CIA QUESTIONED ON INDIA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 18, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

it4SHINGTON STAR
Approved For Retetse 2001/013/NAMARDP84-004k9R001000100012-2
KASHMIR FUMBLE?
CI tuestioned
On India Policy
By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer
HONG KONG?Recent revelations about Central Intelli-
gence Agency estimates on the India-Pakistan war raise curious
questions.
How balanced are the sources of the CIA's information in a
place like New Delhi? In other words, how vulnerable is the
agency to one-sided rumors?
Some of the CIA estimates
contained in the Anderson pa-
pers disclosed in Washington
amount to rumors circulating
in the Indiana capital at the
beginning of the war last
month. They were rumors
that well-informed Indian
sources flatly denied at the
time?and their denials seem
to have been borne out by de-
velopments.
? The CIA thought India was
going to make an all-out at-
tempt to smash the military
power of West Pakistan and
capture the Pakistani-held
part of disputed Kashmir
state, according to the Ander-
son papers. This was reported
as an Indian goal after captur-
ing East Pakistan? which is
now Bangladesh.
Helms Quoted
Richard Helms, CIA direc-
tor, is quoted as telling a Dec.
8 meeting of Washington's spe-
cial action group on the India-
Pakistan war:
"It is reported that prior to
terminating the present hostil-
ities. Mrs. (Indira) Gandhi
(Indian Prime Minister) in-
tends to attempt to eliminate
Pakistan's armor and air
force capabilities."
Helms and Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, President Nixon's
national security adviser,
thought India intended to
seize the rest of Kashmir, the
Himalayan state which India
claims but Pakistan has held
part of for a quarter-century.
The U.S. government's
"tilt" toward Pakistan appar-
ently was based on these as-
sumptions of Indian intentions
to try to smash West Pakistan
into "an impotent state," as
Kissinger put it.
But were those ever really
the serious intentions of the
people who controlled policy in
New Delhi, rather than being
simply the dr am of some -F
dian hawks vROp.riet
policy?
Interpretation
Report Cited
This correspondent reported
from New Delhi Dec. 9, and
The Star published Dec. 10,
that "the best available indi-
cations are that India will
want to bring the war to a
speedy end once Bangladesh is
cleared" of Pakistani troops.
The dispatch went on: "In-
dian military commanders
have been itching for a chance
to smash Pakistani tank and
warplane strength in the West
with major battles which they
are confident of winning. But
political control of the situa-
tion, heavily influenced by
the Soviets, is against provok-
ing big battles."
There was considerable So-
viet pressure on India to hurry
up and capture East Pakistan
and then end the war. Both
Moscow and New Delhi envis-
aged the capture "and then
cease-fire on the Western
front," that dispatch said.
India declared the cease-fire
the day after Dacca fell.
The dispatch, and several
others that repeated the same
points as background to devel-
opments, was based on high-
ranking informants in both the
Indian government and Saviet
mission in New Delhi.
What they said would hap-
pen is what happened, contra-
ry to the Helms-Kissinger ex-
pectations. The question is
what sort of sources the CIA
was using.
Embassy Locked
One correspondent, even one
with the kind of contacts built
up by five years of reporting
from New Delhi and almost as
long from Moscow, cannot
compete with the CIA's exten-
sive system of sources for in-
formation. That other political
o ease02 9 a
section in the U.S i
its doors locked, as distinct
from the political section with
an open-door policy?picks up
all sorts of information.
Maybe the problem is evalu-
ation. If the CIA heaps Indian
generals talking about smash-
ing Pakistani military power,
maybe it believes them rather
than believing those quieter ci-
vilians wlio hold them back.
The armed forces in India
never have been able to do as
they pleased regardless of ci-
vilian politicians, unlike a
number of other undevel-
oped countries and overdevel-
oped generals with which the
CIA is a lot more familiar.
And Mrs. Gandhi is not the
personality to let her armed
forces start such impudence,
as anyone who has been in
India long should know.
Weather Problms
As for India's trying to take
Pakistani territory problems
of winter weather and the lo-
gistical situation of the Indian
army were involved.
Perhaps Helms and Kissin-
ger had noted the Indian state-
ment that India would no long-
er respect the old United Na-
tions cease-fire line dividing
Kashmir and they had made
the herotic jump of lbgic?or,
considering the georgraphy,
winter and logistics, illogic?to
conclude that India wanted to
capture everything beyond the
line.
But in fact, as reported from
New Delhi, Indias' ambitions
were limited to clearing out
some Pakistani army outposts
that endangered Indian coma-
The U.S. government has
argued that its estimate was
right and that only its efforts
prevented the larger war
which it foresaw. Thus, the
dispatch of a naval task force
built around the nuclear pow-
ered aircraft carrier Enter-
prise to the Bay of Bengal has
been claimed in Washington to
have had the effect of limiting
india's war aims. And Ameri-
can influence in Moscow got
the Soviets to restrain Indian
according to claims.
Perhaps this will have to be
marked down in the doubtful
column on U.S. policy influ-
ence and results. Perhaps
Washington more influential in
limiting the South Asian viar
anCitAaRDP84000499R001000100012-2
e
WA.SHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2g011/007.2CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
Protesters Leak Their
By Jack Anderson
? The planners in the White
House basement, who howled
In pain over our disclosure of
their India-Pakistan secrets,
have slipped fragments from
the same secret documents to
their friends in the press.
This illustrates how the
White House uses official se-
crecy to control the flow of
news to the public. Favorable West Pakistan. But the same
facts are leaked out; unfavora- disgests also suggested India
nation reserved for the dar-
kest of the CIA's secrets.
Alsop's 'Proof'
Alsop told us he never read
the CIA reports himself. He
had no way of knowing, there-
fore, that his sources gave him
only part of the story.
These CIA digests, true
enough, raised the possiblity
of an Indian attempt to crush
ble news is suppressed.
? The official le.akers are nm,v
spreading the word that Presi-
dent Nixon's pro-Pakistan pol-
icy was not the disaster it ap-
peared but really saved West
Pakistan from dismember-
ment.
' As evidence, the boys in the
basement leaked a few selec-
tive .secrets to our column-
writing colleague; Joseph
Alsop, who has excellent con-
tacts at the highest levels of
government.
Alsop stated "on positive au-
thority" that the U.S. govern
merit had "conclusive proof"
of India's Intention to crush
the main body of the Pakistan
army in West Pakistan. This
positive proof, he wrote, was
"the centerpiece of every one
of the CIA's daily reports to
the White House during the
crisis period."
We have read the CIA's
!daily reports to the White
, House during the India-Paki-
stan war. They are stamped
1"Top Secret Umbra," a desig-
would accept an early cease-
fire.
Here is a typical excerpt:
"There have been reports that
(Indian Prime Minister) Gan-
dhi would accept a cease-fire
and international mediation as
soon as East Bengal had been
liberated ... On . the other
hand, we have had several re-
cent reports that India now in-
tends not only to liberate East
Bengal but also to straighten
its borders in Kashmir and to
destroy West Pakistan's air
and armored forces."
The strongest CIA warning
was sent to the White House
on December 10. "According
to a source who has access to
information on activities in
Prime Minister Gandhi's of-
fice," declared the report, "as
soon as the situation in East
Pakistan is settled, Indian
forces will launch a major of-
fensive against West Paid-
sten."
But the CIA also took note
of repeated Indian assurances
to American Ambassador Ken
Lyn Secrets
Keating that India has no ter-
ritorial ambitions and wished
only tO end the conflict with
the least possible bloodshed.
Dubious 'Proof'
It is clear from the secret
documents in our possession
that the CIA had no "conclu-
sive proof" of an Indian plan
to dismember West Pakistan.
The CIA had received a num-
ber of reports that a major In-
dian offensive might be immi-
nent on the western front. But CIA:
viet Union . .," according to
the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told
Indian officials that the Soviet
Union is not prepared to rec-
ognize Bangladesh until Dacca
falls and until the Indian
army successfully liberates
Bangladesh from Pakistani
forces,"
The question of an Indian
offensive . against West "Paki-
stan was brought up the next
day by Soviet Ambassador Ni-
kolai ? Pegov. Reported the.
these were discounted by both
the State and Defense Depart-
ments.
Only Henry Kissinger, the
President's foreign policy czar,
seemed eager to believe the
worst.
Alsop's sources also told
him that President Nixon in. no longer exists.
tervened with the Kremlin, "If India should decide to
threatening "an ugly show-
down," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's
army from. carving up West
Pakistan.
In response, Alsop claims
that the Kremlin hurriedly
dispatched Deputy Foreign
Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to
New Delhi on December 12 to
tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack
West Pakistan.
The secret CIA report on
"Pegov pointed out that
India has achieved a marvel-
ous military victory. Pakistan
is no longer a military force,
and it is therefore unneces-
sary for India to launch an of-
fensive into West Pakistan to
crush a military machine that
take Kashmir, Pegov added;
the Soviet Union would not.in-
terfere, but India would have
to accomplish this objective.
within the shortest possible
time."
Joseph Alsop is an enter-
prising and conscientious col-
umnist. He acknowledged to
us that "it is possible to be
lied to on the very highelst
level." But he assured us his
his mission, however, doesn't source had "never lied be-
mention any ultimatum fore."
The evidence in our posses-
sion, however, suggests that
the White House is playing
peekaboo with CIA secrets to
distort the truth.
Bell-McClure Syndicate
against attacking West Paki-
stan.
"Vasily Kuznestsov arrived
in India on 12 December to
discuss the political recogni-
tion of Bangladesh by the So-
,
7.4
011,
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Ta1,3;
Approved For Re*lase 2001A3/51/51: .WRDP84-004NR001000100012-2
Close !h on Secret Pa
BY WILLARD EDWARDS
(Chicano Tribune Press Service]
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15?The
Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion has reportedly narrowed
an original field of about 200
suspects down to a few individ-
uals in its pursuit of the feder-
al official responsible for leak-
ing secret documents dealing
with the India-Pakistan crisis to
columnist Jack Anderson.
One highly placed staff aide,
in particular, is under suspi-
cion. His identification, if and
when it comes, should serve to
dispel some of the wide-rang-
ing speculation published about
this incident.
? But in the strange world of
the capital, where political ma-
neuvers command more atten-
tion than illegal acts, the
? "why" of the leak to Anderson
has provoked more concern
than the "who" and the
"how."
Second Thoughts Begin
The first instinctive reaction .
here of many was almost
unanimous: "Someone in gov-
ernment must surely hate
Henry Kissinger!" I
But, after a few days, second I
thoughts have begun to spread i
about the motive inspiring this I
massive disclosure of the inti-
mate details of National Secu-
rity Council meetings properly
labeled "secret-sensitive."
Under examination, the "get-
Kissinger" theory began to
lose substance. A higher target
?President Nixon himself?be-
came visible.
Inconsistencies Seen
Kissinger, chief assistant to
the President in national secu-
rity affairs, was initially
thought to be the intended vic-
ers Lea
President Nixon
sessed, it became evident that
Kissinger was always Presi-
dent Nixon's spokesman, relay-
ing his impatience and his de- .
m ands for an anti-Indian!
"tilt." '
The President, Kissinger re-
ported on one occasion, pre-
sumably in a voice dripping.
with sarcasm, was under the
"illusion" that he was direct-;
.! versations, never intended for
ing foreign policy. He was giv-
! publication, gave the public a
Henry Kissinger
Democrats zealous to see the I
President defeated in Novem-
ber.
The verdict was unanimous
that there was nothing particu-
larly new or startling in the so-
called Anderson papers. But
they made good reading. There
were many pungent quotes and
the reporting of private con-
it
? ? ?
ing Kissinger e
The minutes did not even
delightful sense of eavesdrop.
make clear that Kissinger !!
agreed with the President in;1 Tries No Concealment
taking Pakistan's side against ! One novel theory, based on
India. But he was faithful in
emphasizing Nixon's position.
Nixon Is Target
Thus, if there was a target
in the unauthorized disclosure,
it was the President, not Kis-
singer. Sen. Edmund S. Muskie
[Me.], leading contender for unquestioned authority in the
the Democratic Presidential intelligence field.
speculation like all the others,
has been advanced in the
search to establish a motive
for the deliberate and calculat-
ed disclosure of secret data to
a newspaper columnist.
It was provided by a man of
nomination, was quick to sense He noted that Anderson, a!
the political value of the veteran specialist in publishing
leaked documents. In several private papers of every vane-
recent speeches, he hammered ty, did not in this case, as of-
tim because he was quoted ex- their revelations of how the ad- ten in the past, make any at-
tensively in the minutes of the ministration handled the India- tempt to conceal the secret
council meetings.
A comparison of Kissinger's
statements in a "background
briefing," later made public,
and his private remarks to the wanted "government in secret
council, as revealed in the or government in the He made no attempt, for ex-
leaked documents, revealed sunshine." ample, to paraphrase their
contents, a practice often fol-
what may lowed to handicap investigation
y mildly, be described For every political enemy
as inconsistencies. Therefore, a Kissinger may have blade in
of the sources from which se-
number of commentators comparatiVely briefWashing-
opined, the leak was designed ton career, politicians agreed , has been 'busy appearing on
cret papers are obtained. He i
Pakistan crisis. He called classification of the papers, the
them evidence of "duplicity" officials to whom they were
by Nixon and demanded that distributed, ' or their exact
the country decide whether it wording.
to impugn his integrity and Nixon has 10 foes in govern- te i s
thus "destroy:ft
When a m raYeS
dilcrIPSP#113P11?34?16
r gat an o er e era partments
are crowded with holdover ; authorized to possess, and has
of all' the documents was
made, and their import as- ?
r.
I been boldly challenging in his
statements.
Anderso'n, in the opinion of ,
this expert, seems to be invit-
ing prosecution and he sug-
gested an explanation offering !
delight to lovers of Machiavel- !
lian intrigue.
?
Anderson was given the pa-
pers, he submitted, after
pledging that he would not
seek to avoid indictment and
trial for "conversion to private
;use of government
documents."
Linked to Eilsberg
This is the same chrage lev-
eled in a West Coast indict-
ment of Daniel Ellsberg, a for-
mer Pentagon aide, who con-
fessed that he leaked the Pen-
tagon Papers to newspapers.
Anderson, it was suggested,
has a good chance of beating
this charge in the District-of
Columbia ferliral courts where,
it is well known in the legal
world, "liberal" jurists domi-
nate the judicial philosophy.
Thus, a precedent could be set
by similar leniency in Ells-
berg's later trial.
There is this much to sup-
port such an admitted venture
into surmise: Powerful groups
in government and the journal-
istic world are determined to
protect Ellsberg from the con-
sequences of his confessed vio-
lation of the laws regulating
classified information.
01000100012-2
Approved For Reldlr?e 200Wig
A forgotten
footlocker
;
Mergelf-Er01?,909R001000100012-2
The Game of the Foxes .
The Untold Story of German Espionage
In the United States and Great Britain
during World War II.
By Ladislas Farago.
McKay. 696 pp. $11.95
Reviewed by RICHARD HANSER
? rt does seem a little" late in the day?doesn't it??fOr
the international spy to be _dusted oft and taken out for
another literary airing. With Ids Godes and covers, and his
devilish stratagems for stealing the plans to the fortifica-
tions, he may not yet be quite one with Nineveh and Tyre,
but he's getting there. Today he seems so quaintly , and
dimly World War II-ish that he takes his place with the
intrepid commando, the gung-ho 'Marine, and Rosie the
Riveter?all cherishable dements of our folklore in their
time but now grown a touch fusty, somewhat stale around
the edges. The fictional 007 having long since become a
ividesereen joke, it is a little hard to take US/7-362, his
honest-to-god counterpart, very seriously.
, ,Ladislas Farago does, though, and in no less than 696
pages of unrelenting prose. Your average writer can lead
It long, productive life without once using the word "spy-
master," but Farago uses it four times on one page, and
three of the four times in the same sentence. his book is
trumpeted on the cover as "more exciting than any spy
thriller,"-' which is a little puzzling, since the book in-
Richard Hauser is the author of Putsch! How Hitler Made
Revolution.
dubitably is a spy' thriller. Its area is German espionage
in America and Britain- during WW II, a field in which
Farago is thoroughly grounded. This is his sixth or sev-
enth book on spying? and helms had some rather special
experience at first hand in that curious endeavor. Though
a naturalized citizen, and a native of a country with which
we were at war, he rose high in U.S. Naval Intelligence,
an exploit that not just every immigrant who comes
through customs could duplicate. (It is perhaps not nec-
essary to explain that Farago comes from Hungary. Hun-
garians, as we know, have a knack.)
The Game of Foxes tells how agents of the Abwehr,
the German Intelligence Service, pulled off such dazzling
feats of cloaking and daggering as swiping the Norden
bomb sight, trickling spivs into sensitive spots in Wash-
ington and Lo don, ta hihe osevelt-Cht
line and the Mid.PN cu9iL, IMP
. We are never toldthe name .
,
of a Politburo member ,
whose urinesainple was stolen
from a noted Viennese urologist.. ..
(here called Trails) between agents,. and pilfered docu-
ments, and sensational reports relayed to a "Nest'? in
Hamburg known as `,Axt,X.",Before we are through we
are well -steeped in what Farago himself calls "the hoary
melodrama of espionage and it bizarre rituals." Every-
thing is scrupulously, not -to say laboriously, documented,.
down to the last street number, date, and middle initial.'
(Well, perhaps not. eVerything. We are never told the
naine of. the Politboro Manlier whose urine sample was
stolen by the. CIA from the laboratory 'cif "a noted Vien-
nese Urologist.")
. -
At the end, though, one wonders whether the game of
foxes has been worth the candle. Despite the successes, of
Nazi eSpionage--semetimes detailed here with what can
only be called misplaced enthusiasm?nothing really de-
cisive was accomplished. The theft of the Norden bomb-
sight did not win the air war for Germany. Stealing secrets
of Allied shipping and troop mpveinents did not prevent
our troops and supplies from getting there, and in over-.
whelming quantities. Eavesdropping on Roosevelt and
Churchill, if it actually occurred, did not save Hitler and
Goering and Goebbels from dying like dogs in utter de.-:
feat. As the Bible itself 'says', the little foxes spoil the vines'.
They do not brinc, down the house. -
Farago's book isthe outgrowth of a find he made "in a
dark loft of the National Archives in Washington, D.C."
The find was a forgotten footlocker Which :turned out to.".
contain microfilm documents on the inteimal 'workings of
the Abwehr under its enigmatic chief, Admiral Canaris.
Farago has based his story on what he calls "the incon-
trovertible evidence of the {Abwehr's] own' papers.:
An agency's :Pim papers are seldom incontrovertible
evidence. of :anything but the agency's natural desire 'to.
make itself look good. From other sources it 'IS pb86ble to
get a quite different picture of- the AbWehn Others have
seen it as a monumentally foaled-up operation, inefficientlY
run by CanariS (who may have been pouring Sand in his
own gas tank) and caut,lit in an insane tangle of rivalries.
with other Nazi intelligence agencies, of which there, was
a mushroom-like proliferation in the Third Reich.
There is, to be sure, a certain fascination in getting this
unexpected peek into all those Strettg .Geheinil papers
from that forgotten footlocker, but the fun is a good deal
diminished by the circumstance that the Abwehr, like Ger-1;'
many itself, was 'a loSer. How Mitch thrill can there .be in
kibitzing a pokeihand, be it held ever so close to the vest,
when somebody else wins the pot? It is a little like being
made privy to the football play book of 1971 Buffalo
Bills.
vo/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
NEW MX DM? 1/Mr
Approved For Reltivese 2001/63M A-RDP84-004249R001000100012-2
Secv t pers: PALI. wdhi'
5iautrShe Rad Kremlin Pied
Washington, Jan. 14 '(Special)----Columnist Jack Anderson released today the text
of a summary of another White House meeting on the India-Pakistan war. In it, a
senior administration official was quoted as attributing to Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi a statement that the Soviet Union had promised to take "appropriate counterac-
tion" if China intervened in
the war.
The summary of the Dec. 8
meeting of key administration of-
ficials includes the widely quoted
remarks by presidential adviser
Henry A. Kissinger that Presi-
dent Nixon "does not want to be
even-handed' in his position on
the war because he "believes that
India is the attacker."
Stamped "Secret"
The summary was one of four
that Anderson obtained and used
as a basis for his columns earlier
this month detailing the adminis-
tration's attempt to cope with the
India-Pakistan crisis.
The documents received by
Anderson were stamped "secret
sensitive." Anderson published his
stories on the premise of the
public's right to know.
Kissinger charged that Ander-
son quoted him out of context.
Anderson then made public the
texts of the summaries of the
meetings, which were conducted
by the Washington Special Action
"She said that the Soviets had
Jack
Releases
Anclesapn
another
text
Group of the National Security
Council.
? Attended by 20
Bef or e today, Anderson re-
leased the texts of the group's
meetings Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec.
6.? ?
The Dec. 8 meeting was attend-
ed by 20 representatives of such
agencies as the CIA, Agency for
International Development, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, State Department
and Defense Department, accord-
ing to the summary.
Among the main speakers at
the 70-minute meeting were Kis-
singer; CIA Director Richard M.
Helms; David Packard, who re-
signed Dec. 14 as deputy secre-
tary of defense; Assistant Secre-
tary of State Joseph J. Sisco; U.
Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of
state, and Maurice Williams, dep-
uty administrator of AID.
Seven-Page Summary
The India-Pakistan war broke
out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17.
Packard announced his resigna-
tion Dec. 11, three days after he
attended the meeting.
The following are excerpts from
the seven-page confidential sum-
mary that Anderson made public:
"Mr. Helms then stated that
earlier he had omitted mention-
ing that Mme. Gandhi, when re-
ferring to China, expressed the
hope that there would be no Chi-
nese intervention in the West.
"Dr. Kissinger said that We
cannot afford to ease India's
state of mind. 'The lady' is cold-
blooded and toughu and will not
turn into a Soviet satellite mere-
ly because of pique. We should
not ease her mind. He invited
anyone who objected to this ap-
proach to take his case to the
President. Ambassador Ken-
neth) Keating, he suggested, is
offering enough reassurance on
his own."
"Next Turn of Screw"
The summary also shows Kis-
singer's deep interest in U.S. aid
to India and Pakistan. Pakistan's
aid was cut off before the war;
most of India's after it began.
Having been assured that very
little aid was getting through to
India, "Dr. Kissinger inquired
what the next turn of the screw
might be."
At another point, when dis-
cussing the 1972 AID budget,
'Dr. Kissinger stated that cur-
rent orders are not to put any-
cautioned her that the Chinese thing into the budget for aid to
might rattle the sword in Lad- India. It was not to be leaded
dakh but that the Soviets have 1 that AID had put money in the
promise dto take appropriate
budget for India only to have the
counteraction if this should oc- 'wicked' White House take it
cur.
Mr. Helms indicate dthat there
was no Chinese buildup at this
time, but, nevertheless, even with-
out a buildup, they could make
'motions and rattle the sword.'"
(Ladakh, a remote part of
Kashmir n India, juts between
China's Sinkiang province and
Tibet. The Chinese overran the
area in 1951 and, without the
Indians finding out about it for
a year, built a road from Sink-
iang to Tibet across Ladakh's
Aksai Chin Plateau in an effort
to protect its Tibetan supply line.
The Chinese last made a show of
force in Ladakh in November
1965.)
On the Kissinger remark, the
text reads as follows:
"Dr. Kissinger said that we are
not trying to be even-handed.
There can be no doubt what the
President wants. The President
does not want to be even-handed.
"The President believes that
India is the attacker. We are
trying to get across the idea that
India has jeopardized relations
with the United States.
out."
The document recorded Kissin-
ger's interest in a suggestion
that the U.S. might get military
supplies to Pakistan by routing
them through , Jordan.
Question of F-104s
"Mr. Packard explained that
we could not authorize the Jor-
danians to do anything that the
USG (United States government)
could not do," the document read.
"If the USG could not give the
F-104s (American F-104 jets) to
Pakistan, we .could not allow
Jordan to do so.
"If a third country had ma-
terial that the USG did not have,
that was one thing, but we could
not allow Jordan to transfer the
104s unless we make a finding
that the Paks, themselves, were
eligible to purchase them from
us directly.
"Dr. Kissinger suggested that
perhaps we never really ana-
lyzed what the real danger was
when we were turning off the
arms of Pakistan."
Pressures on Aides
The pressures on Nixon's ad-
visers to come up with some basis
for Nixon's apparent sueport for
Pakistan was seen in the follow-
ing exchange:
"Ambassador Johnson said
that we must examine the possi-
ble effects that additional sup-
plies for Pakistan might have. It
could be that eight F-104s might
not make any difference once the
real war in the West starts. They
could be considered cnly as a
token. If, in' fact, we were to
move in West Pakistan we would
be in a new ballgaine.
"Ambassador Johnson said that
one possibility would be our re-
nly to Foreign Minister (Indian
Foreign Minister Swaran) Singh,
in which we could acknowledge
the Indian pledge that they do not
have territorial designs. He also
stated we must also consider the
fact that the Paks may them-
selves by trying to take Kashmir.
"After discussing various pos-
sible commitments to both Pawis-
tan and India, Mr: Packard stated
that tre. overriding consideration
is the practical problem of either
doing something effective or do-
ing nothing.
"If you don't win, don't get in-
volved.
"If we were to attempt some-
thing it would have to be with a
certainty that it would affect the
outcome. Let's not get in if we
are going to lose. Find out some
way to stay out."
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
WASIaINGTON FOS%
Approved For Relealg 2001/03ap frfiligfADP84-00490D001000100012-2
Hill Committees Met Secretly One-Third
Congressional QuarterlY
met in secret one-third of the . of Time in 1971-
. Congressional -committee
time last year.
Congressional Quarterly's
annual tabulation of commit-
tee sessions showed 36 per
. cent were held behind closed
doors in 1971, the year a new
law?aimed at opening meet-
ings to the public?went into
effect.
This marked a decrease
from the 41 per cent closed
committee sessions recorded in
1970, but matched the 36 per
cent secrecy score for 1969.
. Since 1953, when Congres-
sional 'Quarterly began its an-
nual tally, the highest secrecy
score was 43 per cent in 1968.
The record low was 30 per
cent closed sessions in 1959.
The House, as usual, topped
the Senate in the number of
executive sessions. The public,
was barred from 41 per cent-
1,131 out of 27,858 of its com-
mittee sessions. This was a de-,
crease from the 48 per cent of
1970 but comparable to the 42
per cent recorded in 1969.
Senate committees had a se-
crecy score of 30 per cent?
down from the 33 per cent of
1970 tut up from the 28 per
cent in 1969. It closed 580 of
Its 1,905 meetings.
Most noteworthy in 1971
was the opening of selected
House Appropriations Com.-
mittee hearings.
Although only eight per
cent of its sessions-36 out of
a total of 455?were open, this
was in contrast to the zero per
cent recorded in the past.
The Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1970?the first re-
form act in 24 years?was de-
signed, in part, to open up
committee proceedings to pub-
lic scrutiny.
It stipulated that Senate
committee business meetings
are to be open, except for
'markup (when a committee re-
*vises and decides on the final
language of a bill) and voting
sessions, or when the commit-
tee closes them by majority
vote.
Ninety-seven per cent of
those Senate committee meet-
ings specifically designated in
the Congressional Record as
business sessions?organizing,
markup, voting, briefing ses-
sions?were closed to the pub-
lic in 1971.
According to the reorganza;
lion act, House committee
business meetings, are to be
open, except when the com-
mittee closes them by major-
ity vote.
Excluding the House Appro-
priations Committee, 79 per'
cent of the sessions listed as
business were held behind
closed doors. (House Appropri-
ations subcommittee markup
sessions are not reported to
the Record.)
Approved for Release 200 6 : CIA-RDET4-00499R001000100012-2
rC 7:73
1 FEB '1972
Approved For Rehaase 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00469R001000100012-2
NW RULES URGED
ON SECRET PAPERS,
SeCurity Agency Proposes a
Presidential Order on Law
Special to The Stew York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 10?The
National Security Council has
proposed an Executive order
tightening regulations govern-'
ing_ the, hen, ng of classified
information i Suggested the
possibility that the President
might seek legislation to make
it a crime for unauthorized per-
sons to receive secret docu-
ments, a White House officiial
said Thursday night.
Tbe legislative suggestion, if
accepted, would result in a pro-
posal by the President of a
tough new law similar to the
British Official Secrets Act,
which imposes stiff penalties
on those who receive as well
as on those who disclose classi-
fied information.
? This was one of three alter-
natives suggested for the Presi-
dent in a draft proposal now
being circulated among the De-
partments of State, Defense and
Justice, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and other governmen-
tal bodies, the White House of-
ficial said.
Of the two others, the draft
suggested that the President
might seek revision of a sec-
tion of the Federal Esrionage
Act to make it a crime to give
classified information to any
unauthorized person. The law
noW provides penalties for dis-
closure to "a foreign agent."
Other Passibility
The other possibility suggest-
ed .was merely that present
laws be left unchanged.
These were the only legis-
lative suggestions in the draft
proposals, which were offered
in response to the President's
demand for a study of the
handling of classifed material,
made shortly after the publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers,
the . Defense Department's se-
cret study of the United States
drift into the Vietnam War. ?
The other suggestions in the
draft proposal applied primarily
to the classification of Govern-
ment documents, setting up
regulations over how materials
should be classified, the length
of time certain documents
could remain classified, and
who would be allowed to re-
ceive them.
These, the draft proposal
said, could be effected in a re-
vision of the Ekecutive order
that now controls the handling
of classified information.
The draft Was being circulat-
ed to the various agencies for
their comments.
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
By
Approved For Re!Cage 23151/e1OrphtWczagi9itR001000100012-2
...1.11=11111.{.11?111111?111
The Secrecy ilemma
? You can't run the
Government if every
important secret is
going to be handed
over to the press
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Ir.
A popular Government, without
-popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.
?JAMES MADISON (to W. T. Barry,
Aug. 4, 1822).
IT .says in the 29th chapter of
Deuteronomy, "The secret things
belong unto the Lord our God."
This has not been a view; however,
wholly accepted by the American
press. Last month, when Jack Ander-
son published classified documents
showing how the Nixon Administra-
tion really felt about the Indo-Paki-
stani war, he observed an established
tradition of journalism. At the same
time he transgressed an established
tradition of government. Here were
the two solemn principles, disclosure
and confidentiality, equally porten-
tous and equally-venerated, in sharp
collision. The conflict of principles
left many Americans, I would think,
considerably baffled.
- OD You can't run a
free press if it is
a crime to publish
everything the Govern.
ment stamps secret
membered their intense displeasure
over equivalent journalistic audacity
when they were in power. Still, both
Republicans and Democrats probably
agree that you cannot run a govern-
ment if every internal memorandum
is promptly handed to the press. And
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr. is Albert
Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities
at the City University of New York.
both probably agree that you cannot
run much of a press if it is a crime
to publish anything stamped secret
by the Government. The question is
whether between these extremes it is
possible to discern further guiding
principles.
One principle surely is that the
Government's case for a measure of
secrecy is not altogether frivolous or
self-serving. "The Federalist" is gen-
erally worth consulting on these mat-
ters; and its authors clearly specified
. The recent publication of secret ,
documents has produced a collision
between two equally venerated prin-
ciples?disclosure and confidentiality
It should have given some too a
sense of intellectual discomfiture. Re-
publicans who denounced Anderson
might have remembered their own
delight when The Chicago Tribune
printed secret defense plans of the secrecy and immediate thspatch are
fore Pearl" HMV. tftemocratsVo son, it- is true, 11. atAir
Roosevelt 4doiViiMoitr pwr.t
DAV/101TMt r 'a a
two fields where secrecy seemed to
them essential. The first was diplo-
matic negotiation: "It seldom hap-
pens in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect
that "diplomacy shall proceed always'
frankly and in the public view" and
called for "open covenants of peace,
openly arrived at." Before World War
I the French Assembly did not know
the secret clauses of the Franco-Rus-
sian alliance; nor did the British For-
eign Secretary inform even his own
Cabinet of the military understand-
ings between the British and French
General Staffs. This is what Wilson
hoped to abolish.
But, as he himself made clear at
Versailles, he really meant by "diplo-
macy" not the processes but the re-
sults of negotiation. In practice he
favored plenty of talk out of "the
public view" but no concealment of
results?i.e., open covenants secretly
arrived at. As for the negotiating
process, Jules Cambon, who was
French Ambassador to Berlin before
World War I and whom that acute
student of diplomacy Harold Nicolson
regarded as perhaps the best profes-
sional of the century, was only mildly
exaggerating when he wrote, "The
day secrecy is abolished, negotiation
97
of any kind will become impossible.
His recent trans-Atlantic shuttling
suggests that Henry Kissinger would
agree. Whether blowing the secrecy
destroys his capability for future pri-
vate negotiations is a problem that
one hopes Mr. Kissinger has pondered.
A second field noted in The Fed-
eralist" as requiring secrecy was that?
of intelligence: "There are cases where
the most useful intelligence may be
obtained, if the persons possessing it
can be relieved from apprehensions
of discovery." Contemplation of these
two fields led "The Federalist" to
conclude: "So often and so essen-.
dpcttriro. tia1.416 have we heretofore suffered
id
4 0 9R001t0
00400012u2chs.
applauded Anderson might have re- pudiate this doctrine when he said patch, that the Constitution would
00n t LIMO d
Approved For Relel
have been in cusably defective, if
no attention had been paid to those
objects." In such terms "The Federal-
ist" vindicated the right of the exec-
utive branch to conduct negotiations
and, by inference, intelligence opera-
tions, without any immediate obliga-
tion to supply Congress or the people
the detail of what it was doing.
So from the start the American
Government has been into secrecy.
War, of course, provided a third cate-
gory of legitimate restriction. The
? National Archives tells us that such
classifications as "secret," "confiden-
tial" and "private" can be traced back
to the War of 1812. Military plans,
movements and weaponry remain
items that can be plausibly withheld
from immediate publication. A fourth
category includes information that
might compromise foreign govern-
ments or leaders or American friends
or agents in foreign lands. The case
for withholding such information is
obviously strong; as too is the case,
in a fifth category, for withholding
personal data given to the Govern-
ment on the presumption that it will
be kept confidential ? tax returns,
? personnel investigations and the like.
A sixth category includes official plans
and decisions which, if prematurely
disclosed, would lead to speculation
in lands or commodities, preemptive
buying, private enrichment and high-
er governmental costs. One doubts
whether the most .righteous opponent
of official secrecy would seriously
argue that Government must at once
throw open its files in these six
categories.
Yet no one can doubt either that
a legitimate system of restriction has
long since escalated into an extrava-
gant and indefensible system of de-
nial. The means by which this has
been done is primarily the device of
"security classification"?i.e., restrict-
ing access to public information on
the grounds of national security. In
1962 the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations found there were
"more than a million Government
employes [permitted] to stamp per-
manent security designations on all
kinds of documents," adding that few
of them seemed to heed Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara's sensible
injunction, "When in doubt, under-
classify." The General Accounting
Office estimates that the security
system costs taxpayers. from $60- to
$80-million a year.
Testifying last summer before
Congressman William Moorhead's
Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee, William
G. Florence, a retired Pentagon secu.
rity officer, pkrtraxed tire, cerAtriso,-1?,si
rary conditiaP9 tUrt%scit-feafibWi'iR1
e 20R1/93/06 : CIA-RDP84-00S?R001000100012-2
r?
no
e entagon's top security secret' is the specific invention of
bureaucracy." If secrecy in some
cases remains a necessity, it also
can easily become the ? means by
which Government dissembles its
purposes, buries its mistakes, safe-
guards its reputation, manipulates
its citizens, maximizes its power and
corrupts itself.
The secrecy system, once out of
control, offers temptations few gov-
ernments have the fortitude to resist.
I suppose there may be situations
of dire emergency when gov-
ernments have no alternative
but to deceive the people. But
uncontrolled secrecy makes it
easy for lying to become rou-
tine. And, even short of lying,
governments can hardly resist,
exploiting secrecy to their own
advantage. There have been
few greater frauds, for exam-
ple, than the idea put over by
the executive on Congress and
public opinion that only those
with access to classified infor-
mation know enough to have
a judgment on questions of
foreign policy. Actually 99 per
?cent of the information neces-
sary for intelligent political
judgment is available to any
careful reader of The New
York Times. We would have
been far better off in Vietnam
during the Kennedy years had
our Government confined it-
self to reading newspaper dis-
patches and never opened a
Top Secret cable signed Har-
kins or Nolting. The myth of
inside information ? "if you
only knew what we knew"?
is essentially a trick to ob-
struct democratic control of
foreign policy and defend the
monopoly of the national se-
curity bureaucracy.
As Justice Potter Stewart
has observed, a secrecy sys-
tem constructed on present
lines will inevitably be "ma-
nipulated by those intent on
self-protection and self-pro-
motion." It will also inevita-
bly invite defiance. Indeed,
given Congressional apathy,
defiance remains about the.
only recourse when legitimate
secrecy balloons into illegiti-
mate secrecy and an adminis-
tration runs the system in the
interest not of the nation but
of itself. So, as a corrective,
aggrieved citizens through our
history have felt themselves
morally warranted in violat-
ing what they have seen as a
system of secrecy laid down
,unilaterally by the executive
ease the superiority
branch for its own protection.
of the profes- In 18
officer, he said, believed that the
classification system should even ex-
tend to information in the public
domain; and zealous security-stamp-
ers, particularly in the Navy, had
been discovered classifying newspaper
clippings. Florence estimated that the
Pentagon files contained about 20
million classified documents and that
"the disclosure of information in at
least 99.5 per cent of those classified
documents could not be prejudicial to
the defense interests of the nation."
He later changed this estimate to
read that 1 to 5 per cent "must legit-
imately be guarded in the national
interest," but this hardly affects the
point. The classification system has
plainly got hopelessly out of control.
And the reason for this is evident
enough?it is that the only control
over the system has been exercised
by the executive branch itself. The
legal basis for security classification
was first provided by general orders
of the War and Navy Departments;
then by a 1940 executive order of
President Roosevelt's, still confined
to military intelligence; then by a
1951 executive order of President
Truman's, extending the system to
nonmilitary agencies and authorizing
any executive department or agency
to withhold information it con-
sidered "necessary in the interest of
national security"; then in 1953 by
President Eisenhower's executive
order 10501?"The bible of security-
stamping," Florence calls it. It was
as a result of this order that the
system got completely out of hand,
for it provides no effective control
over the classification of documents
and no feasible method for their
declassification once the sacred
stamp has been placed on them.
Neither the Truman nor Eisen-
hower executive orders were based
n specific statutory authority; but,
S Eisenhower's Commission on Gov-
ernment Security argued in 1957:
'In the absence of any law to the
ontrary, there is an adequate con-
titutional and statutory basis upon
hich to prediCate the Presidential
uthority to issue Executive Order
0501." This very formulation im-
lies, however, that Congress has
he power to control the classifica-
ion system should it wish to do so.
Since Congress has not wished to
o so, the executive branch has had
free hand in dealing with classified
formation. Naturally.this has made
vulnerable to its own worst
stincts. "Every bureaucracy," Max
eber has written, "seeks to in-
a
a
1
a
in
it
in
cr
cUIVIIMOS .k,tAgRDP84410414hati MOM 2-2
eir intentions se- debate over the acquisition of
Cret. . . . The concept (if the 'official Texas, tried to sneak a treaty
of annexation through .the ervatior -f secrecy? Has it
Senate in ex
Senator Beni
Ohio, irate at this procedure, cratic control of the Govern-
wrote his brother Lewis, the ment is not to become a fic-
New York abolitionist: "Sup- tion? Here is a President who
pose I send you the Treaty & last year held five formal press
Correspondence, will you have conferences, plus four last-
it published in the Evening minute chats with White House
Post in such a way that it correspondents; who in the
cannot be traced back?" Lewis year before held four formal
Tappan, a little apprehensive, conferences and one at the
consulted with Albert Galla- last minute. Here is an execu-
V6411?T,Mhet21?111/119g-
tin, who had served as Jeffer-
? son's Secretary of the Treas-
ury and later as minister to
Paris and to London. The el-
der statesman told him to go
ahead. William Cullen Bryant
published the treaty in an Eve-
ning Post extra, and Tyler's
stratagem was defeated. Were
the Tappans, Gallatin and
Bryant to be condemned? Or,
did Tyler's abuse of secrecy
justify their action?
The aniwer might well be
that the functioning of democ-
racy requires some rough but
rational balance between se-
crecy and disclosure, between
official control of information
and public need for it. When
the Government upsets that
balance by deceiving the pub-
lic, lying to it or withholding
information essential for in-
formed debate and decision, a
healthy democracy is likely
to move, in one way or an-
other, to re-establish the bal-
ance, whether through the
agency of dissenting officials,
indignant legislators or re-
sourceful newspapermen. "Se-
crecy can be preserved," Jus-
tice Stewart has reminded us,
"only when credibility is truly
maintained."
THIS principle of re-estab-
lishing the balance is con-
fessedly elusive. Anyone who
acts on it is taking a chance.
Only the aftermath can prove
him right or wrong in decid-
ing that government has vio-
lated its part of the contract.
"The line of discrimination be-
tween cases may be difficult,"
as Jefferson wrote in a dis-
cussion of the question wheth-
er the violation of written taw
was ever justified; "but the
good officer is bound to draw
it at his own peril and throw
himself on the justice of his
country and the rectitude of
his motives."
The Anderson case suggests
the 'problem. Has the Nixon
Administration really fulfilled
Its part of the contract? Has
it maintained the credibility
that Justice Stewart tells us is
necessary tojustify the pres-
tive branch which old Wash-
ington hands regard as the
least open the country has
seen for years. Then came the
Indo-Pakistani war?with the
President in an evident pet;
with a valuable Assistant to
the President for National Se-
curity Affairs saying in private
"the President does not
want to be even-handed,"
demanding in private that his
colleagues "tilt" American
power in favor of Pakistan,
while telling the press, "There
have been some comments
that the Administration is
anti-Indian. This is totally in-
accurate" (and while the State
Department, if that body mat-
ters any longer, was proclaim-
ing in public a stance of "ab-
solute neutrality"); and with
a proven military dunderhead,
still inexplicably blessed with
great responsibility, wrong
once again in his military fore-
casts. Here, above all, was an
Administration dead against
internal or external debate in
the face of highly controver-
sial decision.
Given this situation, what
recourse was there? If the An
derson columns display the
kind of Government we have,
it is surely appropriate in a
democracy that we know it;
it is definitely not the func-
tion of a secrecy system to
shield public officials from ac-
countability for their tantrums,
folly or mindlessness. Nor did
the disclosure jeopardize on-
going negotiations or intelli-
gence operations or military
plans. Worst of all, by out-
lining the "tilt" policy only
behind locked doors, the Nixon
Administration deprived Con-
gress and the electorate of the
opportunity ? one might -say
the right?to discuss President
Nixon's pro-Pakistan program
on its merits. This was the
unpardonable sin; and some
anonymous, disgusted and
courageous bureaucrat, with
the help of Jack Anderson,
was trying to rectify the situ-
ation and to re-establish the
balance.
What can be done to save
Approved FortiRdeite SRN"
nial need for restor the thus far not provided the
R &AA Nevem itogotiogelt2s2xpected to
ways. GWernmenf as "the do so this year.
right to preserve for a period
both the confidentiality of its
internal processes and the se-
curity of information in those
categories where security is
vital. It has manifestly abused
that right. Writing in 1953,
Harold Nicolson said, "I am
confident that, ? in the Free
World at least, the age of
secret treaties is behind us."
He was wildly optimistic; and
it is ironic that secret cove-
nants should have enjoyed so
rich and rank a revival in
Woodrow Wilson's native land.
The contents of the so-called
Hyde Park Aide-Memoire con-
cerning the uses ? of atomic
energy, signed by Roosevelt
and Churchill at Hyde Park
on Sept. 18, 1944, were not
known in this country until
published by the State Depart-
ment in 1960. The Symington
subcommittee in the Senate
has unearthed a parade of se-
cret agreements withheld from
Congress and the people ?
Ethiopia hi 1960, Laos in 1963,
Thailand in 1964, South Korea
In 1966, Thailand again in
1967, not to mention secret
annexes to the Spanish Bases
Agreement of 1953. Senator
Clifford Case has now intro-
duced a bill?or rather revived
a bill the Senate passed in
1955?that would require the
President to transmit all exec-
utive agreements to the for-
eign affairs committees of both
houses. If the President deems
an agreement too sensitive for
publication, he can hand it
over under the seal of secre-
cy; but he can no longer lock
it up in his own office and
tell no one.
N addition to the control
of secret agreements, we
urgently need a rational and
orderly system for the classi-
fication and declassification
of official documents and for
the withholding and release
of nonclassified documents.
The Nixon Administration has
recently shown itself aware
of the need for reform. In the
wake of the Pentagon Papers,
President Nixon asked Con-
gress for .$636,000 to begin
the declassification of World
War II papers?a vast moun-
tain of material, 160 million
'pages in 49,000 cubic feet of
storage space. This was to
have launched a declassifica-
tion program that would have
employed 110 persons for
five years at a cost now set
CI n:1459084scoy499frooain616hclintrosniei,-D2avid Kahn,
continued
The legislative hesitation
may well be justified. The Na-
tional Archives estimates that
at least 95 per cent of the
classified documents of World
War II would be declassified
as a result of this program.
Thus we would be spending
at least $6-million (in all like-
lihood the ultimate cost would
be much greater) to identify
that 5 per cent of World War
II documents that must, it is
supposed, be kept secret for
a few years longer.
? "Systematic declassifica-
tion," William L. Langer has
written, "is patently impos-
sible: The records are so vo-
luminous that it would take
large teams of highly quali-
fied personnel years to com-
plete the assignment." Profes-
sor Langer is not only the
leading American historian of
European diplomacy; he also
served as chief of the Re-
search and Analysis Branch of
the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices, in an equivalent post
in the Central Intelligence
Agency and as a member of
the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board. His
testimony cannot be dismissed
as that of a naive scholar who
has spent his life in the stacks
and doesn't understand the
realities of public affairs.
Document-by-document de-
classification will not do. An
automatic declassification pro-
cedure was nominally insti-
tuted in 1961; but this sys-
tem, however praiseworthy in
intent, left so many excep-
tions as to become substan-
tially meaningless. What we
must have is a system which
after a stated period (of
which more later) automati-
cally declassifies practically
everything, including infor-
mation on diplomatic nego-
tiations and military plan-
ning. A longer period?prob-
ably a very much longer
period?should apply to doc-
uments that describe intelli-
gence operations, compromise
foreign citizens or invade the
privacy of American citizens,
that is, the materials in cate-
gories two, four and five of
legitimate restriction. (The al-
legation that declassification
would expose our diplomatic
and military codes is now a
bogeyman. With the domina-
tion of cryptography by so-
phisticated computers, the old
ciphers have been abandoned,
Approved For Relate 2001/03/06:
the author of "The Codebreak- as Prime Minister, once re-
ers," tells us, "are, in all marked that his inclination
practical senses, unbreak- 'would be rather to tighten
able.") up the 50-year rule than to
The schedule of automatic relax it." But Harold Wilson's
declassification should be Labour Government, in one
accompanied by some form of its few visible achieve-
of appellate procedure. That ments, reduced the closed pe-
is, if a department or agency rind (except for Home Office
feels that disclosure in a par- papers and other records
ticular case would injure the breaching personal privacy)
to 30 years. The Heath Gov-
ernment has recently in one
brilliant stroke opened the
Cabinet records and other
departmental papers for
World War II ? the period
which the Nixon Administra-
tion would keep closed for
five more years until its de-
classification teams slog
through the . snow-drifts of
records, drift by drift.
seOREOVER, Mr. Justice
Caulfield's historic decision in
the recent prosecution of The
London Sunday Telegraph and
its big talk about reclaiming Jonathan Aitken for publish-
lost powers, it ought to pass publish-
ing a secret report about Bi-
such legislation anyway. (One afra has greatly damaged the
difficulty is that Congress's old Official Secrets Act; now
own record in making public the Government has appoint-
its own papers ?and proceed- ed a Committee of Inquiry
ings is far from inspiring.), under Lord Franks to review
the whole problem of Govern-
THE question remains how added that in Sweden, as al-
ment secrecy. It should be
long the closed period should ways an admirable country,
be. Practice abroad varies almost all records, I under-
widely. Denis Mack Smith, stand, including very recent
the best English historian of papers and excepting only
? Italy, has just published a royal documents of the King
book entitled "Victor Eman- in council, can be examined
by any citizen.
nation, it should have an op-
portunity to claim exemption
before an independent review
board. But the burden of
proof must always be on those
who wish to lock the informa-
tion up.
The executive has it within
its power to establish such
a system immediately on its
own initiative. If it does not
do so, then Congress must
pass legislation defining the
criteria for classification and
declassification and providing
for Congressional oversight
of the results. If Congress
is by any chance serious in
uel, Cavour and the Risorgi-
mento" dealing with events in For most of its history, the
the period from 1840 to 1870. United States has led the
In conducting his research, he world in permitting access
was denied access to the to official archives. That in-
papers of Count Cavour and dispensable series, "Foreign
to the royal archives. Cavour Relations of the United
died a solid 110 years ago; States," began the publication
Victor Emanuel died 94 years of diplomatic dispatches in
ago. This would seem an 1861. Until nearly the end
excess a caution. In the So- '? of the 19th century, the nev"..
viet Union, though the Bol- volume each year published
sheviks threw open the Czar- official secrets of the year
ist files, they have clamped preceding, with no perceptible
down hard on their own; a harm to national security.
scholar doing research in Mos- The 1870 volume ran a dis-
cow runs the risk of being patch of that same year from
George P. Marsh, the Amer-
ican Minister in Florence, in
which he criticized the Italian
Government for its "vacilla-
tion, tergiversation and du-
plicity." The dispatch was
reprinted in an Italian news-
paper on the very day that
Marsh was dining with the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"Was Mr. Marsh handed his
expelled as a spy.
But other nations are re-
sponding to the pressures for
access. Until very recently
the French required specific
clearance for the use of offi-
cial documents after 1871; in
a burst of liberalism, the Ar-
chives Diplomatiques have
now accepted a 30-year rule
in principle. The British for
a long time had a 50..yun passport?" William M. Frank-
rule; Sir AlApiatomdrEtoriReileaser2001403/06r:
of the State Department His-
torical Office has written.
ne Mr March hart
CIA-RDP84-00AR001000100012-2
to admit, the only result was
that the Italians tredted him
better than ever. He con-
tinued happily and success-
fully in his Italian post until
his death 12 years later." Per-
haps candor is a more nego-
tiable diplomatic commodity
than those State Department
officials understand who in
recent years have tried to pre-
vent the publication in "For-
eign Relations" of dispatches
20 or more years old because
they contain frank comment
on men still active in the pub-
lic life of their countries.
Partly for this reason and
even more because budgetary
allocations to the Historical
Office have failed to keep
pace with the swelling flood
Of documentation, the series
has fallen behind even the
20-year rule it set for itself
after the war. The year 1971,
for example, saw the publi-
cation of volumes for 1946;
an,d subsequent years will be
even further delayed until the
Nixon Administration decrees
the release to the State De-
partment of the National Se-
curity Council records of the
Truman Administration. The
situation is made worse by
the fact that scholars are not
permitted access to State De-
partment files before the
"Foreign Relations" volumes
for the year have been re-
leased (and access is permit-
ted only on a restricted basis through independent discov,
for the several years preced- ery, clandestine disclosure or
mg). Nevertheless "Foreign other means." It added: "Clas-
Relations" remains an impres- sification establishes barriers
sive achievement. Most other between nations, friendly as
nations committed to docu- well as not, creates areas of
mentary series are still bogged uncertainty in the public mind
down in the prewar period. on public issues and impedes
Concerned with the delays, the flow of useful information
President Kennedy wrote Sec_ within our own country." The
retary of State Dean Rusk Task Force even reflected that
on Sept. 6, 1961, "In my view, "more might be gained than
any official should have a i
lost f our nation were to
clear and precise case involv_ adopt, unilaterally if neces-
ing the national interest be_ sary, a policy of complete
fore seeking to withhold from openness in all areas of in-
publication documents or formation" but decided that,
papers 15 or more years old." "in spite of the great ad-
If our Government had lived vantages that might accrue
up to the Kennedy rule, his. from such 'a policy, it is not
torians would be much hap- a practical proposal at the
pier. Its failure to do so has Present time." Instead it rec-
contributed to the recent ommended a 90 per cent de-
pressure for much more rapid crease in the amount of
disclosure. Other. events, of
scientific and technical infor-
course, have intensified the mation under classification:
pressure, including the dis-
closures by Jack Anderson, HE idea of no secrets at
Neil Sheehan, and Daniel Ells- all is an arresting one. It is
berg. In addition, the knowl- perhaps true that our secrecy
edge that Government offi- system has kept more things
cia i documents o mem- than it has from the enemy.
eiNgE9P134400499ROCT*00011.00031e2k2n people
bets of Congress or news- The North Vietnamese, the
papermen when they find
leaking to their own or their
department's advantage, or
when they are trying to com-
bat their own Government's
policy, has increased outside
skepticism about the sacro-
sanctity of the secrecy sys-
tem. Undoubtedly the prolif-
eration of memoirs in which
former Presidents, diplomats
and even Special Assistants to
Presidents break the official
deadline with impunity has
also encouraged people to
question the 20-year or even
the 15-year rule.
Now we have the appari-
tion of Dr. Edward Teller, who
not too long ago was hound-
ing J. Robert Oppenheimer
as a security risk, sudden-
ly asking, "Can we and should
we keep any secret for more
than a year?" He evidently
received this revelation as a
member of a Task Force for
Security set up by the Penta-
gon in 1970 under the chair-
manship of Frederick Seitz,
the physicist and former pres-
ident of the National Academy
of Sciences. The, Task Force
itself concluded more formally
that it was unlikely ''that
classified information will re-
main secure for periods as
V:aig as five years and that it
is more reasonable to assume
its knowledge by others in
periods as short as a year
Chinese anARWOlaidieED rnae i
ilatisv20111dOWlef: OA-Rialik8440494YROMalilic1121112-9t
_with_a_ view to amending the
knew all about the CIA. war the secrecy system, recently sition. Professor Langer sag- of exceptions. ,he range
In Laos; only the American proposed that any paper gests that confidential and
Congress and electorate were stamped Secret should become secret documents be made Another means of legisla-
kept in the dark. It is also true public in two years; Top available "to qualified schol- tive action lies in the narrow-
that the secrecy system has Secret would take three years. ars" after five or 10 years. ing of the use of "executive
been a fertile source of blun- He would also empower a James MacGregor Burns pro- privilege" as a means by
der and folly in foreign policy. Congressionallyappointed poses eight to 10 years. My which the executive branch
Without secrecy, the British commission to grant excel- own vote would be for 10 withholds information. Mem-
would not have got into Suez tions. Senator Muskie would years?i.e., two and a half hers of Congress ordinarily
nor the Americans into the set up an independent board Administrations? with some can obtain classified docu-
Bay of Pigs, nor would it have authorized to transmit classi- type of appellate procedure to ments on request, at least
been so easy for successive fied documents at any time permit extensions in cate- when it serves the purpose of
administrations to deepen to Congress and, when they gories two, four and five and the executive branch. The ef-
American involvement in Indo- are two years old, to make other exceptional cases. I am feet- of classification is usually
china, them public. George Ball, the strengthened in the belief that less to deny secret informa-
Moreover, the abolition of former Under Secretary of a decade would be about right tion than to prevent public
secrecy might well diminish State and an astute and ex- by the remark of Winston discussion and debate of such
international tensions by mak- perienced public servant, has Churchill in the House of information (and also to make
ing it harder for one power advocated a five-year rule. Commons on May 15, 1930: it harder to know what to
to place the most sinister pos- Yet such ideas raise prob- "When we come to the queg- request). Congress also on tt
h
far these matters oc-
sible interpretation on the lems ? problems which the tion of how casion may request unclassi-
actions of another. Ignorance total abolition of secrecy are affected by the lapse of fied material?internal memo-
time I would point out that
makes it easy to conclude the would raise in even more randa, minutes of meetings
worst; but the worst may not acute form. It is important, it is nearly 10 years ago. That and so on?that might reveal
always be the most accurate. for example, that disclosure is a very long time." With disagreements within the ex-
We begin to see today that not be so precipitate as to the increase in the velocity ecutive branch or expose
both America and Russia did inhibit Government officials of history, it is an even longer bureaucrats advocating unpop-
things in the early Cold War from making unorthodox sug- time 40 years later. Yet the ular views to Congressional
that each government saw gestions. The McCarthy period Nixon Administration refuses retaliation. Immediate Con-
as modestly defensive in pur- had a dismal enough effect to make a blanket declassifi- gressional or public access to
pose and tbat the other gov- on the public service; think cation of World War H docu- the internal communications
ernment saw as intolerably what that effect would have ments after 27 years! of the 'executive would un-
aggressive and hostile. If a been if members of the For- If Congress declines to make doubtedly end the full and
series of Pentagon Papers and eign Service knew that every-. a frontal attack on the secrecy frank exchange among Gov-
Kremlin Papers, recording in thing they put on paper or system, it is still not without ernment officials on which
Sheehan-Anderson detail what said at a meeting would be means of improving public ac- wise policy depends. When
these two governments were submitted to Roy Cohn in cess to official records. The Government wants to turn
actually saying and planning the next two or three years. Freedom of Information Act, down Congressional requests
in their inner councils, had It is also important that dis- passed in 1966 after a dec- for material, classified or un-
been published, say, in 1949, closure not be so rapid as ade's labor and perseverance classified, and if methods of
each side might have recen- to invite fishing expeditions by Congressman John Moss of bureaucratic attrition fail, it
sidered its view that the other by one political party in the California, is based on the may threaten or invoke exeeu-
was fanatically bent on world files of its predecessor. And, proposition that disclosure nye privilege.
conquest. Herbert Feis, after from the viewpoint of the should be the rule, not the Obviously executive privi-
half a career in the State historian, it is urgently im- exception, and that, in Moss's lege is essential to protect the
Department and the other half portant that the system of words, "the burden should be inner workings of Govern
as a historian and therefore disclosure not tend to dilute on the agency to justify the ment. Obviously also it is ha-
with intimate knowledge of the research quality of docu- withholding of a document ble to grave abuse. A decade
both interests, recently and, mentary records. Herman and not fon] the person who ago President Kennedy tried
I believe, correctly observed Kahn?not the thermonuclear requests it." The act further to end the practice by which
of the conventional objections Herman Kahn, but the Herman provides for judicial review lesser officials in the executive
to shortening the closed period, Kahn now at Yale, whose ser- when access is denied. How- branch assumed this authority
"Earlier publication of the vices as head of the Franklin ever, the act also allows for on their own cognizance. "Ex-
American record would, on the D. Roosevelt Library and later nine categories of exception, ecutive privilege," he wrote
whole, dispel suspicion and of .the Presidential libraries the first of which is for mat-
Representative Moss in 1962,
mistrust of our policies rather system have benefited a gen- ters "specifically required by "can be invoked only by the
President and will not be used
than nourish them." eration of scholars?recently executive order to be kept se-
without specific Presidential
? But I guess that Dr. Seitz said, "My own conviction is cret in the interest of the na-
approval." However, when
and his comrades are right, that there has been a decline tional defense or foreign pol-
President Nixon's Secretary of
The abolition of official secre- in the qualities of frankness icy." When Julius Epstein of
Defense cried executive privi-
cy presupposes a different and honesty in our records to the Hoover Institution on ,
lege last summer as an excuse
world. If rigorously carried a considerable degree because War, Peace and Revolution
of the great pressure to make for not showing the Senate
out, it would make interna- tested the statute in his laud-
Foreign Relations Committee,
everything immediately avail-
tional negotiation difficult and able campaign to secure the
able. to historians and journal- even on a confidential basis,
personal privacy impossible.release of the Operation Keel-
who want to do historical the Pentagon's five-year plan
But it is an excess in a good haul documents?a file deal-
for military assistance, the
writing about what happened
direction; and the same kind ing with the forced repatria-
sorely tried chairman, Senator
yesterday, last month or last
of skepticism about secrecy tion of Soviet displaced per- sorely
responded by intro-
year." Too much eagerness
has recently produced a num- sons after World War II?the
o. n the part of historians for ducing legislation requiring
ber of more moderate schemes
instant access may well defeat courts rejected his plea. In
the President to take personal
for a still drastic abbreviation
their own long-term interests. practice, the Freedom of In-
responsibility for the use of
of the closed period. Con- formation Act has simply not
gressman Moorhead, whose affected classified information, executive privilege and to ex-
instructive hearings have . HIS perhaps is one reason The Moorhead subcommittee plain,_, detail.
thrown as usual a
continued
_re.?.
rnAppcosisabRor ease 2004163/06v.eGIA4RIDRE344000499R001MOOTZ-Z:
r n such is-
i
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004R001000100012-2
sues, held hearings on the Ful-
bright bill last autumn before
his Subcommittee on the Sep- '
aration of Powers.
THE problem is that the se-
crecy- system has been uni-
laterally determined and con-
trolled by a major party at
linterest?the executive branch
of the Government. The result
is that Government has been
able to move rather easily
from legitimate to illegitimate
uses of secrecy. Harold Nicol-
son, we have seen, lost no
opportunity to emphasize the
essentiality of secrecy in
negotiations. But he distin-
guished sharply between ne-
gotiation and policy and
always added, with equal ern-
.phasis, that policy "should
never be secret, in the sense 1T.
that in no circumstances BE.LOKT
should the citizens of a free ON HSI
country be committed by their Qi-IAN
Government to treaties, en-
gagements, promises or corn-
mitments, of which they have A -
not had full knowledge," Ask
which the press has not had
full opportunity to publish and
the legislature to .debate and
approve. "I feel it to be the
duty of every citizen in a free
country," Nicolson declared,
"to proclaim that he will not
consider himself bound by any
treaty entered into by the Ad-
ministration behind his back."
This was President Nixon's
particular offense in the Indo-
Pakistani affair?keeping his
policy secret from the Ameri-
can people. But he was far
froth the first offender. Every
President since the war has
done much the same thing at
one point or another. If gov-
ernments were always wiser
than citizens, such a course
might be justified. But the
theory of democracy is that
they are not; and the practice
of recent years generally veri-
fies the theory. Illegitimate
secrecy has corrupted our
conduct of foreign affairs and
deprived I he people of the in-
formation necessary .for the
democratic control of foreign
policy. So long as the execu-
tive branch persists in these
abuses and so long as Con-
gress remains unwilling to as-
sert itself, the courage of the
Andersons,-Sheehans and Ells-
bergs would seem to provide
the only restraint and recourse
if we are to get our democra-
cy back into working equi-
librium. However, with intel-
ligence and dAppooved*or Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
can surely think up a better
way. 1111
WASIIINGT011 NS%
Approved For Relelte irkiff/6/672: CIA-RDP84-004141R001000100012-2
New Light on the Cuban Missile Crisis 01 19
By Chalmers M. Roberts
TIIE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never
ceases to intrigue those who lived through it
or had anything to do with it. And so two
e On Occ. 18 Radvanyi attended the first
edge are well worth reporting. One is a
new works that add to the general knowl-
of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador
unique look at the crisis by a Communist
Anatolyi F. Dobrynin and the heads of all
diplomat then in Washington. The other is the Communist embassies in Washington.
an analytical study by an associate professor Dobrvnin discussed the meeting the previous
at the Kennedy School of Government at day between President Kennedy and Soviet
Harvard. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After
Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian charg?inner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin "as-
in Washington at the time (there was no am- sured his audience that recent reports of So-
bassador), an affable fellow with whom I had viet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were
much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, completely without foundation." As to the
turning up later at Stanford where he wrote Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, "nothing ex-
"Hungary and the Super Powers" to be pub- traordinary had happened"; the German sit-
lished in May by the Hoover institution. The nation had been discussed at length along
book is largely about Hungarian-American with disarmament. At this point in his ac-
relations. But one chapter on the missile cri- count, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly
sis will, have far wider interest. What follows unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been
is from it. "privy to the Kremlin discussions" about the
c+.0 ? missiles but that "it is altogether possible
IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1962, Rad- that Dobrynin may not have been in-
vanyi reported home that the United States formed."
was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity
in Cuba. He did so in part because Soviet dip-
lomats here had told him the uproar was
part of the American pre-election campaign.
But one day he received a copy of a cable to
Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador
Janos Beck in Havana. Beck "made it a
point to discount information he had re-
ceived from the Chinese embassy in Havana
as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi
writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had ap-
parently told him that according to informa-
tion he had received from private sources
the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that
Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba
not as instructors but as members of Soviet
special rocket' force units to operate these
missiles."
Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck re-
marked that his Chinese friends had com-
plained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose
any details and had asked Beck whether he
knew anything more about the whole affair.
Beck argued that the story of the deploy-
ment of ground-to-ground missiles had been
launched by 'American warmongers' and ob-
served that neither the Soviet ambassador
in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials
had mentioned anything to him about the
missile build-up."
This message apparently was sent in late
July or early August. Soviet arms shipments
were arriving at that time, though the first
medium range missiles did not come until
Sept. 6. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John Mc-
Cone voiced to President Kennedy his suspi-
cions that the Soviets were preparing to in-
troduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the
basis of Information gathered in Cuba that
month by French intelligence agent Philippe
De liesjoll. However, on Sept. 19 the United
States Intelligence Board's estimate was
that the Soviets would n t introduce offen-
sive missiietkpprOMec Jr IIRe4e&I
another story.
Former Hungarian, Diplomat Here
Reveals Some Intriguing Background
nist diplomats on Oct. 26, this time at the
Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter
Lippmann'e voliiren of, the previous day sug-
gesting dismantling of American missiles in
Turkey along with the Soviet missiles in.
Cuba. "The Soviet embassy." writes Rad-
vanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann
article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S.
administration to seek out a suitable solu-
tion. Dobrynin sought their (Commu-
nist diplomats') opinion as to whether they
thought the Lippmann article should be re-
garded as an indirect suggestion on the part
of the White House." Only the Romanian
ambassador indicated he had some reason to
think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far
as I know, has never said whether the idea
was simply his own. According to RFK's ac-
count, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had sug-
gested a swap involving withdrawal of
American missiles from both Turkey and
Italy and giving up the naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected
THE CRISIS became public with the Pres- the proposal.
ident's Oct. 22 speech. Next day Dobrynin
e*s AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said
called the diplomats together again, explain-
ing that the purpose was "to collect informa.
tion and to solicit opinions on the Cuban sit-
he still had no information on how Moscow
nation." Dobrynin "characterized it as seri-
would meet the quarantine. "I told him,"
ous and offered two reasmis for his concern.
writes Radvanyi, "that according to my infor-
First of all, he foresaw a possible American mation the American buildup for an inva-
attack on Cuba that would almost surely re-
sion of Cuba was nearly completed and that
suit in the death of some Soviet military
American missile bases had aimed all their
personnel who had been sent to handle the missiles toward targets on the island. Only a .
sophisticated new weapons. Thus by impliea- go-ahead signal from the President was
tion the Soviet ambassador was admitting needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred
the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium-
with my .analysis, adding that the Soviet
range missiles. Secondly, he feared that
Union found itself in a difficult position in
when Soviet ships reached the announced Cuba because its supply lines were too long
quarantine line a confrontation_ and the American blockade could be very
was inevita
effective. (Czechoslovak ambassador) Ruzek
bk." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive
weapon could be labeled offensive as well
remarked grimly that if the Americaes in-
and dismissed American concern ever a vaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear
war. At this point I lost self-control and
threat from .Cuba. The Pearl harbor 'attack,
he suggested, might have been responsible asked Whether it was not the same to die
for this unwarranted paranoia. Everybody from an American missile attack as from a
agreed that the situation was serious and Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure
that the possibility of an American invasion me that the situation had not reached such
of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked Proportions and that a solution would no
...
how Moscow intended to deal with the quer. doubt be found
"At the close of the meeting, any last re-
antine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply
that he simply had no information ..." maining ray of hope I may have had for a
On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's mill-
.peaceful solution was abruptly shattered.
tary attache party Dobrynin told Radvanyi Dobrynin now announced mat the Soviet
"that the situation was even more confused embassy was this very moment burning its
and unstable . ? ." But, as Radvanyi notes, the archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of
Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate
party he had met with Attorney General the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel.
Robert F. Kennedy in the third floor of the Dobrynin replied in the negative.
:embassy. It was then that Robert Kennedy "Back once again at the Hungarian lege-
told Dobrynin the President knew he had tion I rushed off to Budapest a long sum-
been deceived by. assurances from Dobrynin mary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin,
and others that no offensive missiles would and informed the foreign ministry that Do-
be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert brynin had confirmed the information that the
Kennedy's posthumously published "Thir- Americans were militarily prepared to in-
t-en Da_ye." vade Cuba. I emphasized that unless a quick
/OM :gellAbRDP04t0
tymmtiftiorpittopflf2und within the next
2
few days, tAPPLEPAfitEgroaKeaM 141?;11t1494,1; pa-113PE440,4149
.R001000100012-2
with the invasion and nothing short of a
miracle could save the world from nuclear ?
war.
"Within two hours I received a troubled
Inquiry from Budapest asking whether I
could possibly be aware of the implications
of my words. I insisted that I would take
full responsibility for every word in my re-
port."
On the 27th Soviet Premier Khrushchey
offered to swap missiles in Cuba for missiles
in Turkey but the next day he accepted the
Kennedy demand for outright removal of both
missiles and planes from Cuba.
Fidel Castro was outraged and Moscow
sent Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba to reason
with him. After three weeks there Mikoyan
stopped in Washington en route home and
Dobrynin invited the Communist diplomats to
dinner with him on Nov. 30. Mikoyan ex-
plained how he had tried to win Castro's ap-
proval to the United Nations inspection of
the missile dismantling process in Cuba, one
of the President's terms to which Khru-
shchev had agreed, but which Castro rejected.
According to Mikoyan's account, he was the
one who "proposed to Moscow instead that
the Americans observe the evacuation of the
missiles from the air and, if necessary,
might inspect Soviet ships on the high seas."
They were inspected from the air, the tarpu-
Iins covering them pulled back by the Soviet
Alors on ships taking them home.
"After dinner," recounts Radvanyi, "Mi-
koyan continued his briefing by explaining
that the Cuban situation had been compli-
cated by the continual advice which Castro
had received from the Chinese. Peking, ac-
cording to Mikoyan, had sent tons of propa-
ganda material, and Mao Tse-tung had
transmitted to Havana one message after
another assuring the Cubans that the eight
hundred million Chinese stood firmly be
hind them and that the Americans were
paper tigers. Mikoyan reported that while
the Chinese had done nothing to help de-
fend Castro, they had refrained from shell-
ing Quemoy and Matsu during the days of
the crisis. Mikoyan noted ironically that
they might easily have stepped up pressure
against Taiwan which?with the Americans
involved in the Caribbean?could have
changed the whole situation ? . "
In defense against the Peking charges,
hurled by now at Moscow, of "adventurism"
in deploying the missiles and "capitula-
tionism" for taking them out, "Mikoyan of-
fered two explanations for the Soviet action.
The missile deployment in the Caribbean, he
said, was aimed at defending Castro on the
one hand and, on the other, at achieving a
definite shift in the power relationship be-
tween the socialist and the capitalist worlds.
After evaluating the strong American reac-
tion during the crisis, however, the Presid-
ium had decided against risking the security
of the Soviet Union and its allies for the
sake of Cuba."
This account squares With Khrushchev's
in, "Khrushchev Remembers." There the So-
viet leader contended that while the "main
thing" was to defend Cuba, "in addition"
"our missiles would have equalized what the
West likes to call the 'balance of power.' "
6-4,4
IN THE second book, "Essence of Decision"
by Graham T. Allison, published. by Little-
Brown, a
thor accepts as "the most satisfactory ex-
planation" of the Soviet move the effort to
end the Soviet "missile gap" then existing.
The missiles in Cuba "amounted to a dou-
bling of Soviet first-strike capabilities."
Two other points made by Allison struck
me. He concludes that the American warnings
against 'installation of the missiles may not
have seemed all that strong to Moscow and
hence the Soviets went on. Ile notes that on
Oct. 14 McGeorge Bundy, Mr Kennedy's as-
sistant for national security, said publicly
that he knew there was "no present evi-
dence, and I think there is. no present likeli-
hood" of "a major offensive capability" be-
ing installed in Cuba. Yet on Sept. 28 the
United States had taken pictures that Bundy
knew about of crates on the decks of. Soviet
ships in route to Cuba crates similar to
those used to send IL-28 light bombers to
Egypt and Indonesia. So Allison says that
"the conclusion that the administration had
discovered a way to tolerate one type of
offensive weapon in Cuba is unavoidable."
Second, Allison concludes from Robert
Kennedy's account, published hi'. 1069, that
what he told Dobrynin just before Kruslichev
agreed to pull out the missiles amounted to
offering a private deal: to oo secretly what
the President refused to do publicly, pull
American missiles out of Turkey in exchange
for Soviet missiles out of Cuba. In, REK's
account he said he told Dobrynin- that "there
could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement
made under this kind of threat or pressure"
but that he also told Dobrynin that "President
Kennedy had been anxious to remove those
missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long per-
iod of time. He had ordered their removal
some time ago, and it was our judgment
that, within a short time after the crisis was
over, those missiles would be gone." After
the crisis abated they were withdrawn.
4.
AppPoitedtftroReleasei2001/03/06 : C IA-RDP84-00499 R001000100012-2
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CIA Headquarters in Virginia
ck yar
CI
The, Central Ilitelligence Agen-
cy always insists its men aren't in- -
.volved in domestic police work.But in
Chicago CIA agents have been working
with the FBI and-Tresury men in an -
effort to pin the bank bombings on
radical groups.
Heretofore,clandestine CIA police
work within the US was centered around
counter espionage .efforts aimed at the
Soviet KGB.CIA maintains secret bases
in all major US cities.The agency also
has training camps in Virginia and
the Carolinas.These are masked as reg-
ular military bases.Spooks are
trained for duty at Williamsburg,Va.
Two years ago CIA employees were
surprised when members of the Chicago
policefAproved F oReFease201/0* 000100012?
-2
treatment at Langley, Va., headquarters
They met there with-Helms, were
shown around, and taken to the secret
training camps. That was the beginning
of rumors within the agency that the
CIA had been given the go ahead to
move into domestic police operations. '
While everyone denied it, the theory ? I
was that the.CIA Was told to get the ,
radicals.
? Two recent personnel changes
increased speculation. One involved
resignation of Helm's special assis-
tant, Robert Kiley-. Kiley handled the
student operations through National
Student Association facades. He re-
cently turned up as associate director
of the Police Foundation, a new group
launched with a $30 million Ford
Foundation grant. The money is meant
to be used to improve local police.
The second personnel shift involved
Drexel Godfrey; who wis head of ifie
CIA's Office of Current Intelligence.
He quit this high ranking job, turned
up in the narcotics bureau of the
Justice Commission at Harrisburg,
Pa. The commission is another new
police. Both personnel shifts are
cited by agency people to bolstering
fronts in the US, thistime, moving
into was given a new title recently,
making him head of all intelligence
and presumably providing him with a .
legitimate interest in internal police
operations. But such suggestions are
bitterly denied all around.
CASE FILE [DESCRIPTION)
IIEWInvw.vw.y
Place card upright in place of charged out folder.
lace c horizontally in returned file folder.
DATE
Approved For ReleaseelgIM146ciaqh-151J4a149R001000100012-2
FORM NO.
? Rill, GI
10 REPLACES FORM.36.152
I IQ kvuir.t4 u?v RE USES.
(7)
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
B-6 THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, January 7, 1972
Disclosures Reported Pleasing Keating
By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
New York Times Neys Service
NEW DELHI ? Sources
else to Ambassador Kenneth
B. Keating indicate that he
was not unhappy about the dis-
closure of his secret cable-
gram to Washington taking is-
sue with American policy on
the Indian-Pakistani war.
Asked yesterday to com-
ment on his policy views and
on last month's cablegram,
which was divulged in Wash-
ington by columnist Jack An-
derson, Keating would say
only: "This is a matter I can-
not discuss."
It is known in New Delhi,
however, that from the time
Pakistani troops in East Paki-
stan moved to crush the Ben-
gali secession movement there
last March, Keating cam-
paigned privately against the
Nixon administration's pro-
Pakistani stand. He even did
so publicly until he was si-
lenced by Washington in April.
Posture Correct
In recent months, Keating's
official posture has been rigid-
ly correct. He has refused to
discuss his views with report-
ers, even in private. hi his
regular columns in a U.S. In-
formation Service fortnightly
newspaper that is widely dis-
tributed in India, he has con-
sistently defended the admin-
istration policy. He has been
criticized for doing so in the
Indian press and elsewhere.
From the beginning of the
India - Pakistan crisis, which
culminated in India's victo-
rious support of the East Paki-
stan separatists, the American
ambassador's cables to Wash-
ington ,have argued strongly
for a different American poli-
cy. He pressed for a policy
that would be based on what
he views as the moral and
political "realities" on the
subcontinent.
Only a few days after the
Pakistani crackdown in East
Pakistan began, he sent a ca-
ble containing more than a
hint of outrage. In it he re-
ferred to the killings of Ben-
galis as "selective genocide"
and urged Washington to come
down hard on the Pakistani
military regime. The word
"massacre" was also used.
Reportedly Rebuked
After an April 15 news con-
ference in Bombay at which
he differed with the adminis-
tration's contention that the
events in East Pakistan were
an "internal affair," he was
reported to have been rebuked
by Washington and told to con-
fine his public remarks to sup-
port the administration posi-
tion.
"The phrase 'internal affair'
should not be overdone," he
said at the news conference.
He added that the meaning of
the phrase was "limited to the
geographical fact that all of
this is taking place in what is
now Pakistan.
The Pakistan government is
understood to have filed a pro-
test with Washington about his
remarks.
Keating continued to press
his argument in his cable-
Approved For R
A? - - _ _ 1
grams to Washington. His
view all along, according to
confidants, was that Pakistan
was an unstable, crumbling
military dictatorship; that In-
dia was not only an increas-
ingly stable democracy but
also the dominant power on
the subcontinent; and that
East Pakistan seemed certain
to emerge as an independent
state. The Bengali separatists
have proclaimed the establish-
ment of Bangladesh.
The ambassador argued that
the morality of the situation, a
reference to "genocide," as
well as the political realities
should lead the United States
to lean toward India rather
than Pakistan.
By his determined dissent,
Keating, a former Republican
senator from New York who is
a political appointee of Presi-
dent Nixon and a former law
partner of Secretary of State
William P. Rogers, may have
caused these two men consid-
erable anguish and irritation
over the last 10 months, but
his arguments have had little
Obvious effect.
There have been periodic
press reports that Keating has
threatened to resign.
lease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
I up raieFamii nAtiWolgatico Velting
By William Greider
Washington Post Staff Writer
U.S.. interests promoted?
and then apparently backed
away from?plans for a right-
wing military coup in Chile
two years ago to prevent the
election of Marxist Salvador
;11Iende as president, accord-
ing to internal memoranda of
ITT, the giant international
conglomerate.
"It is a fact," said an Oct. 16 for ITT said Anderson's first trust episode?President Har-
message from Latin America
to corporate headquarters in
New York, "that word was
Passed to Viaux from Wash-
ington to hold back last week.
It was felt that he was not ad-
equately. prepared, his timing
was off, and he shpuld 'cool it'
for .a later, unspecified date.
Emissaries pointed out to him
that, if he moved prematurely
and lost, his defeat would be
tantamount to a 'Bay of Pigs
in Chile.'
"As part of the persuasion
to delay, Viaux was given oral
assurances he would receive
material assistance and sup-
port from the U.S. and others
for a later maneuver. It must
be noted that friends of Viaux
subsequently reported Viaux
was inclined to be a bit skepti-
cal about only oral assur-
ances."
These and many other less
sensational glimpses into U.S.
government and corporate ma-
neuvering in Chile are drawn
from a new batch of secret
documents from ITT's files,
obtained by .columnist Jack
At one point, according to Anderson and made available
yesterday to The Washington
Post.
-The copies of 26 memos,
messages and staff reports
hint at many questions which
are left unanswered?What
role did the Central Intelli-
gence Agency play? How seri-
ously was the military plot en-
tertained? How deeply was
ITT involved?
Yesterday, the White House,
1eaSee200140300ed tel
CIA all refused to comment.
In New York, a spokesman
?
The U.S. government, ac-
cording to the ITT papers.
first gave a "green light" to
I he U.S. ambassador-in Santia-
go?"maximum authority to
do all possible, short of a Do-
minican Republic type action,
to keep All.ende from taking
power."
The U.S. government also
promised, according to the
in documents, to selected
Chilean military leaders "full
material and financial assist--
ance by the U.S. military es-
tablishment" if civil war
erupted?even though Ambas-
sador Edward Korry charac-
terized Chile's armed forces as
"a bunch of toy soldiers."
column Tuesday on the Chi-
lean episode, alleging a CIA-
ITT plot to provoke economic
chaos in the Latin American
country, was "without founda-
tion in fact."
Former Gen. Viaux is now
in jail in Chile, charged with
mutiny against the govern-
ment, in cOnnection' with the
preelection assassin ation of
Gen. Rene Schneider, com-
mander of ,the Army. That at-
tack was generally regarded
as an unsuccessful attempt to
stir right-wing resentment and
possibly to touchoff a military
takeover. The ITT documents
mention the incident and
Viaux's arrest, but do not say
anything to indicate that the
shooting was inspired by U.S.
interests.
ITT, which had more than
$150 million invested in Chile,
has since lost its major capi-
tal, an 80 per cent interest in
the ,Chile Telephone Company,
and is negotiating with Al-
lende's government over com-
pensation for its loss. ITT con-
tinues to operate two Shera-
ton hotels and a telecommuni-
cations factory there.
Taken as a whole, the ITT
messages from Latin Ameri-
can agents to Washington and
New York suggest a picture of
frantic, sometimes bitter,
sometimes contradictory com-
munications within the corpo-
ration, trying to find some-
thing that would keep the Chi,
lean congress from certifying
the documents, ITT informed
the U.S. government that it
would volunteer funds in
"seven figures," $1 minion or
More, to aid in some unspeci-
fied way the efforts to keen
Allende out of power.
Finally, the ITT documents
state that in mid-October' of
1970?a week before All.ende
would be elected ? a right-
wing Ax- eneral. wiled R
erto VATta OfftwrDE
ho" by the ITT operatives in
Chile, was advised to hold of.
old Geneen, Washington office
vice president W. R. Merriam,
public relations vice president
E. J. Gerrity and others.
In some memos, the ITT
executives reported a plan for ?
stimulating economic chaos?
which might in turn, have pro-
voked a military coup. But it
is not clear that the corpora-
tion embraced the idea fully
and acted upon it. The Wash-
ington officers attributed it to
a "Mr. Broe" or a representa-
tive from "the McLean agen-
cy," references to the CIA and
to William Broe, CIA director I
in Latin America, according
to columnist Anderson.
Gerrity, for example, re-
ported in one memorandum
his skepticism: "Realistically,
I do not see how we can in-
duce others involved to follow
the plan suggested. We can
contact key companies for
their reactions and make sug-
gestions in the hope that they
might cooperate. Information
we received today from other
sources indicates that there is
a growing economic crisis in
any case."
At another point, Gerrity re-
lated that Geneen, the board
chairman and president, re-
garded the plan as "unwork-
able."
As Allende's election drew
near without any "crisis" to
prevent it, the ITT memos
turned sour and pessimistic in
tone, blaming the State De-
partment for not taking a
An- g to lobby
Wilhite House
for a stiffer U.S. policy.'
1
are
t gritiallagMlt
have figured in the ITT anti.
k
W
Oise 2001/0
AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1971 PAGE A.22
The White House Brief on South Asia
The White House, with an assist from Senator
Goldwater, has now revealed publicly what the
United States did privately over the last eight
months to ease the South Asia crisis. A "back.
ground" news conference with Dr. Henry Kissinger
on Tuesday, which the senator was good enough
to put into the Congressional Record on Thursday,
establishes that in fact Amoebas officials did work
to induce political compromise in Pakistan and mili-
tary restraint in India. The record is at once so
important and judgmental that it needs to be in-
spected in detail
That Rs duress, Including pressure from Wash-
ington, was affecting Pakistan is plain. As the
White House noted, Islamabad replaced the cruel
military governor in the East, allowed relief there
to be internationalized, offered formal amnesty to
refugees who might choose to return, and had
agreed to restore a facade of civilian rule this
month. President Yahya Khan had agreed to talk
to Calcutta representatives of Bangle Deck (the
Bengali nation proclaimed hi former East Paki-
stan/ though not to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or
his nominees?"Mujib," the acknowledged and
elected Bengali leader, is the Pakistanit' prisoner
trial tar Giessen. Islamabad was reportedly ready
to grant the East autonomy in everything but for-
. eign policy, defense and currency. Further Paki-
stani concessions were expected in the week of
Nov. 22.
The Indians, according to the White House, knew
all this. They also knew Islansabad had offered to
let Americans communicate with Mujib through
his lawyer. On Nov. 19 they were told the U.S. was
prepared to discuss with Islamabad a timetable for
establishing autonomy in East Bengal But with.
out waiting, without giving word of Its own mili-
tary timetable, India struck on Nov. 22. The White
House conclusion: peaceful mans had not been
exhausted; recourse to arms was accordingly
unjustified.
The question, of course, Is whether Delhi moved
because It was sure American diplomacy would
fall to produce a Bangle Desh state independent
of Pakistan, India's goal; or whether Delhi moved
nut of fear that the Americans would succeed and
thus deprive it of a long-sought chance to bash
the Poke.
The answer, we submit, must take into account
the constantly reiterated Indian position that ne-
gotiations had to begin with Mujib. Whether India
figured realistically that otherwise negotiations
would be meaningless, or whether It calculated
cynically that President Yahya could not stomach
that course, does not alter the uncontested fact
that the Americans knew from the start this was
the Delhi position. By Nov. 19, or by Nov. 22, Pres-
ident Yahya had talked with no Bengalis. He had
ruled out Mujib and Mujib's choices. Ile had Said
the autonomy he would grant would not cover
foreign affairs, defense and currency?dominant
heights of any country's public life. Eight months
had passed. Refuge. were continuing to pour in.
Press reports of India's grooving impatience were
rampant. And presumably Washington was not
altogether dependent on India's formal statements
to learn the status of its preparations for open war.
Knowing now what the administration kept secret
before, we are not an inclined to criticize the ad.
ministration for its attitude as for Its judgment.
Through eight months of gathering misery and
tension it stuck in a public posture of support for
Pakistan on the ostensible grounds that it could
apply more effective leverage. At the end, it had
only persuaded Pakistan to promise talks?not yet
In begin them?for a limited purpose with Bengalis
whom the Wiens regarded as stooges. And on this
basis it expected India to hold still.
The Indians have Non rough anti irceilicruiliim
they have encouraged and directly taken part in
the dismemberment of a sovereign state. But could
the war have been avoided It, early on, Washington
Dad openly and entirely withdrawn support from
Pakistan and demanded that it honor the free elec-
tions which Mujib was and Yahya nullified in
March? Was not the appearance of American favor
crucial in allowing Yahya to sustain his misrule to
the point where the Indians jumped him?
We note that, contrary to some accounts. evidencs
Is lacking that the White House and State Depart.
went have different views on the crisis. The Depart.
ment on Dec. 4 had cited India as the aggressor.
But the White House did not really shy away from
this indictment as sharply as some reports made it
seem; rather, it reinforced the indictment by offer-
ing a diplomatic record intended to show what
peaceful possibilities the Indians had preempted. In
noting that the first charge of aggression came
from State, the White House?the briefing tran-
script makes clear?was trying to rebut other
charges that American favor for Pakistan had
flown from the personal preferences of the Presi.
dent. In short, there are other places?and aspects
other than Internecine conflict between the White
House and State?at which to look for the flaws
and failure of American policy.
Around
Teachers College at 120
With a fascinating past and great promise for
Ike future, the District of Columbia Teachers Col-
lege has had much to celebrate on the occasion of
(is 120th anniversary this month. To begin with,
ec this chm'ished community institution
go back to the roots of racial segregation in the na-
tion's capital, when the education of Negroes was
anything but a priority item.
It was in this setting that Myrtilla Miner, awhile
woman from Madison County, N.Y., dedded to
opens school at 11th Street and New York Avenue
NW, to -prepare "colored girls to teach." By the
1870s, it had become the Miner Normal School,
which, along with the Wilson Normal School, had
developed from one-year institutions into schools
offering three-year .eourses.
Racially separated normal schools continued
here uMil 1929, when Congress authorized the es.
tablishment of two teachers colleges? still segre-
gated. It wasn't until 1955 that the two colleges
merged into the Integrated D.C. Teachers College.
Today, the college has an enrollment of more
than 4,500 students and, under the presidency of
Dr. Paul P. Cooke, is exploring new roles In the
life of the community, as well as in the field of
public higher education here. One current com-
munity activity, for example, is the Adult Courtesy
Patrol, an organization of men and women who
patrol 14th Street NW to provide better security
for citizens; there is also a children and youth
community recreation program, under which the
college is providing its basketball courts, playroom
and gym for neighborhood activities; there Is a
pilot District police project, to work on police-con,
malty relations between some 900 police officers
and the neighborhood they serve, as well as dozens
of other student and faculty projects.
Above all, D.C. Teachers is on Its way to becom-
ing a general community college, with hopes of
some day functioning as a vital part of a Federal
City University concept. This plan envisions a net-
work of breach colleges for junior college educe-
tine, to supplement and feed the city's four-year
liberal arts omits:on aad the Washington Technical
Institute.
The college, which has been accredited for the
next 10 years by the Middle States Association of
College and Secondary Schools, has been a keystone
of public higher etlacation here, and merits re-
newed cong,resslonal and community support as It
moves toward a greater role in the years ahead.
Fare Smudging
Man Is born to trouble; hut Attorney Philip
Hirschkop who has rendered much service to civil
liberty and public order in this community, seems
Os have had more than his fair share of it. Trouble
began for him when he was appointed to defend
the amealled "D.C. Nine?an aggregation of Roman
Catholic dergy and laymen charged with ransack.
log the Dow Chemical Co. Washington office in
what they conceived of as a protest against the use
of napalm in the Vietnam war. The trial before
Federal District Court Judge John Pratt was a
tumultuous one in which the judge and Mr. Hirsch-
hop collided constantly. At its conclusion Judge
) Pratt summarily found the defense attorney guilty
of Contempt; and on top of that filed charges
against him before the court's committee on admis-
sions and grievanceS.
The contempt conviction is still pending before
the Court of Appeals. The Ethics Committee of the
local bar association found no occasion for dis-
clplinary action against Mr. Hir.hkop. But the
court's committee on admissions and grievances
recommended his disbarment. About six weeks ago
Town
a three-judgr panel of the mud-reviewing the case
concluded against disbarring or suspending Mr.
Ilirschkop but found that his defense of his clients
"went far beyond the hounds of zealous repre-
sentation." They censured the lawyer for "prof.-
sional miscionduct" bed observed that this rniseon.
titiot iaaTi iiiin tathatiTi tLit
the respondent's behavior before the various courts
in this area has been exemplary."
5.1r. Hirschkop hailed the news of this finding
by saying that he did not believe the panel would
have censured him at all except as "a face.saving
device for Pratt." Whereupon, the members of the
panel filed new charg. against Mr. Ilirschkop with
Ike grievance committee, accusing him of "know.
ingly making false accusations." Since when is a
defendant foreclosed from commenting on a ver-
dict? Otis an absurdity to characterize this offhand
remark made to a reporter as "false accusation"
against a court. The action does nothing to save
face for Judge Pratt, It serves only to smudge the
face of the District Court.
Pop Sculpture
We are enchanted by the new abstract sculptures
that flank Rock Creek Parkway and frame the Lb.
coin Memorial as you approach Memorial Bridge.
For all the monuments and statuary in this city,
there isn't much modern art In public places. The
David Smith alongside the Universal Building on
Connecticut Avenue and the Alexander Calder, Jose
de Rivera and George Rickey around the Smith-
sonian's History and Technology museum are all
we can think of, now that the Corcoran sold Barnett
Newman's rust red, up-side-down obelisk to Hoots.
ton.) The Constructivist, translucent cubes near
the Lincoln Memorial, at any rate, seem truly in-
spired, a perfect expression of our time. They are
bold in their utter stinplieily, in keeping with the
monumentality of the Lincoln Memorial Yet, being
translucent, they also blend quietly into the en.
vironMent, Merely marking a point in space, ern-
phasiring the perspective on the Memorial, the
traffic around It, the trees, the sky, the river, the
infinily of the ecology. These petifeelly seared plas-
tic cubes on granite pedestals, moreover, are, like
all true art, hauntingly Mysterious. (What could be
more mysterious than golden horses shimmering
through plastic sheets") They +obviously symbolize
the ultimate union of art and technology, with the
former all wrapped up In the latter. What could be
more metaphysical? And all of this Is, of course,
with it, lois relevant, ills op and it is pop. It's a
happening.
But unhappily it will unhappen in a few weeks,
the Park Service tells us. The repair and re.plating
of the statues will be completed and the scaffold.
ing will come down. We will again be treated to
the familiar sight of the strutting stallions repre-
senting peace ?which were given to us by the
Italian government In 1951.
Kissinffer's tackgroundei on the War in South Asia
FInsT OF All, lot no get a number of
things straight. There have been some com-
ments that the administration is antdIndian.
Thin is totally inaccurate. India is a great
country. It is the most populous free coon
try. It is governed by democratic prom-
dues.
Americans through all administrations in
the postwar period have felt a commitinent
In the progress and development of India,
and the American people have contributed
to this to the extent of $10 billion. Last year,
in this administration, India received from
all sources $1.2 billion for development as.
sistance, economic assistance, of which $700
million came from the IfMted States in var.
Ions forms. Therefore, we have a commit-
nient to the progress and to the future of
India, and we have always recognized that
the success of India, and the Indian demo-
cratic experiment, would be of profound
significanee to many of the countries in the
undertleveloped world.
Therefore, oh en we have differed with
India, as we have in recent weeks, we do
NO with great sadness and with crest dig.
appointment.
Now let me describe the situation as we
saw it going hark to March 25, Mardi 25
is, of course, the day when the central gov-
ernment of Pakistan decided to establish
military rule in East Bengal and started the
process which has led to the present situa-
tion.
The United Stales has never supported
HE RI' ISSINGER
the particular action that led to this tragic
series of events, and the United States has
always recognized that this action had con-
sequences which had a considerable impact
on India. We have always recognized that
the influx of refugees into India produced
the danger of communal strife in a country
always precariously Poised on the edge of
communal strife. We have known that it is a
strain on the already scarce economic re-
sources of 0 country in the process of de-
vetopment.
Therefore, from the beginning, the United
States has played a very active role in at-
tempting to ease the suffering of the refu-
gees and the impact on India of this large
Intim of unexpected people. The United
States position has been to attempt two ef-
forts simultaneously: One, to ease the
human suffering and to bring about the re.
turn of the refugees; and secondly, we have
attempted to bring about a political resolu.
tion of the conflict which generated the ref-
ugees in the first place.
Now, the United States did not condone
what happened in March 1971; on the con.
trary, the United States has made no new
development loans to Pakistan since March,
1971.
Secondly, there has been a great deal of)
talk about military supplies to Pakistan. The
fact of the matter is that Immediately after
the actions M East Pakistan at the end of
larch of this past year, the United States
mtspended any new licenses. It stopped the
shipment of al1 military supplies out of
ARICH.CAO depots or that were under Amen.
'no governmental centred. The only arms
that were continued to be shipped to Paki.
stan were arms on oLd licenses in commer.
Oat channels, and those were spare parts.
There were no lethal enditems involved.
To give you a sense of magnitude. the
hinted Slates cut off $35 million worth of
arms at the end of March of this year, or
eat.V. April of this year, immediatrty after
the actions in East Bengal, and continued to
ship something less than $5 million worth;
whereupon, all the remainder of the pipe-
line was Out off.
ereeR
Ir is true the United States did not make
any pudic declarations on its views of the
evolution, because the United States wanted
to use its influence with both Delhi and Isla.
mailed to bring about a political settlement
that would enable the refugees to return. At
Ohs request of the President, this was ex.
plained by me to the Indian Foreign Minis-
ter and to the Indian Prime Minister when I
was in New Delhi In early July, and both In-
dicated that they understood our-decision in
this respect and made no criticism stone de.
cision.
They did make a criticism of the arms
shipments. Secondly, we consistently used
our influence that we gained in this manner
to urge the Government of Pakistan in the
direction of a political evolution. We urged
the Government of Pakistan and they
agreed that relief supplies be distributed by
Intemational agencies, in order to take away
the critidam In East Pakistan that they
might be used to strengthen the central au-
thority, and the government agreed that a
"A spokesman," "high officials..? in formed sources" ?
these are the players in as game called "for background only"
which government officials play with newsmen and which
everybody but the reader wins: the newsmen get a story and
government officials can speak candidly, or self-servingly,
without taking official responsibility for what they say.
Last week, however, the reader won one when Senator
Goldwater put into the Congressional Record the transcript
of a White House "backgrounder" with the press and
thereby gave away the identity of the source: Dr. Henry
Kissinger. The result, excerpts of which are printed here,
,offers a revealing glimpse of what the White House thinks
?or wants everybody to believe it thinks?about the origins
and causes of the India?Pakistan war.
timetable be established for returning Pain
stan to civilian rule. That was supposed to
be done by the and of December.
We urged a mutual withdrawal of troops
from the border, and when India rejected
this, we urged a unilateral withdrawal of
.Pakistan troops from the border, and that
wasi accepted by Pakistan and never replied
On by India.
We urged an amnesty for all refugees, and
that wan accepted.
We went further. We established contact
with the Bangle Desk people in Calcutta.
and during August, September and October
of this year no fewer than eight such con'
lane took place.
We approached President Yahya Khan
three times In order to begin negotiations
with the Bangle Desh people in Calcutta.
The Government of Pakistan neeeated
were tald by our contacts in Calcutta that
the Indian Government discouraged such net-
gotiations. In other words, we attempted to
promote a political settlement, and if I can
sum up the difference that may have existed
between as and the Government of India, it
was this:
We told the Government of India on many
occasions?the Secretary of State saw the
Indian Ambassador 18 times; I saw him
seven times since the end of August on be.
half of the President We all said that po-
litical autonomy for East Bengal was the
inevitable outcome of a political evolution,
and that we favored it. The differences may
have been that the Government of India
wanted things so rapidly that it was no
longer talking about, political evolution, but
about political collapse.
Without attempting to speculate on the
motives of the Indian Government, the fact
of the matter, as they presented themselves
to us, was as follows: We told the Indian
Prime Minister when aloe was here of the
Pakistan offer to withdraw their troops uni?
laterally from the border. There was no
response.
We told the Indian Prime Minister when
she was here that we would try to arrange
negotiations between the Pakistanis and
members of the Amami League, spedfically
approved by Mujibur, who is in prison. We
Sold the Indian Ambassador shortly before
his return to Indian that we were prepared
even to discuss with them a political time
a precise timetable for the establish.
ment of political autonomy in East Bengal.
The conversation was held on November
lath. On November 22nd, military action
started in East Bengal.
We told the Pakistan Foreign Secretary
when he was here that it was desirable on
November 15th; that we thought It was time
for Pakistan to develop a maximum pro-
gram. lie said he could not give us an an-
ewer until the week of .November 22nd when
he would return to his country. He also
pointed out to us that there would be a re-
turn to civilian rule at the end of December,
at which time it might be easier to bring
about such matters as the release of Mull.
bur, whose imprisonment had occurred
under military rule.
This information Was transmitted, and
military action, nevertheless, started during
the week of November 22nd. On when we say
Ileal there was no need for military action,
we do not say that India did not suffer. We
do not say that we are unsympathetic to In-
dia's problems or that we do not 0510,0 India.
This country, which in many respects has
had a love affair with India, can only, with
enormous pain, accept the fact that military
action was taken in our view without ade-
quate muse, and if we express this opinion
In the United Nations, we do not do so be.
Douse we want to aupport one particular
point of view on the subcontinent, or be.
cause we want to forego our friendship with
what will always be one of the great roan.
tries in the world; but because we believe
that if, as some of the phrases go, the right
of military attack is determined by arith.
metie, if political wisdom consists of saying
the attacker has 500 million and the de.
Sender has 100 million, and, therefore, the
United States must always be on the side of
Ohm numerically stronger, then we are crest-
ing a situation where, in the foresecalote fu-
ture, we will have international amrchy,
and where the period of peace, which is the
greatest desire for the President to estab-
lish, will be jeopardized; not at first for
Americans, necessarily, but for peoples all
over the world.
The unilateral withdrawal, that was with-
out any qualifications. The willingness to
talk to the Bangle Desh people involved a
disagreement between the Indians and the
Bangle Desh on the one side, and the Pakis-
tanis on the other. The Indians took the
view that the negotiations had to begin with
Mujibur, who was in prison.
What we attempted to promote was a as.
collation with Banda Dego people who were
000 10 prison, and who were in Calcutta. The
Pakistanis Said they would talk only to these
Bangle Dash people who were not charged
with any particular crime in Pakistan, and I
don't know whom that would have excluded.
There is no personal preference on my
part for Pakistan, and the IRDWN that I. ex.
pressed at the beginning, of the American
position--that is, about the crucial Mum,
tance of India as a country in the world
and in the subcontinent?have always been
stiontic held mo Bra
SIANDCBUY support those as an expression of
bipartisan American policy in the postwar
period.
As for the President, I was not aware of
his preference for Pakistan leadem over Ili.
dian leaders, and I, therefore, asked him
this morning what this might be based on.
Ile pointed out?as pm know, I +vas not a-
quainted with the President before his ores.
not position?but he pointed out to me that
an his trip in 1967, he was liebeived very
warmly by the Prime Minister and by the
President of India; that the reports that he
was snubbed at any point are ovithout any
foundation, and that in any event, the
Warmth of the reception that we extended in
the Milian Prime Minister two weeks before
the attacks on Pakistan started should make
clear what enormous value we attach toll.
'din? friendship.'
While I can understand that theile can be
sincere differences of opinion about the wise
RA/ Mit A.
courts to take,' I do not think we do min
selves any justice If we ascribe policies to
Ike personal pique of individuals. Besides,
the charge of aggression was not made in
this building moths first place. ?
Q: Dr. Kissinger, I would 1110 00 ago you s
clarifying, question about something you
said just a motnent ago.
You said that the charge of aggression
was not made in this budding.
Dec Kissinger: We do not disagree with its
but it was in reference to a point that the
President and I have an anti-Indian bias.
(4, Does this carry the implication that
you are putting the responsibility for that
original charge of aggression on the State
Department? .
Or. Kissinger) No. There is a united go,
ernmental view soil
Wobingtan Vast
EUGENE MEYER. 1815-1959
PHILIP L. MADAM. 191,1963
PAM R. IGNATIUS BENJAMIN C. BRADLEE
PreAdent ExeeeBee
'MIN L. Myelin. EdItortal Pare Editor: Rowan,
Berno o emee J? BeD. eBee eBBRdent
Thome. Tre Joee
r ld W. Siegel. Res Pre ret
L. .3333 133
3
3,1331133 313 The. Weshinetav 3.033 COM3511.11,
FREDERICK. B. PERIM
Chairman Of the Boer.]
1.111=1.1,11101
mz.rmirgg
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
Indians Say China May Aid
Evacuailar8rNartalgas
DELHI, From Al
Indian alarm at this new
development was reflected
today in new rounds of
urgent talks between top
officials in both New Delhi
and Moscow.
According to the Infor-
mation gathered by Indian
Intelligence sources, the
Chinese-Pakistan plan is for
the boats, believed to he a
motley assembly of met,
chant ships, barges and
other craft, to sail out un.
der the Chinese flag when
they are fully loaded with
escaping soldiers.
The Indian eastern naval
rommand, which is in the
Ray of Bengal not for off
lite coast, has given a warn-
ing that all ships in the
area will be subject to in-
MI-option. India hag also
warned repeatedly that
boats attempting to take es-
taping troops back to West
Pakistan will be attacked
and sunk.
Indian nava( and aW units
have already attacked sev-
',rat small. Galt taking rot
dier out of East Pakistan
toward Burma. They were
spotted hugging the coast In
a bid to escape.
India's chief spokesman
tonight would not disclose
any details of discussions
believed already to have
taken place with the Ran-
goon government about any
Pakistan soldiers who man-
age to make their way to
Burma,
If the Indians carry out
their threat and attack me
lensibly Chinese vessels,
this would clearly raise the
risk that China would re-
gard India as having made
a direct attack on her.
The Indian concern has
been made apparent by
the frequent radio messages
teemed to Pakistan soldieta
in East Pakistan by Gen.
Sam Manekshaw, Indian
commander-in.chlef, urging
them to surrender. These
were sent all through yes-
terday afternoon and again
today at five-minute inter-
THE WASHINGTON POST Ilolvicy,ii?1,13,197I A21.
AILOSAGE MEAT
Grand Union
. -
AREIMISS
Mated Irreta Internat.,.
Patricia Poldhanunor. 18, of Beloit, Kan., greets a
friend Sunday night in a Singapore hotel lobby after
arriving on one of three evaroation flights from Daccn.
vale on a variety of wave-
lengths.
Another factor in the
situation is the almost cer-
tain presence in the Bay of
Bengal of Chinese sub-
marines. The U.S. 7th Fleet
is also believed to be within
easy reach of the are.
With fighting apparently
stalemated Mr the present
on the western front, the
possibility of Chinese inter.
welkin could lake the con.
Dist to a potentially danger-
ous new stage.
India has reckoned it un-
likely that the Chinese
would give Pakistan any-
thing stronger than verbal
Fneport.
Despite Moscow's concern
over China's ling with the
Pakistan military regime,
the Russians arc likely to
discourage the Indians from
attacking any escaping boats
flying the Chinese flag even
if the price is that p dal.
1407 H St. N.W. (DOWNTOWN) ? 05 7.1300
7351 Wisconsin Ave. (Bethesda) ? OL 6?8300
49th and Mass. Ara. N.W. (Spg. Va Iley) ? 244-7722
POINTSETTIAS
For Christmas
Phone and
Charge it
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$7.50
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MINI ADORA CEDAR TREES
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$7.50 & up
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sion or more of soldier. gen
home to fight ladle again
on the western front.
The Russians are believed
to be anxious to bring the
war to an end as soon as
possible after the establish.
ment of a stable govern.
moot in East Pakistan and
have sought to be a strong
modern influence on New
Delhi.
la addition to possible
Chinese involvement, In.
than sources have charged
the United States with sup-
PlYing military equipment
either directly or indirectly
through an Asian ally, per-
haps Turkey, to Pakistan.
The foreign ministry
spokesman said last night:
"Some foreign aircraft
have landed military stores
at Karachi civil airport The
government of India is
obliged to reserve the right
to secure that civil airports
are not used for such mili.
tory plaToese."
The spokesman refused to
identify the nationality of
the foreign aircraft but
made it plain that he was
referring to the U.S.
Ulster Gunmen
Kill Senator,
Blast His house
BELFAST, Northern Ireland,
Dec. 12 (AP)?Gunmen allot a
hard-line Protestant Senator
tonight, then wrecked his'
country mansion with a bomb.
His body was buried under,
tons of rubble.
Sen. John Barnhill, a right-
wing member of the Protes-
tantbased Unionist Party that
rules the British province, was
the first member of the North-
ern Ireland Parliament to die
in two years of violence that
has now resulted in Igh d ath
His- wife said he went to
answer the door at their home
at Strabane, close to the
border with the Trish Repub-
lic.
She said she heard tvvo shots
and found her husband lying
near the door with a gunman
kneeling at his side. Then a
second man helped drag him
into the main room, where the
attackers planted a gelignite
bomb beside his body, she said.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100010
CIA Policy Shifts Urged
B,y Cooper, McGovern
By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer
Republican Sen. John Sher-
man Cooper of Kentucky, senior
member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, submitted leg-
islation today which would make
available to Congress all the
intelligence information and
analyses developed by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and
similar government agencies.
Cooper proposed an amend-
ment to the National Security
Act of 1947 which would require
that the CIA make its intelli-
gence discoveries and conclu-
sions available to the commit-
tees on Armed Services 9 od For-
eign Relations In both branches.
He said that as the law now
says the information is only
a vaila ble to the executive
branch.
In a related move, Sen.
George McGovern, D-S.D., pro-
posed that the CIA expenditures
each year be listed as an over-
all total in the national budget.
McGovern's Amendment also
would prohibit use of CIA funds
by other departments and agen-
cies.
The South Dakota Senator said
he recognized that security limi-
tations would prevent a full dis-
closure of all CIA funding, but
said a single line item in the
budget would "put the Congress
in a position to judge if we want-
ed to spend more on intelligence
operations and clandestine wars
than on improvement of the en-
vironment ,or on education or
even on other aspects of national
defense."
Cooper said his bill "would
not, in any way, affect the activ-
ities of the CIA, its sources or
methods."
But he said it would put Con-
gress "in a much better position
to make judgments, much more
informed and broader perspec-
tive than is now possible."
CIA expenditures are overseen
by a select subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee. All
of its deliberations and decisions
are kept secret.
Funds for the CIA are Oen
hidden away in other money
bills.
Cooper said his bill would not
affect the method of congres-
sional oversight.
012-2
1 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100010 012-2
VEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1972 Phoue 223-6000 g::,;11algi, 243,--6,2170
1.5s Beyond Washington,
10 Maryland and Virginia
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2
Secret U.S. Papers Barcd
By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Stait writer
Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a
major challenge to the secrecy surrounding
U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night
gave The Washington Post the full texts of
three secret documents describing meetings
Of the National Security Council's Washington
Special Action Group (WSAG).
The documents indicate that Henry A. Kis-
singer, President Nixon's national security ad-
viser, instructed government agencies to take
a hard line with India in public statements and
private actions during last month's war on the
Indian subcontinent,
Anderson released the documents after Kis-
singer told reporters Monday during an air-
borne conversation en route to the Western
White House in San Clemente that the col-
umnist, in stories based on the materials, had
taken "out of context"AtnyrimideittaFortRt
the administration was kgtinst
Among the significant statements bearing
on U.S. policy
following:
? "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half
hour from the President that we are not being
,tough enough on India. He has just called me
again. He does not believe we are carrying out
his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakis-
tan. He feels everything we do cornea out
otherwise."
? "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was put-
ting out background information relative to the
current situation is provoking presidential
wrath. The President is under the 'illusion'
that he is giving instructions; not that he is
merely being kept apprised of affairs as they
progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept
in mind."
? "Dr. Kissinger also directed that hence-
forth we show a certain coolness to the In-
dians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be
in the documents were the. Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pak-
istan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy
assistant secretary of state for South Asian
affairs) stated the United States cannot permit
a third country to transfer arms which we
have provided them when we, ourselves, do
not authorize sale direct to the ultimate re-
cipient, such as Pakistan."
? "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of
state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs)
suggested that what we are really interested in
are what supplies and equipment could .be
made available, and the modes of delivery of
this equipment. He stated from a political
point of view our efforts would have to be
directed at keeping the Indians from 'extin-
guishing' West Pakistan."
? "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the
Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be
getting emergency requests from them . . .
Dr. Kissinger said that the President may
14*`cr VisistIlle916.1e.tAD.:
.' Texts of documents.
v. ke 11 4 O
1e)gte ea-ARr- w04 9 9 R 0 0 100 0 00017-2 A9,
have the right to authorize Jordan or SaudiCol. 1
Page AS
ColumnistBamcSresteiR?U:ST2Papers
DOCUMENTS; From Al
want to honor those requests
The matter has not been
brought to Presidential atten-
tion but it is quite obvious that
the President is not inclined to
let the Paks be defeated."
After getting the documents
from Anderson, The Post de-
cided to print the full texts in
today's editions.
Anderson said he would
make the documents
able to other members of the
press today, and he invited
Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, ?to use
them as the basis for an in-
vestigation of U.S policy in
South Asia,
Fulbright, out of Washing-
ton during the congressional
recess, could not be reached
for comment.
The columnist also suggested
that other members of Con-
gress might wish to investi-
gate government security clas-
sification policy.
Most of the significant state-
ments in the three documents
released last night had al-
ready appeared in Anderson's
column, which is distributed to
700 newspapers, including The
Washington Post.
The Justice Department ac-
knowledged yesterday that the
FBI is investigating the nature
of the security leak that led
to the disclosures.
But Anderson, who said he
will write several more col-
umns based on the documents,
pointed out that no govern-
ment agent had visited him
and that he had received no
request to halt publication.
The Post has not received any
such request either.
Pentagon Sources said an-
other investigatiOn is under-
way by military security
agents. They said the scope of
their investigation would be
narrow because "very few peo-
ple" have access to minutes of
the meetings.
Anderson, in an interview
with The Post, said he also
had copies of cables to Wash-
ington from the U.S. ambassa-
dors to India and Pakistan, as
well as numerous other docu-
ments bearing on American
policy.
He showed this reporter a
briefcase with about 20 file '
folders, each containing some
of the documents.
Anderson declined to name
his sources, but suggested that
they occupy high positions in '
the Nixon administration.
"TC the sources were identi-
fied," he said "it wAtninyn
hart-ass the admiliaTEtroli
more than it would me. It
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
... coolness to India
would make a very funny
story."
Since the controversy last
year over release of the Penta-
gon Papers, a top-secret his-
tory Of U.S. policy in Vietnam,
Anderson said, his sources had
become more, rather than less,
willing to disclose classified
material.
The texts obtained by The
Post provide 'substantial de-
tails of the back-and-forth
at Special Action Group meet-
ings among representatives
of the White House, State
and Defense departments, Con-
ti-al intelligence Agency, Na-
tional Security Coulicil, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Agency
for International Development.
The three texts are:
? A "memorandum for FCC-
Ord" about a WSAG meeting in
the Situation Room of the
White House on Dec. 3, by
James H. Noes, deputy as-
sistant secretary' of defense tot-
Near Eastern. African and '
South Asian affairs. lt Was ap-,
Proved by G. Warren Nutter, as-
sistant Secretary of defense for
international security affairs,
and was printed on his station-
cry.
? A memorandum for the
Joint Chiefs .of Staff, on their
stationery, concerning a Meet-
ing an Dee. 4, by Navy Capt.
Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.
? Another memorandum by
Kay on JCS stationery about
a meeting on Dec. 0.
The first of the three meet-
ings was held on the opening
day of full-scale hostilities be-
tween India and Pakistan.
That was he day Pakistani
aircraft launched a series of
strikes against Indian air-
fields on the western border.
Indian Prime Minister Indira
)kkitlFcirReiletse 2001
her country to be on a "war
footing."
JACK ANDERSON
... releases documents
By the time of the second
meeting, the war had spread
through East and ? West Paki-
stan; by the third meeting,
Mrs. Gandhi had announced
India's recognition of Bangla-
desh, formerly East Pakistan,
as a sovereign country.
The Post obtained type-
written copies of photocopies
of the documents in Ander-
son's possession.
Acopies,nderson's which
were inspected by a represent-
ative of The Post, showed that
the original documents were,
stamped "SECRET SENSIT-!
IVE" at the top and bottom!
of each page.
Anderson said he hoped his-
columns on the Indo-Pakistani!
situation, and now the release!
of the documents, would pro-
voke a "showdown" on the
government classification sys-
tem.
lie said he had been
"timid" originally about quot-
ing from the documents, but,
later quoted more extensi',7ely
when he became convincea of
the "colossal blunders" of U.S.
policy.
Invoking his own view of .
what might harm national sec-
urity, he said he would not;
release the exact texts of;;
cables, "just in case they
would be useful to crypto-
graphers."
Anderson said the doe- ,
uments should not have been I
classified in the first place.
He said they showed that
"Kissinger is surrounded, by
secrecy. tie is treated I Ike a
new weapons system."
T h e Anderson documents
differ from the Pentagon Pa-
pers in that his disclosures
cover current diplomatic ac-
tivities, rather than history.
/03i060t C1AaRDP8440499 R001000100012-2
printed articles based on the
47-volume Pentagon Papers
ever had possession of the four
volumes deserfbed by the gov-
ernment as the most sensitive.
Those volumes dealt with U.S.
diplomatic contacts t hip ough
other nations, for a negotiated
settlement of the Vietnam war.
After government suits
against The New York Times,
The Washington Post arid
other newspaper had worked
their way through the federal
courts, the Supreme Court de-
clared on June 30 that the gov-
ernment had not proved its
contention that publication
would endanger national se-
curity.
? in releasing the documents
last night, Anderson said "I
don't think the public should
have to take either my word
or Dr. 'Kissinger's" about
whether his columns had
quoted the documents "out of
context!'
"I invite reporters to com-
pare Dr. Kissinger's state-
ments at the secret strategy
sessions with the transcript of
Di. Kissinger's background
briefing to reporters on Dec.
7."
That "background" talk be
came public when Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) placed i
in the Congressional Record,
to the surprise of the White
House.
In the meeting with news
men on Dec. 7, Kissinger said,
"First of all, let us get a num-
ber ef things straight. There
have cen sonic comments
that the ad min is trtio n is
anti-Indian. This is totally in-
accurate
Kissinger said, howeve r,
that the United States, "which
in many respects has had a
love affair with India, can only!
with enormous pain accept the I
fact that military action was!
taken in our view without ade-
quate cause . . ."
State Department officials
denied yesterday that any in-
vestigation of the leak was Un-
derway there. Other sources.
at State said no one there
had been required to under-
go lie 'detector tests, as in
some previous security invest-.
Igattons.
Anderson said, however, that
his sources told him investiga-
tions were being conducted at
State. Defense and the White
!House,, reportedly under the
!coordination of Robert C.
Mardian, assistant attorney
general in charge of the Jus-
tice Department's Internal Se-
curity Division.
A .Justice Department
spokesman said last4 night,
howe,V,M -that "assistant at-
torney generals don't coordi-
nate investigations." if any
Prosecution were initiated, he
added, that might fall into
1"Mardian's bailiwick."
! "If Mardian's investigating,
,Inc." said Anderson, who took
over the "WashingtonMerry-
(in-Round" column from the
late Drew Pearson, "I'm go-1
ittgl to investigate him."
"I have an idea I'll know
more about him than he'll'
know about me," Anderson;
;,...rided. "He can take his to a!
grand jtuy, and I'll take mine
to the public."
ThreApWcriltdiftir IiJdeie
MUSKIE, From Al
panion and Muskie neighbor
at Kennebunk Beach, and
long-time Muskie aides and
advisers Berl Bernhard, Ge-
orge Mitchell, Don Nicoll
and Milton Semer.
As always, Muskie did lit
tie talking, but went around
the room asking each man's
views. Harriman was first,
and he declared the Presi.
dent Nixon's methods would
backfire, that Muskie should
pick a few issues and stick
In those but make a deter-
mined, nearly Open run 100
We top office. By all means,
he should run.
"I'm an old man, and I
don't want to die with
Richard Nixon in the While
linage," said the 78-year-old
patriarch of the party.
There was general agree.
mcnt Mr. Nixon was valuer.
able and that Mashie was
the one Democrat with the
stature and credibility to
snake the liberal position
make sense in opposition.
But prior to the 1972 race,
Muskie was faced with seek-
ing re-election to the Senate
in November, 1970. There
was much discussion of the
proper blend of the presi-
dential buildup with the si-
multaneous Senate race in
hinter.
Characteristically cau-
tious, Muskie was reluctant
toga very for down the trail
leading to the White House.
After nearly three hours of
talk, Clark Clifford, who
likes to speak last, summed
up the consensus. Some brat
steps toward staffing the
presidential drive should
now begin, but quietly and
slowly at first.
"You don't have to decide
everything today. 'there is
lots of time," Clifford de-
clared.
Muskie made no commit-
ment at the close of the
meeting. but it was clear to
everyone that a bridge was
being crossed. It was agreed
that Muskie would institu-
tionalize his effort to ex-
plore the presidential bid,
opening the first small
downtown office as a staff
renter for this purpose and
raising funds to support a
growing exploration.
Within a few weeks, some
57,000 in campaign money
Viet Policy Correct,
Marines' Chief Says
By George C. 1111000
wtaitaidas sod ssts weer
I'S. Vietnam italic,/ "was Going into Vietnam "kept
sga wsritselfour word on the international
reaped economic and strategie ;,or"% ow?moot-a to
dII. dends, the new Marine .dn7dthe nh:tZsthtionNa'ri?g
Corps commandant said in a
Pentagon press conterence
Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.,
YesterdaS
56. the 25th commandant of !
the coins, made those remarks
when asked if he believe thel
Vietnam War had been "worth I
it." Specifically, he said/
"I do believe that the policy
was correct of getting the Vi' I
etnamese country. both the po-
litical and military sides, in,
such shape that they could
reach their own decisions as :
to how they wished to he gov.
erned and not permit 11 00 be
forced by an invading army
from the North.
'T do believe that.' Cush-
man added, "and I do believe,
that we succeeded. and that
ue're withdrawing now at the
prop, time."
said.
, Asked how Vietnam was im-
portant to U.S. strategic inter-
ests and what the war "bought
us," Cushman replied, "I be-
lieve it may be important eco-
nomically as well as strategi-
catty in a geographic sense to
have friends In that area."
As to whether this was
worth the billions the war
cost, Cushman said "I don't
really feel qualified to an-
swer."
Turning to his coming four
, year stewardship of the Marine
'Corps, Cushman said he will
hew to the course of being
lean and tough. He said the
biggest single problem loom-
ing in the corps' future was re.
eruiting enough qualified men
To maintain the current force
level 01 200,010.
left over from the 1968 vice
presidential drive was trans-
ferred to a new account am-
biguously labeled "Muskie
Election Committee" (which
might refer to Maine or to
the nation at large.) From
this day forward, the Mus-
kie presidential campaign
was scarcely ever in doubt.
Whatever his disclaimers
(usually accompanied by a
grin), he was off and run-
ning.
it was a long and often
rocky trail that brought the
shy son of a Polish immi-
a,rant tailor from Rumford,
Maine, to a starting gate po-
sition as the tallyho for the
Democratic presidential
nomination in 1972. Like the
political path of many
American leaders, the M.-
kie trail includes many acci-
dental turns, some detours
and a considerable number
of lucky breaks. '
A mere glance at the sur.
lace facts demonstrate that
this is an extraordinary can-
didaey in many respects.
According to the trash.
tonal wisdom of American
politics, the Democratic
Party would be most
unlikely to choose as its 1972
standard-bearer a Roman
Catholic from a prcdomi
nanny Republican state ion
far corner of the nation, a
state with only four elec.
total votes and 00 010 over
15.000 population.
Moreover, Muskie is nei-
ther HO nor the favorite of
the rich; unthl. four years
ago he was virtually un-
known to most Americans,
he has no interest group
(such as organized labor) en-
thusiastically behind him.
He has little experience in
foreign affairs ond except
for some. reputation as a pol-
lution n widely
fighter, is not
known for any particuLar ac-
complishment or political
stand.
In a sense. he is every-
body's candidate and no
candidate. There are
few strong objections to him
from any segment of the
Democratic Party or voting
public, but there are also
few enthusiastib backers.
Mashie's chief assets now
are the absence of powerful
rivals. his understated per-
sonality that projects a spe-
cial serenity and decency
through the powerful politi-
cal instrument of television,
and the widespread impres-
sion that Ms appeal would
be likely to unite most fac-
tions of the Democratic
Party and simultaneously
deny Mit Nixon the et
s IIUQj
of the independent "ticket
splitter," votes the Presi-
dent must have to win a sec-
ond term in the White
House.
Whether all this will en-
dure or perish in the con-
frontations of the primaries
and beyond is an unanswer.
able question. But as of
today Muskie seems to have
first crack at the Demo-
cratic nomination. lobe can
maintain his appeal to
Americans when they come
to know hue better, he is
likely to be nominated?anti
would be a very serious
threat In Mr. Nixon this
November.
As national leaders go, Xd.
mend Sixtus al uskie started
late, Born in 191a he mace
virtually unknown small
town lawyer until age 40.
when he was eleeted
Maine's first Democratic
governor in two decades. In
that year 019541, Richard
Nixon was vice president of
the United States, Hubert
Humphrey Wale controver-
sial and well known U.S.
senatar and Henrs M Jaek-
son was lakina a prominent
role in the Senate hearings
on Joseph MuCarthe after
more than a dozen years in
Congress.
After two terms 00 001,01"
our. Muskie eame to Wash-
ington in 1958 as the first
Democrat,/ senator fro
Maine in nearly half a cen-
tury. He noose quiet. amen/
troversial. hardworking sen.
ator, weliliked and re.
sperted within the instil.
tion but little knawn oul?
side.
Muskies first national
fling Was in 1064, and it was
both modest and synthetic.
He was fatting a reelection
campaign in Maine that fall,
and staff aides thought d
would do him some good at
home to be mentioned as a
possible vice presidential
running mate for President
Johnson. The aides spread
the. word that Muskie was
the logical choice, because
of his ethnic background
and New England regional
appeal. Johnson never seri-
ously considered him. but
Muskie's name was often
mentioned in press specula-
tion.
Mashie's big chance mine
when Hubert, Humphrey
chose him ao the Democratic
vice presidential nominee in
1068. Muskie did not cam-
paign for the job/ Hum-
Ithrey picked him largely he
vause no faetion of the party
objected 10 him, he was
THE WkSHINCTON POST
41AMORWWW914611.00012.2-2 A 7
compatible personally and
politically, and yet had a
contrasting and appealing
style.
"I went for the quiet
man,? Humphrey said later.
"I know I talk too much..,
two Hubert Humphreys
might be one too many!'
During the fall campaign,
Mashie's ecool" approach
won him much acclaim as a
welcome contrast to all
three men sharing the na-
tional tickets? Humphrey,
Nixon and Spiro Agnew.
Demoeratic Party planners
and the press gave aluskie
unusual attention as a coun-
terpoint to Agnew, who was
considered the weak link in
the GOP ticket, Mashie
enlarged from the campaign
well known and well liked,
and there had been kindled
ill IliS mind the weighty am
baton known in Washington
as "presidential fever."
The man from 'Maine
traveled widely M early 1960,
making 57 speeches in 00
states in the firs/ three
months of the >ear to test
his charm. By summer. Ile
was disenuraged. People
were cordial and he was
welcome, but he received lit-
tle press attention and the
polls showed Ted Kennedy
far ahead as the first sluice
of Democrats for the next
presidential nod.
Musky had crone clase
giving up when the accident
al Chappaquiddiek changes!
everything. By the fall of
1969. Muske was couvinced
that Kennedy was' out of the ratings dropped. Muskie's
jumped. Easily reselected to
the Senate, lie had been the Democratic nomination.
given a major boost toward He has the generally ac.
his paety's nomination.
The Jan. 4, 1970, meeting
with his advisors confirmed
'1h/00ie's determination to
make a serious bid for the
Democratic nomination.
That spring, the downtown
office was opened to Pre-
pare Inca national race, and
Inter that year Margie hired
Robert Squier as his televi-
sion consultant, ostensibly
for the Maine senate cam.
paign that fall.
Duce again, it was televi.
sion that propelled aluskie
into a national leadership
position. On election eve.
President Nixon chose to
purchase 15 minutes cm na-
tionwide TV to mak,/ a par-
tisan "law and order" appeal
for Republican caadidates in
the form of a political rally
speeeli he had given several
slays earlier in Phoenbx. lt
was a scratehy and nap/a/-
Cession. tape and an appeal
that seemed narrow and 1111-
presidential.
biter lye Democrats
lammed that Mr. Nixon was
Inm Mg time party leaders
//hose Muskie to eive
reply. The Mashie answer. a
fireside chat from Maine
written in part hy veteran
ghostwriter Dick Goodwin,
conveyed a low key yet ring.
ing indignation. Even Re-
publicans conceded that the
back.to-back political op.
peals constituted a /grave
setback for the Presideat
and triiihmh for liuskie.
The President's poll
Yesterday Muskie for-
malty joined the race for
Still, Muskie was a man of
caution. Some of his advis-
ers urged him to "put the
heat on" early in 1971 to by
to sew up commitments for
the Democratic nomination.
The senator decided other-
wise, lie felt Ms popularity
after the election eve per.
romance might be a passing
thing: he didn't feel he had
the organization in place or
the finanetat backing in
place to move quickly.
Instead, Inc went 10 the
Middle Pont. the Soviet
Union and Europe to build
his foreign policy creden-
tials and continued his
slowly growing effort to win
support
Last summer and fall. Mr.
Nixon made a political come.
back with his wage-Priee
freeze, his newsmaking
opening to China and other
surprising at/tiotm. And in
Septembee, .Muskie made a
costly polite:al slip in Los
Angeles, where he told a
meeting /if black leaders
that he did not believe the
American people would vote
for a ticket with a black as
the viee presidential candi-
date. Mr. Nixon called Mus-
kies remark "a libel on the
American people." and the
senator's Democratic rirals,
who had been buildings
sten /gill in 1971, began to
exploit it.
knowledged fronkrunner
but was by no means a sure
winner. Like many experi-
enced politicians, Muskie has
a fatalistic streak in nim, an
inner voice that reminds
him that nobody can predict
the breaks and whatever
will be, will be.
"You work hard and you
get some breaks and you try
to build some inomeolum."
the senator mused yester-
day. He worked hard on the
announcement speech Our
television and if Mal goes
over well?he said be had
an idea that it would?it
should help. Whatever hal0
pens, he has nothing to lose
?lie never planned tllat Ile
would spend decades in In/li-
lies, and he certainly never
planned at the heginning
that lied have a ehanee 10
be President.
Ile has prepared hiniself
as well as he knows how,
and now is ready for the
trail ahead. "Whether or not,
ran really meet the test of
the presideneY I don't s0P-
pose I would know unless I
were elected to that office,"
he told Maine newsmen in
Portland yesterday. Rlit by
the end of the campaign sea-
son, I ought to halos better
idea?and the country onght
to have a better idea. That's
what a campaign is all
about.
McGovern Enters Primary in N.H.
Sell. I:C01, S. McGovern, file Thursday. Thal will com. in Tilton. N.H., Rep. Paul didacy for the Denmeratie
Ma S.D./ formally entered i he Mete thr fo..... field vying a 1 eCI os key 11-1 -11110 charged presidential nomination soon,
l
New Ilampshiee presidential , fee In Demorratie convention that President Nixon is perste said. 'Vietnam is being esea
prime, yesterday, nrnmi'ing -
delegates and the psarbologi- ine the bombing of North lated and the American people
fronbrunner Sen. Edmund S., eat advantuae of winning the Vietnam to keep the South Vi- arc wondering what han.
Muskie Ill 'bind a leery. Hist PrimagY. , elnamese government from pened."
very tough fight" in the March, Polls taken in New Ham, , falling unthl. after the 1972 Also touriug Florida yester.
7 enntest. , shire last boar gave Muskie !U.S. elections. day was Sen. Henry al. aack?
ur,,,,,, fl,, ///,,,,
,, anw
yhee. r from 3-10-1 to 54.1 He told a high schoolW
audi- son (D.asha, who predieted
I' Hl b
n,/,/, -, '/ I margins over aleGovern, with mime, "President Nixon insists That retention of Vice Prest-
here Fd Muskie is ri ht next feri'ing
7000a2Zdr/i';-if,esta,?laltnost, 0010 01 the voters pre., that we continue to prevent :dent Spiro T. Agnew on the
other candidates orn-
u, the unification of Vietm !R
na." epublican ticket th s- w
is yeaill
g,
cern ..iii in (2.0?1 decided. No polls on the! In Columbus, Ohio. Seta , be an asset to Democrats in
cord, Nil. 'Tut I don't con-1 Hartke and Yorty strength !Robert Taft 10.01110) an-,Novembem
cede him this state no-gnu , ha,'Eeern,r?fnee,d/
hil Endicott Pea- '''''''"e" fth/alrittiee.sOen%Tddird'at?e tjs'eon 1/'?dAg=',Yaa'rT01,1/i;/./0e.5.
other. L think were
g?i'gto body. fogmer.gov'ernOr of Mas- 'f'sT leosidaevn't. and now hopes a meets in overkill and will
do very well.''
:saehusetts who announced last unifitd delegation pledged to work adversely on the Nixon
McGovern's New Hampshire,
week he will run for vice pre. President Nixon will be cho- administration." tic also pre-
backers, who have been organ., ideal, filed his nomination pa- sen from mat state. dieted that Southerners will
izing for the fight sinee early,
: pert yesterday in the New In Miami, Rep. Shirley not "throw their vote away" by
last year filed petitions wita , Hampshire Democratic pri- Chisholm In-N.Y.) began an. casting ballots for Alabama
011001 2.000 signatures to Plaee /nary. "I am runt/deg for the day campaign tour by telling Gov. George C. Wallaetit. 1101.
Ohsname on the hallat vice presideney," he said, "be- University of :Miami students Mee has indicated he will enter
'Iashie is scheduled to file caime it is thne that the peo- that 'domestic war 0111 0000k the Florida primary and ob,
here on Thuesday. Sea. Vance ple had a say in who should be out in this country unless the severs to believe he would
Ilartke of Indiana f iled testeit;elertell Lo the seeond most inm Vietnam conflict is soon run strong in the northern con.
day saul )1,1-1e pedant publie nth, in lily ended." Mrs. Chisholm, who II gressional districts that Jack-
s., vorty's supporters arc itt , expected to announce her can. son hopes lo carry.
'ortavemer to Nit.
P. leis Mi. Co, De-
pi e ent.ttive
W-GDIDIJVAIRE)
1,0"1"FIROP
- CO
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