THE CIA'S DIRTY TRICKS UNDER FIRE - AT LAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

TUE PROGRESSIVE
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under, Fire-- t Las
ANDREW HAMILTON
For the first time in more than two decades, Congress
is beginning to take a hard look at the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. In the wake of revelations of CIA com-
plicity in the Watergate affair, a serious debate about
the Agency is now taking shape, and it could develop
into an historic battle over the role of clandestine oper-
ations in American foreign policy.
"Clandestine operations" (which should not be con-
fused with the gathering of foreign intelligence) in-
clude a wide range of political, propaganda, economic,
cultural, and paramilitary activities known within the
CIA as "covert action" and "special operations," or,
more generally, Dirty Tricks. T.liese operations have
included, over the years, such practices as:
0 lidden support and assistance to political parties
in foreign election campaigns.
gaged in scholarship, propaganda, labor, youth, and
cultural affairs.
o Establishing ostensibly 'independent, private com-
.panics, including a number of airlines.
C Arranging coups d'etat; supporting, training, and
leading private armies and air forces in foreign nations.
o Helping to establish security police organizations
in a number of countries, and other Cold War ploys.
The CIA operations amount, in total, to a clandes-
tine American foreign policy under the exclusive
control of the President, insulated from public control
and even from public scrutiny-not to mention Con-
gress itself.
President Nixon has given a clear signal that he
places a high value on covert operations. His new Di-
0 The establishment of dummy foundations to pro- _ .........
fifty-three, spent his adult life in Dirty Tricks, bcgin-
vidc funds for a number of private organizations en- ning with OSS guerrilla operations in World War II
Andrew llamiliton is a 11'a.chington writer whose articles and culminating in a twelve-year stint as one of the
have appeared in many publications, including Congressional CIA officials most deeply involved in the Vietnam war.
Quarterly, Science, The New York Times, and The Colby was CIA station chief in Saigon (and a
Economist in London. Recently he served in the office of staunch supporter of President Ngo Dinh Diem) -from
.program analysis of the National Security Council, where 1959 to 1961. From 1962 through 1967 lie was chic? of
he. specialized in the defense program and arms control the Par East Division. of the Clandestine Services, the
plans. lie wrote "Helpless Giant," a study of the national formal title of the operating arm of the CIA. From
defense budget. 1968 to 1971 he was involved with the "pacification"
IIS/HC- %)
rIP
h k/ no, C E A's EDY'Rhfty Tricks.
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program in Vietnam, first as deputy and later as ain-
bassador in charge. Ili 1971-72 he was back in Wash-
ington again as Executive Director (number three
man) at the Agency. When that post was abolished in
a reorganization this year, he became head of the
Directorate of Operations, which runs the Clandestine
Services.
Colby is.a quiet, undemonstrative nian-"where lie's
really mad he's almost whispering," recalls a former
employe-whose mild manner conceals the toughness
and boldness of a behind-the-lines guerrilla fighter. Ile
has the reputation of being one of the CIA's most re-
sourceful managers of Dirty Tricks. Ile was responsi-
ble, as head of the pacification program, for American
participation in the Phoenix program in which thou-
sands of Vietnamese suspects were killed or jailed on
suspicion that they worked for the Vietcong.
Senator William Proxmire, Wisconsin Democrat,
complained during the recent debate on Colby's norn-
ination that the Senate was being asked to cast a
"blind vote." He observed: "We don't really know who
Mr. Colby is. We are not allowed to go back into
his personal employment history and judge his fitness.
We do not know what jobs he has accomplished . . .
And we will be confirming him for a blind position
[about which] we know very little...."
Although the Senate confirmed Colby August 1 by
a vote of eighty-three to thirteen, the decisive battle
will begin this fall. Senator John C. Stennis, Mississip-
pi Democrat, has announced that his Senate Armed
Services Committee will hold hearings on the CIA's
basic legislative charter to determine whether the
Agency exceeded its authority in waging war in Laos
and in its involvement with the White House "plumb-
ers" in the Watergate affair.
Stennis's Committee is the one whose CIA Oversight
Subcommittee has failed to meet for several years,
and whose members have rarely expressed any interest
in supervising the secret and powerful Agency. But the
hearings come amid a growing feeling in Washington-
expressed even by Chairman Stennis-that the CIA's
Cold War mission as the clandestine action arm of
U.S.foreign policy no longer serves the national inter-
est, if it ever did.
The man who founded the CIA in 1917, President
Harry S Truman, reached this conclusion a full decade
ago. In 1963, he wrote: "For some time I have been
disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from
its original assignment. It has become an operational
and at times a policyrnaking arm of the Govern-
ment . . I never had any thought that when I set
up the CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak-
and-dagger operations."
Other Presidents have had qualms about the CIA.
John F. Kennedy, a former aide once said, wanted to
"splinter it into a thousand pieces and scatter it to
the winds" after the Bay of Pigs disaster, a CIA-
planned operation which Kennedy had approved. Lyn-
don 13. Johnson, hardly a shrinking violet when it came
to U.S. exploits abroad, was appalled by the rainifica-
Lions of some CIA operations. When lie took office he
learned, according to an account by Leo Janos in the
July, 1973, z1 lantie, that "we had been operating a
damned Murder Inc. in the Caribbean." Even Rich-
ard M. Nixon, in a 1969 speech to CIA employes,
acknowledged that "this organization has a mission
that, by necessity, runs counter to sonic of the very
deeply held traditions in the country, and feelings, high
idealistic feelings, about what a free society ought to
be."
But President Kennedy, like his successors, soon came
to recognize the immense potential of an organization
whose acts could be neither traced by the victims nor
supervised by his political opponents in Congress. The
Kennedy years, in the opinion of one former intelli-
gence official, became "tire heyday" for the CIA's covert
political intervention in other countries. President
Johnson followed by unleashing massive CIA oper-
ations in Laos and South Vietnam. And President Nix-
on, in the same 1969 speech, concluded that the CIA
"is a necessary adjunct to the conduct of the
Presidency."
What both troubled and attracted these Presidents
was not the CIA's "quiet intelligence" activities, but
its wide range of Dirty. Tricks. In the decade since
Harry Truman's warning, little has been done to curb
the President's own Back Alley Boys. Except for a hand-
ful of progressives; Congress continued politely to look
the other way and ask no embarrassing questions.
Now, in the lurid light of Watergate, Congress can no
longer refuse to take a closer look.
By their very nature, covert operations defy effective
Congressional oversight. A handful of men in the
House and Senate, senior members of the Armed Serv-
ices and Appropriations Committees, are the only
members of Congress allowed to ask the Agency what it
is doing. Their meetings have always been secret, and
their deliberations are never disclosed even to other
members of Congress. Their recommendations to the
Agency, if any, have never been tested in general de-
bate or put to a vote of Congress.
From the time of its inception, the CIA's name has
been synonymous with secrecy; no outsider can hope
to obtain more than a rough map of its terrain. It is
the Agency's practice neither to confirm nor to deny
any allegations made about it. CIA employes take the
most stringent secrecy oath administered by the Gov-
ernment. This oath has been interpreted by the Agency
as prohibiting a present or former employe from reveal-
ing anything he has learned while working for the
CIA--an interpretation that has won at least partial
support in the Federal courts. Victor Marchetti, a for-
mer CIA official, is under court order to submit the
manuscript of his forthcoming book about the Agency
for review before publication, and the Agency has been
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authorized to stake deletions, provided they are not
arbitrary or capricious.
But the Agency has found it impossible to remain
wholly invisible. '.Ilhc picture I present here was as-
sembled from the public record (which grows longer
almost daily), and from interviews conducted over a
period of several years with a number of present and
former CIA employes, intelligence officials from other
U.S. agencies, foreign service officers, Congressional
sources, and Administration aides. (While I had a
limited contact with CIA intelligence analysts when I
served as a member of the National Security Council
staff in 1970-1971, I had no contact with the Glandes-
tine organization or activities of the CIA.)
The CIA has khoth a public and a secret charter.
The public charter, on which Senator Stennis's hear-
ings will focus, i!; found in the National Security Act
of 1947 and its 1949 amendments (U.S. Code Cliaptcr.
50, Title 15, sections 403 ff.). It is the vaguest of char-
ters, stating that the. CIA shall "coordinate" intelligence
,activities undertaken in the interest of national security
and shall:
o Advise the National Security Council regarding
national security intelligence activities.
e Make recommendations to the NSC for coordina-
tion of intelligence activities.
G Correlate, evaluate, and
curity intelligence.
o Perform "for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies such additional services of common concern"
as the NSC directs.
? "Perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time
direct."
The last two provisions provide the official rationale
for the CIA's clandestine activities, both in collecting
intelligence and in performing covert operations.
These duties are detailed in the Agency's "secret char-
ter"-a series of top-secret Presidential orders known
as National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or
'.I'he first proviso, which the CIA apparently violated
in extending assistance to the White House "lYhunb-
crs," was intended to protect the FBI's turf from CIA
encroac.huncnt and to restrict the CIA to foreign intel-
ligence activities. The second proviso, however, seems
to give the Director scope for a broad range of domes-
tic counter-intelligence activities. Whatever the justi-
fication, the CIA has not been reluctant to undertake
clandestine operations within the United States.
The Act also permits the Agency to keep secret its
budget, organization, personnel strength, identity of
personnel, and other operational and administrative
details, notwithstanding other provisions of law, and
to spend money without regard for normal Government
procedures. -
Three points about the CIA's charter stand out,
FIRST, the Agency is answerable directly to the Pres-
ident, and to the President alone. (The National Se-
curity Council is merely an advisory body made up of
Presidential appointees-the Secretaries of State and
Defense and, the Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness.) '
SECOND, the CIA enjoys extraordinary freedom from
public and even Congressional scrutiny.
TsxiRD, its duties encompass much more than the
routine collection and evaluation of information. "The
powers of the proposed Agency," warned Secretary of
State George C. Marshall in a memorandum to Pres-
ident Truman in 19.17, "seem almost unlimited and
need clarification."
The CIA grew rapidly from its first days in 1947.
("Bigger than [ the Department of ] State, by '48," was
a common boast.) The Agency now has about 16,500
employes (after a seven per cent reduction in force
put into effect earlier this year by Director James R.
Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense). In recent
years its direct budget has hovered around $750 million,
including funds for direct expenses and. covert projects,
but it may now be slightly lower as a result of the
winding down of the wars in Vietnam and Laos.
which has Similar in size, budget, and overseas staff, the CIA
d Services Committee
A
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,
rme
enate
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jurisdiction over the National Security Act, apparently rivals-if. it does not surpass-the Department of State
has never seen these documents, though they are essen- as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In A Thou-
tial to an understanding of the CIA's clandestine op- sand Days, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that in 1961
orations. Colby, the new director, recently promised to the Agency "had almost as many people under official
make the "N-Skids" available to the Committee, but cover overseas (i.e., posing as employes of other Gov-
there is no reason to assume that they will be disclosed ernmcnt agencies, such as the Foreign Service or AID)
to the public. as State; in a number of countries CIA officers out-
Section 103(d) also contains two seemingly contra- numbered those from State in the political sections (of
dictory provisos regarding CIA activities within the the, U.S. mission). Often the CIA station chief had been
United States. One declares that "the Agency shall in the country longer than the ambassador, had snore
have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or money at his disposal, and exerted more influence."
internal security functions." The other states that "the This situation seems to have changed little in the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible last twelve years. Some recent U.S. foreign policy offi-
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from cials believe that the CIA's overseas employes, both
? a I nationals and foreign, includ-
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ing those operating under "deel) cover"-tliat is, with
no visible ties to the U.S. Government-far outnuin-
ber those of the State Department.
For a variety of reasons, the CIA's direct budget
(including project money) does not begin to tell the
full story of the Agency's size or role within the Gov-
ernment:
OIn large overseas clandestine operations, such as
the war in Laos, covert activities in Vietnam, and the
Bay of Pigs invasion, direct Agency costs and project
funds represent only a fraction. of the total costs to the
U.S. Government. The staff of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee found earlier this year, for instance,
that of the $375 million ceiling set by legislation for
spending in Laos (until recently a CIA operation) dur-
ing the last fiscal year, only $5.5 million represented
direct CIA expenditures, while another $60 million was
distributed by the CIA as project money for support
of Laos and Thai irregular troops. The rest of the
funds were supplied fr?oni the budgets of the Agency
for International Development and the Defense Dc-
partmcnt, (These Laos program figures exclude addi-
tional large costs for U.S. air operations in Laos, many
of which have been in support of CIA-directed military
operations.)
a The CIA has financed, and apparently controls, a
number of private corporations which provide cover for
covert activities overseas. Of these the largest and best
known is Air America. Earnings from these activities
are said to be available to the Agency in addition to
the annual budget provided from general Federal rev-
enues.
O The CIA has the use without cost, according to
former officials, of U.S. military bases and "surplus"
equipment, from which it is said to have built up a
large worldwide supply and operational base network.
For these reasons alone,, the CIA has been called a
multi-billion annual operation. But, in addition, the
Director of Central Intelligence, in his role as head of
the U.S. foreign intelligence community, has respon-
sibilities for coordinating the activities and reviewing
the budgets of all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies
and operations, In total, these activities-most of them
under Defense Department auspices-cost between
$3 billion and $4 billion a year,.not counting the CIA.
These operations include the costly overhead recon-
naissance activities of the Air Force (such as spy satel-
lites, U-2s, SR-71 aircraft) ; communications and sig-
nals intelligence, which conic under the direction of the
$1-billion-a-year National Security Agency; the analyt-
ical staffs and operations of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force intelligence agencies; the Defense Intelligence
Agency; the minuscule State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research; and such miscellaneous
oilier organizations as the National Photo Interpreta-
tion Center and. the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, the latter of which transcribes and translates
SANDERS IN THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
"No, dear, they weren't on trial .... they were
the Prosecuting team"
intelligence operations of the various military com-
mands around the world are included, the annual cost
may reach $6 billion, according to some sound esti-
mates. In cost, personnel, and influence, the foreign
intelligence "community" ranks with or above several
Cabinet departments.
The CIA is organized into four main divisions, known
as "directorates," each headed by a deputy director.
Until recently, these men reported more or less formal-
ly to the Executive Director, nominally the Agency's'
number three man. Under Schlesinger's reorganization
plan, the post of Executive Director was abolished early
in 1973 and the incumbent, at that time William E.
Colby, was made the head of the Agency's largest
branch, the Directorate of Operations, which has re-
sponsibility for all clandestine activities and for the
CIA's eighty-five overseas stations. In recent years this
Directorate (formerly called "Plans") has had about
6,500 to 7,000 employes and a budget of about $350
million, or nearly half the Agency total.
The other directorates arc:
0INTEI.LIGLtvcr, Which. collates, analyzes, and dis-
seminates intelligence collected by all U.S. foreign in-
telligence agencies and also gathered from unclassified
sources. The size of this directorate has been esti-
mated to be roughly 3,000 persons; its budget, about
$75 million.
overseas radio Fc~4_0100~~ItJ~J~$UU'2-~vliich
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search and development of technical systems for collect-
ing intelligence, such as spy satellites; analyzes scientific
and technical data collected by all sources, and circu-'
lates reports on its findings. The personnel strength
is estimated at about 1,500; its budget at about $125
million,, not counting large additional amounts (per-
haps $500 million to $1 billion) spent annually by the
National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force on
technical collection systems.
0 AnsIINIs'rt vrIoN, under which are lumped such
functions as supply, finance, medical and personnel
services, training, security, and communications. (Over-
seas communications appear to have been transferred
to Operations under the Schlesinger reorganization.) In
recent years, the personnel strength of this directorate
has been estimated at roughly 4,500 and its budget at
about $200 million a year.
Former intelligence officials calculate that when sup-
port costs are distributed, somewhere between two-
thirds and three-quarters of the CIA's direct budget is
allotted to clandestine operations. Of these funds, more
than half are said to go to various types of covert
foreign policy operations-Dirty Tricks-rather than to
intelligence collection and reporting by overseas stations.
A separate staff known as the Office of National
Estimates supervises the preparation of the intelligence
community's principal long-range projections--the se-
ries of National Intelligence Estimates which cover
such diverse subjects as the strength and organization
of the Vietcong and the size, trends, and doctrine of
the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The office is under
the direction of the Board of National Estimates, a doz-
en senior officials from CIA,. State, and the military.
In addition, a number of smaller staff offices are
attached to the office of the Director. These include
the inspector general, general counsel, legislative coun-
sel, cable secretariat, and an office of plans, programs,
and budgets. Perhaps the most important of these of-
fices is the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), recent-
ly expanded by Schlesinger and given a stronger role in
coordinating the programs and budgets of the entire
intelligence community.
The Directorate of Operations constitutes the covert
side of CIA, known as the Clandestine Services. Offi-
cers of the Clandestine Services generally pose as offi-
cials of some other U.S. Government agency or private
organization, and sometimes use false names. Except
for some minor modifications that may have been in-
? stituted in the Schlesinger reorganization, the Director
ate is organized as follows:
A number of specialized, functional staffs oversee as-
pects of clandestine activity.-Their names provide some
notion of the range of CIA work: Foreign Intelligence
(espionage and political reporting) ; Counter-intelli-
gence (reporting the operations of the intelligence
services of other nations) ; Covert Action and Political
Action (secret financing of various youth, labor, cul-
tural and academic groups, operating clandestine radio
propaganda outlets, large-scale efforts to influence for-
eign elections) ; Special Operations (planning, suppor?t-
infg and directing paramilitary operations) ; and 't'ech-
nical Services (wiretapping, lie-detector operations, ille-
gal entry, false identities, disguises, and the like).
Most work of the Clandestine Services is carried
out by the large regional divisions and their field staffs
abroad and in the United States. The major divisions,
and some of their activities which have come to light,
are:
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION, which allegedly re-
cruits agents among foreign students and U.S. res-
idents with relatives in foreign countries. It also in-
terviews Americans planning to travel abroad . for
pleasure or business and those who have recently re-
turned. (The Domestic Contact Service, which carries
out these interviews, was recently transferred from
the "overt" side of the Agency, where it was under the
Directorate of Intelligence, to the Clandestine Services.)
This Division also apparently conducts counter-intel-
ligence activities among East European, Cuban, and
other emigre groups in the United States.
WESTERN I-IEMISPIIERE DIVISION. Among the major
known clandestine operations of the past twenty' years
are,
0 Overthrowing the Guatemalan government of
Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.
a Setting up and supporting a special anti-Commu-
nist police agency for the Batista regime in Cuba in
1956. The agency, known as BRAG, soon gained a
reputation for brutality and oppression.
a Liter backing anti-Castro Cuban exiles in a variety
of political and paramilitary activities, culminating in.
the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.
O Helping to put down an attempted coup in Guate-
mala in 1961, in part to protect the base of operations
for the planned invasion of Cuba.
a Mounting a major covert political campaign to
deny leftist Brazilian President Goulart control of the
Brazilian Congress in 1962.
a Advising and assisting the succccssful Bolivian ef-
fort to capture Che Guevara in 1966-67.
O Intervening with covert financial and other sup-
port for opponents of Salvador Allende in the Chilean
Presidential elections of 1964 and 1971.
FAR EAST Divis1ON. Largest of the regional divisions,
this organization supervised:
o Large-scale clandestine operations by Nationalist
Chinese and U.S. agents against mainland China from
the Korean War period through the late 1960s. Agents
were air-dropped into China-two, Richard G. Fecteau
and John T. Downey, were captured in 1952 and freed
after the U.S.-China rapprochement of 1971-and
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guerrillas and political agents were infiltrated into
Tibet in the late 1950s.
a The Philippine campaign against Iluk guerrillas
in the 1950s,
a U.S. efforts to establish the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment of N,,o Dinh I)icin after the Geneva settle-
nment of 1954. CIA agents subsequently encouraged (at
President Kennedy's direction) the generals' coup
against Diem in 1963.
O An unsuccessful coup against President Sukarno
of Indonesia in 1958, in which an American pilot, Al-
lan Pope, was captured.
O The arming, ,training, and operations of an army
of Mco tribesmen in Laos during the 1960s.
O Financing and directing a wide range of clandes-
tine and special operations during the 1960s in Vict-
nam. These included cross-border operations into Laos
and Cambodia to gather intelligence and harass North
Vietnamese and Vietcong base areas, organizing and
paying various mercenary groups, and setting up the
Provincial Reconnaissance Units, special Vietnamese
.teams whose job was to locate and capture (or assassi-
nate) Vietcong political agents. The latter effort, orig-
inally organized under the "Combined Studies Divi-
sion" of the U.S. military command in Vietnam, later
became known as the Phoenix program, which Colby
headed.
NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA DIVISION, now reportedly be-
coming one of the more active branches of the CIA.
The best known CIA exploit in this part of the world
was the coup which overthrew Premier Mohammed
Mossadcgh of Iran in 1953 and returned political
power to the Shah.
AFRICA DIVISION. Deeply involved in Congo affairs
during the early and mid-1960s, when the CIA sup-
plied pilots (Cuban veterans of.the Bay of Pigs), me-
chanics, and aircraft to the 'government of Moise
Tshombe.
o The EUROPE and SOVIET DIVISIONS. One of the
first major clandestine operations of the postwar period
was the massive infusion of funds to prevent a Com.
munist victory in the 1947 Italian elections. According
to reliable sources, CIA continued well into the 1960s
to provide a large annual subsidy to the Italian Chris-
tian Democratic Party. In Greece, the Agency became
deeply involved in internal politics in the late 19410s,
and its role, according to sound speculation, is un-
diminished today.
The CIA and its predecessor organizations also
helped organize anti-Communist labor unions in
France and other West European nations during the
period following World War II. The Washington of-
fice of the Clandestine Services provided funds to sup-
port an entirely independent underground network
established under cover of the international division of
the AFL-CIO.
For many years during the 1950s and 1960s the Co-
vert Action staff in \Vashington ran one of the most
remarkable CIA activities: the large-scale subsidization
of a wide range of youth, academic, cultural, prop-
aganda, and labor organizations in the United States
and abroad. Among the long list of beneficiaries of the
payments, which ran as high as $100 million a year,
were the National Student Association, the Asia Foun-
dation, the American Newspaper Guild, Radio Free
Europe, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (which.
sponsored Encounter magazine). The Covert Action
staff, under Cord Meyer, Jr., now CIA station chief
in London, set up numerous dummy foundations to
distribute the money, using a wide number of legiti-
mate charitable institutions as cooperating go-betweens.
(One of the dummy foundations was named, by
strange and, to me, annoying coincidence, the Andrew,
Hamilton Fund.)
These. subsidies, exposed in 1967, were terminated,
but the Covert Action staff remains in business. Accord-
ing to informed sources, its annual bucl et continued
at about the $100 million level in 1971.
This list of operations is hardly comprehensive. It
does not, for example, include such large-scale intelli-
gence exploits as the U-2 project and the first spy sat-
ellites, both initiated by the covert side of CIA. But
the list illustrates the wide range of political, propa-
ganda, and paramilitary operations which the CIA
has carried out, in deepest secrecy, at White blouse
behest. ?
Two points stand out: These operations were often
mounted not against hostile countries, but against neu-
trals or allies. And they frequently resulted in creating
and sustaining repressive regimes. The CIA. has been
accused by well-informed U.S. officials of helping to
establish "anti-subversive" police units in a number of
countries which have then used them to repress all lib-
eral political opposition.
Informed sources estimate that of the roughly $350
million annual budget of the Clandestine Services in
recent years, perhaps $225 million-most of it project
money-was allocated to covert action and special op-
erations. (including $80 million to. $100 million for
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Vietnam and Laos). The remaining $125 million went
to support the CIA's Clandestine. Services in its es-
pionage and counter-intelligence activities.
As the buclgcc.tary breakdown suggests, the road to glory
and adv;unccniciit in CIA is through operations-Dirty
Tricks-rather than the patient and often grubby work
of collecting foreign intelligence. A number of former
high-ranking intelligence officials have complained
over the years about the Agency's tendency to Mount
"operations for operations' sake."
In theory, CIA covert operations are tightly con-
trolled, and can be engaged in only with the approval
of the President, who delegates the task of reviewing
suggested operations to a high-level NSC committee
consisting of his assistant for National Security Affairs,
Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Defense Secretary William
P. Clements, Jr.; Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs U. Alexis Johnson; and the CIA Director. But
this group has no staff facilities for a jiroper review-
the papers are handled at the White House by a single
CIA official who acts as secretary to the committee-
and, in any event, the committee would hardly be dis-
posed to subject CIA plans to close scrutiny.
CIA station chiefs, moreover, enjoy considerable
autonomy. An enterprising, empire-building station
chief, as one source pointed out, will be on the constant
lookout for an opportunity to mount a covert action,
perhaps by bribing a foreign minister or a key legislator.
With sufficient initiative, he can increase his budget
and staff and enhance the standing of his station with
Washington. In the process, the United States gradual-
ly becomes drawn more and more into the internal pol-
itics of that country.
"The Clandestine Services," says a former CIA offi-
cial, "never developed a philosophy that 'our job is to
.spy.' They have always had the desire to manipulate
events."
The CIA's predisposition toward operations has been
influenced by the fact that for most of its life the
Agency has been headed by men who made their rep-
utations in that field. Allen NV. Dulles (1953-61) and
Richard C. Helens (1965-1973) were both operators;
so was the new Director, Colby. Colby and Helms, be-
fore their respective appointments as Director, were
both in charge of the Clanclestinc Sctvices, a job which
has generally been filled by forceful men who wielded
great, if unobtrusive, influence in Washington. By con-
trast, the Agency's senior intelligence official, the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence (DDI), has seldom been a
man of comparable stature or influence.
As long as the glory, power, promotion, influence,
and White house attention fall on the Dirty Tricks op-
erators at CIA rather than on the intelligence special-
ists, the inherently unmanageable predisposition of
many CIA station chiefs toward operations rather than
intelligence work is unlikely to conic under control.
And as long as operations are the principal source of
his influence, the Director of- Central Intelligence can
hardly be faulted for taking a narrow view of his job.
In theory, he wears at least three hats: Ile is the top
operator; he is the nation's senior interpreter of foreign
intelligence; and lie heads the vast but amorphous
community of U.S. foreign intelligence agencies. In
practice, however, recent directors have not fulfilled
all roles equally well.
For several years, White House foreign policy experts
have sought improvements in intelligence analysis and
management of intelligence budgets and activities. In
November, 1971, President Nixon ordered a reorganiza.
tion of the intelligence committees to address these
problems. Ile gave the Director of Central-Intelligence
power to oversee the budgets and activities of all in-
telligence agencies, including those under the Defense
Department. The Intelligence Community Staff was
expanded and an Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee (IRAC) was established with the Director
as chairman. At the same time the National Security
Council set up an Intelligence Committee to review the
quality of intelligence reports.
Director helms, in the White House view, failed to
make the reforms work. This was a factor in the deci-
sion to replace Helms (now Ambassador to Iran) with
James Schlesinger, author of the 1971 reorganization
plan. ..
Schlesinger's background seemed admirably suited to
the broader concept of the Director's job. Ile was not
only a management expert but also an economist and
defense intellectual, with a background at Rand Corpo-
ration, where lie had a reputation as a forceful analyst.
But the Watergate scandal forced shuffles. Schlesinger
became Defense Secretary. Colby, his successor, is not
considered by intelligence experts to be as well-
equipped to manage the intelligence community, or to
improve the quality of analysis. His appointment ap-
pears to have shelved or diminished the ambitious re-
fornis envisioned by Schlesinger. Instead the appoint-
ment of Colby put the spotlight back on operations.
When Congress confronts the CIA this fall, it should
recognize that it is time for the United States to end
all Dirty Tricks operations-by the CIA or any other
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org;inization, Such operations, a standard part of the
U.S. foreign policy repertoire since World War Ii, have
become more than occasional cnlbarrassnlcnts: They
are now a distinct liability to the nation's foreign re-
lations. And they present a Serious threat to constitu-
tional government in the United States.
The reasons for ending clandestine operations are
not just moral but practical as well. The moral objec-
tions to Covert action are obvious. Intervening in in-
other nation's internal politics violates the principles
to which the United States professes to adhere when it
establishes diplomatic relations, And covert interven-
tion offends the general principle that nations, like in-
dividuals, should be accountable for their actions.
There are at least two practical objections. The first
is that clandestine operations have a corrupting influ-
ence on American politics and foreign relations. They
undermine the credibility of the Government at 11o111C
and abroad. Their inherent secrecy violates the princi-
ples of accountability in the American political process.
Available recourse to clandestine operations breeds
contempt for more arduous-but legitimate-methods
of achieving objectives. As Watergate has demon-
strated, an easy familiarity with clandestine operations
and a ready access to persons and techniques used in
clandestine operations can become a direct threat to
the American political and legal system.
It has been evident for some years that the American
political establishment is deeply divided on the direc-
tions and the tools of foreign policy. Politics no longer
stops at the water's edge. No more vivid demonstration
of this division is needed than the recent votes in
Congress to end the bombing of Cambodia and to limit
the President's war-making powers. In these circum-
stances a clandestine foreign policy becomes a danger
to domestic politics. To prevent leaks, the circle of peo-
ple in the know is drawn ever smaller. In the process,
the definition of the national interest becomes more
narrow, and more directly associated with the political
fortunes of the party in control of the Executive
branch.
As the confusion between the national interest and
political advantage spreads, distrust of the opposition
grows to paranoid dimensions. Political operatives find
it difficult to discriminate between domestic opponents
and foreign agents. In this paranoid state, they have no
difficulty justifying the resort to espionage and Dirty
Tricks--originally developed to fight a clandestine war
against alien enemies--against their domestic political
opponents. The existence of occasional proof of sim-
ilar skulduggery on the part of their opponents merely
intensifies the psychosis. The result is an indiscriminate
intermingling of domestic politics, foreign policy, and
covert operations-a common theme in the Water-
gate affair and associated cases.
If the corrupting effect of clandestine operations is
one- practical objection, a second is that when they do
not fail sllcctaculivivorov~d` or_Ffeiea ef1bs vlc/12l/~c4
successes of the CIA in clandestine operations may be,
as several Presidents have hinted, substantial. But these
successes would have to be of phenomenal value to
outweigh the general damage which results from the
CIA's blunders, from the widespread assumption that
the Agency meddles everywhere, and from the exposure
of those operations which have come to light over the
years.
An outright ban on the CIA's clandestine operations
would result in a cut of as much as fifty per cent in
the Agency's budget, an annual saving of perhaps
$300-.$-100 million, not counting the savings of substan-
tial additional funds diverted from other agencies for
covert CIA activities. The more important effect, how-
ever, would be a much needed redirection of the ef-
forts of the Agency's overseas staff (which could be
greatly reduced in size) toward collection of intelli-
gence.
Since many CIA operatives already work under dip-
lomatic cover at.U.S. embassies, it might prove feasible
to transfer activities devoted to gathering intelligence-
not to operations-to the State Department. (Time far
smaller British Secret Intelligence Services cone under
the control of the Foreign Office.)
Such steps would go a long way toward restoring
the primacy of the Department of State in foreign rela-
tions, and toward putting clandestine activities under
an official directly responsive . to the Congressional
committees responsible for foreign relations. Under the
present system, decisions on the use of the Clandestine
Services are made by the President, who is not directly
answerable to any committee of Congress, and oper-
ations are the responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence, who answers to the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees, neither of which has prin-
cipal responsibility for oversight of foreign relations.
CIArI (PWT8ol99R2('W111%0 UN01 O2111I responsibilities,
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the Director of Central Intelligence could begin to de-
vote full time and attention to iniprovin g the man-
agement of the intelligence community and upgrading
the quality of analysis.
Finally, it would be feasible to set up a more
broadly representative system for Congressional over-
sight of intelligence activities by the CIA and other
agencies, since the risk of compromising sensitive for-
eign policy operations would no longer exist. This
could be accomplished by creating new House and Sen-
ate committees, as recommended by Senator Proxmire
and others, or by setting up a joint committee on intel-
ligence, along the lines of the existing joint committees
on economic policy and atomic energy.
In sure, the. Congress should:
? Repeal CIA's vague authority to carry out "other
functions and duties related to intelligence," as directed
by the National Security Council.
m Substitute, if necessary, language authorizing over-
seas and domestic activities strictly for collecting for-
eign intelligence, plus such counter-intelligence activ-
ities as are required overseas (leaving domestic counter-
intelligence to the FBI).
o Consider placing the Clandestine Services under
the operational control of the Secretary of State, either
by requiring that lie be responsible for reviewing and
authorizing clandestine activities, or by transferring
the CIA's intelligence collection functions to the State
Dcpartnient.
O Deny CIA all project funds for covert action or
special operations, but allow limited secret funds for
intelligence purposes only.
? Require the CIA to divest itself of ownership or
control of such organizations as Air America.
G Clarify and strengthen the statutory powers of the
Director of Central Intelligence by giving him explicit
authority in law to review and make recommendations
to the President on the budgets and programs of all
U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
0 Require disclosure of the overall expenditure of
the CIA and other intelligence agencies, with reason-
able accuracy allowing a little leeway for security
purposes,
O Establish a committee or committees of Congress
to oversee the programs and authorize the budgets of
all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies., including the
CIA. An effective oversight committee is essential to
insure that a Congressional ban on clandestine oper-
ations is honored by the President. Given the fine line
between sonic types of intelligence gathering, and the
clandestine manipulation of events, it will be impossible
to draft a law which closes all loopholes through which
small-scale operations will be undertaken. Thus vig-
orous oversight will provide the only reassurance that
the spirit of the law banning Dirty 't'ricks operations is
being observed. The coinniittee should include, but not
be restricted to, current iimembcrs of the Foreign Re-
lations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate,
and Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees
of the House.
The committee or conunittees should have automatic
access to all finished intelligence reports published by
any intelligence agency, and these classified reports
should be retained at the Committee for review by all
members of Congress. This would provide Congress
with an intelligence library, which it now lacks, and
could considerably improve the quality of understand-
ing and Congressional action on foreign policy and de-
fense questions.
It is by no means certain that a majority of Congress
is ready to bar all clandestine operations. Such a step
would signal a major shift from the way the United
States has conducted foreign policy since World War
II, and opponents will no doubt argue that it would be
tantamount to "tying the President's hands" or
"unilateral disarmament." And it might also be argues(
that a clandestine action agency is more necessary in
the 1970s than ever, given the decline of the Cold
War with its clear-cut antagonisms, the emergence of
a multi-polar world of shifting alliances, and the devel-
oping contest among the industrial nations of the
world for access to oil and other raw materials, Nor is
President Nixon likely to abandon without a struggle
a tool which seems peculiarly suited to hls approach to
foreign (and domestic) antagonists.
Finally, the job of defining clandestine operations so .
they can be stopped without damaging the capability
for intelligence-gathering activities or leaving large
loopholes could prove difficult for legislative draftsmen.
These are all important practical considerations. Were
the nation really in a state of siege, were real
politik the only basis for conducting American foreign
relations, were there a genuine consensus on the aims
and methods of American foreign policy, and were
clandestine operations compatible with American dem-
ocratic institutions and processes, then such reasons
might suffice to justify continuing such operations. In
the real world, they do not.
The Administration's approach, and that of many
influential members of Congress, will be to cope with
the CIA's current crisis merely by making its covert
operations even more truly clandestine, and by restrict-
ing them in size to reduce the risk of exposure. But
the only way to clear the nation's reputation, restore
credibility, and re-establish a basis for a foreign policy
based on broad consensus-and the only way to create
a real basis for effective Congressional participation in
foreign policy-is to put a firm end to clandestine oper-
ations. The divorce must be clear and categorical, and
ought to carry the force of legislation an outright ban
on Dirty Tricks. ^
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