COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT DRAFTS OF THE INTRODUCTORY NOTE AND TEXT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 14.3-67

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000500030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1967
• Content Type: MFR

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9 November 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Comments on the Current Drafts of the Introductory Note
and Text of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67
1. Having studied the Viet Cong manpower problem since early
1966, and discussed various drafts of NIE 14.3-67 for what seems almost
as long, I wish to make the following comments as a matter of permanent
record. They are my views and not necessarily those of my office.
The Introductory Note
2. The first paragraph of the current draft of the introductory
note to NIE 14.3-67 states that "our initial understanding of Communist
capabilities; in Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely" on GVN data, and that
Hour information has improved substantially in the past year. " Both
statements, although factually correct, are misleading because of facts
omitted.
3. While it is true that our first understanding of Communist
capabilities was derived from GVN data, we continued to rely on it well
past the initial phases of our military involvement in South Vietnam. By
mid-1962, the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam
exceeded 10, 000. The massive commitment of American infantry began
in March 1965. Yet:
a. The U.S. intelligence community conducted no
research on the size of the Viet Cong irregular structure
between early 1962 -- when MACV J-2 estimated there were
100, 000 guerrillas and militiamen -- and September 1966.
b. The U.S. intelligence community conducted no
research on the size of the Viet Cong political apparatus until
1a
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late 1966.
c. The U.S. intelligence community conducted only
rudimentary and incomplete research on the strength of the
Viet Cong military support structure before this year.
4. It is also factually accurate to say that "our information has
substantially improved in the past year. " It is a misleading statement
in that it tends to obscure the fact that the quantum improvement in
intelligence occurred not in 1967 but in the latter half of 1965 and during
1966, as U?S. forces began to capture large numbers of enemy documents.
Strength studies compiled in 1966 based on materials captured in 1965
and 1966 came to essentially the same conclusions as current strength
studies. In fact, since the earlier studies usually listed numbers higher
than those in the present NIE, they were probably closer to the truth. I
cite the following examples:
a. A "Draft Working Paper" (which I wrote) dated
8 September 1966, suggesting that the number of Viet Cong
irregulars carried in the MACV Order of Battle should be at
least doubled. * The paper was based on captured documents,
the latest of which was released on 29 July 1966.
b. An unpublished MACV study, the existence of which
was surfaced in Hawaii in February 1967, based almost entirely
on data of earlier years, which indicated there were 198, 000
Viet Cong irregulars -- 13, 000 more than carried in a draft
MACV study on irregulars dated 1 September 1967. The earlier
study is probably that more accurate.
c. An unpublished DDI study (which I wrote) suggesting
the number of Viet Cong irregulars in 1966 was between
250 - 300, 000. The study was completed in late 1966, and
contained 83 footnotes, most citing one or more captured documents,
the latest of which was published on 10 December 1966. The study
was never published, for the stated reason that MACV was itself
about to publish a study on irregulars. **
This memorandum prompted MACV to review its irregular holdings.
** As of this writing, MACV has not done so.
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d. An informal CIA study of January 1967 -- based on
1966 documents and population statistics -- estimating the Viet
Cong had 304, 000 irregulars as of August 1966. Shortly after
the completion of the study, a captured Viet Cong document
was published which indicated that the enemy had 330, 000
irregulars in early 1966.
e. A MACV study, the existence of which was surfaced
at Honolulu in February 1967, based on 1966 data, which
indicated the Viet Cong political infrastructure had some 90, 000
members.
Specific Comments on the Text
5. I believe the current draft of NIE 14.3-67 contains several
misleading passages, most of them having to do -- either directly or
indirectly -- with Viet Cong manpower. The passages are cited in the
following paragraphs.
6. Paragraph 25 of the NIE states that "we are reasonably
confident that the Communist Regular Forces in South Vietnam now total
about 118, 000 well-equipped troops. " Evidence is coming to light which
suggests that MACV has considerably underestimated the number of Viet
Cong local force troops, one of the two types of Communist regulars.
The evidence consists principally of documents and POW reports which
indicate that large numbers of small local force units have been omitted
from the OB altogether,
7. Paragraph 27 states that "we estimate that there are now at
least 35 - 40,000 administrative service troops in South Vietnam. . . . "
I believe the statement is essentially misleading despite the inclusion
of the words "at least, " which makes it technically accurate. My view
is that the evidence, both direct and inferential, could support a total of
administrative service troops of, perhaps, double the listed figure. The
first NIE draft, in fact, estimated that there were 75 - 100, 000 such
troops. This estimate was lowered in a later draft to 50 - 75, 000. A
subsequent draft lowered the estimate further to 40 - 60, 000. Still
another draft changed the estimate to "at least 35 - 40, 000, " followed
by the phrase that the number "could be considerably higher. 11 The phrase
was subsequently deleted. I feel the deletion was a mistake, since most
persons familiar with the problem believe the number of Viet Cong support
troops could, in fact, be much higher than 40, 000. One highly-placed MACV
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OB expert, for example, speculated in August 1967 that the table of
organization for the Viet Cong administrative service structure --
as currently defined -- could allow for as many as 100, 000 persons. ~F
8. Paragraph 30 contains a sentence which says that certain
VC documents which asserted there were 170 - 180, 000 guerrillas in
early 1966 were "almost certainly exaggerated. " Although I have seen
no direct evidence indicating that Viet Cong hamlet and village officials
falsify returns -- on the contrary, a long association with VC documents
convinces me that their personnel records are essentially honest -- it is
probable that certain VC functionaries, for self-aggrandizement, inflate
strength figures. ** While it is possible, therefore, that the 170 - 180, 000
figure is inflated, the extent of the exaggeration, if any, is far from clear.
Since I tend to accept VC personnel accounting procedures and their
definition of "guerrillas, " I feel that the exaggeration is probably not great.
9. The problems I have with the assertion that the 170, 000 - 180, 000
figures are "almost certainly exaggerated" bears directly on an estimate,
made later in paragraph 30 that the strength of guerrillas is now 70 - 90, 000.
Having spent several months over the last year studying guerrillas and having
had a part in persuading MACV to raise its guerrilla figure from 65, 000 in
September to the present range I do not feel that 90, 000 is realistic as the
range's upper and. The reason for my lack of confidence in the 90, 000
maximum is that I believe available evidence does not necessarily support
as sharp a dropoff in guerrilla strength as the NIE seems to indicate. In
viewing the questions, one can make a number of assumptions, of which
two follow:
a. First, that the strength listed in documents was not
exaggerated and that there were 170, 000 guerrillas in early 1966.
If this was so, and the current strength is 70 - 90, 000, then there
has been a decline in the number of guerrillas of from 47% to 59%.
The actual strength of such units would of course be below the TO/E
strength. The question, of course, is how much. Viet Cong infantry
units, for example, are believed to be. at about 70% of TO/E.
It can also be argued that some VC bureaucrats, to forestall hierarchical
calls for the upgrading of local manpower, deflate strength figures. A
COSVN-level document of early 1966 indicated that the competition for
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be Second, that the strength listed in the document was
exaggerated and that there were, say, 150, 000 guerrillas in
early 11966. If this was so, and the current strength is 70 .? 90, 000,
then there has been a decline in the number of guerrillas of from
40 - 53%.
10. Although the decline may have been this precipitous, there
is a body of evidence suggesting it was not. First, according to GVN
figures, the VC population base decline during approximately the same
period by only 311o;* and there is little evidence to demonstrate that the
Viet Cong are less efficient now than in early 1966 in the extracting
guerrillas from their population base. It can be argued, in fact, that they are
more efficient, since a disproportionately large number of people leaving
VC areas are children, old men, and old women, who are not normally
recruited as guerrillas. Second, Viet Cong documents suggest that since
late 1966 the Communists have been making major efforts to check the
decline in guerrilla, 'Strength, redress the balance between the regular
and irregular forces. The practical effect of such a decision, if carried
out, would be to lower the rate at which guerrillas are upgraded -- thus
cutting down on one of the major drains on guerrilla strength.
11. Finally, a recently published COSVN-level document, almost
certainly written in early 1967, opens the possibility that as of that date
the Viet Cong had some 150, 000 guerrillas. **The relevant passage in the
document is by no means straighforward and is certainly open to questions
of interpretation and of reliability. It states that the U.S. "pacification
plan failed because they could not annihilate 150, 000 guerrilla soldiers . . . "
Apparently a lesson plan for instruction to be given by a high-level political
staff officer, the document elsewhere exaggerates Allied losses (in common
with most other VC documents) and VC successes, and obviously contains
a large measure of VC propaganda. In this regard, however, the document.
resembles other VC documents which suggest a figure of 170 _ 180, 000
From 3, 35,8, 000 in December 1965 to 2, 312, 000 in August 1967.
Extrapolations from two VC documents, one which showed the VC
thought they controlled 5 million people in early 1966, and another
which suggested that they lost an additional 440, 000 in the second and
third quarters of the year, suggest that the present VC-controlled
population (using their criteria for control) is now in the neighborhood
of 3 1/2 million people: a decline, therefore, of 30% since early 1966.
MACV Translation Report 03-1499-67, 20 September 1967, page 10.
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guerrillas in early 1966. These documents are cited in, but not necessarily
accepted by, the NIE. Whatever its faults, I do not think this latest
document can be disregarded. My own opinion is that 150, 000 is plausible
as an estimate of the number of guerrillas in early 1967.
12. The in Saigon stated in a cable dated
3 November 1967 that he thought the upper end of the guerrilla range "should
be raised considerably on the high side. " On balance, I believe the maximum
number of guerrillas should be raised to at least 120, 000.
13. Paragraph 31 states that the number of members of the political
infrastructure is "large, " but refrains from making even a minimum estimate
of the infrastructure's overall size. A numerical estimate was foregone
partly because a MACV range of 75 - 85, 000 as the number of VC political
cadre in South Vietnam omitted large numbers of full-time Viet Cong civil
servants serving at district level and above. Although I would hesitate to
estimate the overall strength of the infrastructure, I believe the evidence
warrants a statement that there are .at least 100, 000. Most military and
civilian analysts who have worked on the size of the political infrastructure
would probably agree that there are at least this many.
14. Paragraph 35, which discusses the Viet Cong Assault Youths,
asserts that "little information is available to indicate .(their) strength or
distribution. . . . " Having written the first memorandum (unpublished) in
February 1967 calling the attention of the MACV Order of Battle branch to
the existence of the Assault Youths, and having kept watch on the evidence
concerning the Assault Youths since then, I believe it is unwarranted to
assert that there is only "little" evidence on their strength and whereabouts.
The amount of such evidence is substantial -- it includes several documents
from the COSVN Assault Youth Command, extensive records from Viet Cong
Region V, and a number of district and province Assault Youth rosters: not,
by any means, a complete picture, but one that is as good as that for other
types of Viet Cong organizations. The problem concerning the size of the
Assault Youth force is not a lack of information, but an absence of research.
15. Paragraph 36 states that "current evidence does not enable us to
estimate the present size of (the self defense and secret self defense forces,
among others) with . . . confidence. " While true, a similar assertion could
be made about any set of numbers concerning the Viet Cong. Estimates of
the size of these forces -- probably as good as other estimates made in the
NIE -- were put forward by MACV J-2 in a draft study dated September 1967.
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MACV then felt there were about 100, 000 in the self defense forces, and
20, 000 in the secret self defense forces. I see no analytical reason why
these estimates cannot be included in the current draft of the NIE, and
have little sympathy with the political reasons which apparently led to
their dismissal from the NIE,
16. Paragraph 39, and particularly Table 4 which supports
paragraph 39, are virtually meaningless, since they compute logistic
requirements for NVA and VC "regular" and "administrative support"
forces only. Neither the table nor the text makes any estimate of the
food consumed by guerrillas, political cadres, Assault Youths, or
civilian laborers serving away from home. Since they probably eat
as much per capita as the regulars and support troops, * since they may
number over 100, 000 (say,50, 000 political cadres, 30, 000 village
guerrillas, and 30, 000-odd Assault Youths and civilian laborers), and
since food accounts for 80% of the Communists' "daily logistical resupply
requirements, " their omission from logistical computations seems
difficult to understand. I am aware that the overall subject of Viet Gong
logistics is complex. I do not feel, however, that the subject is made
any more comprehensible by a table and text which discuss only those
materials and that food used by half of the Viet Cong organization.
17. Paragraph 55 asserts that the "average monthly recruitment
probably falls within the range of 3,.000 to 5, 000 men per month for the
Main Forces, the Local Forces and the guerrillas. " Those who have read
the evidence on which this assertion is based believe the range is
questionable. Work in progress on an in-depth CIA study suggests the
monthly recruitment rate may be in excess of the 3, 000 - 5, 000 range
used in the estimate.
General Comments on the Text
18. I see no reason to dwell at length on why I think the current
draft of the NIE is an inadequate piece of analytical work. I will make
four points, briefly.
Table 4 computes food requirements on the basis of 118, 000 "regulars"
and "35 - 40, 000" administrative service troops. If both categories are
on the low side, as is probable, the amount of food they consume is also
underestimated.
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19. First, the current draft is ill-formed and incoherent. Dis-
cussions of logistics, losses, and manpower are largely unrelated.
20. Second, the draft is less than candid. It conceals rather than
edifies, using such devices as the phrase "at least" to obscure the possible
existence of tens of thousands of Viet Cong soldiers. Too often, it attempts
to blame evidence as inadequate, when the fault is not in information but in
analysis.
21. Third, the draft is timid. Its history is one of attacks by
soldiers and politicians, and retreats by intelligence officials. Rather
than admit the extent of past underestimates of enemy strength, its authors'
hide behind disclaimers and refuse to add up numbers, while protesting
that it is inadvisable:. to make sums of apples and oranges.
22. Finally, it is unwise. Although it intimates that there are
"considerable" numbers besides the "at least 223, 000 - 248, 000" (listed
in paragraph 37), it does not come to grips with the probability that the
number of Viet Cong, as currently defined, is something over half a
million. Thus, it makes canyons of gaps, and encourages self delusion.
25X1
SAMUEL A. ADAMS
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
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Copies of the 9, November 1967 memorandum~
were distributed to the Office of the Deputy
Directorate of Intelligence and certain of its
subordinate components, td the Board of National
Estimates, and to the Special Assistant for
Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA). In distributing it,
I had the permission of SAVA, to whose office
I was then attached.
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 SECRET ({Then Filled In)
AREA ON COUNTfY(S)
DATE' July 75
DCI
CS
BACKGROUND statement on Samuel A. Adams = on (VC Order of Battle
"issues") -- 14 pages...ADMIN-INTERNAL USE ONLY.
ALSO HARPER' S May 1975 issue, article on "Vietnam Cover-Ups :play- LOCATION:
qar wwithh nuers" by Sam. Adams. (a conspiracy against its own HS/HC 890
A! TRACT
The background statemet is Adams' "rebuttal" to Agency's releasing him and
describes how he saw the whole picture.
Har er's_ article of May 75 goes into detail how Adams saw the picture ...with
ed tails and names of those he was in contact with during his 'struggle'.
Samuel Adams resigned June 73.
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4.65 2523 EDI?IONS PeEV10Uf (19.15)
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