CIA ACTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000500110009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 1, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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TO: A. B. Darling 1 July 1952
SUBJECT: CIA Activity in Scientific Intelligence
I
Scientific information, within the --framework of -National Se-
curity interests, may be considered to exist at three levels:
1. Raw intelligence, constituting facts of current discovery
and applicability not evaluated beyond assessment of probable re-
liability.
2. Processed intelligence, constituting ordered and assembled
intelligence material fully evaluated in the light of existing scien-
tific knowledge and theory.
3. Scientific research, constituting positive development and
transcending scientific intelligence, the latter being only one and
frequently a minor area of data available for such research.
. It is probable that the line between 2 and 3 above has not al-
ways been clearly recognized within CIA, and particularly in OSI.
It is obvious that item 3 above is no concern of CIA or any part
thereof. However, it is of concern to non-intelligence components
of the other IAC agencies, such as the Office of Naval. Research,
Bureau of Ordnance, Air Material Command, AEC, and others.
CIA has properly two classes of customers for production of
matters under item 2 above. One class is the components of the
other IAC agencies enumerated in the previous paragraph, as well as
other elements of the government such as RDB. This class has use
for such information because of its possible effect on the course of
military scientific developnent in the US. The second class is
made up of the IAC agencies as such, particularly including CNE with-
in CIA. Their interest is in the presentation of enemy scientific
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capabilities for national security planning, and among the IAC com-
ponents of the Defense Agencies and the JCS, for specific war plan-
ning.
The evolution of the role assigned to CIA in the field of
scientific intelligence is best understood if we first define the
gap in our intelligence that needs to be filled. High-level con-
sideration of the problem from 19L.6 on pinpointed one deficiency:
the lack of current and continuing facial informmation on what was
going on in the USSR. This definition of what was critically needed
was clearly expressed as late as 1950, when the ad hoc committee to
review the state of our atomic energy intelligence reported to the
NSC on 9 June 150 that the problem of providing adequate intelli-
gence on Soviet atomic energy activities is not separable from the
general problem of intelligence against the USSR. This clearly in-
dicated that the deficiency was in (ntelligence)collection rather
than in the ability to process information once it had been obtained
in raw form.
Concurrently, as the USSR became more clearly and more univer-
sally recognized as the target(of US defense and intelligence acti
ityl, it a:Lso became more obvious that espionage must be the chief
source of (current and ccontinuing ;factu information on what was go-
ing on in the USSR. Since CIA was given the mission of espionage
as a service of common concern, this threw upon CIA the main bur-
den of building up the flow of raw intelligence on the USSR.
Processed intelligence, the specific assignment of CSI, should
be viewed (in this context-)as a function, a channel of transmission
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between collection at one end and utilization in foreign-policy plan-
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ning, both diplomatic and military, at the other. The job that needed
to be done was in one respect more humble, and in another more com-
plex, than appears to have been recognized and accepted by OSI. Fur-
thermore, the area of CIA authority was more touchy and delicate than
in almost any other field. This is because, except for contributions
to national estimates, in which the finished product of OSI is the
raw material of ONE, the whole range of scientific intelligence is
within the sphere of competence and responsibility of the Defense Es-
tablishment and its . component) services.
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Historically the recognition of the need for_~apec?alists and
special skills in guiding the collection,,arrd carrying out the pro-
Technical Section within SI/,PASS in May, 1913. Its first job was 1
cessing of scientific intelligenegan with the creation of the
level processing, the screening and reviewing of `incoming')raw inter
rectives in response to customer needs. In this work it serviced 32
of the Government, mostly in the Armed Services
different e&nen ts
and including the Manhattan Project. It should be noted, however,
that the Technical Section was a sub-unit of a collecting branch,
and not a processing branch itself. There is no evidence that the
Research and Analysis Branch addressed itself particularly to the
field of science, t lough it did prepare such reports in response to
mil~V i&~~P ~ e121065` ~1 ~IA-1 E 8 9~ 0 ~91I?
ligence in preparation for sending such reports on to the customers
acies. It very soon took on the job of preparing collection di-
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The Technical Section, geared directly to the collection mis-
sion, was preserved in FSiio/SSU; became Special Division, Techno-
logical under OSO,CIG in Decanber, 1945, and has had uninterrupted
existence up to the present. It is now the Technological Guidance
Staff, and has six branches embracing the principal subject sub-
divisions of scientific intelligence" /
The other stream of inheritance to CIA in the field of scientific
intelligence was the Manhattan Project Foreign Intelligence Section,
was transferred to CIGs after an interval was placed in the Scientific
which, by arrangement between General Vandenberg and
Branch of CRE, later was placed, apparently very loosely, in OSO, and
finally became a component of CSI. Within its field of atomic energy
inteLLigeice, this group had a wide and. comprehensive charter, includ-
ing guiding collection, processing reports, making digests and esti-
mates, and arranging dissemination.
CSI, in simplest toms, came into existence because of the ex-
treme desire for current infon3nation on scientific progress in the
USSR. Its success, in the eyes of its customers, was to be measured
in the increase in the flow of such information. Because everyone
was agreed that espionage was the chief hope for such information
from such closely guarded areas of the world, OSCZ was the chief hope
for increased collection. However, other areas had lesser potentials
and were equally in need of guidance. These included Foreign Docu-
ments and Contact Divisions within CIA and overseas elements of State,
Army, Navy and Air. Ccnplex as the job of collation, digesting and
estimating by OSI may have been in prospect, it was secondary to the
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job of insuring that there would be something to collate.
In starting its job, OSI logsc asked itself two questions:
What do our customers want? What can our suppliers give? 0SI had
to have partial answers to both these questions in order to start
to work. But it also had to prove its capacity to produce in order
to win the confidence and respect of its clients and thereby dis-
pose them to supply the necessary answers. This is the dilemma that
has been with CIA from the beginning. The agency carne into exist-
ence as the junior partner with senior authority at least by statute.
But regardless of statute, as a practical. matter it had to earn its
position in the intelligence family. IWhere successful cooperation
has been achieved, it has been the result of the gradual develop-
ment of a:mutual exchange with benefits accruing to both partners. /
There is evidence that CSI started out expecting all doors to
be opened to it as a preliminary to its getting to work. This meant
on the one-hand complete details of the activities of the research
and development activities of the armed services and other elements
of government charged wd th the creation of new weapons and equip-
ment; on the other hand, complete details about the agents, con-
tacts, sources and operational activities of the intelligence col-
lecting offices and elements. By asking so much before offering
anything in return, QSI created an atmosphere of mistrust and stand-
offishness in many of the areas where close harmony was essential to
success.
A p'6O 9rS eR&M&eA }611 OFAODW'4-T504J9 5'Mr1 0
toughest
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assignment within the Agency. There is no question that it was in-
tended to be the clearinghouse and coordinating core of all scientific
intelligence. To persons with a background in the freemasonry of
science, the compartmentalization of the intelligence process must
present a maze of frustration. The distinction between the second
and third levels of scientific information within the Government,
as defined. above, was far from sharp and clear. Yet the second
level was as far as CSI was chartered to go, and when it appeared
to the Army or Navy that it intrude into the third level, sharp re-
sistance was inevitable.
When CSI came into the picture, the Technological Staff, QSf,
was growing to maturity in its function as a channel between consu-
mers and CSC field collection. It had its several branches for
atomic energy, biological warfare, etc., nd had recruited scientists
in these various special fields to provide competence in scientific
terminology and understanding. It also had intelligence personnel
of long experience who understood the methods and difficulties of
field collection and-had developed a close working relationship
with the geographic divi_si_ons which were in command of the field
stations. Thus the customers, in addressing collection directives
to CSC, come in direct contact with an el anent of CIA which under-
stood both the subject matter of science and the techniques and capa-
bilities of field collection. The function of translating between
these two fields was an essential one that was being performed more
and more adequately. So far as production of intelligence in 050
was concerned, the situation was progressing satisfactorily. The
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difficulty at this time and in this particular area lay in the fact
that espionage operations against the USSR were extremely difficult
and many years short of full and fruitful development. The total
take was inadequate to the needs of the customers, and in prospect
would continue so for some years.
The optimistic and unrealistic expectation for COI was that it
would stimulate a quick and substantial increase in this take, an ex-
pectation for which there was no basis in fact. The second expecta-
tion for OSI, more realistic, was that it would do for the entire
Agency, and indeed the entire intelligence community, .that 0SO's
Technological Staff was doing for OSO alone. OSI would guide and
collate the production, not only of OS03 but of Contact Division and
Foreign Documents Division within the agency and the collecting ele-
monts of the other IAC agencies. And with this total product flow-
ing through its hands, it would be able to assimilate and make es-
timates on a wider body of material and in turn provide more compre-
hensive guidance for subsequent collection.
The ;present estimate of the other TAC agencies as to the ef-
fectiveness of COI is unknown to me. There is some evidence, from
personal. contacts and strictly non-official, that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense still feels unable to get in touch with a part
of CIA which appears to them to be knowledgeable as to the whole
range of CIA scientific intelligence collection.
The ,present state of effectiveness of CSI in its relationship
to mv FOikeleisec OD$/ ~1O i)MA 041M 0 0' oving
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but with still room for much progress.
At one point in its career, OSI considered a project for the
preparation of background manuals for collection, to be carried out
by the Scientific Intelligence Committee, an undertaking of particu-
lar urgency and value from the viewpoint of collection. However,
according to OSI's own statement, this undertaking was "deferred by
pressure of higher priorities."
In guiding collection by Contact Division, there continues to
be an extreme urge on the part of OSI to operate by arranging con-
ferences between OSI personnel and original sources of information.
This as an expedient can and frequently does work satisfactorily.
But it tends to reduce coverage since it is limited by the avail-
ability of OSI personnel for travel about the US. If written require-
ments susceptible of effective fulfillment by contact specialists
throughout the US could be developed into more general use, it is ob-
vious that far wider coverage would result,44l One other factor worthy
of note is that Contact Division headquarters still maintains its
on liaison with the Air Material Command at Wright Field. It is
fairly obvious that the reason for this is that AX feels that Con-
_
tact Division headquarters is a more direct, informed and knowledge-
able channel to the point of actual fulfillment of their requirements
than GSI would be. The drawback is that ANC thereby activates the
collecting; capacity of ContactDivision alone, and loses the theoreti-
cal advantage of activating the collecting capacity of the entire in-
telligence community though OSI's broader control and liaison. How-
ever, the relationship and participation of CCD to any Agency-wide
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collection directive in the scientific field may also be pertinent
to this, and may result in what appears to the customer - in this
case AMC -- as still another middleman to add remoteness to the re-
lationship between customer and client.
In girding collection by 0SO, OSI has made substantial, strides
in the past year. Despite this, only a minor part of the scientific
collection in OSO' has the benefit of OSI guidance. From the OSO
viewpoint, one of the most valuable services that OSI could perform
would be to establish priorities for scientific collection, to the
point of a flat statement that information on uranium production was
more urgently needed than information on radar development. No such
statements of priorities have yet been forthcoming. Another serv-
ice of great value is the preparation of guides and questionnaires
which translate the abstruse topics of scientific importance into
the capabilities of field collectors whose knowledge of science is
at the lay, rather than the expert, level. One such guide was com-
pleted in October, 1951, after several months of cooperative en-
deavor. It was in the field of chemistry, directed at a specific
intelligence target, and worked out a long series of low-level in-
dicators., details that any alert laymen could observe and understand,
which, when reported, would provide the desired answers to the scien-
tific question posed. ';chile only one item in a large field, this
detailed guide was a milestone in the development in the relationship
of the two offices, since it successfully linked two unrelated types
of skill and knowledge into an effective team operation.
The entire above discussion doubtless regards the CSI mission as
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on a much lower plane than OSI' on definition. Certainly any con-
sideration that slights 0SI's mission of producing processed and co-
ordinated scientific intelligence is incomplete and unbalanced. How-
ever, there are certain elanents in the overall problem which justify
placing this mission as secondary in time even if not in importance:
1. From the customer's standpoint, the critical lack in US in-
telligence on scientific development in the USSR is in obtaining the
raw information rather than in interpreting it once it is obtained.
2. Scientific research as such is of no concern to CIA except
as it serves as a tool for obtaining current and continuing informa-
tion about the USSR.
3. Conclusions and estimates regarding scientific development
in the USSR can never be better or sounder than the raw material on
which they are based.
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