THE 'ORDER OF BATTLE' PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000500030004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 20, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

. ,
ApprO4d For Rel
MEMO/UM:3M
SUBIZeTt, The "Order of Battle"' Problem
For the past rear1 a growing body of evidence has indicated that
long-standing conceptual and triethodological approach** to the Communist
Order of Battle in South Vietnam had led be a consistent understatement of
enemy litary and political strength. This new evidence was derived from
the wealth of captured documents acquired from enemy headquarters elements
overrun by Allied operations since 1966, supplemented by interrogations in
depth of numerous captives and defectors. Accordingly, our knowledge of
the organisation, composition, strength and roles of the various component*
of the Communist political-militazy forces has increased dramatically in the
past two years.
2. The intelligence corr.xnunity has sought to reconcile this new body
of evidence with the official order of battle holdings developed in Saigon by
3-2 MACY. Because of his greater access to the raw intelligence data, his
Larger analytical resources, and his direct command responsibility for
assessing Communist capabilities and strengths, the Washington community
had largely deferred to 3-2 MACV's analyses. In mid-1967, however, during
the preparation of NI E 14.3-67 ("Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for righting in South Vietnam"), the Washington community proposed an upward
revision of the strength figures in several, categories blued on the new evidence.
3-2 MACY countered with more conservative figures, and the strengths finally
published in the NEE represented a compromise pending further detailed
research on various aspects of the problem both in Saigon, and in Washington.
(3-2 MACV's previous holdings are listed in Column A in the attached table:
the agreed ME figures are listed in Column B.)
3. 3-2 MACY subsequently adjusted the agreed figures to omit the
spiv cad, their new figures tending toward the lower end of the scale. (Column
C in the attached table lists MACV's pre-Tet adjusted holdings.) These and
subsequent adjustments were rationalized on the basis of a systematic accounting
approach which deducts "known" enemy losses from the assessed strength of
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specific Communist units and force components. Since the Washington
community already had serious reservations concerning the eompletene of the
data base, it was felt that this bookkeeping methodology exacerbated the problem
of reconciling the new evidence with the officially "accepted" figures.
40. Our own detailed research in recent months on the various components
of the Communist force structure has led us to conclude that their strengths ?
before the Tet offensive -- were suhstaustially higher than mAcvitt holAiings.
(Column D in the attached table lists our strength estimates.) Since Tot, J`-_Z
MACV ha* inrther adjusted his holdings of enemy strengths to account for
reported Communist losses and allow for the belated acceptance of additional -
NVA troops which infiltrated into I Corps in December and January. (MACY',
currentadjusted holdings are listed in Cohens Zof the attached table.
5.. Our, continuing problems with MACY are partly methodological,
partly conceptual, and pertly philoeophicale MACY uses a series of tabulating
methodologies which require "hard evidence" reflecting multiple confirmation
before unite are "accepted" in the order of battle. Although such methods
ensure careful analysis at the working level, they do not produce best estimates
of an actual state of affairs and inevitably lag behind current reality. This has
been particularly true with regard to administrative service and guerrilla
strengths, where the evidence is admittedly less conclusive than for Main and
Local Force elements. Aa for the political infrastructure, our problem is to
some extent one of clumsy definitions which encompass more than hard core
leadership but exclude many full-time activists. Moreover, MACY is
adamantly opposed to any quantified estimate of "irregulars." The philosophical
problem derives from our desire to give the clearest possible picture of the
total enemy threat which frequently conflicts with MACV's desire to maximize
the appearance of operational progress and reluctance to acknowledge past
estimative errors.
b. A more immediate problem since the Tet offensive -- results
from MACV's deducting the entire reported Pah total from its military strength
holdings. Thus, even after "accepting" about 20,000 NVA troops, MACV's
strength figures were reduced by about 21,000. We have not yet adjusted our
pre-Tet estimate fox losses since 1 February because: (a) there is no clear
evidence permitting a break-out of the reported losses against the various
Eorce components, and (b) there is yet no evidence permitting a firm assessment
of the extent to which these losses have been offset by intensified recruiting
and increased infiltration. We feel strongly, however, that whatever KEA
figure ,is used -- and we have serious reservations regarding the reported
iigures -- it should be attrited against all enemy forces (i. e., the total
"Insurgency base"), and not against the select groups used by 2v1ACV.
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7. Our strength estimates, -which are being coordinated in the
Washington community do not reflect, for the most part, a real, increase in
Communist military strength-over recent months. Rather, they largely
represent adjustments to reflect armed components and personnel which have
existed but have been omitted from previous estimates. Most components
(excluding NVA and VC _Main Force elements) have actually declined soul
from peak strengths reached in 1966 because of subsequent loosen. We - -
believe these, figures represent a realistic assessment of current enemy
strength, and one which should be taken into account in our policies and plans.
An-admen
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C(iMPONENT
COMMUNIST sSECATi IN VIETNAM
A
MACV kloldins
B
AgreedNIE
C
MACV otdtni
30 Nov 61
I'vf air'. Force-
Local Force
116,552
119,000
114,77
-
? ,
.Administrative
Service s
25, 753
35-40,000
37,600
?
Guerrillas
112, 760
70_90,0002
ill. /00a?
Sub-Total
255, 06.5
244-249, 000
4,4
Self-Defense .1 3 Unquantified4
CIA Pre-Tot
Estimate
?
-
160, 000
75.l20,0006
?
?
E
MACV Post4ot..,
Bolding*
33,725
2
109-120, 000 47, 470'w r
1?nrixor
4 N a 4
VituluantifP34 100. 000 Ilactuaatilied
,
Political Cadre
39,175
75-1:15, 000
84.000
Total
294,240
299-334,000
307,477 .
? ? '??
S0-120,0009 84,000 -
515.600,000 4 488.126
NOTES: 1. Grouped guerrilla and self-defense components into ono category.
2. Includes guerrilla strength only.
3. Included with guerrillas.
4. Agreed that no figure would be listed, witb staterneit that 8011.1)fsiesto streniib: 641 roached
150,000 in mid-1966.
5. Difference bttween columns C arid D results from our inclusion Of identified unit, (22, 000)
inilltrated since November, plus 24,000 in specieiPlad eieroetsts not reliectecl /114Cre 11.91dirtig4
t#, :
6. Difference results from inclusion of numerous elements' it various ieveis'aof rao981:11-vid by
MACV's 11014i4o, ,
7' ii'vide"AcUtfalftif 9-Vii2E18 14iiheqr t3m514. 6' 6
0 . C 4-00499R0Q0 000 00 4-5 . ?
J ,
0`,,A` ? ? , ' E4WH-
RifTPT
1 a ?
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1. Evidence supports an order-of-magnitude est/mate of this size; wo believe this
increment, which suffers losses and plays a sigallicaut ?oleo, shoould be included
in the "insurgency base."
. Accumulating evidence tends to support the
higher end of this pe ad.
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se 2004/12/22 : CIA,RDP8440
ZONIareil
GACarver, Jr.
Th. "Order of Battle" Problem
- ?
This is the brief iturnmary' you respaset,ed
outlining our problem* With the Communist
Order oi Settle in Vietnam. This paper
has been coordinated vies the appropriate
elemante of DIAL
499R000500030004-
George A. CarVeit Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnagnese Affair*
Attachment
cc: DM!
D/OCI
DD/OR
D/01.4M V
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