MARSHALL - DEWEY LETTER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 26, 2004
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 15, 1944
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9.pdf | 287.31 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
AvaiZ?cthie
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
Approved For Release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
r A ' 'dad hrovf !
a
First t.etfcr
TOP SECRET
;1o:
-. ut'int; the 2944 election c.unls.tign General Gcor,a;c C. M.lrshali
:+ tcrotctwoletters to Rcl?; ; Ii.anCandidate l'honaas 1 . Desccv, tell-
ing him that Army cryptic r.iplicrs had broken thc,j.,l,ane>c "ultra"
code. This fact was first revealed in a story by Lli is Editor Jolni-
Ciianibcrlain which appc.trcd in LIFE, Scpt. l.y. 1i.ar loll s pairlti,sc,
(hanihcd.tin wrote, was to forestall Dcwcy's rcvcl.i on of that fact
in .1 possible attack on the Rooscvelt adnunistr.uinr,', i,lp.u:c.c ;\)l-
icy before Pearl Harbor. The actual test of the letters ccnta:ncd sccrcc
until last week, when Gcncr.ti sl.arslutli appeared i%cforc the Con-
ressional comtnittCC investigating Pcarl H:arhor and made the lct-
t.rs public. They appear below.
Wlicn he had finished rc.iding the first two paragraphs of the iir'sr
1. t..:r, Governor Dcwey stopped because, as the Ch.enbcrl:un artrc:z
re futcd, "tltc lctrcr might possibly contain materi.:i whin, h......-
coti:c to him from other sourccs, and tan YS. IV, a .,t:diLi tc
,ir President teas in no position to make blind ;r r,tiscs. i;;ncr.:i
:g ar .hail sent the letter back :warn with ail inrro,du, tion tV uch rc-
I,:k-cd the -ovcrtior of hi rid ni cond it ions. This rime i)cwcv read the
Lt c and after much thought and discussion decide.! clot to make use
during the campaign of airy information he prcviotuiv had.
(FOR Mat. DLwi:v'S EYIS ONLY)
2. SCPr.cmhcr, 1944
hay Dear Governor:
I ant writing you \virluiut the knowledge of any other irrson CX-
cept Admiral King (who concurs) because we arc apprnachuifr a
grave dilcnuna in the political reactions of Confress rcgardtrug Pear!
Harbor.
What I have to tell you below is of such :a highly secret nature char
.eci coma ciied to ask you either to.aicept it in the basis of Your not
ti11 its contents to in)- other person and returning this
icttCr or nor reading any further .otd returning the lctrcr to the
1 sUCili d I.,vc preferred to talk to you in person but I could not dc-
visc a method char would not be subject to press and radio re.acuons
to why the Chief of St iff of the Army would he sccki ng an intcr-
:t,:sv With you at this p:trtictil.tr moment. Therefore, I have t u'ne1
..:c method of this letter, to be delivered hr hand to VOU by
o oncl Cartcr Clarke who has.hargc of the most secret doewnenu
oC the War and Navy Departments,
in brief, rite military, dilemma resulting from Congression.il Pulit-
al hattlcs of the political campaign is this:
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAO$
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Il,tfl,i I.tr'ant as fill rstta 1;tt:G
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Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
t)ON...r '?/.s,;;
s is
13asc.i can this, a correspor ling machine 'vas built o y us v: i
ciphers their messages.
chime tiic J,:pancsc arc using; for encoding their diplu::::.c rt.-.S,.
iiii, ."..C1~2:: t.1 the iap;&ilesc d1ploiliai ii. Co lnIilnteatim s. I. ,ve
ncrefore, 55-C po5:;css cif a wealth of Ill torniatIon re i'::rd ::'
moves in the Pat ;ic which in turn was furnished the St.:tc
no reference whatever to intentions towar l Hawaii ',ii the
nicss.;tic before Dec. 7, which did not ;each Our hands until
following day, Dcc. S.
I :c?nt-rather as Is popularly sul,.~K?c. tic
F,) V; r us With the information-but which unl >rr,ul:te;.
wi:a this business of deciphering their codes until vv,: :~?.,s c-s ;nII. r
ernes, Gcrnr.ua as well as Jap:icsc, but our main basis of :tli.,rn..in, n
re.:rding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained lroa,
Osiiinla'a messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with
and other onicials to the Japanese Goveriuncnc. Thcsc are still in r:e
codes iuvolvcd in tie Pearl Harbor events.
To explain further the critical nature of This sec-up which sv ;
be wiled out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were :uou-.c,l
regarding it, the Battle of the Coral Sea rwas based on lc::;!hic:i.i
niessag;cs and therefore our few ships were in the right :lace ..r the
;ht time. Further, we were able to concentrate or. our :ni:led
lorces to meet their advances on Midway viler, Oche:-w: sc we
certainly would have been sonic 3,000 miles out of place.
We had full information of the strength of their forces i? rha:..,i-
sou will understand from the foregoing the direr tragic curs,- I
qucnces if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor L111-
close to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of r':e vita!
vance and also of the smaller force direc:c.l against the
which iinally I:tndcu troops on Attu and K;ska.
Cperarions in the Pacific are largely guided by the infoiniarlie; 0
obi.iin of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in vatic;.o
garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing t...,,
and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet Iitoven;e
the movements of their convoys.
The heavy losses reported from time to time which tiuev su:a.:Iri ,y
reason of Our submarine action largely results from the filet slat 55r
know the sailing dates and the routes of their cnnvuys and can notify
our submarines to tic in wait at the proper point.
The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on
Jai .ulcz:
sliil-p;ng In Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timi::
on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which wet:
caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.
sources of informations we now possess.
The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have with drawn front
it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in port (105 ;t
necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dicuttcJ
that course is . vet more important today because our souses have
been greatly elaborated.
As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of iAln-
off: s ;scople the OSS wf, a tcTItn Ins r uiul t
se t iC J:ips use .nib tssy offices in i5 it tug it
w,M
Chan., ,c and though this occurred over ,, year ago, we h ve not ',,cc
axe::. bi?.: co break the new cote and have thus lost :ISIS my:au:iillc
.lot c finfo n . Ion, particular ly regardi g rile Euroyes i1.:.1000.
c.'c t speech in Congress by Rept c.::ntrve ~tioul,i
clearly site: est w the Japanese that we have h?een ~ea . t.,ei,s,
thoa ;h :var. Harness and the American pul,iie would
dray:.::: such conclusion.
conduct of General Eiscnhowcr's caa.paign and ail
.t lo:,. . f;i he Pacific are closely related in ccnccptio:i and troll., , .
the ,our-:..lion we secretly obtain through t;;CSc iluercepred c:;:'.
The c.;r:uihute greatly to tilt victory and tremendously to tmm s.;v-
Ins;, c-.calliivcs,bothin the conduct ofcurrent operItions:r.:J
in 1c: =.. ? coward the early terniinacion of :sic war.
1 .... .resenting this matter to you, for yoi,. secret ir,icrrna=loos, .,.
the .ape that you will sec your way clear l:a, - "')id the 'CA '11C resihi,
Wl tl. tvni cat we are now threatened in the hresee 1>olitiral can; n:u ~?n.
f noglit :odd th.tt the recent action of C:ot:o in rec,uirins- Ar:Iiv
and Nrvy invesUZations for action before t.:r:inn lots leas ,:0ni-
pel,c6 inc to hack the corps co:nt:...r.ler, General Gerow,
whose troops arc ig lirint; it Trier, to resti r ... whir d.c G,,;oats
arc counterattacking his forces there. '1 :: ....rover, ,Cry tumor
matter compared to the loss of our code in:orrnation.
.L r
., ., c.c.:s lids a rains
C1o:1d'; a:Id soaves.
in,o .u1sCc:tt Stor';, cisc
acts tS, ar,.l pr,tduce an I
is . cactlll sc11.~t the mcl
1.,c1:cthint;toso'
.oIimicr tiuiig to
Dustin'; ..;
CC ;sae's novel "'T'hey V
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Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500080005-9
Lli E'J /rEP0 T S CO:t'TiNUEa
Plcase return this letter by
bearer. I will hold it in my
secret file subject to your rcfcr-
cncc should you so desire.
Faithfully yours,
G. C. 1"11ARS11ALL
Second Letter
TOP SECRET
(Foe MR. DEwuv's LyLs ONLY)
2.7 September, 5944
My Dear Governor:
Colonel Ciarkc, my ritcsscn-
gcr to you of yesterday, Scpt.
16, has reported the result of
his delivery of my letter dated
Sept. 2.5. As I understand him
you (A) were unwilling to
commit yourself to any agree-
ment regarding not communi-
cating its contents to any other
person" in view of the fact that
you felt you already knew cer-
tain of the things probably re-
ferred to in the letter, as sug-
gested to you by seeing the
word "cryptograph," and (B)
you could not feel that such a
letter as this to a Presidential
candidate could have been ad-
dressed to you by an officer in
my posi ti on without the knowl-
edge of the President.
As to (A) above 1 am quite
willing to have you read what
comes hereafter with the un-
derstanding that you arc bound
not to communicate to any
ocher person any portions on
which you do not now have or
later receive factual knowledge
:o:;ii: ?: s Grit
..,.,.e,.c;,.Lc Angel
from some other source than
myself. As to (B) above you
have my word that neither the
Secretary of War nor the Pres-
ident has any intimation what-
soever that such a letter has
been addressed to you or that I
the preparation or sending of I
dens in Cli~ist-
lt Lo:ua.