BRITAIN'S SECRET SERVICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 1, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Approved For Relelge 2001/03/06 : CA01312124-0040R001000100008-7
Britain's Secret Service
After the Second World War Britain built up a rami-
fied secret service system. The leading role in it is played
by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) which engages in
world-wide espionage, "psychological warfare" and ideolo-
gical subversion. The activity against the Soviet Union
and the other socialist countries is conducted by its big-
.gest department and the most experienced agents. In the
developing countries the Secret Intelligence Service engi-
neers plots, coups and other anti-government actions with
the aid of the total reactionary forces.
A top secret organisation, Speciail Political Actions
(SPA), was set up within the SIS in the mid-1950s for
such.subversive activity. SIS Ordinance No. C (102) 56,
which has since found its way into the press, said the
SPA was set up to organise coups, clandestine radio
stations and. subversive activities, publish newspapers and
books, wreck international conferences or run them,
influence elections, etc. In 1969 the SIS was placed in
the charge of the Foreign Office. It maintains numerous
agencies abroad and its members masquerade as diplomats,
correspondents, businessmen, employees of British firms,
and so on.
Military reconnaissance is directed by the intelligence
department of the Ministry of Defence. Electronic reconna-
issance is headed by the so-called Government Communi-
cation Centre which operates under the control of the
Foreign Office. The Centre monitors foreign broadcasts,
intercepts radar beams, deciphers codes, etc.
The counter-intelligence functions are exercised by
the Security Service, which is called MI-5. It has organised
quite a few anti-Soviet actions and forged documents to
whip up anti-communist hysteria. Last autumn it took
part in the provocative campaign against Soviet officials
in Britain. It also' spies on progressive organisations in
Britain herself.
The. British secret service system is directed by the
Cabinet's Joint Intelligence Committee. ? It summarises
the information obtained, gives assignments to the secret
services and coordinates their activity. The Committee
is made up of representatives of the leading intelligence
services and is headed by a high-ranking Foreign Office
functionary.
Among the special political actions undertaken by
the British secret service one May cite provocations
against progressive and 'peace organisations both in
Britain and other countries. It has done its best to
prevent normalisation in Europe and hamper the socialist
countries' efforts to promote d?nte. .
During the counter-revolutionary events inCzechoslo-
vakia the British secret service encouraged and instigated
the anti-socialist elements to step up their anti-govern-
ment activities.
. In its political activity, the British secret service
makes good use of British newspapers and radio stations.
According to press reports, there are many SIS-paid agents
in such newspapers as the Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times,
Daily Mail, Observer, and Financial Times. It has particu-
larly close ties with the BBC, preparing many of its
foreign-language programmes.
The British secret service is also very active in col-
lecting information with the aid of electronic reconnais-
sance and radio interception devices. Besides "passively"
monitoring broadcasts, it engages in "active"
reconnaissance, like organising flights along the frontiers
of socialist countries and sometimes incursions into their
air space. Ships are also used for that purpose.
The SIS has a technical operations department which
installs bugging devices in other countries' missions and
offices abroad. In' the process of Operation Contrary A,
the British installed such a device at the Polish trade
mission in Brussels. A microphone . was mounted in a
Soviet diplomat's fiat in Denmark. The conversations of a
Czechoslovak export official in Cairo were listened to.
One might also recall in this connection that the British
secret service participated together with the American
secret service in building a 600-metre long tunnel from
West Berlin to the communications lines of the Soviet
Military Command in the GDR territory. ?
The British secret service makes wide use of all kinds
of international contacts for purposes of espionage. Among
those it employed, for instance, was a representative of
English Electric who had made several trips to the Soviet
Union. It also recruits tourists. Last year the Soviet
security forces detained several motoring tourists from ?
Great Britain who were caught photographing military
installations. A number of British tourists were detained
when 'attempting to smuggle anti-Soviet literature into
the country.
While the British secret service activity against
socialist countries dates back some fifty years, its strug-
gle against the national liberation movement has been
going on for centuries. It is especially active in the Middle
East. British agents are inciting strife and splitting the
Arab countries fighting against Israeli aggression.
Such are only some of the activities the British secret
service engages in in close contact with the secret
services of the United States and other imperialist
countries.
E. vLADimiRpv
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7
WASTI I NG TON POST
Approved For Reittse 2001/03/06 ? CIA-RDP84-00409R001000100008-7
13 APR Wz
1 Books -- possibility of landing the
82nd Airborne Division near
Rome to defend that city
against the Germans.
A General's Mind
?- SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES.
By Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.
(Norton, 434 DP., Illustrated, $10)
Reviewed by , mies, large and small, for-
eign and domestic. To cope
Stuart H. ',wry
The reviewer, a fellow at
,the Woodrow Wilson Intern,a-
,tional Center for Scholars, is
'co-author of "The Secret
_Search for Peace in Viet-
nam." He is currently writing,
a book on the American miii-
tary establishment in the post-
Vietnam War era.
Here's a book that tells
you just what makes a Joint
Chief tick, a book that is a
clear self-revelaton of a sen-
ior military man's life,
thought processes, and per-
ception of his times.
It's an honest book but, to
one interested in the demili-
tarization of American for-
eign policy, a discomforting
one. It's a frank book but, to
one convinced that our serv-
ice leaders must be soldier-
statesmen in fact as well as
title, it reveals the difficulty
of fusing those two func-
tions successfully.'
To begin at the end, Tay-
lor sums up 47 years of pub-
lic service by taking a look
at the future. He foresees
the United States entering a
new Cold War period as a
declining power. He writes:
"A first step is to recog-
nize the new Cold War tech-
nique directed against the
sources of our power as a
formidable threat to our na-
tional security. This form of
threat is not new in its
weapons?propaganda, sub-
version, power seizures by
minorities. But the acute-
ness of the threat is new be-
cause of the increasing
strength and boldness of the
Internal revolutionary move-
ment and the mind-numbing
power of press and televi-
sion in their effect on the
-critical judgment of ? the
public. This threat strikes at
It was also an inportarrt
one He served as superin-
tendent of West Point and
Berlin garrison commander
under President Truman; as
8th Army Commander in
Korea and Army Chief of
Staff under Eisenhower; as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs
under John F. Kennedy; and
as Ambassador to Saigon for.
with it, we need a new con- one crucial year under Lyn-
don B. Johnson,
Taylor is a man who
clearly did his homework?
arriving in Korea in 1953 to
take over field command of
all Unit6d Nations troops
there, he had a piece of
paper outlining the mission
as he perceived it; returning
to Washington a few years
later to become chief of
staff of the Army, he had al-
cept of national security,
broad enough to assure that
defensive measures . are
taken against subversion in
this form . . ."
As a declining power, he
says, the United States can
either adjust its interna-
tional goals downward, as
did Great Britain, or it can
continue to maintain its
war-making capacities for
all-out as well as limited
war. He issues this caveat,
however: if the nation ever
again gets involved in lim-
ited war the President
should obtain a declaration
of war from Congress and
then go all out to achieve
the goal. "The resources al-
located and their use in
combat should be limited
only by the requirements of
prompt victory," he writes.
All of this is gloomy stuff,
particularly as it comes
from the urbane, articulate,
widely traveled linguist who
was chosen in the early
1960s to be the number one
soldier on the New Frontier.
The point is that while
Taylor extracted lessons
from his experienced, he ,
gives little indication that
he applied them. Another ?
example: In May, 1961, he
conducted a post-mortem of
the Bay of Pigs inVasion
that led Kennedy to con- ,
elude that the Joint Chiefs ,
did not give him advice on a
broad enough basis. The fol-
lowing October, Kennedy
sent him to Vietnam with
Walt W. Rostow under or-
ders to determine how best
to engineer the rescue from
disaster fo President Ngo
Dinh Die.m.
was not asked to review
the objectives of this policy
but the means being pur-
sued for their attainment,"
Taylorvrii es. "The question
was hoe- to change a losing
game and begin to win, not
how to call it off" '
Even if the President did
ready drafted a new pro- not specifically ask for
gram for the service. And he views on whether the game
clearly studied his lessons: was worth Winning, does not
For example, Ile extracts a soldier-statesman have
these, among others, from the responsibility to investi-
the Korean War: gate a question such as that
"A central theme was the and present his views?
importance of learning to
use our military resources
effectively in limited war
. . . In combination thee-
nemy, the terrain and the
weather tended to nullify,
the usefulness of much
costly equipment procured
during and after World War
11 in preparation for an-
other world war, presuma-
bly to be fought primarily in
Western Europe . . .
The absence of an enemy
air force or navy limited the
En 1972, Taylor reveals him- useful employment of much
self as a man given to views of our air and n aval
somewhat to the right of strength . . . In the absence
Spiro T. Agnew. On just one of a naval adversary, the
matter, that of the press's mightiest warships of the
role and performance in re- world were obliged to con-
cent years, Agnew's criti- tent themselves with born-
cism appears moderate in barding unimportant shore
comparison with Taylor's. targets hardly worthy of
their shells."
One can imagine Generals
William C. Westmoreland or
Creighton Abrams, Jr., writ-
ing such paragraphs in their
memoirs a few years from
now. Why did not Taylor,
who had great influence on
Vietnam war policy, work
nore actively to make sure
that Korean War mistakes
were not repeated in Viet-
nam? And one wonders, in
considering Taylor's thought
processes, why he does not
? the roots of national power, Commander on D-Day; he try to explain to his readers
Schooled in the Old Army
of pre-World War Ti, sea-
soned as a combat com-
mander and high-level staff
man in Gen. George C. Mar-
shall's Pentagon and Dwight
D. Eisenhower's , European
Theater, Taylor came into
his own during the Korean
War. To .use today's vernacu-
lar, he had all his tickets
punched to perfection.
His was an exciting ca-
reer: he parachuted into
Normandy as a Division
behind
?or himself?why weapons
particularly at our national made a secret trip
n2W1403#0q4ogyottn t
unity, withApprometinforReleasen a
r. .
Mussolini government the
As '-. professional soldier-
statesmen, the Joint Chiefs
must be more than advisers
on, and devisers of, ways to
"counter threats." They
must also have a deep un-
derstanding of just what the
threats are. Nowhere in his
book does Taylor show an
appreciation for the nature
of the Communist system he
was so busy containing dur-
ing the last half of his ca-
reer.
Traditionally, troop com-
mand has been a prerequist-
ite for membership on the
Joint Chiefs. Why not edu-
cate them as well in cotm-
tries perceived as potential
enemies?say, as military at-
taches or in some other ex-
perience-broadening capac-
ity? That should be as indis-
pensible a ticket punch in a
soldier-statesman's career
pattern as troop command.
A' future Joint Chiefs
member who had a real'
first-hand knowledge of the
"Communist threat," as did
say, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell,
who never became a Joint.
Chief, would ndeed be a re-
freshing novelty.
to negotiate with the post- n then *MI* R001000100008-7
an easy target for all ene-
THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOT REVIEW
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIW*1514849:6b4459R001000100008-7
Maintaining an ernpire?the General explains how
Swords and
Plowshares
By General Maxwell Taylor.
Illustrated. 434 pp. New York:
W. W. Norton & Co. $10.
By NEIL SHEEHAN
This book is bad history, but in
its own way, a good memoir, for
it tells a great deal about Gen. Max-
well Taylor and those other states-
men of the 1960's who led us into
the Indochina war. Taylor's account
of some of the events of that period,
such as the involvement of the Ken-
nedy Administration in the over-
throw of the late President Ngo
Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, is so
at variance with the documentary
record now available to us in the
Pentagon Papers and elsewhere that
the kindest description one can give
his version is to say that it reflects
the wish-think reconstruction of the
past in which men of power are
prone to indulge themselves in their
memoirs.
That kind of factual truth is not,
however, what one ought to expect
in a memoir. Rather, one would
hope to find truths of character,
attitude and perspective. Taylor's
memoir is filled with enough of
these kinds of truths, inadvertently
at times perhaps, to make well
worthwhile the task of forging
through the occasionally stilted
language and the bureaucratic de-
tail which interrupt its narrative
flow. One emerges from the book see-
ing more lucidly the realities of the
foreign policy of the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations, in con-
trast to the illusions we held at the
time.
Maxwell Davenport Taylor and
his theory of the use of military
forces in the conduct of foreign
policy came into their own with
the Inauguration of John F. Ken-
tnedy in January, 1961. Taylor's
exemplary military career?born in
Keytesville, Mo., on Aug. 26, 1901,
he graduated from West Point in
1922, commanded the 101st Airbdme
Division in World War II and the
Eighth Army in Korea?had come
to a seeming end in 1959 because of
his profound disagreement with the
Eisenhower Administration's nuclear Neither in Mr. Kennedy's letter, nor
strategy of "massive retaliation." in Taylor's memoirs, however, is the
In "The Uncertain Trumpet," pub- question ever addressed of whether
the United States should be invading
lished the year after his resignation
as Army Chief of Staff, Taylor had a foreign country in the name of,
a counterinsurgency. That question,
argued his doctrine of "flexible
response" ? the development of Taylor's memoir implicitly makes
strong conventional forces to enable clear, had already been answered.
the United States to conduct limited The object of Taylor's Bay of Pigs
wars below the nuclear threshhold investigation was simply to learn
how to do it better elsewhere the
as an effective tool of its foreign
next time.
policy. In his memoirs, Taylor de-
fines limited war as "rational war" And that is the heart of Taylor's
to achieve "national interests," or memoir. It is the story of a man and
"a resort to arms for reasons other his fellow statesmen who, in the
than survival." psychological atmosphere and
The first task the new President through the ideological forms of the
set him to was indicative of the cold war were actually engaged in
maintaining and enlarging an
kindred minds Taylor found among
the statesmen of the Kennedy Ad- American empire through the use
of force.
ministration and then of President
Johnson's. Mr. Kennedy had him Taylor expresses no essential mis-
giving over the termination ofetrir
take leave from his position as
course in the
president of the Lincoln Center for
Indochina war, with its cost
the Performing Arts in New York of 55,000 American lives so
to conduct an exhaustive review of far, well over $100 billion and
the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a million to two million In-
To demonstrate what Mr. Kennedy dochinese dives. He believes
desired from the investigation, Gen- that President Nixon has a
era! Taylor quotes from the letter of good chance to attain the cen-
instruction the new President gave tral American objective of
him: preserving an anti-Communist
South Vietnam. He concludes
'it is apparent that we need to
,
take a close look at all our practices
that, "Personally I would ex-
and programs in the areas of mili-
pect the probable gains of vic-
tary and paramilitary, guerrilla and tory to exceed its anticipated
costs by a substantial margin."
anti-guerrilla activities which fall
His regrets over Indochina re-
short of outright war. I believe we
late to how force was applied
need to strengthen our work ia
there and to the lack of
this area. In the course of your
stamina the country displayed.
study, I hope that you will give "But even in victory we
special attention to the lessons cannot completely redeem the
which can be learned from recent unheroic image created by
events in Cuba." Mr. Kennedy told many aspects of our behavior
Taylor that he hoped the General's in the course of the conflict,"
report would help by "drawing from he writes. "The record of our
past experience, to chart a path violent internal divisions, our
towards the future." loss of morale, and our psy-
As Taylor comments in his
chotic inclination to self-
flagellation and self-denigration
memoir:
justifies serious doubts as to
"There were several interesting
the performance to be expect-
points in this letter. One was the al-
ed from us in any future crisis
most passing mention of the Bay
?an uncertainty which will be-
of Pigs, which was to be the primary
cloud our prestige and diminish'
subject of our investigation. An our ability to influence world
other was the broad invitation to events as long, as it lasts."
make excursions into any aspect of
He blames the news media
limited and guerrilla warfare, the and the antiwar movement for
first intimation I had received of much of this "unashamed de-
the President's deep interest in feat ism" and says they caused
these activities later lumped together unwarranted "demoralization
for convenience under the heading and lack of confidence" even
of counterinsurgency." within President Johnson's in-
ner circle.
Neil Sh
Times Was t ? I
Alt I 1 ;Meese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001000084-t-inuo
author of "The Arnheiter Affair."
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Taylor regrets the tradition-
al American suspicion of mili-
tary power which "leads to
questioning the efficacy of mil-
itary forces as an instrument
of policy" and the fact that
the Indochina experience will
probably deepen this suspicion.
Future Presidents, he believes,
will also have to utilize the
"limited war option" to pro-
tect our "many interests
abroad which are vulnerable
to foreign predators. They in-
clude the lives and interests
of our citizens, our trade and
investments, and our Armed
Forces and their bases."
His counsel to a future Pres-
ident who resorts to limited
war is to avoid the "gradual-
ism" that characterized the
Johnson Administration's strut-
-egy in Vietnam and to apply
force with maximum vigor. He
particularly singles out "the
restrained use of our air. pow-
er" against North Vietnam as
a model not to imitate in the
.future.
? _."A proper concept of limited
war," :Taylor writes, "is one
in which the objectives are
limited to something less than
the total destruction of the en-
emy but which carries no impli-
cation of curtailed resources
or restricted tactics. The re-
sources allocated and their use
in combat should be limited
only by the requirements of
prompt victory." How this is
to be achieved against an agri-
cultural country like Vietnam
without finally making the pop-
ulation itself the target of the
bombs is a question that Taylor
does not address.
He also advises a President
who decides upon limited-war
first to obtain a declaration of
war or emergency from Con-
gress so that the President can
"silence future critics of war by
executive order" and avoid the
dissent that hampered the
Johnson Administration.
In his concluding chapter,
Taylor warns that the tech-
nique of subversion developed
by Communist powers, as part
of their so-called Wars of Lib-
eration has now been extended
to the United States itself.
"This effort to split and defeat
us is now in progress, based
not on guerrilla warfare but
upon the exploitation of our
own internal weaknesses
coupled with the abuse of such
revered democratic practices as
freedom of press, speech and
dissent." Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7.
?
"To cope with it," he con-
cludes, "we need a new concept
of national security broad
enough to assure that defen-
sive measures are taken against
subversion in this form. Surely.
the defense of our national
unity merits a dedication of
effort at least equal to that
which we have lavished in the
past on the. protection of our
overseas possessions, our coast-
lines, and our air-space from
overt foreign foes."
And so in General Taylor's
memoirs, one comes full circle
from the creation of an Amer-
ican empire in the course of
seeking to defend our liberty
against the perceived threat of
Stalinist Communism, to the
counsel that we must now sac-
rifice our liberties in order to
maintain our empire. El
TIO NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIF?
Approved For Release 2001/931011 atA2RDP84-0040R001000100008-7
An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all
? In the
Midst of
Wars
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia.
By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale.
Illustrated. 386 pp. New York:
Harper & Row. $12.50.
By PETER ARNETT
Before the Vietnam war turned
sour and Americans could still be-
lieve in legends, there was an
idealized cold-war warrior whose
bravery, boldness and common sense
were carrying the American Way to
victory over Communism in South-
east Asia.
His legendary exploits and style
became the model for the scores of
young American operatives dis-
patched by various departments and
agencies to that arena of big-power
political intrigue. Like the idealized
cold warrior himself, those operatives
were armed with a moral certitude
about their mission. It sustained
them through the long hot nights in.
backwaters like Luang Prabang and
Pakse cultivating minor princelings.
And it justified their support of the
shoddy political accommodations
that passed for democracy in Bang-
kok, Saigon and Vientiane.
Then it all started to go bad. Deeds
once thought bold and daring now
seem to have been blundering acts
of miscalculation that sucked the
United States into an unforgiveable
bloodletting in Vietnam.
Those who had a hand in shaping
the recent history of Southeast Asia,
however, feel differently from the
average American about that his-
tory. One such man is the model
cold-war warrior of them all, Ed-
ward Geary Lansdale, Novelists
have tried to put him between cov-
ers: Graham Greene made a kindred
idealist the antihero of "The Quiet
'American," and he was later featured
as the hero of "The Ugly American"
by William Lederer and Eugene Bur-
dick.
Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, for-
mer San Francisco advertising man,
oriental kingmaker, frustrated, coun-
terinsurgency expert, speaks for
himself with, "In the Midst of Wars:
An American's Mission to Southeast
Asia." But he remains as elusive as
the legends, even after 378 pages,
and the reason seems to be that his
memoirs are strangely abbreviated;
the narrative concluded with Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power
in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian
monarch helped to the throne by
Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag-
saysay of the Philippines. But with
all we know of the later dramatic
developments of the war, and with
all Lansdale knows, his memoirs are
like reading a history of the Ameri-
can Civil War that ends with the
first election of Abraham Lincoln to
the Presidency.
The record states plainly that in
1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly nega-
tive report on the way the war was
going in Vietnam, and later dis-
cussed his finding with President
Kennedy who wanted to send him
back to Saigon in a high position.
But top Kennedy aides intervened
because of his bureaucratic crock-
ery breaking and independence. This
same reputation apparently forced
his retirement from the United
States Air Force with the rank of
major general at the age of 55. But
none of this appears in his memoirs.
But if Lansdale is reluctant to eval-
uate his life's work or discuss his
personal reverses, he has plenty more
to say. His pages ring with the
evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric
of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S.
officer in World War H, remains an
idealist who believes that the United
States can prevail in distant, un-
derdeveloped lands if she exports
"the American way," a composite
of "winning the hearts and the minds
of the people" and expert leverage
of American economic aid.
The former operative made plenty
of enemies in his freewheeling days
as Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles's personal emissary in Indo-
china, but he names none in his
memoirs, preferring to rail against
the "back rooms of Washington pol-
icy makers," which are "too full of
articulate and persuasive practi-
tioners of the expedient solution to
daily problems, of the hoary art of
power politics, and of the brute
usages of our physical and material
means."
Lansdale's belief is probably sus-
tained because of his first and last-
ing counterinsurgency success, the
crushing of the Huk rebellion in the
Philippines. He teamed with the then
unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secre-
? tary of national defense, and mount-
ed a drive against the Communist
Huks that demonstrated superb co-
ordination of political, military and
social-psychology strategy and tac-
tics. This dramatic campaign, which
he details minutely in his memoirs,
destroyed the Huks and led Mag-
saysay to the Presidency in 1953,
with Lansdale's help.
By then Lansdale had become
America's Number One counter-
insurgency expert, and John Foster
Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the
same there. In the Philippines Lans-
dale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty
tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Viet-
nam he was given every opportunity
to put his skills to use; his mission,
among other things, was to launch
paramilitary operations and polltioale
psychological
warfare against North Vietnam
a few days after the Geneva
accords gave that country to
Ho Chi Minh.
Lansdale's operatives were
the first American fighting men
in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto
known until the Pentagon Pa-
pers last year revealed minute
details of sabotage in Hanoi by
Americans in 1954, including
the pouring of contaminants
into Hanoi buses to eventually
destroy them. Lansdale men-
tions the teams in his memoirs,
but he fails to include the con-
taminants, or his? association
with the Central Intelligence
Agency revealed by the Penta-
gon Papers.
Lansdale's main contribution
to the history of Vietnain was
his success in propping up Ngo
Dinh Diem, the obdurate Viet-
namese nationalist appointed
Prime Minister by the French
in a power play in 1954 and.
saved from political extinction
by Lansdale who saw in him
the makings of another Magsay-
say. Dulles, in April, 1955, had
already agreed to a demand by
his special envoy in Saigon,
Gen. .Y. Lawton Collins, that
Diem be dumped in favor of a
coalition of Saigon politicians
and sect leaders, when a dra-
matic cable arrived from Lans-
dale stating that Diem was suc-
cessfully surviving a military
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Vietnam.
aft
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coup. Dulles changed his mind,
and Lansdale helped Diem to
victory in a Presidential elec-
tion.
But Diem was not a Ramon
Magsaysay, and this was be-
coming clear to Lansdale as in
'his daily meetings with the
roly poly President he saw the
trappings of democracy fall
away to reveal a tightening
dictatorship. The special opera-
tive was not even informed of
Diem's disastrous decree ban-
ning the traditional village
self - government elections in
favor of appointed leaders.
"The disbelievers of this world
may find it incredible, but I
learned of this decree only
long after I had left Vietnam,"
Lansdale writes.
In a postscript, Lansdale
writes of the overthrow of
Diem in 1963, which he viewed
from Washington, and says,
"the coup and murders in Sai-
gon seemed incredible." But
the irony of that remark, one
of the many ironies of Amer-
ica's Vietnam venture, is that
the generals who so brutally
overthrew Diem were the same
who had fought to place him
in power. And the American
C.I.A. agent relaying the win-
ning play from rebel head-
quarters was none other than
Lansdale's former top aide and
Hanoi saboteur Maj. Lucien Co-
nein, who had worked closely
with Lansdale on that busy
day in April, 1954, when
Diem's ascendancy to power
was clinched. The lesson seems
too obvious to restate:. We
were out-intrigued. El
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2
W.P.SHIIIC;TON POST
L
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uper Spy, Strange
. Books
GEHLEN: Spy of the Century.
By E. H. Cookridge.
(Random House, 402 pp., Mu8trated, $10.00)
ii
i,
t,
. Reviewed by
Arthur M. Cox
The reviewer, a former
.Senior relloin at the _Brook-
ings Institution and a spe-
cialist on
THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Truth About international -eoln-
nrunisin, is a consuitant,
General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. By Heinz Hohne writer and lecturer on for-
& Hermann ' Zolling. Introduction by Hugh Trevor- eign affairs, -
Roper and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew
Tully. U.S. policy by the fact that
Reinhard Gehlen was a ',first Vlassov's propaganda
Gchlen was selected fOr this
leaflets promising good
Nazi general with an obses- treatment to deserters and role, But there can be little
. .
sive hatred of 'communismemployment in the Vlassov doubt too that given Stalin's
'
-who. May have had more in- movement produced massive aggressive moves the U.S.
fluence on the course of the defections, but soon Hitler's would use the only available
Cold War than any other ruthless treatment of the source of intelligence. Prob-
. man. Soviet articles refer to Russians brought an end to ably the revisionist histori-
him as a fascist warmonger that. Had littler not been a ans of the Cold War will be
who was the biggest single maniac, it is conceivable debating for years the es-
factor in the prevention of that Gehlen's plans would sem ce of the conclusion E. H.
an East-West detente, These. have provided the basis for Cookridge reaches in his
two 'books tell his extraordi- a German victory in the book: "Whether we like it or
nary story. . East, certainly a substantial not, Western democracy
- . From late 1941 to the end prolongation of the war. must be prepared in times
of the war Gehlen was Hit- . Gehlen remained loyal to of danger to accept such
ler's chief of intelligence for Hitler, hut seeing how the strange allies as Reinhard
the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- war would end he made Gehlen in defense against
rope: Then, having arranged plans for his -future. Ile ar- totalitarianism."
to be captured by the Amer- ranged to have all his intel- According to Cookridge,
leans, he soon emerged as ligenee files on the Soviet who is a British author of
the principal- source of CIA Union packed 'in 50 steel many, fine books on estrio-
intelligence f r 0 01 the corn- eases and hidden- away until nage, the CIA pumped over
munist world until 1955, he could be captured by the, $200- million into the Gehlen
when he became Chancellor u,S. Army. As Stalin's ag- organization. But the results
Adenauer's - chief of intern- gressive program in Eastern more than paid off. Amot.ig
gence for the West German Europe, the Balkans and its sensational exploits were
Republic. ? . Iran began to unfold, it was the accurate forecasts of the
. Gehlen was one of the apparent to the Americans East German uprisings in
planners of "Operation Bar- that they were totally unpre- 1953, the Hungarian revolt
?barossa," the 1941 German pared, without intelligence in 1956. and the Soviet inva-
attack on the Soviet Unien, about the Soviets. But Geh- sion of Czechoslovakia in.
which sent Nazi divisions six len was prepared and had 1968.
hundred-miles . into the soOn negotiated a remarka- Gehlen secured the text of
U.S.S.R. in seven' weeks., ble deal in Washington giv- Khrushchey's secret speech
placing 50 million Russians ing him authority to estab- denouncing Stalin, and gave
under Hitler's rule. When lish an all-German intelli- it to Allen Dulles. His intel-
Gehlen became chief of in- gence apparatus with corn- ligence operations exposed
telligence for the Eastern plete control over its per- sonic of time most successful
Front,. he immediately sonnel. Soviet, secret agents. His
began organizing a Russian In the little village of Pul- plans led to the 600-yard.
Artily of Liberation among lach outside of Munich in tunnel the CIA dug into
anti-Communist prisoners of--
a large housinpment 1..a.st. Berlin, where the main
came more effective in pen-
etrating his organization
and planting fake informa-
tion. But the greatest blow
to G-ehlen wag the discovery
in 1962 that his chief of
counter-intelligence, Heinz
Felfen,.was a Soviet double
agent. The Felfe Affair,
combined with changes in
German political leadership
and the new technology of
spy planes and satellites all
contributed to the fading
impact of Gehlen. He re-,
tired in 1968 at 65.
Gehlen probably was the.
"spy a the century," but his,
rightist ? proclivities and
rigid anti-Communism proba-
bly contributed to prolong-
ing the most dangerous pe-
riod of the Cold War and
may have slowed the evolu-
tionary political process in
the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu-
rope. A proponent of revolu-
tion not evolution, he be-
lieved that all communism.
was bad and dreamed of war
between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. He had no sympa-
thy for national commu- ?
nism, Titoism, and revision-
ism. He didn't seem to be-
lieve that the political proc-
ess in Moscow and Eastern
Europe would allow for a"'
struggle for power between .
the rightist Stalinists and
the anti-Stalinist revision-
'Isis. Even after the advent
of Khrushchey his opera-
onsfi continued to. give
weight to the arguments of
those Communist .leaders
who most feared the Ger-
mans and who were most op-
posed to relaxing the Stalin-
ist tactics of tyranny and
terror.
Both of these books are
lively reading, well docu-
mented and cover essen-
tially the same events. The
Cookridge book is better or-
ganized and better written,,
-,
war and partisans. By the
S develo
spring of 1943 he had organ-
formerly for SS officers telephone trunk lines lead- but spy buffs may enjoy the
,ized this army under Soviet Gen. Gehlen built a walled- ing to Moscow and other operational detail of "The
was sPY nine
'Gen. Andrei Vlassov, who in headquarters for what capitals in Eastern Europe General Was A Spy" by
viding' the CIA with 70 per successful operation was di base of the Cold War, pro- months until this incredibly man newsmen who write for Der Spiegel.
had been captured 'by the Hohne and Zolling, two Ger-
soon to become the were tapped for s-
-Germans and turned against
Stalin. Vlassov and Gehlen.
estimated that there were cent of its intelligence on covered. In June, 1967, CIA
hundreds of thousands of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- Director Richard Helms was
anti-Communist Russians rope. Thus, in a matter of .able to make high Marks
-prepared to join with the months Hitler's chief from President Johnson by
?
Germans in the overthrow Soviet spy had become the prediction the exact date of
.
'of Stalin. Soviet expert for the United the six-day .Tsraeli attack in
But Gehlen's plans ran States. the Middle East. His source:
head-on against
There can be little doubt Gen. Gehlen.
-
view that the Slays were that the Soviets, fearing the Tt wasn't until he became:
sub-human beings who Germans more than any head of German intelligence
i es n,hi?, hp.
should be ,:fan to have
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eneed in ther asssment of
ror and mass execution. At cesses. The Communists be- ?
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ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST?DISPATCH
E ? 326,376
S 541,868
APR 7 1972 -
ore CIA
Americans seem to be the last to learn what
the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and
. now they' aie learning about the CIA's role in
Cambodia from a Caml,odian who had a part
nit,
Prime Minister Son N'goc T.hanh told a British
interviewer, before attaining his present post,
that the United States paid millions of dollars
after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said
'CIA:agents assigned to him ("they have three
names a month," he added) assured him of help
?if the existing government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came
.under laftwing attack.
The government was overthrown, in 1970, and
that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by,
Sihanouk, and that in turn led to a massive
? American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
Iffeddijno.
bodia. So the Southeast' Asia war ennlfecl Cam-
bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was
involved with its private army. The results of
all this insIddling have been to spread a war
without gaining a vestige of victory. If the med-
dling alone were not bad enough, the disasters
following it made it worse.
So far the CIA seems ,to have done better in
its strictly intelligence operations than in its
paramilitary and covert actions, but not evren
Congress knows for sure. Congress might be ex- .
pected to approve a standing proposal to require .
that the CIA report to it as well as to the '
Executive branch.
Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to
a blank check, and getting reports on Central
Intelligence Agency activity through the prime
minister of Cambodia,
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Approved For Reretise 20
( ole
Dispatch News Service,
the source of the following
article, .was the first news
agency to disclose details of '
the killings at My Lai, South ?'
Vietnam.
By RICHARD A. FINEBERG
Copyright 1.972 Dispatch. News
Service hitereetional
WASHINGTON.?The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA)
played a crucial role in en-
couraging the coup that top-
pled Prince Norodom Sihan-
?
ouk and plunged Cambodia
into the Indochina war, ac-
cording to Cambodia's re-
cently named prime minister,
Son Ngoc Thanh.
Describing Sihanouk's over-
throw in a series of interviews
last year with Oxford Univer-
sity- scholar T. D. Allman,
Thanh said that CIA agents
promised they would do "ev-
erything possible" to help if
the Cambodian plotters suc-
cessfully mounted a coup and
then found themselves under
attack by pro-Sihanouk and
Communist forces. ,
Shortly after the March 1970
coup, Thanh's own forces,
trained by U. S. Special
Forces in Vietnam, were dis-
patched by plane to Phnom
Penh, where they played a
vital role in defending the
Cambodian capital for Gen.
Lon Not.
THE WHITE HOUSE main-
tains that ? the U. S. had no
prior knowledge of the coup
and that "no American mili-
tary or civilian officers" were
ever involved officially or un-
officially with the plotters. Si-
hanouk's ouster "surprised no
nation more than the United
States," President Nixon said
after the coup.
Sen. Mike Gravel (D.,
Alaska) said on Tuesday that
White House denials of U. S.
involvement in the 1970 coup
arc "incredible" and he called
for full disclosure of the U. S.
-004/19R001000100008-7
tired in Sihanouk Ouster
PRINCE SIIIANOUK
. . . toppled by CIA
role in Cambodia prior to the
coup.
"It is incredible to take the
position?as the White House
has done?that the U. S. con-
ducted continuous clandestine
incursions into Cambedia,
hired and trained members of
a sect avowedly dedicated to
Sihanouk's overthrow, and
still did not know that a coup
was being planned," Gravel
said.
ALTHOUGH THE Sihanouk
regime was faltering, Gravel
said, "It i; doubtful that the
prince could have been bver-
thrown without clandestine
U. S. support for the coup."
According to Son , Nftoc
Thanh, CIA agents assigned to
Thanh's staff were kept aware
of developments concerning
the coup including secret'
meetings between Thanh and
aides of Gen. Lon Not.
? At that time, Lon Not was
Sihanouk's prime minister,
while Thanh, who had been
sentenced to death by Sihan-
ouk, , headed a rebel sect
known as the Khmer Serei
("Free Cambodia") from a
jungle post near the Viet-
nam- Cambodia border.
According to Thanh, begin-
ning in 1965 the U. S. paid
"millions of dollars" to train,
arm and support his forces,
most of whom were recruited
from the Cambodian minority
living in South Vietnam's
Delta region.
Thanh told Allman, who was
on assignment for the (Man-
chester) Guardian, that in
1969 a U.S. agent assigned to
Thanh's staff gave assurances
that the U.S. would support a
two-pronged invasion of Cam-
bodia by Thanh's partisans.
THE PLEDGE, Thanh said,
came from a CIA operative
identified only as Fred. "They
have three names a month,"
said Thanh referring to his
American collaborators. "We
never knew their real
names."
The plan, Thanh said, was
"to penetrate the country"
from the South Vietnam and
Thai borders. "Our hope was
that the Cambodian army
would rally to us. We would
ndgotiate with Sihanouk, to
avoid bloodshed. He could ei-
ther leave the country or
agree to become a constitu-
tional monarch."
? Large-scale Khmer Serei
defections to the Cambodian
? government were reported in
1969 and may have been part
of Thanh's invasion plan to
overthrow Sihanouk. Accord-
ing to reliable sources, the re-
patriated Khmer Serei units
were serving in the royal
army under Lon Not and
spearheaded political demon-
strations in Phnom Penh just
before the coup.
Thanh's invasion plan was
shelved ? "overtaken by
events," as Thanh put it ?
early in 1970 when Lon Nol's
aides sought Thanh's support
in the event of- a coup.
THANII TOLD Allman that
Lon Nol's officers asked him
"If the Vietcong attack Phnom
Penh the way they attacked
Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol
expect the help of Son Ngoc
Thanh's forces in defending
the capital?"
After checking with his
"American friends," Thanh
committed his U.S.-trained
and financed forces to the Lon
Nol coup. The CIA, he said,
promised that the U.S. would
do "everything possible" to
help.
The 63-year-old Thanh was
named prime minister, by the
ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A
devout Buddhist and an early
Cambodian nationalist leader,
Thanh was prime minister for
a brief period in 1945 when he
staged a coup prior to the
Japanese surrender. He was
quickly arrested by British oc-
cupying forces, however, and
exiled \to France.
Thath returned to 'Cam-
bodiaAin 1951, and joined the
militaot Issarek (Independ-
ence movement. At that time
he allied with the Communist
Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk.
whose strategy of cooperation
with the French to achieve in:.
dependence was too moderate
for the militant nationalist.
From that time until the
March 1970 coup, Thanh en-
gaged in anti-Sihanouk guer-
illa efforts from rural Cam-
bodia, Thailand and Vietnam.
In July 1970, Thanh re-
turned to Phnom Penh to be-
come an advesir to Lon Not.
? By that time, Cambodian left-
ists had become allied with
Sihanouk and Vietnam Com-
munist forces to fight ton
Nol, the combined U. S.-Saigon
forces had swept into Cam-
bodia, and the war that had
raged on its borders for two
decades finally engulfed Cam-
bodia.
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xpia: aquEs
5 APR 1972
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Congress and C.I.A.
The. Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted
? bearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional
committees with the same intelligence analyses it regu-
larly furnishes the White House. This legislation, intro-
diaced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited
in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign
policy.
As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign'
policy process, it is essential that its members be as
fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional
committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence-
gathering operations for which the American taxpayer
Is billed up to $6 billion annually. These fruits include
assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Execu-
tive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed.
There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's pro-
posal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that
the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelli-
gence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee for fifteen years, 'with no security.
breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral
briefings to other committees on request but only with
White House approval. Congress could better discharge
its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign
policy field if it had full and direct access to this
information.
Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress
revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny
of intelligence operations. In a move designed to side-
track legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations
Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members
to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees, which are ,currently
responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no4
meetings of this group were called during all of last'
year?an "oversight" of frightening dimensions.
? It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A,
is saying. Itcis also essential that at least key members of
the legislative branch, which provides the funds for
worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover
operations, keep informed about what, in general, this
secret arm of the United States Government is doing.
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WAS/M(1'1'01i STAR
Approved For Relegge 2001M706127CIA-RDP84-004941R001000100008-7
Sleuthing for Clues About
No subject of modern times Rtissia in S ace
combines more romanticism
and frustration for the layman
? at least for this layman ?
than man's exploration of
space.
The romance comes in the
inevitable fascination with pi-
By GEORGE SHERIVIAN ? ?
Star Staff Writer
oneering adventures in con-
quest of the unknown. The
frustration sets in when the
work-a-day civilian sits down
and tries to decipher the mul-
titude of technical detail which
sustains the space adventure.
Here is where this book
makes a welcome contribu-
tion. It is comprehensible,
scholarly yet thoroughly read-
able. Mr. Daniloff has set him-
self a dual task ? not only to
THE KREMLIN AND THE
COSMOS. By Nicholas Dani-
loff. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
258 pages, $6.95.
write about the space age in
simple readable prose, but
also to unravel the carefully
guarded secrets of the Soviet
contribution to that age.
AS A RESULT, he has ac-
complished a notable first ? a
book which sets in perspective
the "space race" of the 1960s
between the American and So-
viet superpowers, by tracing
the Russian efforts from their
origins in the late 19th century
to the present day.
It was not an easy task. The
author makes unmistakably
clear with numerous examples
that he considers himself more
the expert sleuth in search of
clues than a straightforward
researcher of published docu-
ments.
"The book is less a chronicle
or, a pleasant narrative than
an effort to strip away layers
of secrecy and uncover some
beginnings," concludes Mr.
Daniloff in his prologue.
"Some might argue that it
has been a chancy effort be-
cause of the relative paucity of
available information. I would
claim the opposite: the
mystery has made the search
all the more compelling."
The author is well qualified
to conduct the search. Born of
Russian parents in Paris, he
later spent six years in Mos-
cow during the 1960s as a cor-
respondent in the United Press
International Bureau. Having
studied at both Harvard Uni-
versity and later at Oxford
University, he therefore has
the academic, cultural and
writing background to meet
the challenge of his subject
matter.
For the average American,
names like Konstantin Eduar-
dovich Tsiolkovsky, the 19th ,
century space theorist born in
old Russia and destined to be
the father of the Soviet drive
into the cosmos, come as a
revelation. More to the point
for modern times, perhaps,
Mr. Daniloff spends a long
chapter ? based on painstak-
ing research ? identifying the
Chief Designer of the space
program under Khruschchev
Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov.
THE BOOK devotes much
space to Soviet-American ri-
valry in space, from the im-
mediate postwar effort by Sta-
lin to gain and perfect offen-
sive ballistic missile power to
the all-out race for the moon
in the 1960s. Mr. Daniloff
shows how the Russians com-
bine military, scientific and
political imperatives in their
space effort.
Most interesting of all, he
returns constantly to the Sovi-
et ambivalence over whether
to compete with President
John F. Kennedy over a
manned-lauding on the moon.
It is the author's thesis that
Khrushchev wanted to take up
the challenge, that he pres-
sured Soviet- scientists ,te cre-
ate the wherewithal for land-
ing a Soviet man on the moon
first, but that Soviet rocketry
was simply not up to the task.
By the late 1960s, concludes
the book, the Soviet leadership
under Kosygin and Brezhnev
had retreated from Khrush-
chev's more grandiose
schemes and had definitely
settled on automatic devices
for exploring heavenly bodies,
confining the activities of cos-
monauts in space to work on a
manned orbital station.
The book ends on a cautious
note of hope. While the U.S.
and the Soviet Union were un-
able to establish any real co-
operation in the early phases
of national competition in
space, the author finds signs
that the two giants are now
settling down to less spectacu-
lar programs of exploration.
With this more sober assess-
ment of costs and capabilities
is dawning the realization that
both sides have more to gain
from cooperation than rivalry
Mr. Daniloff does not offer
any dramatic shifts today or
tomorrow ? he merely sug
gests that the imperative of
reason, which his book era
braces, may ultimatel3
triumph.
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Approved For Rerfftillig0010031061: CIA-RDP84-0046eR001000100008-7
2 APR 1972
'
Congress and the CIA
No more useful piece of foreign-policy legislation
has been drafted since Congress got its dander up
than Senator Cooper's bill requiring the Central
Intelligence Agency to share its reports "fully and
currently" with the military and foreign-affairs
committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," said Mr.
, Cooper, opening hearings, "that the Congress,
which must make decisions upon foreign policy
and national security, which is called upon to coin-
mit-the material an4 human resources of the nation,
should have access to all available information and
intelligence to discharge properly and morally its
responsibility to our government and its people."
Meaning to end the practice of arbitrary CIA brief-
ings, he would require the CIA to keep Congress as
well as the Executive informed, Just as the Atomic
Energy, Commission and Defense Department have
been required to keep the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee informed in that field since 1948.
dt4,11
It seems to us Mr. Cooper is quite right to regard
the CIA?at least, that largest part of it concerned
with intelligence?not as a beast needing to be
tamed, RS many of its critics do; not as a baby
needing to be coddled, as most members of the
congressional "oversight" committees do; but as
An agency of disinterested specialists providing a
necessary and valuable product, intelligence, which
Congress has reason and right to share. Such an
approach accords with the CIA's known capabilities
And it accords as well with the political realities:
efforts to tighten legislative oversight have tradi-
tionally failed.
Mr. Cooper has taken an undogmatic approach
:to such essential Questions as what part of the CIA
paper factory's product should be made available,
by what procedures, with what security arrange-
ments, and so on. He hopes to avoid a constitu-
tional challenge, noting that since Congress created
the CIA, it can direct it to share its output. No
substantial question of executive privilege is in-
volved, in his view, since Congress would not be
asking for the advice the President receives from
his lieutenants but for the information on which
the advice is based. Further hearings will explore
these sub-issues.
C4.11
The overriding point remains that Congress can-
not make good decisions if it does not have good
and timely information. The CIA is the logical place
to look: it is charged with collating all intelligence
produced within the government and, unlike the
Executive departments which deal in the critical
fields of weapons, military aid or arms control, it
has (in those fields) no operational responsibilities
and hence no incentive to shape its intelligence to
fit its own departmental programs. The exemplary
record of Congress in dealing with atomic energy
makes it untenable to claim that Congress can't
keep secrets. Anyway, everyone knows that it's the
Executive branch which does most of the leaking.
Regular provision of CIA information to Congress
would probably tend to limit the practice of self-
serving Executive leaks.
We trust the President will look sympathetically
upon this bill introduced by one of the most re-
sponsible and experienced , members of his own
party and realize its potential advantages to the
Congress and to the nation as well.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-0199R001000100008-7
NEW REPUBLIC
1 APRIL 1972
CIAid
Senator Edward Kennedy released March 19 a "sani-
tized summary" of the third in a series of reports he
had asked the General Accounting Office to write
him on the effectiveness of US humanitarian aid to
Southeast Asia. The summary, "sanitized" to purge
secret information contained in the full report, deals
primarily with medical aid to Laos through the Agency
for International Development (AID). Unavoidably it
stumbles on something that has long troubled Kennedy
and his staff on the Senate refugees subcommittee: the
slipperiness of federal budget statistics when they
have anything to do with the Indochina war. Two years
ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings that publicized AID's link with the Central
Intelligence Agency; AID's director, John Hannah,
publicly admitted that since 1962 his agency had sub-
sidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for
secret agents.
As chairman of the refugees subcommittee, Kennedy
protested that AID funds were being misspent, and in
May 1971 he got a letter from Hannah saying that "at
the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financ-
ing with which you have been concerned will be termi-
nated." As the latest GAO reports shows, the govern-
ment had responded to an over literal interpretation
of Kennedy's protest and had left the Laos arrangement
virtually unchanged. The CIA would still train its
secret army in Laos; it would still work out of AID
offices and rely on AID for logistical and medical sup-
port. But beginning with the new fiscal year on July 1,
1971, the CIA would reimburse AID for service's rend-
ered. Technically, AID ceased to subsidize the CIA, but
in every other way it remained a front and a supplier.
The GAO report given to Kennedy, a classified doc-
ument, shows how this new system works. According
to The New York Times, the report states that the CIA
has already refunded $1.3 million to AID for medical
assistance during the first half of fiscal 1972, and that
more than $1 million will be refunded for the second
half '?a total of about $2.5 million a year spent by AID
on the CIA army in Laos. The conclusion is that either
AID is overspending its budget to accommodate the
CIA (which is unlikely), or. that $2.5 million originally
appropriated for humanitarian aid is being diverted to
back up the CIA's army. Only the bookkeepers know
how the financing is arranged.
To a State Department spokesman, the whole issue
is a "non-story" because this "cost-sharing agree-
ment" between AID and the CIA was announced
almost a year ago. Furthermore, he believes that it's
nearly impossible to distinguish between human-
itarian and military aid in Laos where the soldier-
tribesmen are accompanied by their families. In any
case, what was true before Kennedy made his protest
half of it ($2.5 million) goes to support the secret war.
Judging from. reports last week, the secret war may be
? coming to an end no matter what Congress does: the
base of CIA operations in Laos, Long Cheng, has been
abandoned by about 1000 local volunteers who were
recruited to defend it against the North Vietnamese,
A US spokesman in Vientiane said the situation at the,
?
'base is '!critical and rapidly deteriorating." If it falls,
it will be the farthest south the Communists have
reached in Laos.
AipprovediforcReteate)21701ite/Qr01-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7
humanitarian aid in Laos ($4.9 million in Ou
Approved For agfrlease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-1.499R001000100008-7 ?
PROVILNCE, R.I.
BULLETIN
E 149,463
APR I 197?
'
CIA Information
ammomaasg.
One of the recurring criticisms of the Central
Intelligence Agency is that despite the hundreds of
millions of dollars it spends to gather information,
the distribution of that information is so limited that
Congress has little benefit from it. A remedy for
this gap has been proposed by former CIA official,
Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., once deputy director for
research, has suggested that the same intelligence
and analyses be supplied to appropriate congressional
committees as now goes to the White House. He '
argues that while much information is provided by
the executive branch to Congress, it is subject to
distortion by administrative officials.
There are two aspects of such a development
that raise .questions. One is the issue of security. But
Dr. Scoville pointed out that CIA intelligence has
been submitted regularly to the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy for years, as required.
by statute, without any breaches of security. The
other is the danger of congressional members being
overwhelmed with a mass of information.
. To solve the latter problem, another former CIA
official, Chester L. Cooper, proposes that represen-
tatives of the CIA be assigned to the congressional
.committees to screen out the important material and
bring it to their attention. The material wouldn't
be available to everybody, but only to those commit-
tees dealing with foreign affairs and national secur-
ity.
In a period when Congress is insisting that it
be given a larger voice in the direction of foreign
policy and those activities likely to involve the
United States in international conflict, it is vital
that its members be fully informed. In the recent
past, the accumulation of power in the White House
has left Congress all too often in the dark or able to
obtain only what information the executive feels it
should have.
? Many critics in Washington feel that the CIA
and its activities should be controlled directly by
the State Department, except perhaps for clandestine
activities, which should be directed separately. There
have been many indications in the past decade that
the CIA operates independently of the State Depart-
ment and, as a result, has a tendency to make its
own foreign policy. While the State Department's
state of eclipse is such today that it is scarcely in
a position to assert greater control over the CIA,
increased reporting to Congress might at least keep
Congress in closer touch with the realities of power
in the federal government and enable it to make
sounder decisions on policies to be followed by both
agencies.
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SATURDAY REVIEV
Approved For Release 2991nkor79.701A-RDP84-0041W9R001000100008-7
IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia
by Edward tleary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50
Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky
? With the exception of the Pentagon
Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's
memoir could have been the most valu-
able eyewitness account of the inter-
nationalizing of the Indochinese war.
Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in
his own book, furnished the model for
the Ugly American who, from 1950
through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put
down the Huk revolution in the Philip-
pines. He then proceeded to Vietnam
where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck
close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's
first shaky years when Washington
couldn't make pp its mind whom to
tap as the American alternative to Ho
Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured
Diem as the final choice for Our Man
in Saigon. While the book's time span
is, therefore, relatively brief, the period
it covers in the Philippines and Viet-
nam is genuinely important.
There is only one difficulty with In
the Midst of Wars: from the cover to
the final page it is permeated with lies.
That Harper & Row finds it possible
to foist such a package of untruths on
the public?and for $12.501?several
months after the emergence of the
Pentagon Papers, and years after the
publication of other authoritative
studies, exhibits contempt for a public
trying to understand the realities of
our engagement in Vietnam.
The lie on the jacket describes Lans-
dale merely as an OSS veteran who
spent the years after World War II as a
"career officer in the U.S. Air Force."
In the text Lansdale never offers any
explicit evidence to the contrary. In-
deed, on page 378?the last of the text?
he states that at the very time Diem
was being murdered in Saigon, "I had
been retired from the Air Force."
For all I know Lansdale drew his pay
from the Air Force and, as the photo-
graphs in his book attest, he certainly
wore its uniform. This is irrelevant.
Lansdale was for years a senior opera-
tive of the Central Intelligence Agency;
on page 244 of the Department of De-
fense edition of the Pentagon Papers,
Lansdale, two other men, and Allen
Dulles are identified as representing
the CIA at a meeting of the President's
Special Committee on Indochina held
on January
Why is this important? Because if
there is one word Lansdale ,uses re-
peatedly it is "help"?and he uses it
personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-
like urge to offer spontaneous assist-
ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw
? Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to
me that perhaps he needed help. . I
voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . . .
Heath told me to go ahead." The in-
formal atmosphere continues when
Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem,
immortalizes him as "the alert and
eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding
what to do about Snow White."
Further desires to serve inform Lans-
dale's concern for the "masses of
people living in North Vietnam who
would want to ... move out before the
zommunists took over." These unfortu-
nates, too, required "help." Splitting
his "small team" of Americans in two,
Lansdale saw to it that "One half,
mder Major Conch:, engaged in
-efugee work in the North."
"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to
play the major role the CIA had in the
murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in
the secret CIA report included by the
Times and Beacon editions of the
Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972)
as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Gr9up]? for
cover purposes." The secret report
refers to Conein's refugee "help" as
one of his "cover duties." His real job:
"responsibility for developing a para-
military organization in the North, to
be in position when the Vietminh took'
over . . the group was to be trained
and supported by the U.S. as patriotic
Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams
also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's
largest printing establishment and
wreck the local bus company. At the
beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the
CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents
into the North. They "became normal
citizens, carrying out everyday civil
pursuits, On the surface." Aggression
from the North, anyone?
Lansdale expresses particular pleas-
ure with the refugee movement to
the South. These people "ought to be
provided with a way of making a fresh
start in the free South. . . . [Vietnam]
was going to need the vigorous par-
ticipation of every citizen to make a
success of the noncommunist part of
the new nation before the proposed
plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale
modestly claims that he "passed along"
ideas on how to wage psychological
warfare to "some nationalists." The
Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that
the CIA "engineered a black psywar
strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the
Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on Xuyen. (At every step Diem .1zwas h eatictc-
a I; ev20011103/66*CIAADP84-00499R1004100040000 :13
iggiRoved For Rele
over of the Hanoi region in early
October [1954] including items about
property, money reform, and a three-
day holiday of workers upon takeover.
The day following the distribution of
these leaflets, refugee registration
tripled."
The refugees?Catholics, many of
whom had collaborated with the
French?were settled in the South, in
communities that, according to Lans-
dale, were designed to "sandwich"
Northerners and Southerners "in a
cultural melting pot that hopefully
would give each equal opportunity."
Robert Scigliano, who at this time
was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-
gan State University team on how to
"help" Diem, saw more than a melting
pot:
Northerners, practically all of whom are
refugees, [have] preempted many of the
choice posts in the Diem government. .
[The] Diem regime has assumed the as-
pect of a carpet bag government in its
disproportion of Northerners and Cm-
tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The
Southern people do not seem to share the
anticommunist vehemence of their North-
ern and Central compatriots, by whom
they are sometimes referred to as un-
reliable in i
the communist struggle. . . .
[While] priests n the refugee villages hold
no formal government posts they are gen-
erally the real rulers of their villages and
serve as contacts with district and pro-
vincial officials.
Graham Greene, a devout Catholic,
observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-
nam, "It is Catholicism which has
helped to ruin the government of Mr.
Diem, for his genuine piety has been
exploited by his American advisers
until the Church is in danger of sharing
the unpopularity of the United States."
Wherever one turns- in Lansdale the
accounts are likely to be lies. He re-
ports how Filipinos, old comrades
from the anti-Huk wars, decided to
"help" the struggling Free South. The
spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture
warms the heart?until one learns from
Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-
dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA
had stage-managed the whole business.
The Eastern Construction Company
turns out to be a CIA-controlled
"mechanism to permit the deployment
of Filipino personnel in other Asian
countries for unconventional opera-
tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and
other governmental personnel were
'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."
Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of
Diem's success against the various
sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh
Approved For Relege 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004001000100008-7
moment, even holds the weeping Chief
of State in his arms.) Everything de-
pends on timing, daring, and honesty
in the face of venality. Therefore Lans-
dale ridicules a Frenchman who dares
accuse him of bribing the sects.
Actually, in the literature on this sub-
ject, the only argument about bribes
has been about their magnitude. Ber-
? nard Fall estimated that American
bagmen disbursed more than $12-mil-
lion. John Osborne, in Life, May 13,
1957, also put the amount in the mil-
lions, while Joseph Alsop, in the New
York Herald Tribune of April 1, 1955,
cautiously guessed in the hundreds of
thousands.
Although at the end of In the Midst
of Wars Lansdale says that he regrets
Diem's "brutal murder," he makes no
mention of the CIA's central role in the
affair. And he immediately lies again
by claiming: "I had been shunted from
Washington work on Vietnamese prob-
lems in 1961 and had been busy with
other duties." Unfortunately for Lans-
dale and Harper & Row, the Pentagon
Papers reveal him, in 1961, as very
busy indeed with precisely such prob-
lems?briefing his superiors on CIA
activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Thai-
land. The CIA being the kind of or
ganization it is, perhaps there was for
Lansdale no "need to know" that his
old subordinate, now "Colonel" Conein
?at the behest of Lodge, Bundy, Rusk,
and John Kennedy?had been instru-
mental in the coup that brought Diem
to a bloody end in the back of a truck.
But why should Lansdale have the
last word? The Defense Department's
analysts knew that Diem's short-
comings were more profound than the
kind of stubbornness which made him
so exasperatingly lovable to Major
General Lansdale.
As far as most Cochinchinese peasants
-were-concerned, Diem was linked to Bao
Dai, and to the corrupt, French-dominated
government he headed. Studies of peasant
attitudes conducted in recent years have
demonstrated that, for many, the struggle
which began in 1945 against colonialism
continued uninterrupted throughout Di-
em's regime: in 1954, the foes of national-
ists were transformed from France and
Bao Dai, to Diem and the U.S.?My-Diem,
-American-Diem, became the universal
term of Vietcong opprobrium?but the
issues at stake never changed.
Jonathan hlirsky is director of the East
Asia Center at Dartmouth College.
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2
Approved For RelergeTfieV14 .TWATikreftrib049i1R001000100008-7
SPY TEAM
LOST IN U.S.
GUNSHIP
? By JOHN DRAW.
In Saigon
Normi VIETNAMESE ?
surface-to-air missile
(S A M) crews have shot
down an .AC130 gunship
with 14 Americans aboard
said to be on an "intellig-
ence mission."
They were probably highly-
trained personnel whose job is
to observe and determine the
significance of the flow of Com-
munist men and material to
southern front lines.
A second gunship was shot
down by anti-aircraft fire over
Laos but the 15 men aboard
parachuted to safety and were
rescued after a night in the
jungle.
The SAM ? "kill," in the
Tact-tone area, was the first deep
Inside Laotian territory. It was
the first confirmed case of North
Vietnamese SAM presence be-
low the 17th parallel, which
divides North and South Viet-
nam.
Major victory
North Vietnamese gunners,
rocket and mortar crews
launched 'a massive bombard-
ment?the heaviest for four
years?on South Vietnamese
villages and outposts south of
the demilitarised zone.
The barrage, which ended
early yesterday, killed 32 Gov-
ernment soldiers and civilians
and wounded more than 100.
Government troops were forced
to withdraw from five of their
Vases.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-004a9R001000100008-7
NEWPORT NEWS, VA.
PRESS
?
M 48,828
S ? 74,643
'APR 1 1976a
ala-Sharing
Sen. John Shermman Cooper (R-
Ky.) complains that the Senate can
hardly carry out its foreign policy role'
adequately unless it receives up-to-date
information on relations ? with other
countries and he is not satisfied with
the data which seeps down from the
executive branch. so he is pushing an
?amendment to the 1947 National Secur-
ity Act that would require the Central
Intelligence Agency to keep the Senate
and house Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs Committees "fully and cur-
rently" posted.
The White House looks upon this
proposal as an attempted encroach-
ment .on the responsibilities of the sec-
retary of state and raises the question
of whether it would violate the con-
stitutional requirement as to separa-
tion of powers. Behind this argument
is the fear that once Congress started
getting hold of secret Intelligence data
there would he no end to it.While Sena-
tor Cooper said the legislation "would
not affect in any way or inquire into the
intelligence gathering activities of the
CIA, its methods, sources, funds or per-
sonnel," that is a portal which an ele-
ment in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee wouldn't mind entering.
ny!
However, this and other relevan
congressional committees do need ac
cess to the best current data on mat-
ters which they hear testimony on and
debate and it is a disadvantage to have
to rely on the executive branch.
A constructive way out Of the im-
passe was offered this week by a for-
mer senior CIA employe in committee
testimony. He said it would be advis-
able for the agency to give information
and analysis on a continuing basis and
proposed that a staff of "carefully"
chosen officers be designated to pro-
vide liaison, adding that the mind bog-
gles at the thought of truckloads of
classified documents being delivered to
the Senate and House.
There is no reason. why such a
system should have to pose any of the
dangers that have been raised directly
or implicitly in response to the Cooper
bill. Of course Congress would want to
satisfy itself that the officials chosen
were just as aware of its needs as the
desires of the executive side of govern-
ment, within the realm of recognition
that the CIA can serve security needs
best only by remaining as essentially
a secret operation:
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SIIII?TC TON STAR
Approved For.Rettierse 2abirtpfl362: CIA-RDP84-00489R001000100008-7
Chikah Pariell to .Probe
.Charges Against .ITT
United Press 'Met-national
The Chilean Chamber of
Deputies formed a special
commission yesterday to in-
vestigate alleged efforts by
International Telephone and
Telegraph Corp. to prevent
the inauguration of President
Salvador Allende.
- Business Week magazine,
meanwhile, sa d Tormer CIA
Director John A. McCone has
confirmed that ITT executives
discussed possible moves to
prevent Allende from taking
office, the Associated Press
reported.
McCone, a Member of the
ITT board of directors since
1966 and a member of its ex-
ecutive committee, disclosed
that he was consulted and that
ITT told the U.S. government,
"If you have a plan, we'll
help with it," 'Business Week
said yesterday.
The 13- member Chilean
panel is to report within 60
days on charges by American
columnist Jack Anderson that
ITT had tried to block Allen-
de from taking power in De-
cember 1970. .
Frei Nephew Heads Panel
The chamber committee is
composed of seven opposition
legislators and six members of
Allende's popular unity coali-
tion of Socialists, Communists
and left splinter groups. The
panel's chairman is Arturo
Frei, a Christian Democrat
and nephew of former Presi-
dent Eduardo Frei,- Allende's
predecessor.
According to Anderson, Ed-
uardo Frei rejected ITT over-
tures to prevent Allende's in-
auguration. -
Foreign Minister Clodomiro
Alineyda told the chamber he
had received photocopies of
documents made public by An-
derson in Washington purport-
ing to show ITT involvement
in Chile's internal affairs.
' Memos ? 'Were Staff'
, Of the memos published by
Ander so n; McCone said,
"those were staff," Business
Week reported. An earlier ITT
statement dismissed as base-
less allegations that the com-
pany plotted against Allende
to protect its properties in
Chile against expropriation.
' Business Week reported that
McCone said suggestions of
"economic repression" meas-
ures against Chile were "pru-
dently, properly and firmly
rejected" by ITT Chairman
Harold S. Geneen.
McCone was quoted as say-
ing that he and Geneen regret
"the way that the memos were
Approved For Release 2001/aftaaVAM*040499R001000100008-7
our true policy has been dis-
torted."
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 20014y/ph: ak-RDP84-004440R001000100008-7
CHILE'S CONGRESS
SETS CIA. INQUIRY
I.T.T. :Role Another Target
but.Doubt Is Voiced
By JUAN de ONIS
. special to The New York Times
SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30
?The Chilean Congress has de-
cided to investigate past activi-
ties of the United States Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and
the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation report-
edly aimed at keeping President
Salvador Allende Gossens from
taking office in 1970.
130th the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies called for
the investigation after Hern?
del Canto, Minister of the In-
terior, had reported on what
he said was a plot by retired
military officers and a small,
right-wing opposition party to
overthrow Dr. Allende last
week.
? The investigation will be
conducted in the Chamber of
Deputies. However, the anti-
Marxist Opposition, which con-
trols the Congress, questioned
the evidence the Government
has presented on both the
C.I.A. activities and on the:
supposed plot.
The main opposition party,'
the Christian Democratis, an-
nounced that in protest it would
organize a march open to "all
democratic parties." The march,
it said, would also serve to
demonstrate opposition to the
tetusal by Dr. Allende's left-
wing Government to authorize
a march by women 10 days
ago and another by private
organizations Tuesday.'
While Congres agreed to an
investigation of the C.I.A. in
Chile,- a court of appeals re-
leased on $82 bail the president
of the Fatherland and Liberty
movement, Pablo Rodriguez
Grez, a lawyer who was ac-
cused byt he Government Prose-
cutor of fomenting the plot last
week.
A retired general, Alberto
Green Baquedano, and two re-
tired .junior army officers are
being held in the plot, which
the Government has said called
for the assassination of Dr.
Allende.
The investigation of the
C.I.A. and the International
Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration, which has large in-
vestments here, stems from
purported I.T.T. documents
made public by Jack Anderson,
the synclicaleignFt
c in
olunist./APragi
The documents, which sug- -
gest that I.T.T. employes. some
of whom were in contact with
the C.I.A. in Washington, tried
unsuccessfully to promote a
military coup to keep Dr. Al-
lende from taking office, have
caused a political storm here.
Director Cited
John A. McCone, a former
director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, has confirmed
that executives of international
Telephone & Telegraph Corpo-
ration had discussed moves
against ? President Salvador Al-,
lende Crossens of Chile, the
magazine. Business Week said
today.
Mr. McCone, now a member'
of the I.T.T. board of directors
and its executive committee,
was quoted as saying he had
been consulted and that the
company had :told the United.
States Government that if it
had a plan to block the elec-
tion of Dr. Allende, "we'll help
with it."
Far from disavowing the an-
thenticilv of the memorandum
published by Mr. Anderson,
Mr. McCone said they were
written by I.T.T. staff mem-
bers, according to Business
Week.
I.T.T. snokesmen have denied
as "without foundation in fact"
allegations that the company
had panned or participated in
any plots against Dr. Allende
in an effort to protect its
properties in Chile against ex-
propriation.'
Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7
ST. LOUIS POST? DISPATr"
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? . ITT and CIA
Perhaps it was not entirely surprising, given
a long history of dollar diplomacy in Latin
America, that an international corporation such
as the International Telephone & Telegraph
, Corp. would have tried to exercise its own
foreign policy in. Chile, or have attempted to
_ enlist Administration and Central Intelligence
Agency support. After all, ITT had big holdings
threatened by the election of President Allende.
I3ut Newsweek magazine mentions another point
that has probably not occurred to many Amen-,
cans, which is that ITT's telephone network
in Chile "was an invaluable resource to spies.
as well as stockholders." Maybe that repre-
sented a kind of interlocking relationship. It is
unlikely, however, to show up in reports to
stockholders.
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Approved FOr Relege 2010.03011PCIA-RDP84-00490R001000100008-7
29 MARCH 1972
A Matter of intelligence
Diplomatic dealing and higher-level
statecraft often require attentive alert-
ness, but it has sometimes happened
that even the most astute leaders out-
smarted themselves because they under-
estimated their own intelligence.
Successive recent Presidents of the
United States, for instance, either dis-
counted or downgraded perceptive pro-
fessional intelligence estimates about
Vietnam?the dismal details are fully
recorded in some of the Pentagon
papers?and it is clearly lamentable
that some of the more prescient counsel
went no further than the files.
There are many such reasons why
the Central Intelligence Agency's anal-
yses of various foreign policy problems
should be more widely accessible, and
some of the organization's unhonored
prophets seem to agree. Former direc-
tor John A. McCone is apparently speak-
ing for them as well as himself in
supporting a pending bill that would
provide key Congressional committees
with CIA estimates and even some
special surveys.
Since the American public is pay-
ing for this advice, its representatives
are fully entitled to more than a fleet-
ing look, and it is quite possible that far
better informed Congressional opinion
would result?whatever the prevailing
view at the White House.
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ZJW YORK TIMES
Approved For Rergase 2001/03/0?6 9).A-9,84-0C1269R001000100008-7
DATA TO CONGRESS
FROM C.I.A. URGED
Two Ex-Agency Aides Back
Bill to Require Reports
By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 28?
Two former officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency
urged Congress today to require
the agency to provide it fully
and currently with the same
intelligence and analyses it now
regularly provides the White
House.'
Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a
former Deputy Director for Re-
search, noted that for 15 years
the agency had been supplying
the Joint Congressional Atomic
Energy Committee with highly
classified intelligence on world
atomic developments. There
have been no security breaches,
he said.
Dr. Scoville also suggested
that regular briefings of Con-
gressional committees dealing
with foreign affairs would en-
hance ?not jeopardize ?na-
tional security.
At present, he said, both
Congress and the public are de-
pendent on the Administration
for information, which is often
"distorted" to suit Administra-
tion policies.
Would Screen Information
, Chester L. Cooper, a former
senior analyst on Vietnam for
the agency and now an execu-
tive of the Institute for Defense
Analyses here, urged that se-
lected agent officers with ex-
perience on the National Secu-
rity Council staff? be assigned
tours of duty with Congres-
sional committees dealing with
foreign and national security af-
fairs.
These officers, he suggested,
would screen what was im-
portant for Congress and thus
prevent its being "drowned" in
a flood of intelligence material
?much of it irrelevant.
Mr. Cooper also urged con-
gress to seek access to Na-
tional Security Coundil study
memorandums which, he noted,
include not only intelligence
but also other pertinent in-
formation relevant to policy de-
cisions.
Dr. Scoville and Mr. Cooper
testified before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, wrich
was opening hearings today on
a bill proposed by Senator John
Sherman Cooper, Republican of
Kentucky.
The measure, sponsored in
the House by Representative
Paul Findley, Republican of Il-
linois, would oblige the agency
to provide Congressional com-
mittees dealing with armed
services and foreign policy
"fully and currently" with
both intelligence information
and evaluations affecting for-
eign relations and national se-
curity.
Senior agency officials pro-
vide frequent oral briefings on
world affairs at the request of
Congressional committee chair-
men, but these briefings are
expressly sanctioned by the
White House.
With the exception of the
Atomic Energy Act, there is
no legislation that requires the
agency to disclose its opera-
tions or its findings to Con- ,
gress.
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17;3Slt ,N;470'.; 0:%?)
Approved For. Re!elle 29819061761A-RDP84-00490R001000100008-7
teess ?y Hillk
To CI A lata
ee m elide
13y Stanley Karnol.v
. Washington Post Staff Writer
Two f a rmer senior et-1i- Congress "would raise a con- Both former CIA Men catt
ployees of the .Central Intern- stitutional question as to sena-
tioned the committee against'
' gence Agency urged yesterday
that selected congressional
committees be provided regu-
larly with CIA information
and analysis concerning U.S.
foreign relations and "matters
of national security."
The ex-CIA men, Chester L.
Cooper and Herbert Scoville
Jr., testified at a Senate For-
eign Relations Committee
hearing convened to discuss a
bill introduced 'by Sen. John
Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to
amend the National Security
Act of 1947.
The bill, a variation of pre-
vious congressional efforts to
supervise the -U.S. intelligence
community, calls for the CIA
to "inform fully and cur-
rently" the Armed Services
and Foreign Affairs Commit-
tees of the House of Repre-
sentatives .as well as the Sen-
ate Armed Services and For-
eign Relations Committees.
Speaking in defense of his
proposal, Sen. Cooper said
that it "would not affect in
any way or inquire into the in-
? telligence gathering activities
of the . CIA, its methods,
sources, funds or personnel."
Its main purpose, the sena-
tor explained, is to give Con-
gress "access to all available
information and intelligence"
so that the legislature can
"discharge Properly and mor-
Idly its responsibility."
The Nixon administration
has voiced its hostility to the
bill in a State Department let-
ter sent in January to Sen. J.
William ? Fulbright (D-Ark.),
the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee chairman, saying that re-
quiring the CIA to inform
Congress is "incompatible"
with the Secretary of State's
role as principal foreign policy
adviser to the President.
The State Department let-
ter, described by Fulbright as
"about as weak a letter as I've
Approved"Favr-Rdessen
obligation for the CIA to brief
ration of powers betwen the
Legislative and Executive
Branches."
Chester Cooper, 55, a vet-
eran of the CIA, the State De-
partment and the White
House_ who now works for the
institute of Defense Analyses,
recommended yesterday that a
having Congress provide the
public with information given
to its committees by the intel-
ligence community.
Sources close to the commit-
tee also expressed fears pri-
vately that any intention on
the part of Congress to release
CIA intelligence to the public
might restult in the defeat of .
the bill,
special staff of "carefully"
chosen officers serve as
son men between the CIA and
the congressional committees.
He warned against Congress
demanding access to all intel-
ligence studies, saying that
"the mind boggles at the
thought of truckloads of classi-
fied documents being deliv-
ered daily to the Senate and
House mailroom.
The former CIA employee
therefore .Suggested that Con-
gress be authorized to receive
the National Security Study
Memoranda, an eclectic set of
documents that contain a wide
array of information and in-
terpretation of current Policy
options.
The other committee wit-
ness, Scoville, 57, formerly the
CIA's Director of Science and
Technology, asserted that the
administration has deliber-
ately misused intelligence in
its presentations to Congress
to promote its own legislation.
Scoville alleged that admin-
istration Spokesmen in 1969
sought to justify the safe-
guard anti-ballistic missile
program before Congress by
reporting that the Soviet
Union would soon acquire a
"first-strike capability" that.
demanded endorsement of the
U.S. program.
Disputing the administra-
tion argument that intelli-
gence briefings..raise a "Con-
stitutional question," Scoville
said that the-Joint Atomic En-
ergy Intelligence Committee-
h as been performing_ that
041031064 GIA-4RDR64-00499R001000100008-7
ear developments for years,
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CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIKES
?
M 336,108 1
S - 709,123
MAR 2 ia
By Thomas B: Ross
Sun-Times Bureau
WASHINGTON ? Sen. J.
William Fulbright (D-Ark.)
and a former official of the
Central Intelligence Agency
expressed doubt Tuesday that
Congress would be able to pry
loose the CIA's secret in-
telligence reports from the Nix-
on administration.
Fu'bright, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, opened the hearings
on a bill that would require the
CIA to give its estimates to
Congress as well as the White
,louse. After disclosing a State
Department letter declaring
the administration's opposition
to the bill, Fulbright indicated
he was pessimistic about the
prospects of overriding a Pres-
idential veto.
The first witness, Chester
Cooper, a former CIA, .White
House and State Department
Intelligence analyst, said he
doubted an OK would be forth-
coming until the adminis-
tration was convinced the
CIA's secrets would be pro-
tected by Congress.
"Frankly," he testified, "I
think the Executive does not
want you to have this informa-
tion. Unless the issue is faced
squarely, you are going to get
very sanitized, thin,. harmless
. information. You'll get a lot of
bulk but not much nour-
ishment."
- Cooper and Herbert Scoville,
former head of the CIA's re-
_ _ -
ress can defy Nixon
search division, insis-ted the
administration's fear of leaks
was unfounded but, nonethe-
less, very real.
Scoville argued that the CIA
has been providing secret re-
ports to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy for more
than 20 years without any leak
of security information. But
Cooper pointed out that "few
of the AEC issues are political-
ly contentious," while most et.,
the Foreign Relations Corn.
mittee's are.
The bill, sponsored by Sen.
John S. Cooper (R-Ky.), is de-
signed to give key Senate and
House committees the type of
secret information that will al-
low them to judge whether the
President is following the best
intelligence advice.
Fulbright said his ex-
perience over the last 10 years
has been that the "reports of
the CIA have proved more ac-
curate than any other esti-
mates."
Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho)
suggested the State Depart-
ment opposed the bill because
it wanted to make "adminis-
tration stooges" of key mem-
bers. of Congress.
Church joined Sen. Charles
H. Percy (R-Ill.) and the five
o t 11 e r committee members
present in supporting the bill.
But he contended that an even
more important issue was how
to stop the CIA from "military
and paramilitary" operations
around the world. He said Con-
gress had never received
on a data
satisfactory answer on the
statutory authority under
which those operations are
conducted.
Percy said the CIA had
proved more valuable to him
than any other source of secret
information but said, he was
still appalled at how little sen-
ators are told about vital ques-
tions. He confessed to voting
'wrong on the supersonic trans-
port and the antiballistic mis-
sile because of "fallacious" in-
formation.
The State T)epartment letter
argued that the bill would un-
dermine the secretary of
state's role as the President's
chief adviser on foreign policy,
violate the separation of pow- .
ers between the executive and
levislative branch and risk vio- ?
lotions of security. Fulbright
dismissed the department's re-
sponse as "about as weak a
letter as I've ever seen." .
Scoville and Chester Cooper
agreed on the charge that
there was no merit in any of
the department's arguments.
Cooper went so far as to sug-
gest that the administration
was "making a "conscious ef-
fort to confuse." .
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Approved For RtteikhAM
tr.
^
c&pu
CIA heroin tra
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6 ; -;ot year fur
4-06499R001000100008-7
His curiosity piqued by Sunset Strip billboard, Dielif investigated the charges with expert on spies, Laclislas fa
BOOK TALK
Sniffing Around
U.S. Spy Network
BY DIGBY DIEHL
? A sensational billboard on Sunset Strip a few
Weeks ago caused me to look into .lhe March issue of
EARTH magazine with considerable interest?and
great skepticism. Another attack on our government
.Within the government, the Central Intelligence
Agency, was leveled in a message 48 feet long, her-
alding an article by Berkeley professor Peter Dale
Scott about CIA involvement in heroin traffic in
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Although Scott does not "prove" his charges con-
clusively, his research is impressive and the bulk of
circumstantial evidence as, well as peculiar coin-
cidence would certainly lead me, if I were a congress-
man, to ask just what the CIA is up to running Air
America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, and
being inconspicuously conspicuous around the opi-
tim. triangle. EARTH's editor, Jim Goode. says, "All
-this is terrifying. It has to be stopped and the only
..way to stop it is to make the CIA?specifically, its
secret unauthorized war in Laos?accountable to the
public. When 'a 'secret' agency is allowed to operate
beyond the reach of the law, it becomes a criminal
agency."
-Goode sounds shrill and unrealistic Until you recall
weird scenes like the Bay of Pigs and read a few
more facts. The CIA employs 18,000 people "direct-
ly," only we don't know exactly what 6.000 of them
because they're involved in Clandestine Services.
The $6 billion annual budget of this organization is
.spent in ways mainly unknown by the American
taxpayer . . . unknown, for that matter, by chair-
man of the Senate Appropriations Committee Allan
'Ellender who says, "It never dawned on me to ask
'about it."
- My curiosity piqued, I talked to the forein t civi-
lian expert on secret intelligence operations, Ladis-
las Farago, who is also the author of the current
best-seller, THE .GAME OF' FOXES (McKay:
$11.95).ApproVedforifteleelge12001103/06
'American intelligence services, and studying espion-
age. "The spying operations of the CIA are a mg silly
joke: they're all playing Alice in Wonderland
games," he says, roaring with laughter like a IHtunga-
rian Santa Claus.
? We're spending something like 82.9 billion brib-
ing prime ministers in Asia and buying armies in
Burma and it's all nonsense. Counterinsurgency is
not the business of the United States. Nixon would
be better served by getting the facts than by the CIA
overthrowing governments."
, Actually, according to Farago, the CIA and other
intelligence operations. do have valuable informa-
tion-gathering services, mostly run by civilian scho-
lars. "These are useful and necessary services: main-
ly reading newspapers and official reports from oth-
er countries. But the rest could be canned. The Unit-
ed States could have a very adequate intelligence
operation for under $100 million. To be informed
would be cheap; to play games is expensive."
? A comic aspect of the intelligence problem is that
even when a spy does come up with information,
who knows if he can be trusted? "As I point out in
'The Game of Foxes,' the Germans and the Allies
had so completely penetrated each other's infoirna-
tion lines with double agents that no one knew what.,
was happening. Hitler's own men invariably
gave him f.i1;se information because they didn't like
him. Of course, they couldn't have 'known for sure
what they were giving bim since the British were
running the German spy nett-VO.yk in England. Then
again, the Roosevelt-Churchill hotise was tapped.
Sure, a spy can be important?but you he;Tr know.
to how many people."
History proves over and over that the spy game is
a waste of time and money, says Farago. "When I
worked in naval intelligence in 1935-37, the infor-
mation published in the New York Times was super-
ior to what was coming through our office. The
Korean invasion of June, 1950, wasn't announced to
President Truman by our vast spy network; it came
.
over' the Associated Press wire. And, of coucse, the
CIA's 'secret' Bay of Pigs was one long farce..Eisen-
hower turned down the idea in September, 1960, but
Allen Dulles (then CIA head) and Richard Bissell
alien chief of staff) sold it to Kennedy. It Was so
cleverly planned that virtually every major news
source from the New York Times to the Nation knew
about it in advance."
: Otl4trefi AVOg110 Walsh
intelligence and wenn Me ta 'Bond
?
f',;) s,
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009R001000100008-7
spy novels) had a desk in Farago's Washington of-
fice. "Fleming used to rush in and set Up shop peri-
odically, always very hurried. But. he carried a little
sign with ..him on every journey that he would hang
on the wall that I think tells the whole story of
espionage: 'Never In the course of human history
was so much known abattt so little by so-many."
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z