in such a way as to avoid a
confrontation with the US...", unquote.
And to quote Brezhnev himself in
his five July speech, "the Soviet
Union would pursue a political strug-
gle against Israel on behalf of the
Arab nations."
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SCENE # 9 INT DAY
VCU Board Member No. 1.
He shakes a finger good
naturedly at Member No. 2
DISSOLVE T0:
SCENE # 10 EXT DAY
MS Narrator is standing by
front entrance to Headquar-
ters Building next to the
corner stone.
SCENE # 11 INT DAY
MIS A central classified
mail desk at CIA as mounds
of field reports and journ-
als are being sorted for
distribution. The process
looks neat and well organ-
ized but there is an impres-
sive amount of material
BOARD MAR NO. 1 (humorously):
Willard, I question the validity of
that last "contributor".
BOARD M R NO. 1 (more seriously):
It's the continual reports from our
clandestine service about arms and
aircraft that brings sane evidence. . .
NARRATOR:
When Congress passed the National
Security Act of 1947, it called upon
the Director of Central. Intelligence
"to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security..."
The idea of central machinery for the
correlation and evaluation of intelli-
gence data was not born with the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. In the course
of World War II there emerged a system
designed . . . .
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SCENE # 12 TNT DAY
CU Low angle of a stack of
the classified mail as more
pieces are placed on it.
Some of the packages are of-
ficial looking packets, others
look like ordinary packages
with interesting foreign mark-
ings, some are magazines with
foreign titles and sane are
teebnical books.
. . . to turn mountains of raw intel-
ligence into finished intelligence
useful to those who make high level
policy decisions. Documents which
could be considered a sort of national
estimate were provided to the Presi-
dent, Cabinet and Joint Chiefs during
the latter part of the war.
SCENE # 13 INT DAY
MCU Young man with a mail
cart collects neat stacks of
the material above (seen in
background). He fills cart
with rough-sorted mail and
begins pushing it toward the
camera,
DISSOLVE TO:
SCENE # 14 INT DAY
NS High angle of the
seal in lobby as the mail
cart just seen is pushed
across it.
But the National Security Act provided
the statuatory basis for the develop-
ment of a system for the production of
coordinated national intelligence.
In other words, intelligence into
which all the resources of the nation
are channeled and which represents a
cancensus among the operating intel-
ligence agencies of the Government.
It is in providing the central staff
or secretariat which accomplishes this
coordination and in the role of its
Director as Chairman of the United
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SCENE # 15 INT DAY
Dolly out from very close
of a stack of blue covered
estimates as one of ONE's
secretaries logs them and
sorts them for distribution.
When the camera is well back,
the secretary gets up from her
desk, puts log book out of sight
and picks up the NIEs for dis.
tribution to Board Members. The
camera follows her to Sherman
Kent's office which she enters.
SCENE # 16 INT' DAY
MIS Sherman Kent at his desk
States Intelligence Board, that the
Central Intelligence Agency most fully
lives up to its name.
Since their initiation in 1950, more
than 1,000 National Intelligence
Estimates, called "NIEs " or "Blue-
books" by many because of the color
of their covers, have been prepared
about 60 each year.
The name most often identified with
as the secretary hands him an the NIEs is that of Sherman Kent,
estimate. He speaks pleasantly
to her and she leaves. Mr. Kent Director of ONE and Chairman of the
thumbs through the Estimate and
then lays it down. He looks up Board of National Estimates. His
at camera and listens to the
question.
contribution to the development of the
present estimate system has been unique.
An internationally recognized historian
at Yale, Dr. Kent served during World
War II in the OSS as Chief, African
Section, Research and Analysis Branch.
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In 1953. he joined the Office of
National Estimates at the request
of his old chief, Harvard historian
William L. Langer, who set up the
Office under the directive of CIA
Director, General Walter Bedell Smith.
Camera dollies in to tighter
close-up. Sherman Kent, would you tell us why
the NIEs are important?
SCENE # 17 INT DAY
MOU Sherman Kent. Change
angle from previous scene.
He picks up the NIE on his
desk and uses it as a prop.
Sherman turns the NIE to
the camera and indicates the
signature.
SHERMAN KIT:
The National Intelligence Estimate is
almost by definition directed to the
most important problems of national
security policy, and is the intel-
ligence community's most important
pronouncement.
Let me justify the superlative.
First, the NIE is submitted by the
Director of Central Intelligence, who
is recognized as the chief intelligence
officer of the US Government. It is
his estimate and it bears his signs-
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Secondly, National Intelligence Esti-
mates are initiated at high echelons
of the national security mechanism.
Some have come at the specific re-
quest of the President or White House
staff; a great many are laid on at
the request of Cabinet Members, most
notably the Secretaries of State and
Defense. Still others are made at the
request of the Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of Central Intelligence, or
high officers of the State and Defense
Departments.
SCENE # 18 INT DAY
CU Sherman Kent as he con-
tinues. He opens the cover
of the NIE and shows the
concurrence on the inside
front cover.
If you look inside the cover, you see
that the NIEs are approved and are
concurred in by the United States In-
telligence Board -- the chiefs of the
principal US intelligence organiza-
tions under the Chairmanship of the
He puts down the NIL Director of CIA.
Lastly, NIEs are prepared for the
highest levels of Government where
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they make a significant contribution
to the formulation of national secu-
rity policy. Some estimates, notably
those on the military establishments
of our principal adversaries, are
of critical importance in decisions
relating to the size of our defense
budget and the kind of military es-
tablishment it will be used to create.
SCENE # 19 INT DAY
MCU Sherman Kent as he turns
to the new camera position
and listens to the narrator's
question.
NARRATOR:
What are the subjects of the National
Estimates?
SIHER14AN KIMT:
They cover a broad spectrum. We have
written them on our friends, even on
our closest allies. We have written
many on the uncommitted states. We
have, of course, written them on every
phase of the life of our adversaries,
their politics, their economies, their
foreign policies, scientific and tech-
nological developments, and above all
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their military capabilities and stra-
tegic thinking. One estimate might
cover a large geographic area such
as Latin America or a region encom-
passing several nations. Some deal
with special political or economic
problems or with international, insti-
tutions. All are related to current
foreign policy decisions that confront
the US Government.
SCE # 20 INT DAY
CU Sherman Kent In addition to these erxpository
estimates we do a number of con-
Start slow dolly out.
tingency estimates, papers which be
gin, "What happens if. . ." These pa-
pers are almost always laid on at the
specific request of policy makers who
want to have our best judgment on re-
actions to certain anticipated devel-
opments or on responses to certain ac-
tions by the US.
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This latter kind of a paper, incidentally,
is the closest we ever get to making
net estimates in which US actions are
part of the equation. Note that in
keeping with our constant endeavor to
keep intelligence separate from policy,
we work only with projections of US
policy given us by the policy-maker,
never the other way around.
DISSOLVE TO:
SCENE ,1 21 INT DAY
MIS Narrator is in the
Reading Room with sever-
al stacks of estimates
before him. He indicates
the first stack of some
60 NIEs, those produced
in 1966.
He sorts through stack
looking at titles which
are turned toward the
camera.
Camera dollies to MCU.
He indicates 5 or 6 that
are annual estimates.
NARRATOR:
Any year's inventory of the 60-odd
National Intelligence Estimates will
show marked similarities to that of
any other year. For example, every
year's list for the past decade shows
pretty much the same range of papers
relating to Soviet military matters.
Several papers are written as an
annual exercise. The most important
of these, of course, deal with sub-
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jects such as Soviet or Communist
Chinese strategic attack and defense
forces, developments in the broad
nuclear area and strategic thinking.
SCENE # 22 INT DAY Most of the rest will reflect the
CU Just the titles of
NIEs as he thumbs through Government's preoccupation with cur-
and we see paper on Panama,
Middle East, etc. rent foreign policy problems. The
need dictates the subjects.
At this point the film would cover the
steps involved in initiation of the
National Intelligence Estimates. This
would be developed through a conversa-
tion between the CES,
and
Among the points covered would be that
several members of the USIB have noted
a need for an up-to-date paper on Sov-
iet intentions in the Mediterranean
Basin (conversation to be based on cir-
cumstances surrounding NIE 11-6-67).
It would be pointed out that schedules
are set each quarter, that the USIB
acts on motions to initiate NIEs, that
either the Board approves the estimate
as a part of each three month program
or on an ad hoc basis to meet the imme-
diate need.
"Assuming the USIB approves this NIE
who will have responsibility for it?",
asks 0 In answer to which
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pulls out a copy of form 55066 from
his stack of papers and suggests that
there is a dual responsibility implied.
This serves as a means to go into gra-
phic animation shoving a simplified or-
ganization chart and the narrator giving
a brief run-down. The camera trucks in
on the block representing the Board of
National Estimates.
There is a dissolve to several. Board Mem-
bers leaving a meeting and the camera
follows one to office of
1 who the narrator a ns is the
senior Board Member by virtue of length
of service and one intimately acquainted
with the ONE organization. The question
and answer technique would develop this
information briefly on both the Board
and the Staff.
Taking up the development of the
estimate called for on Soviet Inten-
tions in the Mediterranean, we see
the representatives assembling for a
Terms of Reference Meeting. As they
begin session, the Chairman of meeting
asks the reps to identify themselves
by organization. The Chairman sets
purpose of the meeting and brings out
that contributions are requested from
all interested parties. At this point
we leave the meeting by dissolving
from the Estimates Chief on the Chair-
man's right to him discussing develop-
ments with two or three staff men in
his office. The narrator uses this
sequence as background to develop the
idea that NIEs must have those char-
acteristics of all worthwhile intel-
ligence work: accuracy, credibility,
and relevance.
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In the process of the discussion the
point would be brought out that the
contributors for any NIE are varied,
that only a relatively small -- al-
though important -- contribution is
derived from the Clandestine Services
(contrary to popular opinion) and
again reinforcement of the idea that
the process of making an estimate
involves the whole of the intelli-
gence community.
At some point in the development of
the staff function,we would have the
section chief (maybe l make a
phone call to a contributor (perhaps
Glidden at State) with a special ques-
tion. The call serves as a transition
to the work of the contributors as we
see this work developing at State
(filmed on their location).
Then the Staff man is ready to draft
and as he collects his data and dic-
tates notes, the narrator covers some
of the elements of the writing of the
estimates. Then the staff man goes to
a typewriter and starts the actual
drafting. We follow his rough copy
typing with finished copy, typing of
a stencil by staff stenographer, and
the reproduction by the Publications
Section. It will be pointed out that
the drafting of an estimate from the
contributions is far more than an edi-
ting and compiling job -- it is infin-
itely more than a scam total of its
parts.
Now we follow the estimate draft to the
meeting of the full Board. The meeting
opens with the Chairman calling for
general comments. There are several
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kudos and some constructive criticisms.
At this point the "difference" seen in
the opening is developed more fully.
During this the narrator points out that
the Board of National Estimates strives
for consensus -- not that there is no
room for clean dissent (which has a place
later in the process) but as represent-
atives of the DCI, the Board's role is to
establish a single viewpoint. In the
words of Sherman Kent (in his notes for
the film), "(ki this occasion the Board
will not only wish to search its own
collective soul, but will want direct
communication with the Director in whose
behalf it will be making the judgment."
The meeting progresses and the text is
examined and modified as the Board feels
is proper. Now the revised draft is
ready to go back to the USIB agencies
for review.
We return to the film narrator at this
point as he frames the question, "Con-
sidering that the estimating process
involves a number of contributors from
the intelligence community, how is it
that the National Intelligence Estimates
can resist becoming what Winston
Churchill once referred to as "Top Secret
Platitudes?"
In answer to this we inter-cut short
comments of 2 or 3 Board members in
which they speak to this question and
bring out that Congress' decision to
place coordinating authority in the
hands of a body without "departmental"
or parochial interests has been fund-
amental to a workable, effective system;
that the inherent checks and balances
seem to eliminate the compromises; that
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the Board has never compromised on
real principle although have often
compromised on matters of individual
taste; that the system of USIB dissents
through footnotes provides for minority
position, and the dedication to objectiv-
ity has been jealously preserved by the
Board and contributors; and that the
practices adopted have clearly obviated
the watering down process.
Next the Estimate is reviewed by the
USIB and approved. This section will
be brief and handled as "voice-over"
narration to prevent imposing unnec-
essarily on the USIB's time.
SCENE # X-1 INT DAY
MCU An ONE secretary is
preparing a clean copy of
the estimate.
DISSOLVE TO:
SCENE # X-2 INT DAY
145 Girl in Publications Div-
ision is proofing a galley
NARRATOR:
Once approved by USIB the draft
is prepared for reproduction and
distribution. Every detail is care-
fully checked,
The approved clean copy is set in
type, proofed and again checked
with a colored pencil. She for accuracy by the principal
has found only relatively
few mistakes. She is approach. writer.
ed by the Estimates Staff
man whoa we saw preparing the
initial draft and she hands
him the finished galley. He
thanks her and begins to read.
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DISSOLVE TO:
SCENE # X-3 INT DAY
Dolly back from VCU of press
runs (preferably on the Sov-
iet Intentions Paper 11-6..67).
A CIA printer pulls the paper
off the rack.
SCENE # X-4 INT DAY
MCU High angle of the bind-
ing operation.
SCENE # X-5 INT DAY
er Mr. Helms or
signing a copy.
e ter if both are
available.
(This can be handled by ex-
treme close-up of approximate
signature by someone else if
it is not possible to get in
any other way.)
SCENE =- x-6 EXT DAY
MLS The White House Office
Building gate as a courier
and guard are passed by the
"gate" guard. The courier
carries a briefcase.
Printing is performed by CIA's
own facility under strict security
procedures. Each copy will receive
a classification code number so that
distribution will be rigidly con-
trolled.
Then the distinguishing blue covers
are applied. .
. . . and the finished National.
Intelligence Estimate is signed
by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence as the submitter and the
signature and copy is authenticated
by the USIB Executive Secretary.
Distribution is affected immediately
so that the user will receive it as
quickly as possible. Normal distri-
bution is made to the White House,
National Security Council, Department
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SCENE # 6A - 6E MONTAGE
Deliveries at NSC, State,
Dept. of Defense, AEC and
FBI. Note: some of these
scenes can be aerials, not
necessarily showing the
delivery.
of State, Deportment of Defense,
Atomic Energy Commission and Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
SCENE # X-7 INT DAY
Narrator is again in the
Reading Room. Before him is
the estimate just seen, a copy
of New York Times and a uni-
versity paper on economics.
He is holding a SNIE and a
memorandum.
SCENE # x-8 INT DAY
VCU A SNIE,
NARRATOR (synchronous sound):
Thus we have witnessed the process
by which our intelligence community
relays its knowledge to those who
make policy.
Normally a paper like this one with
the contributions it had would take
about 6 to 8 weeks. However, about
one third of the estimates are done
in faster time by modifying or elimin-
ating some of the steps in the process.
A shorter schedule could, of course,
adversely affect the quality of a
highly factual paper. But the Special
NIE or SNIE, as the more rapidly pro-
duced paper is called, is not necessar-
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SCENE # X-9 INT DAY ily of poorer quality than the regular
MCU Narrator.
NIE. It is a different kind of paper,
as a rule, written to provide the
policy maker with an estimate based on
immediately available facts in hours
or days instead of weeks. On very
special occasions during national
crises, valuable coordinated papers
have been prepared overnight.
He holds up a memorandum. Still another kind of paper prepared
by the estimating process is one known
as a "memorandum", usually written
as short essay on a single subject to
bring a problem to the attention of
the policy maker.
SCENE # X-10 INT DAY
CU The narrator. He holds
up the Estimate 11-6-67 we
have followed.
But getting back to the formal.
estimate, the kinds of information
which some National Intelligence
Estimates convey might seem not to be
very different from, say, a newspaper
editorial or a dissertation in a
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learned journal. Their style and for-
mat, of course, may be apparently
different but what is the read dif-
ference? Let's ask Sherman Kent.
SCENE # X-11 INT DAY
MS Sherman Kent on couch in
his office. A cup of coffee
is on the table. The atmosphere
is relaxed and informal. Near
him on the wall is his picture
of Fujiyama.
SHERMAN KENT:
In many ways an NIE is similar to
an article or an academic study. Pre-
sumably, all three are based on some
sort of research. But the kinds of
research for each is quite different.
The editorial article writer necessarily
roust depend upon the press services,
his personal observations and a few
observations related to him. The
nature of his research is similar to
that of the estimate writer except
in degree of depth. He simply cannot
have the resources afforded the
estimator.
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Camera dollies in to MCU. He has to do without whole ranges of
information available only to the
Government and held tightly within the
Government itself. Much of his article
tends to empress his single viewpoint --
his opinion -- about events. Also,
he does not have the quality of the
process which we have been talking
about. That is not to say that the ed-
itorial may not be highly perceptive,
in fact, it may often be highly accurate
in its analysis.
SCENE # X-12 INT DAY The academic paper on the other hand
MCU Sherman as he talks.
would probably be based on detailed
research. Such papers are usually less
current than the editorial or the esti-
mate. Again,, the sources open to the
academician, although in considerable
depth, are not as extensive as those in
the intelligence process nor are the
sources as current. Another difference
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in the NIE and the academic paper re-
sults from sheer volume of talent that
we are able to focus on a single sub-
ject at a time of our own choosing.
I might say that I know any university
would be pleased to have the services
of the men we have on the ONE Board
and Staff.
SCENE # X-13 INT DAY
CU Sherman Kent.
NARRATOR:
Sherman, would another difference be
that the National Intelligence Esti-
mate is written to meet the exact re-
quirement of the requestor?
SHERMAN KENT:
Yes, but it is not the only such docu-
ment in Government. The NIE must be
distinguished from the "Commander's
Estimate". Theoretically, at least
the estimates we are considering focus
on the other men: focus, for example,
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on his political and economic problems,
and the probable directions his politi-
cal, social, and economic problems will
evolve with the passage of time; focus
on his "strategic stature", to humor
myself by self quotation.
NARRATOR:
I gather you mean from your book,
"Strategic Intelligence"?
SHERMAN KENT (humorously):
I'm afraid so.
Well, my point is that our estimates
do not focus on how our side would
come out in some sort of contest with
the other man. In short, these
estimates are never intended to be
net estimates in which our own
strengths and planned use of those
strengths are pitted against those
of the other side as the commander
would do. To do this would neces-
sitate estimating our own strength
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and our own future courses of action,
SCENE # x-14 iNT DAY
MCU Angle change. He
listens, then answers.
SCENE # X-15 INT DAY
MCU Angle change of Sherman
as he smiles, then speaks.
(Pick angle which will
show picture of Mt. Fujiyaina
to advantage later in the
scene.)
would mean, in short, getting into the
policy area -- a cardinal sin for the
intelligence estimator. Our estimates,
by and large, provide the intelligence
ingredient in the final Commander's
Estimate made by our country's policy
makers.
NARRATOR:
Sherman, would you sum up the estima-
ting process for us?
SHERMAN KENT:
Estimating is what you do when you
run out of facts. Estimative state-
ments are the ones you make when you
cannot talk factually.
NARRATOR:
That doesn't inspire much confidence
in estimates.
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SHERMAN KENT:
In the kind of world in which we
live it is vital that we peer as far
as possible into the unknown, a region
where there are few facts. We try to
do it as systematically as possible.
If you glance at one of the IVIES I
think you will find three sorts of
statement. First, statements about
knowable things which are known to a
high degree of accuracy and can be
stated with confidence. This is
a factual statement. The second and
third kind of statements deal with
phenomena which are knowable but un-
known, or literally unknowable. These
statements are, of course, couched in
the language of judgment. The are,
in essence, reasoned and judicious
speculations.
He gets up and points to the
picture of Fujiyama.
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To give you an analogy, consider
this picture of Mt. Fujiyama. Assume
that the total mountain represents
SCENE # X-16 INT DAY a subject of interest to the President
VCU Picture of Fujiyama.
and his advisers. The solid base of
that mountain represents the in-
He covers the snow covered disputable facts. But suppose that
peak with his hands.
SCENE # X-17 INT DAY
MCU Sherman and the picture.
a good part of that mountain --
or the knowledge we want -- is obscured
by clouds. The security precautions
of a foreign nation are well intended
to "cloud" the information we seek.
Well, just as classical induction
the factual observation -- has revealed
the base of the knowledge we seek, we
can now call on the classical method-
ologies of deduction -- to infer
from reason. You see, even though
the mountain top is not revealed
to us we can speculate on it by the
slope of the sides we can observe and
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(SC # X-17 continued)
Pan with him as he sits
down. He takes a sip of
coffee.
what discernable facts we may see
through the clouds, our knowledge of
other mountains, and the like. This
is the process of estimating.
Bear in mind that an intelligence sub-
ject is seldom as static as a mountain.
In fact, the actions we take as a
result of the estimate may actually
cause a foreign power to make changes
thus changing the shape of the peak,
so to speak.
NARRATOR:
Sherman, is our present system of
estimates effective?
SHERMAN KENT:
It seems there will always be clouds
around the mountain tops. And we must
take care to remind the estimate user
that we have no magic formula -- no crys-
tal ball. Whether the Soviet planner
or the .Arab leader will actually do
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SCENE # X-18 INT DAY
CU Sherman Kent.
Start slow dolly out.
what he thinks he will do, even he
What we do offer the President and
his advisers is the assurance that
they can activate well oiled mach-
inery to sensitize the eyes and ears
of the intelligence community, to
winnow the vast stores of information
in its possession and to produce, as
quickly as necessary, a concise,
credible and accurate document on any
subject they choose. And when that
document is produced they can know
that it represents a national con-
sensus.
National Intelligence Estimates
have received praise from Presidents,
Cabinet officers and other high officers
of Government. Compliments such as
these please us -- but not as much
as the day to day evidence, in the
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FADE OUT
FADE IN
TITLE "F"
TITLE "G"
Standard Classification Title
"SECRET"
form of requests that 11IIEs serve the
needs of our nation's important policy
makers.
MUSIC: In and up.
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