THE HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CENTER THE EXPANSION PERIOD 1951 -1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000400080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 245
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1966
• Content Type: PAPER

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ISECRET.
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THE HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CENTER
The Expansion Period
1951 - 1966
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Office of Communications
Chapter III
The Expansion Period
1 July 1951 - 31 December 1966
THE HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CENTER
GRoil, 1
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THE HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CENTER, 1951 - 1966
Office of Communications
Signal Center
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GROUP I
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Foreword
The unceasing activity, highly efficient
operation, and Agency-integrated stature of today's
Signal Center belie its Topsy-like growth. So
little documented source material being available,
much of the following information had to be obtain-
ed from those longtime members of the component
who shared its growing pains.
Its presentation will stem from their first-
hand knowledge and experience in the work through-
out its transitional development. Accuracy has
been carefully preserved, notwithstanding an occa-
sional subjective quality in so personal a history.
In this comprehensive account of Signal
Center's everchanging activity, certain areas have
been brought into sharper focus; however, the over-
all viewpoint of the necessarily general record
scarcely does justice to the tremendous scope of
its functional responsibilities or achievement
during the 15 years, 1951-66, which it covers.
Virtually isolated by the very nature of
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S E C R E T
its highly sensitive and multi-faceted operation,
the Signal Center has evolved as a close-knit
"family" group -- a natural outcome of the empha-
sis on inviolable security.
Detailed descriptions of cryptographic
systems and machines have not been included in
this section. The reader, on a need--to-know
basis, is referred to the Communications Security
Staff for any details.
None of the many fine tributes paid to CIA
over the years has shown any understanding of the
silently efficient part played by the Signal Center
in their earning - this itself is a mute yet power-
ful tribute to this dedicated organization.
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Contents
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Background (1945-51). . . . . . . . . 1
Ii.
Organization, Mission and Functions . 4
A. .
1951-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
1. Office of the Chief, Signal
Center . . . . . . . . . .
6
2. Signal Center Officers. . .
10
a. Traffic Control
Section . . . . . . .
13
b. Statistics Section . .
15
c. CIA Cable Archives . .
17
3. Manual Cryptographic
Branch . . . . . . . . . .
18
4. Machine Cryptographic
Branch . . . . . . . . . .
22
5. Special Signal Center
Branch . . . . . . . . . .
27
6. Alternate Signal Center
Branch . . . . . . . . . .
28
7. CIA School of Cryptog-
raphy . . . . . . . . . . .
29
B.
1959-62 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
1. Office of the Chief, Signal
Center . . . . . . . .
35
2. Signal Center Staff . . . .
40
3. Signal Center Officers. . .
40
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Page
4. Primary Facilities
Branch . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. Washington Crypto Branch. . 42
6. Washington Terminal
Branch . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Special Signal Center
Branch . . . . . . . . 43
8. Alternate Signal Center
Branch . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. 1962-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Office of the Chief and Deputy
Chief, Signal Center . . . 49
2. Special Assistants. . . . . 50
3. Methods and Procedures
Staff . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4. Domestic Activities
Staff. . . . . . . . . . . 51
5. Manning and Training
Staff. . . . . . . . . . . 51
6. Signal Center Officers -
Communications Watch
Officers. . . . . . . . . 54
7. Signal Center Facilities. . 58
III. Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 60
IV. Operations - 1951-66. . . . . . . . 82
A. Equipment, Procedures,
Circuitry . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Vi
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Page
1. The Early Period -
1951-58. . . . . . . 82
2. The Beginning of the
Communications Revolution. 98
3. The Dawning of the Computer
Age. . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B. Message Volumes and Field Sta-
tions Supported . . . . . . . . ill
C. Message Accountability/Message
Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
D. Cable Dissemination Procedures . 142
1. Distribution of Cables. . . 142
2. Electrical Disseminations 148
3. "Hold Down" Traffic,
Restricted Handling. . . . 151
4. VIP Traffic . . . . . 153
5. Signal Center/Cable Secre-
tariat Relationships,
1952-66 . . . . . . . . . 154
E. Preliminary Disseminations,
Teletype Disseminations . . . . 156
F. "Q" Building Signal Center . . . 160
G. Teleconference Activity. . . . . 171
H. Teletapes, Electrical Dis-
patches . 175
I. Tripartite Alert System. . . . . 182
J. CRITIC Messages. . . . . . . . . 188
K. Move to Langley -- "Q" and "L"
Building Signal Centers . . . . 196
L. Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
M. Crises Periods . . . . . . . . . 211
N. ASCB/Emergency Communications. . 227
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Appendixes
Page
A. Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs, Signal
Centers, OC. . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
B. Signal Center Officers - Communi-
cations Watch Officers, Signal
Centers, OC . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
C. Index of Persons. . . . . . . . .250--251
D. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . .252-255
E. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . .256-261
F. Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . .2627:263
G. Attachments . . . . . . . . . . . . .26471271
H. Source References . . . . . . . . . . 272274
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THE HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CENTER
I. Background (1945-1951)
. The Headquarters Signal Center started
with a small residual nucleus of experienced
personnel from the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) which was terminated in September 1945.
Seemingly insignificant by today's standards,
the OSS Message Center played a very important
role in establishing the basic elements and modus
operandi necessary to the efficient operations
of a communications center designed to encipher,
decipher, transmit, receive, and distribute vol-
umes of classified messages. Though geared to a
less demanding period long since outdated, these
elements nevertheless provided a basic concept
upon which future communications centers could be
built. This small remnant then, actually laid
the foundation for future Signal Center (S/C)
operations.
The interim years were significant in that
continuity of communications service was provided
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during the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) transitional
periods.
Signal Center operations steadily increased
in scope from the time of the advent of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in September 1947 through
the next few years. The high degree of profession-
alism and expertise which was developed in encryption,
transmission, and processing techniques during the
early years enabled the S/C to support the tremen-
dous staff communications requirements levied upon
it after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in
1950.
The communications activity of CIA which
had operated for several years as a Division under
the Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO)
was upgraded as a result of the reorganization of
1951. Effective 1 July 1951 the Communications
Division of CIA was separated from the Office of
Special Operations (OSO) and was established as
the Office of Communications (OC). L/*
* See Attachment A
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The mission of the Office of Commu-
nications is to provide staff support to
the Director of Central Intelligence by
advising him on communications and elec-
tronic matters, to provide command and
administrative communications support by
the establishment and operation of signal
centers and electronic communications
facilities utilized in the transmission
of classified communications traffic, and
to support the clandestine services by
providing training, equipment and related
material to effect reliable and secure
agent communications.
To accomplish this mission, the
office maintains and operates a world-
wide network of communications stations
and field operational headquarters. 2/
As a result of the reorganization, the
Signal Center assumed a new and vital role in the
Office of Communications. The major significance
of this increased stature to the S/C was that it
would become responsible for providing complete
service to all components of the Agency and would
no longer be looked upon as the private "Western
Union" for the OSO.
The situation confronting the Signal Center
in July 1951 was viewed with considerable alarm
by many of its senior officers, and not without
justification. This was due to the fact that oper-
ations had been consistently maintained at peak
level since the outbreak of the Korean War, and
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S E C R E T
because the best available predictions all pointed
to indefinite continuation of sustained maximum
production. Too, notwithstanding increased man-
power and improved technology, there was logical
possibility that future operational demands imposed
on the S/C might well exceed its capabilities. Ac-
cordingly, in anticipation of present and future
demands for expanded S/C services, new plans were
formulated in great detail to bring about increased
personnel strength and grade structure, additional
floor space, and a wide variety of new equipment
and techniques.
II. Organization, Mission and Functions
A. 1951-59
The fundamental mission of the S/C was
the rapid processing of electrical communications.
It was responsible for the administrative and tech-
nical cable processing functions. The expanding
Central Intelligence Agency brought many new respon-
sibilities, and the cable volume increased rapidly.
The S/C functioned as a combined Communications
Center/Message Center until August 1952 when the
S E C R E T
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Cable Secretariat (C/S) was established. 3/*
Responsibility for typing, editing, reproducing,
and assigning distribution to incoming and outgoing
staff cables was transferred from the Office of
Communications to the Cable Secretariat. Thus
relieved of this administrative burden, the Signal
Center was able to concentrate its efforts on en-
ciphering, deciphering, transmitting, receiving,
and related communications functions. The S/C
continued to be responsible for reproducing and
distributing Special Intelligence (SI) and "Eyes
Only" cables.
A complete list of the Chiefs and their
Deputies controlling the Signal Center during the
fifteen year period covered by this study will be
found in Appendix A. Between 1951 and 1955, its
most crucial, shape-taking stage,
I
experience and expertise,
planned the
interdepartmental organization, laying the founda-
tion upon which the Signal Center was built. His
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was its guiding light. Drawing on his long
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own self-evident zeal and unflagging service served
as an exemplar to all who worked under him.
It was in this same 5-year period
that the Signal Center developed the nucleus of
its present day efficiency, by maximal utiliza-
tion of personnel capability and exploitation
of constantly updated equipment and production
techniques. This may be seen graphically in the
organization chart.*
Some indication of the Signal Center's
increased scope and productivity by 1955, as re-
flected in its organization, mission and functions
follows. 4/**
1. Office of the Chief, Signal Center
The Chief, Signal Center, was directly
responsible to the Director of Communications (DCO)
for its round-the-clock, 7-day week operation. His
direction of the S/C involved many and various func-
tions and obligations concerned with two broad cate-
gories: administration and operations.
* See Figure 1, p. 7
** See Attachment C
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SIGTZAL CENTER - 1P56
Chief/
Dep. Chief
Signal
Center
Signal
Center
Officer
Traffic
fl C
ontrol
Statistics 1
CIA Cable
Archives
Panual
Crypto
Branch
Manual
Cipher Sec.
ArSP.I =7 Seca
Projects Se
Aiachine
CC ip r Sec.
W re Sec.
Special
Signal
Center
Branch
I Alternate ~
+ Signal I
Center
B anch* - -J
Special Communications Annex
located in 4?dashinS-ton Area
(Q Bldg).
C)
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Among the Signal Center administrative
problems, he was charged with full responsibility to
implement for S/C use administrative directives ema-
nating from the DCO; to interview and employ person-
nel, subject to acceptance and clearance by CIA, for
the Washington and field Signal Centers; to review
fitness reports and recommend transfers, dismissals,
and promotions; to certify pay cards; to justify
overtime requirements as submitted by the Signal
Center Officers; to ensure on-the--job training of
personnel prior to their departure for overseas
S/C installations; to keep the domestic and over-
seas Signal Centers supplied with the necessary
personnel; and to adjudicate problems of personnel
in the Washington S/C, as well as field Signal
Centers, whenever possible.
His top-level operational respon-
sibilities were to implement operational direc-
tives pertaining to S/C operations from the DCO
and other offices of CIA; to assume responsibility
for cryptographic and registered materials; to
assist in the drafting and coordinating of proce-
dure guides dealing with cable writing and cable
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procedures for CIA; to conduct continuous lecture
courses in collaboration with Deputy Director
for Plans (DD/P) on cable writing procedures;
to provide teletype conference (Telecon) facil-
ities to those interested offices of CIA; to
establish criteria for the on-the-job training
of new personnel destined for duty in Washington
and the field; to ensure that adequate security
precautions were maintained at all times; to
make certain the Alternate Signal Center Branch
(ASCB) could promptly provide communications for
Headquarters on a world-wide basis in the event
normal Washington communications were disrupted
through enemy action or major civil or natural
disturbances; to ensure the overall efficient
operation of the S/C and ASCB; and to coordinate
with proper staffs and divisions the curriculum
of the cryptography school
The Chief, Signal Center, was a mem-
ber of the CIA Emergency Relocation Staff. Once
a month he joined the entourage to the relocation
site known as "the Rock." J
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In addition to his administrative
apd operational duties, the Chief was also respon-
sible for envisioning the future expansion of the
Signal Centers, in light of then known and fore-
seeable needs for space and equipment. During the
Expansion Period, plans were already being prepared
for the eventual move to the new Headquarters in
Langley, Virginia.
2. Signal Center Officers
Under the direction of the Chief,
Commo Specialists designated as Signal Center
Officers (SCO) maintained a continuous watch in
the S/C to ensure efficient operation. The SCO
staff consisted of five officers who rotated on
8-hour shifts around the clock. There was at
least one SCO on duty at all times in the S/C.
The SCO was responsible for the uninterrupted flow
of traffic through the various branches of the
Headquarters Signal Center. Each branch was head-
ed by a Branch Chief, directly responsible to the
SCO. A list of the Signal Center Officers of the
Expansion Period will he found in Appendix B.
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S E C R E T
The SCO's duties were to interpret
directives emanating from or passed through the
Chief, Signal Center, to distribute these direc-
tives throughout the branches of the S/C, and to
implement these directives into an established
S/C policy by the issuance of necessary operating
procedures; to maintain a log of all important
events occurring in the S/C and prepare a daily
report for the DCO via the Chief, S/C; to screen
all outgoing cables in order to ensure their cor-
rectness of format and cryptographic security and
to route them in accordance with existing Commu-
nications regulations; to authenticate and release
crypto and radnote cables and be responsible for
the distribution and delivery of same; to screen
all incoming cables for the purpose of alerting
specific divisions or individuals of required
action and ensuring the correctness of crypto-
graphic content, format, and routing; to initiate
immediate corrective action upon a disruption of,
the communications facilities of the Agency; to
keep ASCB informed of current procedures and
operations, and provide them with duplicate
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copies of pertinent SIC memoranda; to maintain
adequate personnel coverage and maximum efficiency
at all times; to prepare, evaluate, and/or review
fitness reports for all S/C personnel under his
jurisdiction, to recommend promotions as appro-
priate, to take disciplinary action when required,
and to authorize leave in case of emergency; to
make certain that all necessary security (physical,
operational, and cryptographic) precautions were
maintained by the branches of the S/C in order to
protect the sensitive worldwide operations of the
Agency; to maintain liaison, when necessary, with
OC and other offices of CIA dealing with operation-
al matters of concern to the S/C; to supervise the
compilation of the S/C Traffic Report for the DCO,
and for appropriate OC traffic analysts on a daily
and monthly basis; to direct Agency Telecons between
Headquarters and field stations using electronic
equipment in conducting such teleconferences; to
act as Communications Duty Officer during non-
organizational hours; also to act as Special Duty
Officer during non-organizational hours for the
sensitive cable traffic processed by the Special
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Signal Center Branch (SSCB), and to conduct
liaison with Agency officials concerned with this
sensitive traffic; to implement the S/C disaster
plan.(fire/air raid); to maintain Conelrad Watch
(Control of Electromagnetic Radiations); and to
personally process (encipher/decipher, distribute,
and deliver) cables of such great sensitivity that
distribution was limited to one or two individu-
als in the entire Agency.
The Support Staff of the Signal Cen-
ter officer consisted of the Traffic Control Sec-
tion and the Statistics Section.
a. Traffic Control Section
The Traffic Control Section
(TFCL) maintained accurate, permanent logs for
the accounting, referencing, and recording of all
incoming and outgoing cable traffic passed through
the S/C. This included assigning IN and OUT num-
bers, assigning check and message numbers to out-
going cables, and recording and routing relay
cables. The traffic logs furnished vital informa-
tion concerning each individual cable, assured a
complete picture of S/C cable traffic operations
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at all times, and showed at a glance the volume of
material handled. The logs served as a central
check point for the location of a cable in the S/C
at the precise moment in order to ascertain the
stage of processing, to facilitate servicing, and
to ensure against extreme delay in handling or
accidental loss of cables. High precedence cables
were flagged for expeditious handling and were
hand-carried throughout processing. Twice daily,
log checks were initiated to make certain that
messages had been handled in accordance with es-
tablished policies, (i.e., logging, enciphering,
deciphering, transmitting, etc.) and then mailed
to the addressee.
TFCL took care of service messages
from the field, and originated service messages
to the field dealing with garbled or mutilated
texts, incomplete messages, missing numbers, du-
plicate numbers, omissions, and other irregular-
ities. They initiated appropriate action on all
outstanding service messages to make certain the
field stations had complied with the requests and
that answers from the field station had been
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relayed to another field station whenever ne-
cessary. It was the responsibility of TFCL to
make certain that the appropriate distribution
center received notification of corrections imme-
diately upon receipt from the field. All service
messages and crypto cables were filed by TFCL.
b. Statistics Section
The Statistics Section compiled
and maintained operational data and related re-
cords on all stations within the CIA cryptographic
network. Each station file contained a historical
digest sheet, crypto/radnote cables of significant
importance, all operational memos from Commo Secu-
rity and/or operations, and memos from the field
station itself. In addition, each folder contained
a group count sheet showing monthly group counts
over the past year. These folders offered a com-
plete history of the station at an instant's notice,
and were considered an indispensible part of S/C
operations. Duplicate copies of all memoranda were
passed to ASCB for their files.
Crypto and radnote cables (in-
cluding technical service messages) were distributed
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only within OC. Each cable was carefully edited
by Statistics personnel; it was their task to
correct transmission errors, eliminate unneces-
sary repetitions, and certify the spelling of
unusual words or place names. After the cables
had been edited, distribution was assigned pur-
suant to existing regulations. The cable was
then typed on a ditto-master, sufficient copies
run off, and mailed to the addressee. Top secret
cables were controlled by receipt system.
The Statistics Section main-
tained continuing station files. S/C original
copies (including radnotes) were filed geograph-
ically by station number and retained for a period
of one month after which they were transferred to
CIA Cable Archives. Top secret S/C copies (in-
cluding radnotes) were filed separately by station
number and periodically forwarded to CIA Cable
Archives.
The Statistics Section assisted
in compiling the monthly load report from daily
traffic reports, and compiled the monthly station
report from IBM sheets forwarded by Office of
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Communications, Security (OC/S). These traffic
reports measured the overall operating capacity
of the S/C and were invaluable as a yardstick
for production figures. The Traffic Report con-
veyed the necessary information for determining
present and. future operational and personnel re-
quirements.
c. CIA Cable Archives
The purpose of the CIA Cable
Archives was to preserve by microfilming and
filing and make available for reference read-
ing, original copies of CIA cables transmitted
to and received from CIA field stations, includ-
ing lateral cables between CIA field stations.
The Archives maintained a file
of all original incoming and outgoing CIA cables,
separating them according to classification, sta-
tion, and special type categories. Top secret
cables which received limited CIA distribution
were segregated by station from cables of lower
classification. Technical OC cables (crypto) and
S/C service-type cables of a permanent nature were
segregated by station from all other cables.
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All original CIA cables were mi-
crofilmed in duplicate and an indexed file by reel
was maintained. The duplicate reel was dispatched
to ASCB for permanent storage. Each reel contain-
ed approximately 2,250 cables. These microfilmed
copies of cables were available to authorized CIA
personnel for reference reading on the microfilm
reader.
A file also was maintained by
classification and station on all original copies
of lateral (field-to-field) type cables pouched
to Headquarters form the various CIA field stations.
These were microfilmed and made available for re-
view by the appropriate foreign division as desired.
3. Manual Cryptographic Branch
The function of the Manual Crypto-
graphic Branch (MCB) was to encipher and decipher
cables to and from CIA field stations by manual
one-time pad (pencil and paper), strip system, and
AFSAM-7 (rotor machine) cryptographic systems. It
was imperative to simulate the manual cryptographic
traffic of the various agencies through which CIA
routed manual and AFSAM--7 crypto cables in order
T
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to camouflage the true identity of CIA as the
originator, thus protecting and maintaining the
high degree of CIA operational security. The MCB
kept and was accountable for all classified and
registered cryptographic documents and devices
transferred in and out of the Branch. An accurate
record was kept of all material currently in use,
and it was MCB's duty to notify the proper author-
ity when stocks of cryptographic material neared
depletion in order to assure adequate and timely
refills of such material.
Too, they were responsible for draft-
ing and implementing detailed manual cryptographic
operating procedures; maintaining files of all
periodic cryptographic changes; interpreting di-
rectives affecting MCB and fulfilling these direc-
tives consistent with operating procedures and
policies of the Branch; drafting condensed operat-
ing procedure outlines for the manual and AFSAM-7
cryptographic systems to serve as operational re-
ference guides and to coordinate these operating
procedures with the proper authority for compliance
with security regulations and for conformity with
S E C R E T
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the existing policies of OC. In addition, MCB
was to indicate to the proper authority all secu-
rity and procedural violations discovered in the
use of these systems; to note minor discrepancies
of field stations; and to recommend corrective
action when necessary.
One of MCB's most difficult and
important functions was to decipher, when possible,
garbled and badly mutilated messages (employing
highly technical communications methods), reducing
the need for retransmissions, thus speeding up
delivery of cables and saving the organization
unnecessary expenditures.
Included in the scope of CIA covert
operations were certain highly sensitive, clan-
destine field stations and individual agents which
demanded the ultimate in secrecy by participating
parties. In order to protect the unique security
aspects of these field stations and/or individual
agents, the Projects Section was established in
the S/C, thus providing separate encoding and de-
coding facilities for the processing of traffic
between Headquarters and the clandestine elements
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in the field.
The cryptographic systems employed
by this section varied from the routine manual
cryptographic systems employed by MCB to the
special, highly complex secret codes and ciphers
which required extensive knowledge of the art of
cryptography as well as a working knowledge of
the theory of cryptanalysis. The material sent
or received might have been transmitted in a
variety of foreign languages, necessitating the
ability of the Projects personnel to have at
least a working knowledge of one or more foreign
languages.
Incoming messages were usually
received in a badly mutilated condition due to
unique cryptographic procedures or systems and
complicated transmission means dictated by oper-
ational security. However, an attempt was made
to decipher all incoming cables, no matter how
badly mutilated and garbled, since it was not
always possible to secure a retransmission or
reencipherment.
Outgoing cables were very carefully
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and meticulously enciphered, so as to be absolutely
certain NO errors were committed which would com-
promise the field station or individual agent.
The Projects Section was responsible
only to the SCO for releasing material for trans-
mission. Accuracy and efficiency on the part of
the personnel of the Projects Section had to be at
its peak at all times in order to protect the vital
security interests of not only CIA, but the United
States as a whole.
4. Machine Cryptographic Branch
The Machine Cryptographic Branch
(TTYB) was a complex of machinery and devices
necessary for the huh of the Agency's network of
communications. These included several on--line
and off-line one-time tape machine cryptographic
systems. The Machine Branch utilized innumerable
routings and circuits, each to suit a particular
procedure. The routings and circuits were con-
stantly revised and changed, thus necessitating
frequent variations. TTYB was charged with the
responsibility for simulating traffic of the cover
agency over which CIA traffic was to be transmitted.
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The equipment could be interchanged to such an
extent that it was possible to contact any part
of the United States or the world by numerous
routing and relaying procedures over a wide
variety of circuits to suit any particular emer-
gency which might arise at any time.
The purpose of the Machine Crypto-
graphic Branch was to transmit and receive clas-
sified cables for CIA and other Government Agencies
on a world-wide basis, utilizing varied and com-
plex routings, and to ensure that these cables
were transmitted and received securely and as
expeditiously as possible. Wire liaison was main-
tained with the Chief Supervisors of wire rooms
at the Department of State, Department of the Army,
Department of the Navy, and the Department of the
Air Force in order to conform with their procedures.
It was also necessary to maintain wire liaison
with the Duty Officer, Office of Current Intelli-
gence (OCI), CIA; to conduct wire liaison with
the Signal Center, Office of Operations, Contacts
Division (00/CD), CIA, Washington, for the pur-
pose of maintaining proper communications coverage
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with all 00/CD field stations via ASCB; to main-
tain wire liaison with Western Union and the Bell
System (TWX) in order to determine the fastest and
most inexpensive routing to points where CIA might
send cables which could not be routed by military
means and to determine the proper routing on com-
mercial circuits. An accurate record of commercial
cables transmitted and received via Western Union
and TWX was kept for the purpose of checking monthly
charges for any discrepancies.
A daily wire and load report was
compiled which included traffic volumes, total
cables and groups transmitted and received on
each circuit, domestic and foreign. Also includ-
ed in these reports was the breakdown of the var-
ious manual and machine cryptographic systems
utilized.
The TTYB was also charged with im-
plementing various circuit (cryptographic and rout-
ing) changes as directed by the Chief, S/C; account-
ing for all registered cryptographic material within
the Branch and ensuring distribution of refills to
field stations before current supplies of crypto-
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graphic materials were exhausted; transferring
equipment (utilizing a switchboard patch system)
when circuits became inoperative due to equipment
malfunction or line troubles; and keeping a devi-
ation in procedure file on all machine crypto-
graphic field stations to consolidate minor pro-
cedural discrepancies so that if repeated discrep-
ancies occurred, OC/S could be notified to take
appropriate action.
They were further charged with com-
piling monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and annual
telecommunications engineering reports which in-
cluded summaries of originating traffic, sample
analysis of originating flow, and fixed Communica-
tions Directory.
No less important, TTYB activated
station-to-station (on-line) Telecons using a
secure machine cryptographic system between var-
ious government intelligence agencies as required,
and operated classified teleconferences with CIA
field. stations according to prearranged schedules.
Such use was limited to messages which justified
transmission by electrical means. In conjunction
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with the operation of the teleconference it was
necessary to maintain constant liaison with the
Radio control officer of the Department of the
Army, located in the Pentagon, to ensure continu-
ous service to and from the field. TTYB also acted
as a relay point for highly'classified, high pre-
cedence traffic to and from an overseas post for
other government agencies, such as Department of
State, National Security Agency (NSA), etc.,
and served as a relay point during emergency pe-
riods for transmission and reception of high pre-
cedence traffic from overseas points to various
government agencies when normal facilities abroad
were interrupted.
Very high precedence Communications
Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence
Sightings (CIRVIS) messages received over various
Defense Department Communications facilities orig-
inating from both domestic and foreign points were
immediately transmitted to the OCI Duty Officer
via an existing classified cryptographic link.
TTYB conducted weekly tests from
emergency sites to determine the feasibility of
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operation should an emergency arise, thus making
sure that the Agency's emergency wire communica-
tions facilities in the Washington area were oper-
ative.
An additional responsibility for TTYB
was to serve as a superencryption relay point for
the transmission of highly sensitive special proj-
ects traffic.
5. Special Signal Center Branch
The Special Signal Center Branch
was self-contained and was responsible for process-
ing especially sensitive traffic which required
strict compartmentation from regular traffic for
security reasons. Numerous special clearances
were required for all personnel assigned to SSCB.
The branch was off limits to all personnel except
those specifically cleared. Personnel of SSCB
logged, enciphered, deciphered, transmitted, re-
ceived, processed, and distributed cables falling
within the especially sensitive category. Plain
text copies of messages were NEVER viewed by un-
authorized personnel. Outgoing cables were hand-
carried by special couriers directly to SSCB;
S E C R E T
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WI
whenever special couriers were not available, SSCB
personnel personally delivered or picked up cables.
SSCB also served as a relay center between Special
Communications annexes in Washington and in the
field.
6. Alternate Signal Center Branch
The Alternate Signal Center Branch
25X1
was created in 1951 and located at
Its purpose was to
provide world-wide communications for Headquarters
in the event that normal Washington communications
were disrupted in time of war or civil uprising or
other disaster, and to encipher and decipher via
manual and machine cryptographic systems the OO/CD
classified traffic to and from domestic stations
for which they were in contact.
In virtual parallel with Headquarters
S/C, though working quite independently, ASCB car-
ried out similar operations. They maintained a 24-
hour day, 7-day week operating schedule, reporting
directly to the Chief, Headquarters S/C on the op-
erational aspects of the branch; maintained an
25X1
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administrative structure of the personnel assigned
to them, reporting
aspects involved; operated circuits in transmitting
and receiving traffic for 00/CD; ran tests on emer-
gency teletype circuits at various times in order
to prepare, such circuits for workability in case
the need arose; maintained a duplicate of opera-
tional files and preserved a storage file on the
microfilm reels of cable archives forwarded from
Headquarters, S/C; kept a ready file of emergency
cryptographic material on a world-wide basis;
activated any emergency teletype circuit for which
equipment was available as directed by the Chief,
Headquarters S/C. ASCB held duplicates of all
station dossiers and statistics files so that any
disruption of Washington S/C would not affect the
overall communications picture.
7. CIA School of Cryptography
The CIA School of Cryptography was
25X1
The instructor staff for the school was supplied
originally by the Army Security Agency (ASA) and
the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFASA). By the
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25X1
mid-1950's there was a predominance of S/C
personnel as instructors. In addition, the S/C
conducted necessary liaison in order to
keep the school advised of changes in S/C operating
procedures.
Except for expansion, the basic
organization of the Signal Center changed little
during the next few years. The departmental re-
sponsibility for the various phases of the work
remained essentially the same.
succeeded Mr.
25X1 s Chief of the Signal Center, serving from
July 1957 to June 1959. He soon found the "Commu-
nication hub" of the intelligence world inundated
by fast-recurring crisis situations.
25X1
recalls that
expressed amaze-
ment at the long hours and the tedious but diligent
performance of the Signal Center, claiming it to
be unbelievable and incomparable.
The majority of stations in the Mid-
dle East and in South America areas were one-time
pad (OTP), making it an almost impossible chore
25X1
25X1
25X1
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to process the large amount of multiple address
intelligence reports being filed daily to these
areas. It was by
persistence with
Communications Security (COMSEC) that the Signal
Center was aided by a large multiple pad system
(one which was a 16-way) to facilitate the handling
of the large and constant growing volume of these
reports.
also found himself rer-
sponsible for the establishment and management of
the "Q" Building Communications Center. SI traffic
had increased to the point that all government facil-
ities in the Communications Intelligence (COMINT)
field required complete revamping. President
Eisenhower's request for vast improvement in the
method of dealing with Critical Intelligence (CRITIC)
also resulted in complete upgrading of the COMINT
networks. NSA was the Agency chartered and resourc-
ed for the improved media, and consequently provided
both the equipment and installation for the first
on-line cryptographic machine. The KW-26 operation
at "Q" Building became a popular attraction to a
host of officials. 1
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The volume and scope of operations
increased during
tenure of duty; how-
?ever, there was no significant change in overall
Signal Center organization. He did, however, in-
stitute the policy which eliminated all scheduled
overtime, which led to the initiation of a variety
of unprecedented schedules with staggered work
weeks.
B. 1959-62
was Chief of the
Signal Center from September 1959 to May 1962,
.during which time he was instrumental in its
reorganization on a trial basis, the aims of
which are described in Attachment D.
D
served during the era of drastic change brought
about by the advent of the KW-26, allocated cir-
cuitry and development of the Agency's on-line
network which was given the name AXANET. With
the intense desire to gain the maximum usefulness
from the resources at his disposal, he endeavored
to modify whatever-careful analysis proved nec-
essary for increased effectiveness. He was in-
strumental in changing the internal cable format
25X1
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procedures so that cables, as received, could be
distributed to the addressee and others concerned
in an acceptable form with minimal processing.
Another really important change came in
1960, when the Headquarters Signal Center finally
obtained the necessary sanctions to operate as an
"all source" communications center. Prodigious
effort went into negotiating the multitude of
security policies and procedures governing the
handling of SI information to achieve this sorely
needed status. Priority was first given to the
integration of every category of traffic, person-
nel, and facilities into one harmonious system,
thus establishing a self-contained CIA network.
A completely unique innovation, this character
continues to distinguish CIA as the only communi-
cations facility with full capability for handling
all types of traffic. 7/
"three team" concept to the Signal Center. This
innovation required each team to be so similarly
structured that they could function in all aspects
as separate entities. The overall objective was
S E C R E T
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to establish an esprit de corps so that each
shift would operate naturally as a self-support-
ing cohesive unit which would enhance the overall
operational efficiency and effectiveness.
also established an operational
staff structure with functions not only to admin-
ister to the complete needs of the Headquarters
Signal Center, but actively to engage in the pro-
cedural discipline for the world-wide staff Commu-
nication network. V*
I (Staff Communications Security)
0
(Communications Instructions for Use
within AXANET) were progenital legacies of this
staff structure. Responsibility was subsequently
transferred to the Office of Communications, Tele-
communications (OC-T) when their Systems Operations
Branch was activated. Additionally, the first
Agency document for standard procedures in the
operation of the new electronic KW-26 crypto sys-
tem was written by S/C personnel.
During the period between 1959 and 1962
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much time was spent in planning the move to the
new building. This included foreseeing and pro-
viding for the difficult task of running separate
facilities in both "L" Building and the new build-
ing until all functions could be phased out of
the former. The transition proceeded smoothly
and without interruption in communication services
until it culminated on 10 March 1962, just prior
to the end of tour as Chief, Signal
Center. Operational adjustment to the new Signal
Center went extremely well notwithstanding the
fact that the new Signal Center facilities and
operational methods were significantly different
from the old. The Signal Center structure in the
new building is depicted in the Organization Chart
of 1962.*
1. Office of the Chief, Signal Center
Responsibility for the overall ad-
ministrative and operational control of the S/C
rested with the Chief. His duties and respon-
sibilities remained essentially the same as pre-
viously noted. He was responsible on a 24-hour
* See Figure 2, p. 36
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Primary
Facilities
Branch
rFac. Control'
Se c.%
Link Sews
Sec.'
Relay Sec.
FW~ashington
Crypto
Branch
ILa, chine Sys.'
Sec.
Sys .
(nl
Sec
SIGNAL CENT -- 1962
Chief/
Dep. Chief
Signal
Centers
L- I
Signal
Center Off.
Deputy SCO
Washington
Terminal
Branch
1Plain Text i ,j
Teletape Sec;
'Tfc. Control
J
Archives
Sec. ;
Signal
Center
Staff
Special
Signal
Center
Branch
Ext. Dissen.,
Sec.
Int. Dissem.
Sec.
I. Sec.
~\ 1
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Alternate
Signal
Center
Branch*
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day, 7-day-a-'week basis for the enciphering,
deciphering, receiving, and transmitting of all
classified electrical communications passing
between Washington Headquarters and CIA field
stations, and between stations not having lateral
facilities. In addition, the Headquarters Signal
Centers were responsible for providing crypto-
graphic and electrical transmission services for
passing Special Intelligence communications between
CIA and other members of the local intelligence
community.
The Chief, Signal Center, managed
the overall operation of the S/C and kept the DCO
advised on all matters of interest. He undertook
special projects and assignments as required and
directed by the DCO.
The Chief was charged with the re-
sponsibility to monitor and review administrative,
procedural, and policy practices as they pertained
to SIC administration to ensure conformance to
OC policies and practices. He evaluated trends
and made recommendations for changes in S/C tele-
communications, policy making, procedures, and
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S E C R E T
equipment to cope with and provide more rapid and
greater expanded traffic service.
It was the duty of the Chief to
coordinate and provide staff guidance on general
S/C planning and overall operation. He represented
the S/C on operational, technical, and engineering
details with other OC officials for effective and
efficient Headquarters installation and planning;
conducted reviews relative to equipments and re-
commended the necessary equipment programming in
order to fulfill the Headquarters S/C support re-
quirements as projected from one fiscal year to
another; devised and recommended appropriate equip-
ment arrangements, circuit activations, installa-
tions, and initiated all necessary follow-up control
actions to ensure that these methods were clearly
defined to operational personnel; reviewed the
general S/C programs in order to identify and ad-
vise appropriate OC elements on network and circuit
capacity, Agency programs, traffic trends, and
changing conditions which affected the overall
operational support requirements; provided imme-
diate guidance on circuit matters, directing
38 -
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routing alternatives within the purview of Head-
quarters network control; and provided technical
assistance to other OC components based on actual
S/C experience regarding equipment feasibility and
circuit planning as required and/or requested.
The Chief maintained close liaison
with the C/S and appropriate CIA "watch" personnel
on all matters pertaining to traffic; and conducted
continuing liaison with Agency operated components
relating to S/C traffic, particularly on special
projects traffic.
The Chief planned and directed the
Headquarters S/C training program which was designed
to indoctrinate and instruct new employees, over--
seas returnees, and contingency personnel in spec-.
ialized procedures, to provide on-the-job training
in standard circuit and operating methods and in
testing and operating newly developed equipments;
and to provide general proficiency training in the
overall S/C structure and operation. He supported
both staff and special intelligence S/C communica-
tions training requirements.
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2. Signal Center Staff
The Signal Center Staff was respon-
sible for the writing of procedures, manning sched-
ules, training programs, equipment and planning
programs, crypto planning, and statistics. The
staff also was the focal body for liaison and all
coordination.
3. Signal Center Officers
The SCO maintained the operation of
the S/C on a 24-hour day, 7-day-a-week basis as
previously described. He compiled and maintained
schedules in order to ensure thorough coverage at
all times by shifting personnel between branches
and by calling to duty any available personnel
when needed. In this connection, the SCO prepared
advance overtime estimates and requirements for
weekends, holidays, and emergencies, and audited
and controlled amounts of overtime allotted on
the basis of past, present, and anticipated work-
load.
The SCO reported to the Chief, S/C
as required, on security and operational matters
within the S/C, and proposed constructive changes,
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if necessary, to existing procedures and direc-
tives governing S/C operations.
It was the responsibility of the SCO
to maintain the necessary security precautions
which always must be considered in order to pro-
tect the highly classified cryptographic and tele-
graphic systems and procedures used by the Agency.
All outgoing cables were released
by the SCO, and he reviewed all incoming traffic.
Some cables came through the S/C which did not
receive Commo distribution; the SCO supported
the DCO by pulling copies of anything that he
considered of a communications interest to the
DCO.
One of the duties of the SCO was
to manage all "restricted handling" cables. When
the volume increased beyond his control, the re-
sponsibility was directed to the senior section
supervisors.
A primary responsibility of the SCO
was to coordinate the activities of the S/C branches
to ensure that related procedures were properly
implemented and to assure effective and expedi-
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tious handling of traffic.
4. Primary Facilities Branch
The Primary Facilities Branch, which
evolved from the Machine Crypto Branch, was the
hub of all circuitry coming in and going out of
the S/C. This included on-line and unclassified
external circuitry.
Three sections comprised the Primary
Facilities Branch. The Facility Control Section
ensured quality control of equipment and circuitry.
The Link Security Section was responsible for the
encryption and decryption of traffic, using the
KW-26. The Relay Section was responsible for torn
tape relay of classified clear text traffic for
both internal and external circuitry.
5. Washington Crypto Branch
The Washington Crypto Branch handled
all off-line cable processing. The Machine Systems
Section had as its responsibility the enciphering
of traffic on the TEL-7 and the OTT, both off-line
systems. The Manual Systems Section enciphered
traffic in OTP, both literal and numerical.
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6. Washington Terminal Branch
The Washington Terminal Branch was
responsible for the processing of originated (OUT)
and terminated (IN) staff messages. The Plain
Text and Teletape Section managed the incoming
delivery for staff traffic plus the processing
of teletapes. Traffic Control Section performed
the same functions as previously described.*
The Archives Section continued the microfilming
and filing of CIA cables. In 1963 the Archives
Section was transferred to the Cable Secretariat.
7. Special Signal Center Branch
The Special Signal Center Branch was
responsible for processing SI, COMINT, and Elec-
tronic Intelligence (ELINT) traffic. It was seg-
regated from other S/C operating facilities due
to policy regulations for handling and processing
SI traffic. SSCB consisted of three sections.
The External Dissemination Section took charge
of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
Broadcast. The Internal Dissemination Section
* See pp. 13-15 preceding
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was responsible for handling all traffic on the
internal Langley Building circuits. Distribution
was assigned and messages were electrically dis-
seminated to Foreign Intelligence Division D (FI/D),
OCI, and others. The SI Traffic and Message Con-
trol Section were charged with the processing of
SI originated and terminated messages.
8. Alternate Signal Center Branch
Procedures and operations followed
in ASCB remained the same as previously described.*
C. 1962-66
in May 1962. From then until August 1962 Mr.
acted as Chief, Signal Center.
replacing
tered on duty in August 1962.
during
his brief tenure of duty (August 1962 to October
1962) established a Task Force for the purpose of
studying various means to update operations and
procedures. The Task Force consisted of Messrs.
The thorough study made by these
* See pp. 28-29 preceding
25X1
25X1
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members was completed in October 1962, prior to
departure, and they submitted rec-
ommendations for revamping structure and procedures.
These may be reviewed in a memorandum for Chief,
Signal Centers, OC.*
From the time
left in May 1962
(during the brief tenures of
Acting Chief and
as Chief)
assumed the duty of Deputy Chief, Signal
Center. Disarmingly easygoing by nature, his broad
firsthand experience of the work and the overall
know-how facilitated the smooth, uninterrupted con-
tinuity during the transitional period in both per-
sonnel administration and coordinated operations.
A sincere and dedicated worker through the years,
he had long enjoyed the esteem of his colleagues.
In his new capacity of greater responsibility he
readily obtained willing cooperation from all un-
der his control, generating an increasing sense
of involvement during the decisive period leading
to and embracing the Cuban Missile Crisis.
* See Attachment F
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25X1
25X1
25X1
became Chief,
Signal Center, on 22 October 1962. Prepared by
almost two decades of diverse duty in Headquarters
and assignments overseas,
call on a richly varied background knowledge in
facing a soon-to-be uniquely challenging respon-
sibility. His naturally placid manner provided
a well-anchored foundation during the immediately
subsequent changeover to computerization. The
very nature and unremitting urgency of Signal Center
operations called for planning ability of an ex-
tremely high and almost intuitive order, which,
coupled with
innate capacity for re-
silience under pressure, smoothed out what could
have been a most nerve-racking transition for all
concerned. Undemonstrative in manner, he worked
with quiet and unflagging dedication which has set
a consistently challenging but demonstrably attain-
able standard, clearly reflected by all under his
direction.
tenure of duty was destined
to become the most difficult and trying period in
the history of S/C operations. This was due to
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the advent of the technological explosion and com-
munications revolution with its introduction of
new and more complex communications systems and
the dawning of the computer age and evolution of
second/third generation computer systems.
The operational staff structure was
firmly effected late in 1962. Some of the signif-
icant changes are noted in a memorandum from the
Chief, Signal Centers, OC.*
The period from 1962 through 1966 saw
further changes in the S/C organization. These
are shown in the chart of 1966.** The greatest
impact on the position of Chief, S/C, was in the
planning field. Plans for the installation and
implementation for the automation of S/C facil-
ities and implementation of entirely new commu-
nications systems in Secure Data, Graphics, and
Voice Field were completed during this period.
Additionally, plans were completed and portions
of the plan implemented to organize a
* See Attachment G
** See Figure 3, p. 48
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S IGi IAL CLI ITr -- 1966
Chief/
Dep. Chief
Signal
Centers
Special
Assistants
tethods &
Pro cedin^es
Staff
WA SHfl ETON
T;2I' : f:A L
FI C II, ITY
I
Off-
Line
Crypto
Sec.
Cormmo Wat ch
Officer/
Dep. CWO
CUTGOB G
WIASHIPTGTON
TE IIT;AL
F.LC U.ITY
Domestic
Activities
Staff
SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES
FACILITY
7th Fl.
OP -
Center
PR II? RY
FACILITY
Manning &
Training
Staff
F` Cent .
Sec.
=On-Lec
Relay
Sec.
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pulling together
the many widely scattered domestic field activities
and stations under one "area chief."
1. Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief,
Signal Center
Most of the specific duties and respon-
sibilities of the Chief, S/C, and his deputy remained
basically the same with the exception that the S/C
became involved with the planning and introduction
of new communications systems and was given the added.
responsibility for the operation of the domestic
field stations. The latter was the beginning of an
attempt to centralize responsibility for the opera-
tion of communications facilities of the domestic
stations
Hereto-
fore these had been administered by several dif-
ferent OC components. By the end of April 1965
the S/C had accepted responsibility for 22 stations.
* See Attachment H
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2. Special Assistants
. Late in 1966 a Special Assistant for
Plans and Automation was established in the Signal
was designated this
responsibility which included the preparation of
plans for the introduction of new equipments to
the S/C and the participation with other components
of OC in the presentation of operational plans for
automating the Headquarters Signal Center torn tape
relay facility and various terminal facility func-
tions.
During the latter months of 1966 a
Special Assistant for Engineering,
was assigned to the S/C. His duties were
to coordinate the planning for new equipment and
automation with office of Communications, Engineer-
ing (OC/E) from a technical standpoint.
3. Methods and Procedures Staff
The Signal Center Staff was renamed
Methods and Procedures Staff. It performed basi-
cally the same functions as before * with the ex-
* See p. 40 preceding
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ception that more time was devoted during this
period to automation and new communications sys-
tems planning. By the end of 1966 a new Plans
and Automation Staff was on the drawing board,
assuming the responsibility for all programming,
budgeting, and planning for the SIC.
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5. Manning and Training Staff
The Manning and Training Staff under
the direction of
initiated, 25X1
acted upon, and monitored each Communications Tech-
nician/Cryptographer (CT/C) in his career growth
and development within OC. The Manning and Train-
ing (M&T) Officer was responsible directly to the
Chief, S/C.
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The M&T Officer reviewed the folders
supplied by the Office of Personnel and Office of
Communications-Administration on all prospective
employees. He assessed and selected individuals
for pre-employment interviews. After the inter-
views he judged the candidates to determine wheth-
er they met CIA's code of conduct standards and
whether they were qualified in experience and
training to become a CT/C.
After specialized training for new
employees
the M&T Officer supervised the
individual's post-training before assignment to
a working position. He had two training officers
who were responsible for all types of training.
The M&T Officer initiated and con-
trolled all administrative "green sheets" for the
assignment of personnel to overseas stations and
to Special Projects Activities. Upon an individ-
ual's departure to or return from an overseas posi-
tion, the M&T Officer was responsible for the as-
sessment of the individual's skills, and planned
for his training and retraining as needed prior
to a new assignment.
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The M&T Officer assigned and main-
tained distribution and balance of personnel for
the three SIC operating shifts through the GS-11
level to ensure adequate staffing to meet opera-
tional requirements throughout a work week. He
was further responsible for providing administra-
tive personnel listings to the CT/C Career Panel
for action on all promotions through the GS--ll
An added responsibility of the M&T
Officer was the training and maintenance of a
contingency work force of about forty people
drawn from various other Communications offices
to supplement the Headquarters SIC personnel in
the event of an emergency, and to ensure that
there would be a sufficient working force to man
ASCB in the event of a disaster.
The M&T Officer arranged for all
CT/C interviews for transfer of an individual
from Communications to another component of the
Agency, or for individual termination of services.
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6. Signal Center Officers -
Communications Watch Officers
The Signal Center Officer had the
continuing responsibility for the coordination
and implementation of all communications func-
tions, including personnel, communications se-
curity, engineering, training, circuits, and all
aspects of support to the operating elements of
CIA. Additional responsibilities were placed on
the SCO with the ever-expanding activity of the
Agency.
In a memorandum for the Deputy
Directors, Plans, Intelligence, and Research thru
the Deputy Director, Support, it was made known
that the SCO was available at all hours outside
of normal duty hours as a reference point for all
matters requiring OC action and could provide in-
formation concerning the communications situation,
circuit conditions, and traffic flow around the
world. 10/*
In June 1965 additional equipment
* See Attachment I
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and circuitry was installed in the newly created
CIA Operations Center (OPSCEN) to provide Telecon
facilities with overseas DD/P stations which had
Telecon capability. Circuitry was also available
to provide for electrical delivery of messages from
a DD/P field station to the OPSCEN when required
in a crisis situation. A 24-hour pneumatic tube
connected OPSCEN with the C/S and S/C for the pur-
pose of filing outgoing messages to the intelligence
community or DD/P field stations. 11/*
The DCO requested that the SCO obtain
all the information possible about a crisis situa-
tion when it occurred. The SCO accumulated Agency
and Non-Agency cables concerning the crisis and
checked with the CIA Watch Officer for any addi-
tional information. The area staff chief of the
Operations Division, Office of Communications,
(OC/O) was immediately alerted when a crisis
occurred so that he could come to the office of
the SCO to screen all the information available
and be advised of any action taken to provide
* See Attachment J
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communications support.
Cables which required "extremely sen-
sitive handling" were brought directly to the Chief,
S/C, or the SCO. In those special cases, the SCO
assumed the responsibility of clearing the outgoing
cable through the C/S. Such cables were restricted
to one senior operator to be enciphered in the ap-
propriate off-line system. Procedures necessarily
differed for each particular circumstance and sta-
tion, and there was no substitute for the good judg-
ment which the SCO exercised in each particular in-
stance.
Many cables required very delicate
handling and were treated in a highly restrictive
manner and without further discussion. In spite
of all the sensitive material channeled through
the S/C there NEVER has been one known security
leak.
In October 1965 the Signal Center
Officer title was changed to Communications Watch
Officer (CWO) .
The CIA Operations Center was opera-
tive round-the-clock. The Clandestine Services
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Duty Officer (CS/DO) was responsible for reviewing
cables for the DD/P and ensuring that appropriate
action was taken. He provided assistance to the
Operations Center Senior Duty Officer (SDO) by
providing information in response to requests.
The CWO maintained liaison with the CS/DO on all
communications matters and was the point of con-
tact during other than normal working hours.
At the request of the DCO, the CWO
established contact with OPSCEN whenever there
was a political or communications crisis in order
to determine whether or not there was collateral
information available on a situation which might
influence the CWO in his actions. It was essen-
tial that he be alert in obtaining maximum infor-
mation on any unusual problem and then communicate
this to the appropriate people. When there was
information to be passed on, the CWO contacted the
appropriate Commo Ops Division who in turn was
responsible for notifying other officials in OC,
State, or CIA.
In the SIC there was a continuation
of essential activities during other than normal
5 7
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working hours. The CWO served as OC duty officer
and was the point of reference for matters re-
quiring after-hours action by OC. This involved
various responsibilities and procedures as noted
in office of Communications Order No. 1-56 12/*
and Office of Communications Order No. 40-65. 13/**
7. Signal Center Facilities
The various Signal Center Facilities
were streamlined to bring about greater systema-
tization. The Incoming Washington Terminal Facil-
ity was responsible for processing incoming staff
terminated messages while the Outgoing Washington
Terminal Facility processed outgoing staff origi-
nated messages. The Off-Line Crypto Section per-
formed the encryption and decryption of off-line
cryptographic systems, both OTP and OTT, but on a
much reduced scale due to the rapid escalation of
on-line cryptographic operations.
The Special Activities Facility was
accountable for processing Agency and Non-Agency
* See Attachment K
** See Attachment L
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SI (COMINT/ELINT) traffic, as well as other agency
and non-agency "hold down" traffic, and the opera-
tion of the 7th floor communications center located
in the CIA Operations Center.
The Primary Facility had as its re-
sponsibility the operations of Facility Control
Section, On-Line Crypto Section, and Relay Section.
The Facility Control Section continued to perform
quality control and technical control functions
associated with internal and external circuitry.
The On-Line Cryptographic Section basically con-
tinued to operate the KW-26 equipment. However,
a new electronic key generator (KG-13) was intro-
duced at the end of 1966 and was used on a limited
basis. The Relay Section performed the torn tape
relay function for the Headquarters S/C, tying in
the major trunk circuits of AXANET world-wide with
local terminals and communications centers in the
Washington area.
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III. Personnel
The whole, being no better than the sum
of its parts, Signal Center operations left much
to be desired after the chaotic activity imposed
by the Korean War. Of the already inadequate
number of trained personnel many were sent over-
seas and replaced by raw recruits. It was known
at that time that the component was incapable of
handling even the routine load, much less support-
ing projected increases. The demands made by this
highly volatile contingency strained its effectual
capacity to almost the breaking point.
The recruitment of experienced Signal Center
personnel was comparatively easy in the late 1940's
because of the availability of World War II crypto
trained operators still uncommitted to careers in
other fields. By the time the Korean War started
most of these cryptographers had already settled
into other careers. The availability of bright
young trainees was curtailed by military demands
on that general age bracket. Establishing stepped-
up procedures to recruit desirable personnel was
slow and cumbersome from time to time because of
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new Agency policy, new Agency hierarchy, political
expediency, or, under the stricture of general
belt tightening, a freeze would be put on further
employment until the ecomony measure was relaxed.
The time taken to get things rolling again after
complete inertia understandably resulted in the
loss of partially processed employees who had
accepted other employment. 14
Critical personnel shortages persisted
throughout the Expansion Period. Continuing
difficulties in procuring personnel were re-
peatedly pointed out by the Chief, Communications
Division. In June 1951 he submitted to the ADSO
and Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Executive Assistant
to DCI, a memorandum concerning the shortage of
personnel. 15/*
Following is the July 1951 status of Head-
quarters S/C personnel** :
Authorization
On duty
Vacancies
* See Attachment M
** See Figure 4, p. 78
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At that time the Chief, Signal Center, presented
the extremely critical conditions existing in the
S/C in a memorandum to the Director, Office of
Communications. 16/* The problem was the lack of
an adequate T/O as well as an excessive number of
job vacancies.
To ease the situation,
I ssistant Director for Communications
(ADCO), ordered activation of the Emergency Work
Force Program. Former S/C employees skilled in S/C
operations, who had been reassigned to other duties
in OC, were invited to work 8 hours overtime per
month to enable them to maintain their skills and
keep abreast of the various S/C operations, so that
they could perform crucial work with minimal super-
vision in times of crisis. It was optimistically
hoped that his plan would preclude future flaps
such as the one imposed by the Korean War. Unfor-
tunately it fell short of expectations because
personnel used on a part-time basis lacked the
necessary current experience and the time taken
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for on-the-job training and checking by regular
personnel was disproportionate to the total amount
of work produced.
. Personnel procurement had always been a
problem. Applicants for employment in the Agency
had always been required to meet high standards
in all areas of evaluation. But even greater chal-
lenges confronted the candidate for the communica-.
tions organization, for which qualifications as
to background, education, experience, and person-
ality established only a basic eligibility. Com-
munications personnel assigned to the S/C were
those engaged in communications and related activi-
ties requiring knowledge of specific and general
operational plans and understanding of the Central
Intelligence Agency cryptographic systems. Be-
cause of the vulnerability of Agency matters through
the communications media, unprecedented emphasis
was placed on in-depth evaluation of individuals
being considered for communications; recruitment
procedures bent every effort to secure the highest
type of employee for the Signal Center. Careful
screening alone was but a preliminary to a candi-
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date's consideration for this highly specialized
work. Qualification depended as much on native
talents, which had to be of a different order than
would satisfy requirements for other positions in
,the Agency. The completion of inordinately long,
uniquely searching questionnaires was required,
after which many months might pass pending security
investigations before clearance was granted. More-
over, after satisfying all initial requirements
and meeting every special qualification, personnel
would be called upon to complete additional forms
from time to time.
Much valuable time was lost as the result
of delays incident to obtaining full security clear-
ances. Attempts were made to streamline procedures
to the maximum in an effort to reduce the processing
period. Further delay resulted when recruits could
not EOD until clearances were granted. In some cases
losses of personnel occurred because the applicant,
of necessity, accepted other employment during the
indefinite waiting interval. One anomaly of the
recruitment system resulted from personnel being
accepted for duty before passing the polygraph and
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physical examination. Not infrequently the
flunking of these important qualifications worked
a genuine hardship on those already replaced by
their previous employers who now found themselves
without a job, particularly so in the case of
married men with dependents. For many years the
Chief of the Signal Center fought for pre-employ-
ment interviews for physical and polygraph. 17/
Urgent requests were made to accelerate the secu-
rity clearance so that definite training of S/C
personnel could progress. Personnel were trained
in the various cryptographic systems used in the
S/C, techniques of operation, and in many cases
the servicing of communications equipment. Much
of the training was given on the job. Therefore
the entire procedure, from recruitment through
processing and training and eventual assignment
to specific duties followed a somewhat different
course.*
Employment in the Signal Center constituted
an entirely new way of life, highly important to
which was the capacity for ready adjustment to
* See Figure 8, p. 66
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rotating shifts and staggered work weeks, in-
cluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. Follow-
ing changing schedules which transposed one's
Saturday to Monday and one's Sunday to Tuesday
imposed both physical and mental strain. Strict
punctuality was mandatory, since "one replaced
one" from shift to shift, the one being relieved
of duty having to wait for takeover by his coun-
terpart. Failure to report on time thus placed
a burden on one who had already completed 8 hours
of exacting work. Far from ideal, the working
atmosphere was consistently polluted by high noise
levels, crowded conditions, poor lighting, and
the nature of the work itself proved aggravating
often frustrating. Its unremitting volume imposed
constant pressure on operators and supervisors alike;
the various operations were all governed by specific
and binding regulations which intensified the strain.
Without compromising accuracy nor jeopardizing secu-
rity, the work still had to be handled with dispatch.
Speed was always of the essence.
It was necessary that the S/C develop suf-
ficient flexibility and resilience to deal capably
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with unforeseen operational needs and/or peak
work loads while allowing for the inevitable loss
factors caused by leave, sickness, training, over-
seas processing, etc.
Notwithstanding the work-related tensions,
nerve-racking noise, inadequate air conditioning,
and many other difficulties, SIC employees recog-
nized that their efforts in full-spirited team-
work provided a critical ingredient in all Agency
activity, which provided motivation despite the
highly wearing mandatory overtime schedules from
1951 until 1958 when regularly scheduled overtime
was eliminated. Overtime was thereafter performed
on a purely voluntary basis. Furthermore, this
"family unit" cherished the prideful recognition
that their unswerving loyalty contributed measur-
ably to the Agency successes.
During the entire historical period covered,
the Office of the Chief, Signal Center, was re-
sponsible for providing trained cryptographers
and S/C personnel to serve not only at Headquarters
but at most of the Agency's field stations. The
need for additional personnel for overseas duty as
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well as departmental people was perennial. In
selecting the personnel for overseas duty it was
necessary to evaluate the different job require-
ments and place the best suited individual in each
position. While the nature of the work might appear
to be identical at each station in that the primary
function was to encipher, decipher, transmit, and
receive in accordance with established procedures,
in reality the requirements varied considerably
from station to station. Low volume stations in-
variably used the OTP crypto system; intermediate
volume stations used the OTP and mechanical rotor
devices; and the highest volume stations were eli-
gible for the onetime tape (OTT) systems which
offered greater speed. Each system incorporated
different skills and techniques that required many
years of experience to develop to the professional
degree expected of Agency cryptographers. Trans-
mission means also varied in accordance with the
cover organization, and these intricate details
placed further demands on the cryptographer. Per-
sonnel often performed various other duties at the
field stations not associated with their basic
69 --
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communications functions. Use of personnel
for non-communications duties had to be considered.
An appreciable percentage of their time might be
spent on photostatic and photographic work. Other
duties performed were in areas of property and
supply, finance, filing, typing, and a variety of
general clerical tasks. They might also be expected
to act as chauffeur or courier. To select person-
nel to meet such requirements was not a simple
task. Conditions at some overseas posts were such
that only single men could be accomodated while
other posts were well suited to family living.
Thus, the reassignment of personnel demanded much
more than merely entering names on a roster.
The ever-present difficulty in obtaining
sufficient numbers of trained personnel proved a
continuing drawback to the expansion of communi-
cations facilities to cope with rapidly increasing
operational demands. Shortage of qualified, ade-
quately trained personnel to man stations in over-
seas installations made it difficult to meet com-
mitments and responsibilities. Rarely was manpower
fully adequate to the tasks.
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With the establishment of a CIA Cable
Secretariat in 1952 there was necessarily a rea-
lignment of personnel. Option was given to the
S/C Processing Branch personnel to remain with
Communications or transfer to C/S. Many of the
S/C functions designated to become the responsi-
bility of C/S were not transferred immediately
due to lack of experienced personnel on the staff
of CIS. However, with the transfer of some of
the positions of the S/C Processing Branch to CIS
there was also reassignment of some S/C personnel,
though the full turnover of responsibilities was
not completed until several years later..
Due to budgetary restrictions personnel
ceiling limitations were imposed on the Central
Intelligence Agency on 30 June 1953 and in turn
on the Office of Communications. 18/* The impo-
sition of the ceiling precluded acceptance of any
new commitments. It was therefore necessary to
deploy existing personnel to those areas where
they could be used'to greatest advantage. Be-
cause of the constantly changing workloads con-
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fronting the various operations within the S/C,
it was highly desirable that the personnel develop
versatility in order to perform whatever type of
work might be required of them from time to time.
In the early 1950's personnel involved in
logging, encrypting, decrypting, and paraphrasing
of messages in the manual systems,. consisting of
double transpositions (DT), strips, machine rotor
systems, OTP, and OTT, were referred to as code
clerks or cryptographers and were designated as
CT/C's.
In 1958, with the advent of the KW-26 elec-
tronic key generator, a cryptographer no longer
needed to laboriously encrypt/decrypt each message
individually by hand; however, he had to learn the
new and more complex methodology associated with
the operation of an on,'-line system. Within the next
five years, the classified manual torn tape relay
centers were in operation around the world. There-
fore, in addition to the CT/C's acquiring skill in
operating the KW-26, he had to learn the various
routing doctrines in use, familiarize himself with
transmission systems, and learn the operation of
72 -
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S E C R E T
classified torn tape relay centers and terminals.
Later it became evident that even the in"
creased speed of the KWr26 would be inadequate
and that the adoption of additional new techniques
would be necessary. One of the first steps was
automation through the use of computers. This
brought an added requirement, for the CT/C now
had to be trained in the complex operation of
an automated switching system. It was obvious
that the CT/C of the mid-'1960's had to possess
greater knowledge than his predecessor of the
1950's. His duties were more technical and in-7.'
finitely more complex and diverse. He required
many more hours of training, was required to
retain a wide variety of specific and general
knowledge, and to absorb new communications
systems and techniques with a minimum of train-
ing and readjustment. He was no longer just a
code clerk or cryptographer but a well-trained
Communications Specialist (CS) who was able
constantly to adjust and readjust to keep pace
with the rapidly changing communications world. 19/*
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S/C personnel were always an important element
in the communications system and became increas-
ingly more important as new sophisticated equipments
were adopted. As preparation to manage, supervise,
and operate these systems competently and profes-
sionally, it was necessary to embark on an exten-
sive program not only to improve personnel but to
improve grade structure and career management prac-
tices.
Prior to the final move to the new building
in 1962 there were two Headquarters Signal Centers
in operation. This naturally placed a strain on
the limited numbers of personnel who had to man
both units. Pressures on the S/C increased in
direct proportion to overall planning, implementa-
tion of which progressively called for increased
personnel, enlarged facilities, and improved tech-
niques. All this brought with it new responsibili-
ties; these and the ever-growing volume of material
.to be handled increased the S/C operating workload
to the point where'additional personnel became
imperative to maintain normal communications sup-
port.
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The S/C personnel status, while showing-some
improvement, was still far from satisfactory.
Shortage of trained personnel continued to pose
a major problem. The number of people available
and qualified for SIC duties did not keep pace
with the ever-increasing requirements for commu-
nications support. There was an excessive increase
in the workload of the S/C during the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis, and there was an acute shortage of
operating type personnel. In November 1962 the
Chief, S/C,presented to the Chief, Administration
Staff, OC, a request for recruitment of a contin-
gency force of code clerks. 20/* He was hopeful
that this might help alleviate the chronic person-
nel shortage in the S/C.
1963 when 38 potential candidates were secured
from other divisions of the Agency. Their inter-
est and enthusiasm were overwhelming; being engaged
in sensitive communications activity and the pos-
sibility of overseas assignments acted like a
magnet. However, when faced with shift work,
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staggered work weeks, cramped quarters, far-from-
ideal working conditions, and general pressure,
enthusiasm waned and interest flagged noticeably.
Only four remained! The best source of recruits
with "stickability" has always been word of mouth
solicitation. 2
Requests for changes of personnel ceilings
had to be justified by demonstrable needs based
upon specific increases or reallocations in work-
loads. Notwithstanding reiterated requests during
this period, only small net increases were granted.
These were never adequate to cope with continually
increasing demands. There were many pressing con-
tingencies requiring rapid action incapable of
accomplishment without the assignment of additional
personnel, vital to the implementation of existing
programs. These alone provided ample justification
for such a measure, aside from easily foreseen
requirements for other projected plans. The SIC
was no longer able to meet its commitments with
the personnel available, and in March 1963 the
Chief, Signal Center, submitted to the Director
of Communications a request for an increase in
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the S/C personnel ceiling. 22/*
An indication of the personnel shortages
may be seen in the graph on the average employment
for.the SIC during the expansion years.** Despite
the handicap imposed by shortages of personnel the
work progressed. The Headquarters Signal Center
personnel were obligated to keep abreast of each
new change in equipment and procedure and to de-
velop the necessary expertise in the operational
techniques demanded of them. It is to their credit
that they have demonstrated unabated zeal and com-
petence in mastering every innovation, thereby main-
taining the long-established tradition of providing
the Agency with the most efficient communications
service to be found in the United States Government
a universal communications organization probably
second to none in the world.
** See Figure 7, p. 81
S E C R E T
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IV. Operations - 1951'-66
A. Equipment, Procedures, Circuitry
1. The Early Period - 195158
During this period there were many
noteworthy changes in cryptographic and terminal
equipment techniques. The one-time systems (pad
and tape) were the mainstay of secure communica-
tions. The strip cipher system, CSP-1700 (rotor),
SIGABA and associated systems (rotor), and Hagelin
Machines were all phased out by the mid-1950's.
The AFSAM-7, later changed to KL-7 (rotors), was
used during this period with a number of stations
but not to the extent that OTP and OTT (TINYTOT)
were employed. The M-19 family of teletype equip-
ment served as the primary terminal equipments.
On-line cryptographic systems during the early
period consisted of
(rotor) ,
(tape)
ASAM (rotor), and AFSAM (rotor).*
The Headquarters Signal Center in
"L" Building mushroomed in terms of space, person-
nel, and equipment, and developed an overall capa-
* See Figure 9, p. 83
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bility to move huge volumes of messages securely
and as rapidly as off-line technology would permit.
However, space, personnel, and equipment were never
sufficient during the early period.
Although the use of one-time tape
and KL-7 type rotor devices steadily increased, the
laborious one-time pad still maintained its lofty
position as the primary system for off-line enci-
pherments between Headquarters and the majority of
field stations.
A severe blow was struck when the
131B-2 one-time tape machine (SIGTOT) was declared
vulnerable. This resulted in further disruption
of established operating routines and demanded
immediate revision of enciphering procedures. The
TINYTOT OTT machine was quickly developed to counter-
act this threat, and it became the primary OTT en-
cryption/decryption device. Other standard equip-
ment suffered the same fate with the same results
as technology advanced.
A requirement was levied to establish
a COMINT area (later called Special Intelligence or
SI) as a separate restricted enclave within the
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confines of the S/C, and it was called Special
Signal Center Branch. The simultaneous mushrooming
of the OCI "Q" Building Facility caused severe
hardships since traffic in both facilities increased
rapidly and continually, and both of these facili-
ties required that operating personnel have special
clearances. Several special projects such as
additionally made heavy inroads on S/C
personnel and equipments.
General operating steps used in the
encipherment/decipherment process for OTP (in-
cluding KL-7) and OTT between 1951 and 1958 are
presented in charts in Attachment C.* These proce-
dures, with the exception of changes relating to
the development of the TINYTOT, remained constant.
Both the OTP and OTT systems were slow and laborious.
The hourly standard for enciphering OTP messages was
225 groups (literal) with approximately 1,800 groups
as the daily standard. The hourly standard. for en-
ciphering OTP messages (numerical) was 100 groups
as the daily standard. Some relief was obtained with
* See pp. 18 and 26
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S E C R E T
the issuance of multiple pad links with up to 16
station systems being employed. The hourly stand-
ard for OTT messages was 325 groups with 2,600
groups as the daily standard.* The speed with
which a OTP message could be enciphered/deciphered
depended largely upon the speed with which the
operator was able to write legibly and the degree
to which he had memorized the Vigenere Tableau.**
The speed with which a OTT message could be en-
ciphered/deciphered was dependent upon the equip-
ment used. The M-19 (SIGTOT, later TINYTOT) was
the primary device being used for OTT enciphered
messages. The maximum speed of this device was
60 words per minute utilizing the 5 level Baudot
Code. The hourly standards above were exceeded
once personnel became thoroughly familiar with
the system and performed the function repetitively
day after day.
It was not uncommon for 24-72 hour
backlogs to develop during peak operational or
* See Figure 10, p.
87
** See Figure 11, p.
88
86 -
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Figure 10
BASED ON STUDY CONDUCTED CIRCA 1962
GROUPS PER MAN-HOUR
SYSTEM ENCIPITERING
DECIPHERING
KL-7 200 - 275
400 - 440
OTP 225
150
OFF-LINE TOT 325
800
KW-26 1,800
3,000
APPROX RATIOS
KW-26 VS TOT
5:1
3.75:1
KW-26 VS OTP
8:1
20:1
KW-26 VS KL-7
9:1
7.5:1
NOTE: GROUPS PER MAN HOUR INCLUDE ALL SIGNAL CENTER PROCESSING
ABOVE AVERAGES PERFORMED BY EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL ONLY.
NEW PERSONNEL PROCESS MUCH LESS.
87
SECRET
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 S E C R E T
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A
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crises periods. The advent of these frequent
backlogs required that personnel work excessive
overtime, and ;OC found it difficult to hire suf-
ficient personnel and provide the necessary rapid
training required to keep pace with the already
increasing workload. Backlogs were building up
in all phases of the work. The most that could
be expected was that delays for priority and above
precedence messages would not be excessive. Over
a weekend the accepted delay of a routine message
was 48-72 hours, a priority 12-24 hours, and an
immediate 1-12 hours. To meet even these times
was dependent upon the geographic location of the
station to which the message was addressed, the
crypto system used, and the manner in which it
was routed.
The Signal Center resembled a factory
with various assembly and production line tech-
niques employed. These production line techniques
were used in most operational sections/branches.
It was not uncommon for 100 or more pads to be
stacked in the Manual Cryptographic Branch waiting
for encipherment/decipherment and upwards of
89
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300--400 tapes hanging in the Machine Cryptographic
Branch waiting for encipherment/decipherment and
transmission. Even though personnel worked unlim-
ited overtime, the loads could not be kept current.
Periodic MINIMIZE conditions helped, but many times
the application was too little and too late.
To satisfy the ever-increasing need
to pass more and more classified text via cable to/
from the field, the Teletape System was developed
in 1958 and the electrical dispatch (later changed
to telepouch) in 1966. This technique, while it
may have speeded delivery to the field in the early
days, did little to reduce the workload in the
Signal Center. Several other pouch techniques
were tried. One was the "Fast Pouch" between
to/from selected stations. The Fast Pouch lasted
only a very short period during 1955 while the
replacing the Fast Pouch, was still
in use at the end of 1966. Both procedures are
described in the Cable Secretariat History.*
* See Part Two, Chapter IV, pp. 109, 117, 120
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The Machine Cryptographic Branch em-
ployed both off-line and on-line transmission tech-
niques.* During the period 1946-50, the trans-
mission of the encrypted messages was usually
performed by commercial telegraph companies or by
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message. Cover security was the primary reason
for the stringent check and double check system
employed in the early years so that cryptographic
or transmission security violations would not occur.
* See Attachment C, pp. 27, 28
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In 1951 the Agency transmitted most
messages directly from its Comcenter to the com-
mercial telegraph
by wire lines. These transmissions
were in all cases completely enciphered (scrambled)
messages. No classified plain text was processed
by wire/radio rooms, and/or
operating
components as far as transmission of covert Agency
traffic was concerned. The only messages trans-
mitted in clear text form by the Signal Center were
over the Western Union teleprinter and consisted
of plain text telegrams from/to the Agency overtly
as CIA.
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Control over messages was relinquished
as soon as they were accepted by the carrier (Com-
mercial,
own transmission facilities, with the exception of
I adio circuits which were operated
out of the Agency radio station
As a result of this lack of control,
messages were not only delayed but frequently lost,
and stringent control procedures were inaugurated.
However, in the early days, since CIA did NOT con-
trol the majority of its circuitry, lost and de-
layed messages were not uncommon. It was not until
1958 that CIA acquired its first long haul trunk
circuit between "L" Building and
This circuit was leased from RCA.*
Some extremely sensitive messages, in
addition to being processed on a compartmented basis
(SSCB, "Q" Building, and "Special Hold Down" in "L"
* See Figure 12, p. 94
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SMMRT
SIGXkL CENTER CPCUITRY CIRCA 1958
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*FLRST OVERSEAS LCNG HAUL TRUNK
DEPT.
1 STATE
-~. RECEIVE ONLY
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Building), were first enciphered in a manual sys-
tem, then re-enciphered in an OTT system, and final-
ly transmitted. However, due to time consumed in
this superencipherment, this technique was kept to
a minimum, but it was used upon occasion.*
Liaison on the part of S/C personnel
was rather limited during the early period
and consisted mostly of "line" chatter dealing
with receipt of messages and line conditions.
From a cryptographic security standpoint, more de-
tailed day-to-'day liaison was conducted
Several developmental systems were
tried during the early period. One was the AS-4,**
an experimental high-speed system between
Briefly, the sys-
tem was supposed to operate at 1,600 WPM speed in
* See Attachment C, p. 27
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an on-line mode using the KX-3 electronic key
generator (the forerunner of the KG-13). A
receive terminal consisting of a high-speed
Potter Printer and the KX-3 electronic key gener-
ator was installed in the Headquarters Signal
Center. A KX-3 and high-speed transmitter were
installed in the
Tests were conducted periodically
over a 3-year period (1958-61) between Headquarters
traffic was actually transmitted over this system.
However, due to ionospheric disturbances, the number
of frequencies required for Quantized Frequency
Modulation (QFM), and the lack of dependability of
the KX-3 electronic key generator and the Potter
Printer, the system never progressed beyond the
testing stage. It was finally abandoned.
A development which succeeded, how-
ever, was a specially "rigged" M-19 SIGTOT dubbed
* See Figure 12, p. 94
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"the Monster." It was a one-time pad machine
constructed to encipher/decipher the Vigenere
Tableau. In 1961 the Office of Communications,
Research and Development (OC/RD) was tasked with
developing a new monster utilizing the new M-28
teletype equipment as a base. Subsequently, the
machine was designated the HL-6 and has since be-
come standard equipment for one-time pad operations
in the Signal Center. *
In 1957 a directive was received from
NSA that all local circuitry must be equipped with
encryption equipment. Consequently, KW-9's were
installed on several links. These devices were
most cumbersome to operate. Luckily, the KW-26
was developed which provided both link encryption
and traffic flow security.
Generally speaking, the above modus
operandi was in effect until late 1958 when the
first overseas trunk was activated ("L" Building -
and the KW-26 appeared on the
scene. Field stations supported increased from
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108 in 1951 to 155 in 1958. *
2. The Beginning of the Communications
Revolution
In 1958 the first step in what can
be considered the beginning of the Communications
Revolution occurred with the development and in-
troduction of the KW-26 electronic key generator.
With the advent of the KW'26, the encryption/de-
cryption function was, for all intents and purposes,
the first step towards automation since the trans-
mitter and receiver could be operated synchronously
through the use of identical key codes over ded-
icated (CIA controlled) cable and radio circuitry
for both short and long distances, the distance
limitation governed by the quality of the trans-
mission media used. Thus, a new era in secure
communications technology was inaugurated.
Between 1958 and 1963 the classified
manual torn tape relay center "sprang up" around
the world utilizing Military ACP-127 (Allied Commu-
nications Procedures), COI-101 (Criticomm Operating
* See Figure 13, p. 99
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Instructions), and
(modified CIA routing
doctrines). * The transmission/reception function
required that personnel become familiar with the
vagaries of the various transmission media in use,
e.g., commercial wire lines, cables, commercial
radio circuits, and Agency operated H.F. systems.
Signal Center personnel had to be extremely aware
of security ramifications involved in the direct
contact now required with various cover organiza-
tions during the performance of technical control
functions while "marrying" the KW-26 with the
transmission media used.
The KW-26 quickly became the mainstay
of the newborn Agency world-wide network, designated
AXANET. Direct circuits, equipped with the KW-'26,
were activated between the Signal Center, Washing-
ton area stations, and the field. The first local
circuit was activated in 1958 between "Q" Building
and "L" Building. The first long distance circuit
used for live traffic was activated between the "L"
Building Signal Center and
* Current editions available in the Signal Center
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April 1959 at an operating speed of 60 WPM, and
the first lateral field circuits activated were
shortly
thereafter. Thus, AXANET was born. By the end
of 1961 a world-wide network was in operation.
Major trunks activated between Headquarters and
the field during this period were:
S~;cnal Center ~I I (Gateway to Central
Signal Center -
Signal Center -
Signal Center
Europe)
(Gateway to the Far
East)
(Gateway to Eastern
Europe & Middle East)
(Gateway to Western
Europe)
The Headquarters Signal Center was
designated as the Primary Relay for the network.
Major Relays were activated at major Commo instal-
lations around the world and acted as feeders to
Headquarters and through Headquarters to other
field areas.
The advent of the KW-26 and the
introduction of a classified torn tape relay
changed operational procedures considerably in
the Headquarters S/C. A document for the process-
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ing of traffic over the network was promulgated
and was designated
The Signal Center Staffs
wrote the original version of this routing doctrine,
and by testing procedures through a coordinated
effort with
all "bugs" were finally
expunged and the procedures were refined for
smooth,-efficient operation. KW-26 operating
procedural documents were also initially written
by the S/C Staffs.
Processing times for message ex-
changes with the field changed drastically.
Whereas, previously, it took many hours and
sometimes days to exchange a message between OTP
and OTT equipped stations, it now required only
an hour or two, and only minutes for short high
precedence messages. For instance, average length
high precedence messages (200 words or less) were
exchanged between Headquarters and Europe on a
test basis in less than 15 minutes, unheard of
before the advent of the KW-26. This included
the preparation of the message for encryption,
the encryption/transmission/reception and turn
around in the field back to Headquarters. Dis-
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S
E
tance no longer mattered since it took the same
time to transmit a message to Europe as it did
to the Far East since the circuitry involved was
dedicated (CIA controlled) to the Agency on a full-
time basis and was therefore available 24 hours
daily. Initially KW-26 circuits were operated
at 60 WPM since overseas telephone company relays
could not cope with the 100 WPM speed desired and
the limitation of M-19 terminal equipment. How-
ever, by the early 1960's most of the circuits
were in operation at 100 WPM, and the M-28 tele-
type terminal equipment became the standard for
the Agency. Strict security regulations were
rigidly maintained since dedicated leased circuitry
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Terminal and Relay processing times
changed drastically in the Headquarters Signal
Center. The following ratios of KW-26 versus the
old cryptographic systems were developed *:
* See Figure 10, p. 87
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Enciphering
Deciphering
KW-26 vs OTT
5:1
3.75:1
KW-26 vs OTP
8:1
20:1
KW-26 vs KL-7
9:1
7.5:1
The above comparison includes all
S/C processing from start to finish. In spite
of the gain in processing times, the need for
personnel continued to increase since most of
the functions previously performed in OTT and
OTP systems were replaced with new operating
functions necessary for the operation of a torn
tape relay center and necessary for the operation
of a technical control center for the KW-26. The
same number of personnel, however, were now able
to process, for the most part, the continued in-
crease of message volumes with less numbers of
additional personnel which would have been required
to process manual systems. Backlogs of routine
traffic were finally reduced to 12-24 hours on
weekends.
After the designation of the SIC as
an "all source" communications center in 1960, the
special clearance problem was alleviated since all
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personnel were cleared to process SI traffic.
Not all stations were equipped with
the KW-26. Where the volume of traffic was too
low, or the strict security standards in force
for the installation of the KW-26 were not adequate,
the OTP and OTT crypto systems remained as the
primary cryptographic systems.
Poking of messages remained the most
time-consuming operation with the advent of the
KW-26. A study conducted in 1963 showed that the
average operator in one 8-hour day could prepare
for transmission approximately 40 messages of 160
groups average length or a total of 6,400 groups.
An attempt was made to automate the
poking of messages through the use of a Farrington
Scanner. However, due to a lack of capability for
easily correcting typographical errors, recognizing
pen and ink changes to cables, and the sensitivity
of the scanner to smudges, creases, and other marks
on the message the Farrington Scanner was abandoned
since it was not a practical device for the S/C at
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that time.
In March 1963 the network appeared
as depicted in Figure 14.
Field stations
supported increased from in 1958 to
1963. ***
3. The Dawning of the Computer Age
New technology had only started to
scratch the surface. With the advent of the space
age and its demand for "instantaneous" intelligence
it became evident that sooner or later even the
increased speed of the KW-26 would be inadequate
and the adoption of additional new techniques would
be necessary to keep pace with the technological
explosion that was taking place. One of the first
steps was to automate, through the use of computers
the torn tape relay center. The first automated
switching system (MAX-I)
March 1965 at CIA's
* See Attachment V
** See p. 107
*** See Figure 13, p. 99
**** See Attachment W
came into being in
The
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Headquarters Signal Center, along with other Major
Relay Centers and Tributary Stations which ter-
minated in MAX-I, had to modify their routing proce-
dures by the use of the new document promulgated
for routing traffic through automated switching
systems
The computer, which had already be-
come an integral part of the overall technological
explosion of the late 1950's/early 1960's, and its
use in the data processing field had started to
move ahead very rapidly by the mid-1960's. The
technology involving missile systems and space
were only in their embryo stages. In order to
assure adequate information of developments in
this field on the part of hostile countries, the
volume of "instantaneous" intelligence would be
increased, and the secure transmission of infor-
mation from its source to the consumer had to be
considerably improved. Advance computer data
processing techniques demanded "direct" high-speed
access in the real time processing of intelligence
information. This required that the use of the
newer form of communications, referred to as data
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communications, be adopted more widely and fre-
quently by the United States Government. The
transmission of data at high speeds required the
development of a new series of electronic key
generators able to simultaneously encrypt/decrypt
and transmit/receive over wide band circuits in-
telligence at speeds equivalent to thousands of
words per minute instead of 60 WPM as had been
the standard for several decades for regular cable
processing. Although no live circuitry was in-
stalled in the Headquarters Signal Center by the
end of 1966, plans had been completed for the
activation of the first of these circuits early
in 1967.
The Signal Center received its first
KG-13 electronic key generators for use on the
WASHFAX system, a high-speed facsimile system
whereby pages were enciphered/transmitted and at
speeds of 6 pages per minute. * Using this LDX
system, the material did not have to be converted
to machine language prior to encryption. The page
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was merely placed on a Xerox scanner which
digitized the signal and transmitted the page,
after encryption by the KG-13, to a distant
Xerox page printer which received the message in
page form. The system was activated in 1965
between the CIA Operations Center, Department of
State, National Military Command Center at the
Pentagon, and the White House. The system proved
itself extremely useful in the rapid exchange of
information between CIA and the White House during
crises periods.
Additional KG-13 equipment was received
for use on the first CIA overseas secure voice link
The equipment consisted of a HY-i2
vocoder, KG-13, and associated ancilliary equipment.
Through the use of Military (AUTOVON) long distance
telephone cables/circuitry, the system was moder-
ately used between Langley and our representatives
The system was shared with the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of Defense. While
the quality of the service was not good, it never-
theless served as a prototype of secure voice sys-
tems to come.
110
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The responsibilities of the Special
Assistant for Plans and Automation assigned to the
S/C included the preparation of plans for the in-
stallation of new equipments to the SIC such as
MAX-II and secure voice. The Special Assistant
for Engineering coordinated the planning with OC/E.
Thus, the stage was set for what will probably
become the most dynamic and exciting decade in
the history of secure communications. Of some
0
stations supported at the end of 1966,
were equipped with KW-26,
0
(with the KW-7,
with the HW-19A,Iaith OTT, and with OTP.
The KW-7 was not in use in the Headquarters S/C
during this period. Circuitry in use at the end
of 1966 is depicted in Figure 15. *
B. Message Volumes and Field Stations
Supported
Message volumes increased steadily
during the Expansion Period. From 1951 through
1962 message volumes were measured in terms of
groups (five alphabetical letters equalled one
* See p. 112
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code group) to match the OTP system, and later
they were measured in terms of words (an average
of ten words equalled one line of typewritten
text) to match the OTT and on-line systems. Dur-
ing the 1951-62 period the group/word count vol-
umes increased over 1,000 * These increases
were due to several factors, e.g., the increases
in capacity of the crypto systems (OTP to OTT to
the KW-26 on-line system) and the increased number
of stations supported. Field stations supported
With the advent of the KW-26 and the
processing of Other Agency traffic by the CIA net-
work, it became necessary to change the accounting
system to satisfy the increasing demand for new
types of management statistics, and to reduce the
amount of time spent in collecting statistics. In
January 1963
was issued, and it discon-
tinued group/word counts and used the individual
message as its primary measurement for statistical
* See Figure 16, pp. 114-116
** See Figure 13, p. 99
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The statistical breakout of messages also
became more detailed since management wanted to
distinguish between certain categories of message
traffic and between relay and terminal traffic.
In 1962 Staff (including Other Agency), SI, and
the NSA Broadcast (formerly "Q" Building traffic)
were broken out separately as originated/terminated
messages. In 1964 Teletapes were added to this
category of reporting, and in 1965 Restricted
Handling messages were counted separately. *
Additional charts and graphs depicting IN vs OUT,
off-line vs on-line, relay vs terminal, and various
daily and weekly breakouts according to geographical
areas, etc. were maintained on a periodic basis.
A problem throughout the years has been
distribution of workload of outgoing cables. A
high percentage of this traffic was received be-
tween 1600-1900 hours. It was impossible to proc-
ess this overload of cable traffic during the night
with the limited personnel, and in many cases de-
* See Figure 17, pp. 118-120
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livery of cables to the field stations was delayed
for 24 hours or more. Periodically pleas were sent
to originating and releasing officers urging the
filing of cables during the day. *
From 1963 to 1966 the message volume
continued to increase steadily at an average rate
of approximately 17%.
Frequent attempts were made to reduce
cable volumes 23/**; however, with the consistent
upward trend these measures were none too effective.
Special reports of cable traffic volumes for'January
1954 were submitted to the DCI by the Assistant
Director of Communications. *** If any benefits
were derived, they were buried within the increase.
In 1956 a cable writing course was for-
mulated in cooperation with the DD/P,
Chief, SE; OC,
Chief, Signal Centers; and the Office of Training
(OTR). High lights of the course appear in the out-
See Attachment Y
** See Attachment Z
*** See Attachments AA and BB
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line of the proposed agenda. * Ultimately it was
scheduled by OTR three-four times a year. Struc-
tured to effect reductions in cable volumes by
eliminating the writing of unnecessary cables
and by reducing excessive referencing, redundancy,
and verbiage, the course appeared to be successful
and resulted in a marked improvement in cable writ-
ing.
was tasked to give a one-hour
lecture dealing with the relationship of cable
writing and communications procedures, systems,
etc., and he continued to give the OC lectures
during his tenure as Chief, Signal Centers. Mr.
who succeeded
delegated this
responsibility to his Signal Center Officer, Mr.
gave the OC portion
of the lecture. In 1960 the cable writing course
was integrated into the normal CIA orientation
course by OTR, and Signal Center personnel no
longer were required to participate.
C. Message Accountability/Message Formats
One of the most significant functions
* See Attachment CC
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of the Signal Center was the accounting for
every message sent and received. Accepting a
message for delivery entailed more than just its
encryption/transmission or reception/decryption.
The most important factor was being able to guar-
antee its delivery. The CIA network, after its
establishment in 1959-62, lost less messages than
any other large United States Government communi-
cations system. This was accomplished not only by
dedicated professionalism within the ranks of its
personnel but by the adoption of procedures which
afforded more than a 99.99% confidence factor as
far as delivery was concerned. Achieving such a
confidence factor was not possible during the early
years, 1951-58, since the majority of traffic was
transmitted over State or Military circuitry. How-
ever, the procedures adopted after AXANET was
established made this achievement possible. The
most important ingredients in achieving such a
high percentage were a high quality network, the
use of a check number series, and good servicing
procedures.
The check number was the single most
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important number assigned to a CIA message. Vari-
ous other numbers were also assigned to messages.
To make certain that all cables sent to a specific
station were received at that station, a check
number was assigned to each message from a consecu-
tive numbering series maintained between the two
stations. Whenever a number was open, an encrypted
service was sent requesting retransmission of the
missing check number.
There were some stations where relatively
few messages were exchanged. Eventually a missing
check number would show that a message was missing
but obviously not until a subsequent message had
been transmitted. Field stations were divided
into LOW VOLUME and VERY LOW VOLUME stations. For
a better check on transmissions to these stations
procedural instructions were disseminated by the
Chief, Signal Centers, OC. ** For LOW VOLUME
stations, which exchanged between 6 and 30 messages
per month, a ZFF was sent on messages which were
* See Figure 18, pp. 125, 126
** See Attachment DD
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S E C R E T
Figure 18
Numbers Assigned to CIA Mess es
IN Number
STATION Number
OUT Number
IESSAGE Number
CHECK Number
CHANNEL Number
For in-station only purposes of
accounting and verbal reference, a
separate consecutive unclassified
numbering series was assigned to
incoming cables regardless of
originator or addressee.
To facilitate subsequent message
identification, the originating
signal center assigned a number
from a consecutive series of num-
bers to each cable regardless of
destination.
For in-station only purposes of
accounting and verbal references, a
separate consecutive unclassified
numbering series was assigned to
outgoing cables regardless of
originator or addressee.
To facilitate subsequent message
identification, the Headquarters
Signal Center assigned a message
number from a consecutive series
of numbers to each outgoing cable
regardless of destination*
To make certain that all messages
sent to a specific station were
received at that station, a check
number was assigned to each message
from a consecutive numbering series
maintained between the two stations.
To identify a transmission sent on
a specific channel between two sta-
tions a combination of letters and
figures were used to identify one
or both of the stations and channel
designator.
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S
SERVICE CONTROL Number To be used merely for reference and
identification, service messages
carried a control number assigned
in consecutive order*
STATION SERIAL Number To identify a message a reference
number was allotted in sequence by
the originating or refile station
and appeared in the external message
heading to be used mainly in un-
classified services.
DATE-TIME Group (DTG) To be used for reference and iden-
tification on occasions the date-time
group gives the date and time at
which a message was released by the
originator for transmission (ex-
pressed in six digits); the first
pair of digits denoted the date, the
second pair the hour, and the third
pair the minutes (061601Z). The i7PG
was also used in tracer actions if
other portions of the heading were
obliterated, The Navy uses the DTG
for reference purposes.
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PRIORITY or above, and also on any message in
which a time element was indicated. For VERY
LOW VOLUME stations, which had 5 or less mes-
sages per month, it was mandatory that a ZFF
was sent on every message. *
Service messages were brief, concise
messages used by operating or supervisory person-
nel at Signal Centers or relay stations to ex-
change information and instructions pertaining
to any phase of traffic handling, status of commu-
nication facilities, circuit conditions, or other
matters affecting communication operations, e.g.,
circuit continuity checks, correction of errors,
tracer action, etc. Service procedures varied
according to the type of information needed. Serv-
ice messages, assigned sequential reference numbers,
pertained to the encipherment, decipherment, or
handling of a specific cable and were used as a
means of expediting the handling of cable traffic
and of assuring the delivery of an accurate plain
text copy to the addressee. **
* See Attachments EE and FF
** See Figure 19, pp. 128-135
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SECRET
Figure 19
ZM2s of Service Messages
as Request for rerun of staff message received garbled*
b? Request for rerun of Telepouch message received garbledo
c. ZDF - Advising originating station the time of receipt of
high precedence message or answer to any ZFF request&
d. Classified service message, requesting portion of text
received garbled.
e. Advising station that HQS S/C was missing message assigned
a quoted check number and requesting subject message be.
retransmitted*
f. Continuity Check service message to a low volume stationo
go Tracer service - to determine reason for non-delivery or
delay in transmission.
* See samples attached
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Figure 19 a
PP
DE RUE I QCS
ZNR UUUUU
BT n
UNCLAS SVC 1j,15 5 0~_~__ ZES2
a41,5-a
NNNN
129
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Figure 19 b
TELEPOVCH RETFZANSIA I SS I ON REQUEST
PP Um
DE RUE IQCS -aa i1. C>~,G L~
ZNR UUUUU
BT
UNCLAS SVC Ro~?TF5 ~Ia+T 11,0084L,3 -R ' oo$L1ZES2 TO RUE ITP
(DE L I.NE ( DT )
BT
NNNN
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Figure 19 o
ZDF FORMS".
'?.z"^S a yr5 -~ l/4)
17N III UITU'L'U
BT
BT
i o c4
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/2%E6NtTRDP84-00499R00040008000l-f6,m.e 19 d
(When Filled In)
I CASE NUMBER
0+72
2923+7
SERVICE MESSAGE
PRIORITY -
SERVICE
REf~
17812?'PARA 5G
SEND FROM "COST REDUCTIONS Eric ECT" TO "PROVIDE SAVINGS IN"
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L0008000 1 E4n i t i a 18)
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Figure 19 e
6
CASE NR.-
.S E C R Ir T C ITE WASH I NGTO;N .
PR1oRI
SERVICE
P 11-0- ZFQ AND RIZ 5 ND.
ADVISE OR
I' V r - r r r r w w ww r. M 4e M M e~ - M
w w .+. e r ., r r .. .. w
BEFORE SENDING A "W ` NG CK Nit" SFRV 4 CE t-,A?4 E; FI: OC 1'1..
RECEI1'L[; h,t"l3
DC'F?I~' tY :
1 . DETERMINE POSSIBLE OPEN MESSAGE NU14B ER (S) AND LIST ON
'MISSING CKNR' FORM. PASS TO ,ABLE SEC ON YLLLO
FORM LOCATED IN SERVICE DESK DRAV1ER.
2. CHECK T.P. FILES (IF APPLICABLE).
3. CHECK DATA T EL FILE (i F APPL I CA!3L E )'.
4. CHECK SERVICE LOG.
5<
CHECK I RELAY' CARD FOR FUSS i 3L'E ! CRO' .
CHECK TO SEE IF MESSAGE WAS CRYPTO RELAYED BY
RELAY STt,T I ON, BUT LOGGED ON FIELD --TAT I , ,N C10-1IR
CARD.
- 133 -
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Figure 19 f
LCd 1{WK: ~,~~L-' " "~`:"`: n~"t~'C
r
pp `RUESDA
DI: RU 0422
ZNY XXX X .
E 201330
Z ZFFk
UT
x
001333
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S C C R U T COTEo VA-St4V?N TC
aa~cor 0422 .rrra~-C
SER V D CZ
82 pry
f~ "9 A P'rP~ 7
c ct(o IJ T C. r-: ,,, t x; c ,'~ i? ri cz m-D U"% S
S E C R E T
8T
#0+22
W9414
134 -
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Figure 19 g
TRACER HQS ORIGINATED MESSAGE
PP
DI: RUBTQCS O6
ZNRJUU
BT
UNCLAS SVC n, ACME, CLAIMS NOI'T-DLVY RUEIQC ~~ ff a c o / Sa /; 22 _4
ZDQ RUI IQ AS /T/19 o 4 p . TRACE TO ME TINATION AND ADVISE. STA ACCEPTING RFSf O151 Bi LI'T-Y
FOR NON-DLVY GIVE REASON FOR MISHANDLING) CITE RUEIQCS (ido T ON ALL TRAGIC:;
THIS MSG
BT
NNNN
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In some cases servicing was accomplished
through use of the allied military Z code. A
sample of frequently used Z signals, operating
signals authorized for use between allied military
stations and civil stations, were:
ZDF Message ... was received by ... at ... Z
ZDG Accuracy of following message or message
... is doubtful. Correction or confirma-
tion will be forthcoming.
ZDH Request corrected copy of message ... be
forwarded to ...
ZDK Question: Will you repeat message?
Answer: Following repetition of ... is
made in accordance with your request.
ZEL Question: Is message ... a correction
to message ... which was previously trans-
mitted with doubtful or missing groups
(words) ?
Answer: This message is a correction (to
message ...) (transmitted by ...) Note: May
only be used in conjunction with ZDG.
ZES Your message ... has been received ...
(1. Incomplete; 2. Garbled). Request
retransmission.
ZFF Inform me when message ... has been received
by ...
ZFG This message is an exact duplicate of a
message previously transmitted.
Encrypted services were sent when it was
necessary to request reencipherment of the entire
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text or a portion of the text of a specific cable.
Requests were also sent for missing check numbers,
clarification of duplicate check numbers or mes-
sage numbers, garbled portions, clarification of
names, places, etc.
Service wires are used by communica-
tion center personnel to exchange informa-
tion and instruction pertaining to traffic
handling and network operation, e.g., chan-
nel checks, rerun requests, etc. The term
"Service Wire" is used to distinguish such
messages from service messages.
There have been a very few messages lost
over the years. Whenever such an incident occurred,
an immediate investigation was launched to deter-
mine the reason and to initiate procedures to
prevent a recurrence.
Tracer action was required on messages
which were delayed excessively or apparently lost.
The communications center serving the message
originator initiated tracer action on delayed mes-
sages. That station carefully examined records
and the message heading to determine whether the
* See Figure 20, p. 138
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Figure 20
TRACER HQS ORIGINATED MESSAGE
PP
DE RUE IQCS T
ZNR UUUUU
BT
UNCLAS SVC TRACER CLAIMS NON-DLVY RUEIQC Z.
ZDQ RUEI AS ,__,,.~ ,? TRACE TO DESTINATION AND ADVISE. STA ACCEPTING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NON-DLVY GIVE REASON FOR MISHANDLING, C D E
RUEIQCS T ON ALL TRACES THIS MSG
138 -
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cause of delay could be ascertained and adequately
explained prior to commencing tracer action. Cog-
nizance was taken of any adverse circuit or traffic
conditions previously known or reported by inter-
mediate relay stations which might have caused
delay. Format line pilots and the elapsed time
between the date-time group and filing time were
checked for any indications of possible cause of
delay. If the cause of delay could not be locally
established, delay tracer action was normally in-
itiated by routine message.
Upon receipt of an excessive delay tracer,
each station examined its records for time of
transmission of the message being traced. This
information was compiled and transmitted to the
next station in the relay path and to the station
which originated the tracer. If any station(s)
which handled the traced message caused delay,
the reason for the delay and the corrective action
was stated in the report. Delay tracer actions
were discontinued as soon as station-to-station
reporting had accounted for the excessive delay
claimed.
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S E C R E T
The communications center serving the
message originator also initiated tracer action
on a message apparently lost. Upon receipt of
a tracer request which clearly indicated non-
receipt of a message, the originating communica-
tions center retransmitted the message as a
duplicate unless the originator preferred to
cancel it. If a duplicate transmission was
made, it was transmitted as a ZFG.
If the originator suspected, but was
not certain, that a message had been lost, a
duplicate transmission was made if the message
was IMMEDIATE or higher. In addition, a service
message normally of equal precedence to,the mes-
sage believed to have been lost was transmitted
to the addressee station, properly identifying
the particular message, requesting verification
of receipt or nonreceipt. When the addressee
station advised that the message had not been
received, tracer action was initiated. If the
message believed to have been lost was PRIORITY
or ROUTINE, neither duplicate transmission nor
tracer action was initiated until it had been
S E C R E T
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verified by service action that the original
transmission had not been received.
The communications center serving the
originator, upon receiving verification of non-
receipt, then transmitted a service message tracer
to the first relay station involved with the orig-
inal transmission. The latter station, after de-
termining that mishandling had not been involved,
then transmitted the tracer to the next relay sta-
tion for action and to the originating station for
information. Such action was continued on a station-
to-station basis until the cause for the lost mes-
sage had been determined and reported to the orig-
inating station.
Attempts have been made to eliminate
check numbers since they do add to the workload.
Check numbers were sometimes eliminated on book
*
messages and AXANET service messages.
However, it was deemed advisable to retain
the check number as a permanent entity of the CIA
communications network.
* See Attachment GG
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S E C R E T
Message formats changed periodically
between 1951 and 1966. All cables transmitted/
received were recorded on microfilm and became
a permanent entity of the CIA Archives. It
would be too voluminous to include samples of
all the various formats used through the years;
therefore only a sample of incoming and outgoing
message formats existing in 1966 is included.
All CIA communications procedures and
message handling practices are in accordance with
the following documents ** :
ACP 127 - Communications Instructions - Tape Relay
Procedures as amended by I I-
Communications Instructions for Use with-
in AXANET
ACP 128 - Automatic Digital Network (Autodin)
Procedures
COI 101 - Criticomm Operating Procedures
D. Cable Dissemination Procedures
1. Distribution of Cables
In August 1952 the Signal Center
Processing Branch became known as the Cable Sec-
** Current editions on file in Signal Center
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retariat and was placed on the CIA organizational
chart under the Executive Assistant to the Director.
was designated the Cable
was appointed
Specific details of the transfer of
responsibilities and descriptions of the distri-
bution procedures employed by the Signal Center
prior to the transfer of these responsibilities
to the Cable Secretariat during the years 1951-52
are adequately described in the history of the
Cable Secretariat. *
The transfer of the distribution
responsibilities of staff cables to the Cable
Secretariat was quickly offset in a few years
by the increased responsibilities levied upon the
S/C by the highest authorities of CIA regarding
the distribution/dissemination of Special Project
Secretary, and
as his deputy.
COMINT, and other "Hold Down"
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(such as
traffic. The increase of Special Project and COMINT
traffic necessitated the activation of a Special
* See Part One, Chapter I, p. 20 continuing
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Signal Center Branch during the 1953-54 period
to process this extremely sensitive traffic. All
personnel assigned to this branch required special
clearances above TOP SECRET and CRYPTO, and dur-
ing the early years only selected personnel were
granted these clearances. The SSCB in "L" Build-
ing became responsible for performing the functions
identical to those which were transferred to the
Cable Secretariat for normal staff traffic. In
addition to the encryption/decryption and/or trans-
mission/reception functions, SSCB personnel initial-
ly typed, edited, assigned distribution, and re-
produced incoming and outgoing messages in much
the same manner as the Cable-Secretariat employed,
but with the addition of stringent "hold down"
rules. The distribution of these cables was
performed in accordance with day-to-day regu-
latory memoranda. These memoranda were signed
sometimes by the Director, CIA, and often by the
Chief Project Officers. All of the memoranda
governing the processing of these sensitive cables
were destroyed by the S/C immediately upon being
rescinded, and this procedure was rigidly followed.
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As a result, no reference or other description
of the peculiarities involved in the processing
of this traffic can be written by the Signal Center.
Much of this traffic was not only
sensitive but in many cases of the highest prior-
ity, requiring expeditious handling. Many inno-
vations, therefore, were adopted to speed the proc-
essing to the customer after receipt in the S/C.
These included the delivery of advance copies.
In some instances Watch Officers and Senior Super-
visors delivered these "Message to Garcia" style
by actually galloping down the halls of "I", "J",
"K", "L", and other local buildings at all hours
of the day and night. Later, delivery of the hard
copy (teletype copy as received) eliminated retyping
the message. Corrections and annotations were usu-
ally made in pencil on the hard copy. Needless
to say, these had to be legible and accurate.
In 1958 the S/C was given the addi-
tional responsibility of operating the "Q" Build-
ing Signal Center. In order to expedite the proc-
essing of certain categories of traffic received
from NSA and other high level Government offices,
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and to compartment this traffic as much as
possible, restricting it to properly cleared
personnel in "Q" Building, a "Q" Building Annex
was established in the late 1940's. The respon-
sibility for the operation of "Q" Building was
assumed by OC in 1958 and was the final take-
over by OC for the responsibility for processing
SI and other "hold down" messages for the entire
Agency.
The manual distribution procedures
employed by SSCB and "Q" Building, even with the
streamlined processes described above, were still
not fast enough. Therefore, yet another method
was inaugurated, the electrical delivery of the
message directly to the consumer's office, thereby
eliminating the many "Message to Garcia" courier
runs for high precedence traffic as well as the
time-consuming courier runs for routine traffic.
Thus, out of sheer necessity, the electrical de-
livery technique was born. The advent of electri-
cal delivery, later called electrical dissemina-
tion, for the processing of SI traffic did not
entirely eliminate manual distribution procedures,
--,
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S E C R E T
but was used only where technically feasible from
a security standpoint, since a special new shielded
cable was required to connect the S/C with the con-
sumer's office. The electrical dissemination tech-
niques lent themselves to SI material because of
the limited distribution this type of material
received by the S/C combined with the requirement
for extremely fast service applicable to the 60-
70% of the total special traffic load. On the
staff side, in the Cable Secretariat, the require-
ments differed, particularly in the area of the
number of action and info distribution require-
ments levied upon the Cable Secretariat. The
latter did not lend itself to electrical delivery.
The manual distribution techniques
employed by both SSCB and "Q" Building remained
much the same until the move to the new CIA Head-
quarters Building in 1961 and 1962, most of it
consisting of hand-to-hand courier delivery
either by the members of the Comcenters or by
personnel attached to the consumers' offices.
After the move to the new building, a special
window was designed where traffic could be picked
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up and/or delivered directly to the Special
Activities Facility (SAF). Additionally, in
1965 a tube system was installed between SAF
and the OCI-CIA Operations Center.
2. Electrical Disseminations
The first electrical dissemination
circuits were installed between the "Q" Building
Signal Center and the CIA Watch and OCI Dissemi-
nation Offices in "Q" Building. These linkages
consisted merely of a secure shielded cable in-
stallation between the "Q" Building Signal Center
and the two offices mentioned. Two transmitter
distributors were installed in the Comcenter,
and teletype page printers in the consumers'
offices where the consumers tore the copies off
the printers equipped with multiple copy paper
and took appropriate dissemination actions. Even-
tually, several secure building circuits were also
installed between SSCB in "L" Building and several
"L" Building offices prior to the move to the new
CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Further ex-
pansion of this technique was thwarted, however,
by the impending move.
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Upon arrival in the new CIA Head-
quarters Building electrical dissemination tech-
niques mushroomed considerably. The old SSCB
and "Q" Building centers were combined into one
Special Activities Facility in the relocated S/C.
Since the experimentation with the initial "Q"
and "L" Buildings electrical dissemination circuits
proved successful, OCI desired that this service
be continued in the new Headquarters Building.
This was agreed upon, and by the end of 1966 there
were 10 internal electrical dissemination circuits
in operation out of the Special Activities Facil-
ity. *
Two distinct operating procedures
were employed. One was the tape loop whereby a
hard copy and tape were received simultaneously;
then the tape was placed in a loop to a trans-
mitter which was connected to the outgoing dis-
seminations circuit. The operator monitored the
circuits constantly to make certain the message
was being delivered to the proper offices and to
ensure that no mechanical snags developed. A
* See Figure 21, p. 149
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stunt box mechanism on the outgoing side of
the circuit which read certain impulses on the
incoming cable, selected the proper lines for
transmission. This method was dubbed the "tape
loop" procedure. It eliminated the necessity for
tearing tape for each message and manually intro-
ducing these same tapes individually to one or
several transmitters for transmission.
The other method was a torn tape
distribution procedure whereby the operators
affixed the proper distribution to the message
manually after receipt and reintroduced the mes-
sage to the proper outgoing circuits. Although
time-consuming, this method was still much more
rapid than normal distribution procedures where
cables were reproduced and forwarded by pneumatic
tube or courier service. These procedures were
in effect at the end of 1966 and worked very well.
3. "Hold Down" Traffic, Restricted
Handling
The forerunner of Restricted Handling
was commonly called "Eyes Only," "Eyes Alone," or
the "Hold Down" cable of the 1950's. After the
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Cable Secretariat assumed the responsibility
for distribution of normal staff traffic, it was
decided by the Director, CIA, and selected DD/P
elements that certain sensitive "Eyes Alone" type
traffic dealing with high level United States
Policy or Agency deep cover operations should not
be given general distribution through normal Cable
Secretariat channels but should be handled by the
minimum number of personnel possible. The total
processing of these messages, from receipt in the
S/C to logging, enciphering, deciphering, and de-
livery was usually handled by one supervisor or
by one Watch Officer. If an off-line crypto sys-
tem was used, cipher and key tapes and work copies
were all destroyed. If an on-line crypto system
was used, work copies were destroyed. Delivery
was usually by hand, directly to the addressee
if incoming, and confirmation copy directly to
the originator if outgoing. No copies of the
cable were kept in the S/C. When the volume of
this traffic increased to the point where it be-
came too cumbersome for the Watch Officer and super-
visors to process to completion and still be re-
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sponsible for running the shop, it was determined
that this traffic should be given a special desig-
nation - Restricted Handling - and that this type
traffic would be handled by the minimum number of
personnel possible, but not necessarily restricted.
to the Watch Officer or Senior Supervisor. Stand-
ard instructions were agreed upon between the DD/P
and S/C in 1964 for the handling of Restricted
Handling traffic, not only in the Headquarters
S/C but in the field as well. These instructions
were periodically reviewed and amended.
Eventually this traffic was perma-
nently channeled into the Special Activities Facil-
ity where it could be controlled easily along with
SI, Special Project, and other sensitive traffic.
4. VIP Traffic
Starting in the mid-1950's, and
accelerating after AXANET had been converted to
an on-line network, more and more Presidential
and other high level United States Government
traffic was being processed in our network. By
the end of 1966 an average of 10-15 VIP cables
per month were filed with CIA for protection.
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wo
During crises periods, this volume increased in
scope dependent upon the length and nature of the
crises in question. Naturally, this traffic was
"held down" and expedited to the maximum extent
possible. In several instances, the names of all
personnel handling a particular cable were requested
by White House officials. This traffic was handled
quietly and efficiently without fanfare and once
processed was forgotten. No record copies were
maintained in the S/C. In 1966 procedures for
the processing of VIP Traffic were reviewed and
updated. *
The fact that this type of traffic
was filed in AXANET for privacy reasons attested
to the high degree of trust and confidence that
the White House and other United States Officials
had in the personnel and communications network of
CIA.
5. Signal Center/Cable Secretariat
Relationships, 1952-66
After the Cable Secretariat was
* See Attachments II and JJ
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organized, the Signal Center was responsible for
forwarding legible and accurate copies of staff
cables to the Cable Secretariat for their distri-
bution process. During the years that followed,
1952-66, the Signal Center and Cable Secretariat
cooperated and embarked upon many joint ventures
to improve the economy and the processing of the
ever-increasing volume of staff traffic to the
mutual benefit of both parties. Many improve-
ments were made in the processing of Disseminations
such as the installation of Pneumatic Tube System
between the Facilities, the elimination of typing
in the Cable Secretariat by providing copies of
cables on teletype hard copies and later on NCR
paper, the delivery of cables on multilith master
paper eliminating a costly Xerox reproduction
process in the Cable Secretariat in 1964, and the
introduction of paging procedures by field stations
so that messages were already paged upon arrival
in the Cable Secretariat.
Several studies were conducted during
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the Expansion Period which dealt with the advan-
tages/disadvantages of recombining SC/CS again
under OC. Nothing ever came of the studies. A
sample of one study dated 7 February 1958 is in-
cluded. *
E. Preliminary Disseminations, Teletype
Disseminations
The primary mission of CIA had always
been to provide finished intelligence to the Pres-
ident and his advisors. The prestige of CIA
depended on the success in accomplishing this
mission.
Contributing to the fulfillment of this
mission were the thousands of intelligence reports
prepared each year by the DD/P Officers in the
field to keep the United States Government Agencies
and Military Commands apprised of significant de-
velopments. These reports received wide local
distribution and were disseminated to the highest
United States Military Commands around the world
and to senior United States Government Officials
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in Washington.
The Signal Center and Cable Secretariat
cooperated to increase the speed, accuracy, and
presentability of delivery of both the Preliminary
Dissemination (PD) and Teletype Dissemination (TD).
The various methods used are aptly covered in the
history of the Cable Secretariat. * The following
gives but a brief resume.
Prior to 1956 the official designation
of an INTEL cable which was disseminated to the
local intelligence community was a Preliminary
Dissemination. Between 1951-56 most PD's were
transmitted electrically and simultaneously to
the local intelligence community (the Department
of State; the Department of the Army for the Chief
of Staff, U. S. Army for AC of SG-2; JCS SECDEF;
CNO for Director of Naval Intelligence; and Direc-
tor of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force), as well
as receiving normal internal distribution by
the Cable Secretariat. As instructed by origina-
tors these disseminations were further transmitted
* See Part Two, Chapter V, p. 140 continuing
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to the Director, FBI, AEC, or for inter-Agency
handling. This method afforded the most expedi-
tious and efficient service for the passing of
important intelligence disseminations which re-
quired top priority transmission to other U. S.
Government agencies. This constituted a workload
of anywhere between 500,000 and 1,500,000 groups
per month for the Signal Center. Due to cumber-
some processing procedures in DD/P components
involved, delivery of formal C/S Information Re-
ports which were follow-ups of PD's was delayed
sometimes as much as 3-6 days.
In June 1956 the Preliminary Dissemina-
tion was abolished and replaced by the Teletype
Dissemination. Processing procedures were altered,
and with the advent of the TD the Cable Secretariat
assumed the responsibility for reproducing and
distributing copies of DD/P TD's directly to the
consumer, and most PD's previously transmitted
electrically by the S/C were now delivered to the
local intelligence'community by courier. This
action resulted in much needed relief for the
S/C, particularly since both the Hungarian Crisis
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and Mid-East Crisis occurred in 1956, and it also
increased the speed of delivery to the consumers
since both internal distribution and external
courier delivery was accomplished practically
simultaneously during normal organizational hours.
Courier delivery was expanded between
195658 to the point where only TOP SECRET and
IMMEDIATE TD's were electrically delivered by
the S/C, thereby further reducing the S/C work-
load.
During 195866 additional streamlining
of procedures were placed in effect between the
S/C and C/S. The most significant of these events
was the adoption of paging procedures by the Signal
Centers in the field, segregation of INTEL materi-
al in the S/C thereby shunting the INTEL cable
to a selected teleprinter equipped with special
paper, and adoption of roll type mat multilith
paper on the incoming INTEL teleprinter in the
S/C. The latter not only increased the speed
of processing but also decreased the workload in
C/S considerably. *
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By the end of 1966 only approximately
10-15% of the total monthly TD volume was being
electrically disseminated by the S/C, while 85-
90% was delivered to the intelligence community
by round-the-clock courier service. They were
printed on a special form containing a letterhead
which clearly presented the product as a CIA in-
telligence report.
F. "Q" Building Signal Center
During the 194647 period the first secure
encrypted on-line circuit was placed in operation
between the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE),
CIA, and the Department of State, using a tape
crypto system. The circuit was restricted for
the processing of COMINT messages between Arling-
ton Hall (Army Security Agency) and CIA. State
relayed CIA traffic. In 1948 a direct circuit
with Arlington Hall replaced the State circuit.
Circuits were added with the "L" Building Signal
Center and DD/P - FI/D during the 1949-50 period.
The "Q" Building Annex operated on an 8-hour day
basis until the advent of the Korean War. After
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the start of the war the facility was moved to
larger quarters in "Q" Building, and the CIA
Watch Officer was moved adjacent to it. The
center then went on a 24-hour, 7-day week sched-
ule. The ORE Commo Annex was transferred to OCI
in January 1951.
Documentation written by
In fulfillment of its assigned
responsibilities for the timely pro-
duction and dissemination of current
intelligence, for maintaining a 24-
hour watch over incoming information
for the purpose of alerting key offi-
cials to the receipt of critical and
significant information and for the
dissemination of incoming COMINT to
all CIA components in response to
approve written reading requirements,
OCI relied heavily on electrical re-
cord communications.
From OCI's inception in January 1951
until September 1958, it maintained and staffed
its own Signal Center. Equipment and circuitry
were furnished and maintained by OC. The volume
of traffic, primarily COMINT, handled by OCI Sig-
nal Center grew steadily from a monthly average
of 350,000 groups in 1953 to 3,360,000 in 1958.
This phenomenal increase was attributed principal-
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ly to the steady increase in the amount of end-
product COMINT translations and reports received
by CIA from all over the world via the expanded
and improved COMINT communications network.
During 1955, the authorized T/O for the
"Q" Building Annex consisted of one CT/C super-
visor and two CT/C operators. One of the two
Watch Officers on duty in the OCI Watch Office
adjacent to the Signal Center provided replacement
coverage on Sundays from 0001 to 0830 and on Mon-
days from 0001 to 0700. Because of the ever-
increasing workload volumes and addition of cir-
cuitry, OCI borrowed another CT/C in October 1956
on a full-time basis to assist in processing traf-
fic. In January 1957 OC loaned a second CT/C for
the same reason, and in March 1957 a third CT/C
for a total of six personnel working in the center.
During the calendar year 1957, even with
six people and OCI Watch Officer coverage from time
to time, it was necessary to utilize overtime at
the rate of an average of 68 hours per pay period
* See Figure 22, p. 163
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in order to process the workload within the rigid
time requirements and hours of coverage required
by OCI.
By mid-1957 it became evident that OCI
could no longer carry the communications workload
with the limited manpower available. Furthermore,
NSA ha.d achieved its major breakthrough in the
rapid secure processing of record communications
with the development of the KW-26 electronic key
generator. NSA installed the first KW-26's in
its COMINT network and requested CIA to accept
KW-26's in "Q" Building in order to expedite the
flow of COMINT end-product to CIA. CIA accepted.
In order to provide relief for the be-
leaguered "Q" Building Signal Center staff, a staff
study drawn up by OCI and the CIA Management Staff
in January 1958 recommended that the OCI Signal
Center staff and functions be transferred to OC
and that OC he responsible for staffing all oper-
ational aspects of the OCI "Q" Building Center.
In July 1958 the DD/S concurred in the staff study,
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and the recommended transfer was effected. The
OCI Signal Center thus became known as the "Q"
Building Special Signal Center and was staffed
with a T/O of 17 personnel.
a Signal Center
Officer on the "L" Building Signal Center staff
organized the new center. This was quite a task
since the Signal Center was not only enlarged but
received the first KW-26's in the CIA network.
The COMINT network * and "Q" Building volumes **
continued to increase during the 1958-61 period.
The "Q" Building Signal Center was re-
sponsible for the innovation of many distribution
techniques designed to increase and expedite the
dissemination of cables within CIA. The following
are among its accomplishments:
a. First to simultaneously reproduce
cables upon receipt by using multiple
teletype machines for this purpose.
b. First to use multiple ply carbon and
NCR paper for direct customer distri-
* See Figure 22, p. 163
** See Figure l6b, p. 115
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0
bution purposes.
c. First to use electrical delivery
techniques.
d. First to activate a broadcast facil-
ity, USIB Broadcast.
The broadcast facility consisted of 131B2
half duplex broadcast circuits to consumer
elements as shown in the chart, USIB Broadcast. *
The broadcast was used to transmit daily CIA In-
telligence Summaries on a scheduled basis and spot
items at odd intervals. A switching panel asso-
ciated with the system gave CIA the ability of
transmitting to any or all of its USIB subscribers
simultaneously from a single transmitter-distrib-
utor. Since the system provided for select multiple
keying of the individual and respective crypto sys-
tem for each link, individual circuit and communi-
cations integrity was not affected. **
The "Q" Building Signal Center was the
first CIA facility to provide privacy communica-
tions channels for the President on his overseas
* See Figure 23, p. 167
** See Figure 24, p. 168
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 SE C UT
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FUni?e 23
USIB BROADCAST - CIRCA 1959-60
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"Q" BLDG CCUITS 1960-61
SSCB
"L"
BLDG.
ACSI
1.11 IC
CI I
A: SSO
RCI
ACS
f ?
!, Sc1/ //
LIN ISCN A
OCI
DISSEP
25X1
25X1
~"Receive Only
ELECTRICAL DISSEM.
(2)
Lines
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tours through the use of the KL-7 crypto system.
It was also the first center designated for re-
ceiving CRITIC messages in CIA.
In 1956 a staff study recommended that
a consolidated special center be established in
the Headquarters Building at Langley to replace
the proliferation of special centers that ex-
isted. * In 1958 OC, planning for fulfilling
OCI's commo requirements in the new building at
Langley, proposed that the "Q" Building and "L"
Building Special COMINT Signal Center (SSCB) be
consolidated into one large Special Signal Center
on the first floor of the new building. The con-
solidated Signal Center would take care of all of
OCI's (and the rest of its DD/I offices) COMINT
Commo requirements, as well as the DD/P (FI/D)
and OC's own COMINT cable requirements. To expedite
the flow of traffic between OCI's seventh floor
NORTH location and Signal Center's first floor
SOUTH area, it was proposed that a 52-pair secure
shielded cable link the two. OCI would be pro-
vided with all the terminal teletype equipment
* See Attachment 00
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on the, seventh floor necessary to keep the traffic
moving quickly between the two locations. No
cryptographic equipment would' be installed on the
seventh floor, since it was OC's desire to con--.
solidate all such gear in its first floor area,
No satellite crypto facilities were to be perms
mitted in the new building. OCT agreed to accept
OC's proposal for the new building if OC would
agree to staff the seventh floor teletype terminal
with competent S/C personnel. OC was reluctant
to staff the seventh floor with communicators but
finally agreed to do so. The "Q" Building Signal
Center was the first to move into the new building
in October 1961, and eventually became the con-
solidated Special Activities Facility upon comple-
tion of the "L" Building move in 1962.
OCI's local emergency conuno center, until
the move of "Q" to Langley, was located in Room 2
of East Building. Room 2 had the capability for
pulling in traffic from NSA (via G-2) and from
FI/D (via "L" Building) in the event "Q" Building
was knocked out. The facility was tested period-
ically to maintain it in a "ready" state. OCT also
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had an emergency facility at
C. Teleconference Activity
A teletype conference or Telecon was a
technique whereby two parties at remote locations
were in direct contact through the use of tele-
typewriter equipment. Telecons date from the
early days of World War II. Various types of one-
time tape and rotor systems were used to scramble
(encipher/decipher) the conference traffic. Telecons
were used when urgent exchanges of information were
required with groups of personnel at diverse loca-
tions. A teleconference tied up one send/receive
circuit for the entire duration of the conference
since the circuit could not be used for processing
normal message traffic simultaneously with the
holding of the conference. Since Telecons were
very expensive to operate, both from personnel
and circuitry standpoint, they were not used exten-
sively.
CIA first used the teleconference tech-
nique in the early 1950's when special teletype
equipment with projectors and view-through screens
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were installed in OC's Conference; Room in "I"
Building. The Machine Cryptographic Branch could
activate, whenever necessary, special off-line
teletype conference circuits between various
government intelligence agencies, or any part of
the Government having provisions for off-line
transmission. MCB, utilizing facilities of the
Army Command and Administrative Network (ALAN),
operated teletypewriter conference facilities.
These were utilized only when normal message
procedures did not suffice. For several years
regularly scheduled teleconferences for OCI and
OSI were conducted on Tuesdays and Thursdays be-
tween Headquarters and A
OTT crypto system was used to scramble the con-
ference traffic. The facility in "I" Building
flashed the message on the screen as it was being
decrypted and simultaneously provided a hard
teletype reading copy for the conferees. Informa-
tion exchanged during the Telecon was known as
"Telecon Items." Each IN and OUT Telecon Item
was numbered consecutively so that questions and
answers could be easily and quickly identified.
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As many as 100-150 items were exchanged during
a conference, and they sometimes lasted as long
as four hours.
During teleconference activity one
Watch Officer and two-three operators were required
to man the facility in "I" Building. The operators
managed the screening and associated teletype equip-
ment and maintained continuity of service with the
support agency supplying the circuit (Military),
and the Watch Officer served in a liaison capacity
between the conferees at Headquarters and the field,
making certain that proper and secure procedures
were employed during the passage of traffic.
Since teleconferences were very time-
consuming from a personnel standpoint, not to
mention tying up a transoceanic circuit for hours,
they were for the most part discouraged. Tele-
conferences with several other locations were held
periodically in "I" Building but were unscheduled
and strictly on an urgent need basis.
With the advent of the KW-26, the modus
operandi involved in teleconference techniques was
simplified and not so time-consuming as>far as OC
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manpower was concerned, but the technique was still
restricted by availability of circuitry and proper
cryptographic equipment. A teleconference facility
was established in the new Signal Center at Langley.
However, due to continuing space problems it was
not long before it was dismantled. Several M-28
ASR's used for training purposes were set aside
for conference use in emergencies.
A teleconference facility was installed
in the new CIA Operations Center in 1965 for the
use of Task Forces and other high level meetings
during crises periods. Probably the greatest use
of this technique occurred during the
Crisis when almost continuous Telecon activity
was in evidence for several weeks. Thousands of
items requiring "real time" critical action were
exchanged.
Teleconferences, while not used extensively
nevertheless played an important part in the commu-
nications service rendered, affording CIA users ex-
tremely rapid exchanges of information between
Headquarters and the field.
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H. Teletapes, Electrical Dispatches
The Teletape Program was established on
.a trial basis in 1958 for the purpose of expediting
the handling of certain categories of dispatch
traffic. Prior to 1958 all dispatches were sent/
received
Courier runs between many field stations
were infrequent, and it often took two-three weeks
for dispatches which required timely action. There
was also periodic evidence that there had been
dated 3 February 1958
DD/P memo to D/CO
requested that the
D/CO investigate the feasibility of enciphering
dispatch traffic. OC-7459 dated 21 February 1958
answered the initial query and stated that OC would
consider a test program which would encipher dis-
patches for pouching via air mail.
Briefly then, the teletape program was
initiated in 1958 as an experiment to provide a
type of communications more rapid and more secure
but more economical than
* See Attachments PP and QQ
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cables. Secretaries, with the aid of the Friden
Flexowriter, prepared punched tapes simultaneously
with the typing of dispatches. The punched tape
was delivered to the SIC where the dispatch was
logged, encrypted on an off-line OTT system, placed
in a round reel type container, and returned to the
originating Division. They in turn air mailed the
container to its destination. At the distant sta-
tions the message was delivered to the Signal Center
where it was decrypted and the clear text tape de-
livered to the addressee where it was run off on a
Flexowriter for distribution. The system was
ultimately designated
The system was set up on a trial basis
The program quickly
proved successful. The air mailing of tapes be-
tween Headquarters and
for example,
cut delivery time to three-four days. However,
unfortunately for OC, while it may have been
successful for the DD/P, it was an added workload
for the Signal Center since dispatches were much
more lengthy than ordinary messages and therefore
on an off-line one-time tape system the workload
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was significant. It wasn't long before personnel
were assigned to process teletapes on a full-time
basis solely for this purpose. The adoption of
teletape did not then, and indeed never did, sig-
nificantly decrease cable traffic as it was orig-
inally hoped.
During 1959-62 was
designated as the Teletape Coordinator for OC.
This function was transferred to OC/T in 1963.
Because of his primary interest, many of the
memoranda concerning teletapes were originated
by the Chief, Signal Centers.
Initially, from 1958-60, the Cable
Secretariat at Headquarters ran off and processed
0
tapes and delivered these to appropriate
offices. In 1960 the C/S discontinued processing
dispatches, and these were forwarded by the
S/C directly to the appropriate Area Division. *
With the advent of the KW-26, the
program was given added impetus. The cumbersome
manual encipherment/decipherment by OTT was dis-
* See Attachments RR and SS
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S E C R E T
continued, and the teletape was electrically trans-
mitted on KW-26 circuitry on a time available basis,
further reducing the three-four day pouching times
to Europe to one-two days. Naturally, since this
technique, combined with the KW-26, reduced
times drastically, OC got on the bandwagon and an
OC teletape system was inaugurated between Head-
quarters and the Chief
Plans were made by the DD/P to expand
the teletape system on a world-wide basis utilizing
the new AXANET KW-26 system. Consequently, by
20 April 1960, six stations were in the network.
These were Headquarters,
Two developments in 1960-62 caused the
teletape program to slow down:
1. OC again stated that teletapes were
an additional workload and were'not
processed free, and that cable traffic
was continuing to increase with no
significant decreases noted as a
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result of the adoption of the tele-
tape.
2. The Friden Flexowriter was found to
be very insecure and radiated great
distances, the latter almost resulting
in discontinuance of the program.
In order to save the program, DD/P installed shielded
rooms at many of its overseas locations, and OC ex-
perimented and actually installed noise generators
at several locations to "drown out" and counteract
the radiation characteristics of the Flexowriter.
At one time there was an attempt to have
secretarial personnel use the M-19 teletype ma-
chine to prepare the tape; however, the training
problems involved and the lack of enthusiasm on
the part of secretaries to become involved with
the operation of a teletype machine scuttled this
attempt. The M-19/28 technique was used by OC
for its own teletape program.
With the use of screen rooms and noise
generators, by 1963, 14 stations were in the tele-
* See Attachment UU
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tape network. These were the original six plus
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The Systems Group of DD/P, during 1962-
65, continued its search for a radiation free
Flexowriter or its equivalent. Several projects
were implemented and abandoned. The Headquarters
Signal Center continued to process increased vol-
umes of teletapes through its terminal facilities
with no major procedural changes. At one time,
for a short period, teletapes were electrically
delivered by the S/C to the DD/P/RID Teletape
Center; however, this technique, due to service
and accountability problems, did not work out.
By the end of 1965, teletapes were couriered be-
tween the Headquarters Signal Center and Records
Integration Division (RID). Stations using the
teletape system in 1965 are depicted in the Tele-
tape System Status Report of 28 May 1965. * Commo
teletape systems in 1965 were established between
In 1966 a program was inaugurated with
* See Attachment VV
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selected Far East (FE) stations to use normal
communications equipments/channels for the proc-
essing of dispatches to stations not equipped with
the Flexowriter. * This system was designated
the Electrical Dispatch.
participated in a test program which proved suc-
cessful.
were added to the
program in October 1966.
The Electrical Dispatch was devised to
provide immediate service at certain stations
with a need for communications faster than pouch
but less timely than cables, but which for reasons
of space, security, or maintenance could not accom-
modate Flexowriters.
At Headquarters the outgoing Electrical
Dispatch was typed on a Flexowriter in the Area
Division. The punched tape and one copy of the
message was forwarded to the S/C. Check numbers
and communications routing were added, and the
complete tape transmitted via KW--26. With the
* See Attachment WW
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exception of format and OC assignment of check
numbers, the procedure was identical with the
teletapes. The recipient Signal Center passed
NCR teletype paper copies to the station for
distribution.
In the field the outgoing Electrical
,Dispatch was given to the Signal Center which
assigned check numbers, poked the tape on its
normal teletype equipment, and transmitted the
Electrical Dispatch to Headquarters. On receipt
the Headquarters Signal Center forwarded the
tape and monitor copies to the RID Center Tele -
tape Unit where the dispatch received the same
handling as a teletape.
By the end of 1966 plans were completed
for integrating the teletape and electrical dis-
patch systems into what became known as Telepouch.
OC recommended that the Model 28/37 teletype ma-
chine be used at electrical dispatch stations
and as the ultimate machine to replace all
Flexowriters.
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J. CRITIC Messages
DCID No. 1/8, 29 April 1958 * was the
directive for the handling of Critical Intelligence
in the Agency. OCI Notice No. 50-200 dated 15 Jan-
uary 1962 ** summarized the history of the CRITIC
system of reporting.
Generally speaking, the NSA Criticomm
Network was responsible for the processing of
CRITIC messages. CIA field stations filed their
CRITIC messages to the nearest AXANET Relay Center
having a tie-line into the Criticomm Network. The
CIA terminal was first located in "Q" Building.
The Criticomm Network passed the message to Wash-
ington where it was instantaneously transmitted
on the ZICON Broadcast to all U. S. Agencies
authorized to receive Critical Intelligence Mes-
sages. This was accomplished through the use of
a unique format which contained Ilindicator
XCRITIC which triggered a system of automatic
computer controlled dissemination sequences. ***
* See Attachment CCC
** See Attachment DDD
*** See Figure 27, pp. 189-190 and Figure 28,
pp. 191-192
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After the "Q" Building Signal Center was
consolidated into the Special Activities Facility
in the new Langley Signal Center, CRITIC messages
were received on the
cation. Upon arrival, the CRITIC message triggered
a bell notifying the operators that a CRITIC mes-
sage was being received on the Broadcast. The
CIA Operations Center received the CRITIC message
simultaneously with the Signal Center; however,
SAF personnel made certain that the CRITIC was
received on the electrical dissemination circuit
on the seventh floor in good stead. If the CRITIC
message was of a Non-COMINT nature, SAF personnel
also passed the message as rapidly as possible
to the Cable Secretariat for additional dissemi-
nation. For several years the message was also
relayed to the Department of State; however,
State eventually received CRITIC messages directly
from NSA. SAF personnel maintained a separate
CRITIC log and entered handling times of both
live and test CRITIC messages. Periodic tests
were conducted by members of the CRITIC community.
The goal originally was 10 minutes from origina--
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tion in the field to dissemination in the
Washington area for some stations, and one hour
for others. However, the one hour rule was
eventually discontinued, and by the end of 1966
all stations were in the 10 minute category.
CRITIC messages may be altrouted in
AXANET to Washington and filed in the Criticomm
Network at Washington for dissemination on the
0
Broadcast. Stations using OTT and OTP
off-line cryptographic systems directly with
Headquarters filed their CRITIC messages to the
Headquarters Signal Center in the off-,line
system employed. The S/C refiled the message
into the Criticomm Network for dissemination on
The CIA routing document pertaining to
the handling of CRITIC messages during this his-
torical period was
This document is still
being used and is updated periodically.
Starting in 1960 a backup CRITIC telephone
systemi * was developed for use in case
* See Figure 29, p. 195
** See Attachment EEE
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normal communications facilities were disrupted.
The CRITIC message was actually telephoned in cipher
text to a sterile number in the Headquarters Signal
Center directly from the field station, and the
Signal Center Officer took the message down in
long hand. The technique was periodically tested;
however, it was never used extensively. The qual-
ity of circuitry and altroute capability within
AXANET was such that the ~echnique "just
seemed to fade away."
CRITIC messages were always handled in
the most expeditious manner possible by all Branches
of the S/C involved. When a CRITIC message arrived
it was processed to completion IMMEDIATELY, taking
precedence over all other messages in the Signal
Center.
K. Move to Langley "Q" and "L" Building
Signal Centers
T ^Z
Like other Agency employees, Signal Center
personnel anticipated the move to the new Head-
quarters Building with some ambivalence, additional
travelling time needed and possible difficulty in
getting to and from work being the main concern,
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but everyone looked forward eagerly to being
housed in a building designed expressly for CIA
operations. Signal Center personnel were especial-
ly enthusiastic at the prospect of working in a
custom-planned environment offering the ultimate
in modern facilities and working with the most
sophisticated equipment. This was heightened by
the experience of long years spent in makeshift
quarters with substandard conditions in the old
Administration, South, and temporary "L" Buildings.
Unremitting deterioration of these premises in-k
creased as, from the moment of ground breaking
for the new building, maintenance of the old was
reduced to the barest minimum. This was under-
standable in view of long-overdue demolition plans
soon after evacuation.
Construction of the new building proceeded
according to schedule until, only a few months
before anticipated completion, the Agency was
faced with a serious problem. To yield right of
way for the approach roadways to the new Roosevelt
Bridge, "Q" and "M" Buildings had to be evacuated
unceremoniously, as was the case with the Agency's
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historical neighbor, the old Christian Heirich
Brewery. Confronted by this unexpected contingency,
the Agency ordered the general contractor to
expedite completion of the section allocated to
the departments soon to be displaced from "Q" and
"M" Buildings, thus disturbing the uniform progress
previously maintained. In addition to the inevi-
table problems imposed by this unavoidable altera-
tion of construction schedule, the accelerated
move presented a legal difficulty in that the
Agency would have to occupy, before its acceptance
as a government owned building, a property still
owned by the contractor, the Jones and Tompkins
Company.
Communications plans had to be amended,
and a small segment of the new Signal Center area
was set aside for servicing "Q" Building customers.
Expeditious procurement of teletypewriter
equipments of the M-28 type ahead of schedule was
accomplished only as a result of great effort on
the part of both the Teletype Corporation and the
OC Engineering Division. Since all equipments
were used for both normal and special purposes,
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they required not only installation but compart-
mented assembly, appropriate modifications, and
testing. This made it essential that the equip-
ments and their respective components be dispatched
on site by midsummer of 1961.
All seemed to go well until the first
Agency's Government tractor trailer was dispatched
to Langley and was held at the gate by the contrac-
tors for unusually long clearance time, after which
the driver had to negotiate this heavy vehicle
along a soft, muddy lane and then back up to a
small, critical point near the arch of the north-
west cafeteria. This called for extreme skill,
since the contractor was finding it difficult to
establish sound construction footing in this area,
but the driver finally succeeded in maneuvering
into position. Since the building was owned by
the contractors at that point, the S/C and
Engineering Officers concerned were confronted
with another difficulty. The cargo being electri-
cal components, the Electrical Workers Union would
permit its unloading only by qualified electricians,
who had to be pulled off other jobs all over the
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building to perform this heavy but intricate task.
Frustrating as it was, the situation proved en-
lightening to those present in revealing the un-
compromising strength of the union dictations in
private enterprises.
All equipment was crated with specifica-
tions as to purpose, function, mode of operation,
assigned interface, along with internal/external
circuitry information. It was with a sigh of
relief that, after the equipment was placed in
its prearranged area for assembly and testing,
plans were able to progress for the necessary
preparatory work toward moving the equipment into
its final location.
A contract was near completion with a
private commercial firm to install and assemble
the equipment. However, it wasn't long before
the Agency's top security officer assigned to
the building found out through his G-2 chums
within the contractor element that unless the
prime contractor received the communications
contract, there might be a work stoppage by the
electricians. This would also add to construction
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delays. Although this tactic was considered dic-
tatorial and against'CIA's principles,
I Pas subsequently granted the contract.
Their resources for the.job were practically nil,
and their action to support the contract was to
hire a "communications engineer" with the job
authority to recruit moonlighters and muster
talent for the work. Although all details were
defined in the simplest and most organized manner,
results after evacuation of the contract personnel
from the premises were quite shocking.
The work was not completed by the dead-
line for initiating the "Q" Building move. Improp-
er wiring (100 WPM gears in 60 WPM teletypewriters
and vice versa) resulted in chaos in the first
attempt to transfer circuitry and operations from
"Q" to Langley. Fortunately, contingency planning
to maintain the "Q" Building operation, with the
means of transferring traffic from "Q" Building
to Langley on a piecemeal basis, proved successful
and resulted in only minimal delay of service to
the customers. A full force of the limited number
but highly competent Agency technicians dedicated
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themselves in remedying the multitude of faults
made by the contractor. Consequently, transfer
of all circuits and operations was effected within
24-36 hours, and the move of "Q" was completed
without any loss of traffic or service.
Following the "Q" Building move, primary
"L" Building S/C trunk circuitry was phased into
Langley, commencing in November 1961 and finally
completed in February 1962 with the final transfer
of all circuits from "L" Building. During this
period, "L" Building eventually became a terminal
off the Langley Relay Facility, and upon comple-
tion of the move on 10 March 1962, the tape relay
was simply diverted from the external "L" Building
linkage to the new internal Langley Terminal Facil-
ity. This transaction was executed splendidly
because of the sense of involvment and fine work
of all CIA personnel concerned.
Two Comcenters were in operation between
November 1961 and March 1962, which not only proved
wasteful of manpower, but called for great dili--
* See "Q" Building Move by
pp.
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gence and dedication.
Space precludes more than a hint as to
the endless snags, delays, and frustrations. Simple
communication with the subcontractors relating to
their special work often resulted in unforeseen
problems, the various unions invariably dictating
who could do what, when, and to whom or with whom,
with the ever-present threat of legal proceedings.
One example:
threatened legal
suit as well as informing their friends in Congress
because they did not receive a requested bid on
the no-break emergency power system, even though
this company had been previously contacted and
had declared they could not make delivery within
the required time.
Another problem was the new building
"constructional change policy." There was a
tremendous cost for a very minor change, e.g.,
$500.00 was charged just to change a blueprint
for relocation of a door on the architectural
drawings.
Tape relay equipment was the first of
the M-28 variety which the Teletype Corporation
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had described as "their handmade first." The
Technical Control Console which was to have
been the utopia for quality control, had many
engineering deficiencies and disappointments,
although it eventually proved to be a satisfactory
adjunct to the system. The design and installa-
tion of an endless conveyer for transporting mes-
sages between the S/C and the Cable Secretariat
was so "over engineered" that the method of chain-
ing metal baskets appeared more appropriate for
use as a transport for coal or ore from a mine
than for moving office papers. The removal order
was given shortly after the move to the new build-
ing. The telephone company also had their problems
as the scope of the installation and requirements
involved the largest repeater installation at that
time of, any building ever constructed.
Despite all trials and tribulations, the
job was finally completed, to the credit of tire-
less personnel who stayed with it uncomplainingly
with dogged perseverence. The new Signal Center
bore no resemblance to the old "L" Building opera-
tion. Planned during a transitory era, the new
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streamlined system was quite revolutionary.
Notwithstanding, some initial concepts were
outdated by moving time. Yet in spite of all
the. anguish in dealing with new equipments,
operating systems, and functional devices, due
recognition must be accorded to those who gave
so much of themselves to bring it to fruition.
"Q" Building Move to Langley, October 196
by
The "Q" Building Signal Center moved into
an unfinished area reserved for the Signal Center.
Since the "Q" Building Signal Center was one of
the first units to move to Langley, the move was
fraught with difficulties. At the time of the
relocation the south end of the building was still
under construction, and personnel assigned to the
area worked under extremely difficult conditions.
Although the Comcenter itself was secure, construc-
tion people were working all around it continually.
S/C personnel were required to wear two types of
badges, the regular CIA badge and the construction
company badge. The area under construction was
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policed by contractor personnel who had trained
dogs accompanying the guards as they patrolled
the area. The north end of the building, which
was finished, was policed by regular GSA guards.
Sanitary facilities were limited, and the only
eating facility was a contractor type sandwich
bar.
The Temporary "Q" Building Signal Center
activated with the following circuits:
(3) NSA
USIB BROADCAST TO STATE, RCI, CNO,
ACSI, NSA, LIAISON, AFSSO, AND THE
WHITE HOUSE,
(2) SSCB "L" BUILDING
MAIN SIGNAL CENTER "L" BUILDING
7th FLOOR (RECEIVE ONLY)
All incoming traffic was received in the
relocated Signal Center and "tape relayed" to a
terminal facility located in the OCI Watch on
the completed seventh floor north side of the
building. Outgoing traffic (with the exception
of White House, USIB items, and other critical
material) was delivered by courier from the sev-
enth floor to the Signal Center for transmission.
Traffic for overseas agency stations was transmit-
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ted to "L" Building for relay. Non-Agency addressed
traffic was transmitted directly via the above cir-
cuits. The traffic that was received from NSA was
also relayed to the "L" Building Signal Center for
DD/P-FI/D and Office of Communications, Special
Programs (OC/SP).
From October 1961 through February 1962
every imaginable type of outage occurred. There
were several power disruptions caused by the new
installation, heavy snows, automobile accidents,
accidental line cuttings, etc., and these bordered
on the ridiculous. Additionally, since the build-
ing was still under construction, crypto equipment
failure due to heat problems was also experienced.
The seventh floor terminal was literally
an ice box. Personnel assigned to man the terminal
not only found that they had to wear heavy clothing
but also had to install portable electric heaters.
It was quite some time before the Air Conditioning
Contractor tied this problem with one occurring
in a fifth floor office wherein the personnel were
smothering. The thermostats were cross wired:::
Added to all this, traffic volumes tripled
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during the first month in the new building and
the installation of additional circuitry became
necessary. Consequently, a fourth circuit with
NSA was installed and several additional circuits
with "L" Building were activated. During the peri-
od October through February, traffic handling pro-
cedures were refined "under a baptism of fire" to
say the least and with the completion of the move
of the main Signal Center from "L" Building to
Langley in March 1962, the temporary OCI Signal
Center was amalgamated with what was the Special
Signal Center Branch in "L" Building. Procedures
were again reviewed and updated and finally in
April/May 1962, when the dust settled, the Signal
Center was again a smooth-working organization.
It is a credit to the members of the "Q"
Building Center at the time, that according to
available records and recollection of personnel
involved, not one message was irretrievably lost
during this chaotic period of activity.
L. Liaison
There was a saying in the Signal Center
that when the phone rang in the Watch Officer's
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office it could be anyone from the Director of CIA
to the "lead mop" of the heavy duty char force.
The S/C conducted liaison with all components of
the Agency at the directorate and subdirectorate
levels Director's Office Complex, DD/I, DD/P,
DD/S, Deputy Director, Science and Technology
(DD/S&T) in the transmission and reception of
its communications product. The Signal Center
also conducted liaison with communications officers
in the Department of State and the entire military
establishment (Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, JCS, etc.)
as well as other U. S. Government Agencies in the
conduct of its business.
Since the liaison conducted related pri-
marily to the type of traffic processed, the fol-
lowing are samples of the level of liaison for
each category of traffic at the end of 1966.
Liaison functions between 1951 and 1966 were con-
ducted in a like manner, commensurate with internal
organizational changes of the agency.
CIA AND OTHER AGENCY STAFF TRAFFIC
Director's Offices, DD/P, DD/I,
DD/S components, and State and Military communicate
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tions officers providing support in the processing
of this traffic. Perform duty officer functions
for a small percentage of traffic.
CIA AND OTHER AGENCY S.I. TRAFFIC -*~
Director's Offices, DD/P, DD/I,
DD/S, DD/S&T components, and State, Military, NSA,
and affiliated communications officers engaged in
the processing of this traffic. Perform duty of-
ficer functions for approximately 30% of this traf-
fic.
CIA RESTRICTED HANDLING TRAFFIC
Director's Offices and DD/P per-
sonnel involved in the processing of this traffic.
Perform duty officer functions for all traffic.
CIA AND OTHER AGENCY VIP TRAFFIC -
Director's Offices, White House,
Department of State, Secretary of Defense, and
other U.S. Government agencies engaged in the
processing of this traffic. Perform duty officer
functions for all traffic.
CIA AND OTHER AGENCY PROJECT TRAFFIC
DD/S&T Project Officers Office
of Special Activities (OSA), Office of Special
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Programs (OSP), Office of Research and Development
(ORD), Office of ELINT (OEL) and affiliated
Military Communications Officers and National
Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) agencies. In-
cluded is liaison with Commercial Contractors
associated with the various projects. Perform
duty officer functions for all traffic.
M. Crises Periods
The Signal Center had to operate through
many periods of national political crises during
1951-66. A few examples are:
Iran
1953
Guatemala
1954
Hungary
1956
Suez
1956
Ldgbanon
1958
Indonesia
1958
U-2 Incident
1960
Bay of Pigs
1961
Berlin Wall
1961
Laos
1961
Powers/Abel Exchange
1962
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Cuban Missile Crisis
1962
Dominican Crisis
1965
The Signal Center also operated through
several natural crises. One of these was the
frequent threat of flooding of the Potomac during
the "L" Building residence.
During all of the national political crises,
traffic volumes increased and fluctuated wildly,
particularly the number of high precedence messages
handled. It is not possible to reconstruct the
various Signal Center actions during all of the
above mentioned periods due to the destruction
of most records; however, a few have been selected
as examples of what transpired based on recollec-
tions and records available.
As a result of post-mortem analysis after
every crisis, improvements were made in areas of
SIC operational procedures. Thus, every crisis
actually resulted in some improvement and advance-
ment in some facet of SIC operations.
A sample of some of the complex procedures
* See Attachment FFF
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employed in "getting the message through" is
graphically presented by
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described in detail
the cumbersome procedures which were employed in
maintaining communications
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The Great Blizzard of 1966
by
The snow started falling on Saturday after-
noon, 29 January, and continued through the early
hours of Monday morning, 31 January.
Because of extremely hazardous driving
conditions, some of the midnight shift personnel,
29 January, started arriving at approximately 2200.
Evening shift personnel left as they were relieved
by midnight shift personnel. Three of the evening
shift personnel, who were scheduled to return at
0700 Sunday morning, 30 January, stayed over and
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slept in the building. All of the midnight shift
personnel reported for duty Saturday night although
some did not arrive until approximately 2400 hours.
This was most fortunate as it turned out.
Sunday morning, 30 January, it was still
snowing hard and the wind was starting to blow.
It was obvious that no one from the day shift could
get to work. One person on duty had chains on
his car and he and another person were able to
get to the 7-11 store at McLean (it was the only
place open) and brought back some bacon and eggs.
Upon their return, breakfast was served in the
Signal Center lounge. Signal Center personnel on
the sixth floor were also served. There were a
total of 18 personnel on duty -- 15 from the mid-
night shift and the three that had stayed over
from the previous evening shift.
Around noon Sunday, 30 January, the Signal
Center took over four beds in the Medical Section
so that personnel could start getting some rest.
Sunday evening the Signal Center appropriated
two cots and set them up in the Signal Center.
This enabled six people to rest at a time. We
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continued this arrangement for the duration of
the emergency.
Also around noon Sunday, 30 January, build-
ing security advised us they had opened the cafe-
teria kitchen and pillaged some food (ham) from
the cafeteria lockers and the building guards were
cooking and serving meals. They advised us each
time thereafter that food was being served.
The snow continued until the early hours
Monday morning, 31 January. Logistics made
arrangements to pick up some off-duty personnel
at central locations throughout the area and we
called these personnel and told them to be at
these locations at a certain time. Between 1000
and 1200 on Monday, 31 January, personnel started
arriving in the Signal Center to relieve personnel
who had been on duty since 2300 Saturday night,
29 January.
OC Newsletter Item from Chief, Signal
Center to Director of Communications * also sum-
marized the condition aptly. Sample of remedial
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actions as a result of the Great Blizzard is sug-
gested in a memo to Chief, Administration Staff,
OC, from Chief, Signal Centers, OC. *
Since 1966, several other crises periods
have been experienced. Although these will not be
described here, lessons learned from crises of
1951-66 benefitted the Signal Center in weath-
ering these in good form.
N. ASCB/Emergency CommunIcations
As the status of the Agency and its com^
munications network increased, it became obvious,
particularly after the Korean Conflict started,
that an Alternate or Emergency Signal Center Site
in the Washington area was necessary in the event
that the "L" and "Q" Building complexes were
destroyed as a result of hostile action or natural
disaster.
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Abbreviations
ADCO Assistant Director for Communications
ADSO Assistant Director for Special Operations
AFASA Armed Forces Security Agency
ASA Army Security Agency
ASCB Alternate Signal Center Branch
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIG Central Intelligence Group
CIRVIS Communications Instructions for Reporting
Vital Intelligence Sightings
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMSEC Communications Security
CRITIC Critical Intelligence
Criticomm Critical Intelligence Communications
System
Communications Specialist
C/S Cable Secretariat
CS/DO Clandestine Services Duty Officer
CT/C Communications Technician/Cryptographer
CWO Communications Watch Officer
DCO Director of Communications
DD/I Deputy Director, Intelligence
DD/P Deputy Director, Plans
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DD/S
DD/S&T
DEVPLAN
FE
FI/D
ICS
M&T
Deputy Director, Security
Deputy Director, Science and Technology
Development Plan
Double Transposition
Electronic Intelligence
Far East
Foreign Intelligence.Division D
Interagency Communications System
Manning and Training
Manual Cryptographic Branch
National Reconnaissance Organization
National Security Agency
OC Office of Communications
OC/E Office of Communications, Engineering
OCI Office of Current Intelligence
OC/O Operations Division, Office of Commu-
nications
OC/RD Office of Communications, Research and
Development
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S E C R E T
OC/S Office of Communications, Security
OC/SP Office of Communications, Special Pro-
grams
OC/T Office of Communications, Telecommuni-
cations
OEL Office of ELINT
00/CD Office of Operations, Contacts Division
OPSCEN Operations Center
ORD Office of Research and Development
ORE Office of Reports and Estimates
OS Office of Security
OSA Office of Special Activities
OSO Office of Special Operations
OSP Office of Special Programs
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OTP One-time Pad
OTR Office of Training
OTT One-time Tape
PD Preliminary Dissemination
QFM Quantized Frequency Modulation
RID Records Integration Division
SAF Special Activities Facility
S/C' Signal Center
SCO Signal Center Officer
254
S E C R E T
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SDO Senior Duty Officer
SI Special Intelligence
SSCB Special Signal Center Branch
SSU Strategic Services Unit
TD
Telecon
TFCL
TTYB
TWX
USIB
Teletype Dissemination
Teletype Conference
Traffic Control Section
Machine Cryptographic Branch
Bell System
United States Intelligence Board
S -, 255
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Glossary of Terms
Baudot code
The Morse code of the teletypewriter.
Book message
A message sent to several addressees,
none of which is required to know which other
addressees received the message.
A message sent across the sea by telegraphic
cable. Within communications, the words "message"
and "cable" are considered synonymous and are used
interchangeably.
Channel
An electrical path over which transmissions
can be made from one station to another.
Cipher
A method of communicating in which the
letters of the original plain text are rearranged
(transposition) or replaced by letters, numbers,
or symbols (substitution) according to a given
system in order to conceal its meaning.
Circuit
An electronic path between two or more points
capable of providing a number of channels.
Code
a. A system of communicating in which
arbitrary meanings are assigned to letters,
numbers, words, or other symbols, designed pri-
marily to restrict comprehension of a message.
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b. In Morse code, the ordinary dot and
dash symbols of international telegraphic communi-
cations. No concealment is involved.
Communications Center
The office or activity charged with the
responsibility for receipt, transmission, and
processing of messages.
The protective guise used by persons,
organizations, or installations to prevent their
identification with clandestine intelligence
activities.
Cryptanalysis
The methods of breaking codes and ciphers.
to
ca
Technical cables containing cryptographic
information.
Cryptography
The art or practice of preparing or reading
messages in secret writing.
Decipher
To convert a cryptic writing into compre-
hensible terms.
Encipher
To convert a plain text message into cipher.
Encryption
An enciphering or encoding.
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Field Station
An intelligence or operations installation
outside of Headquarters.
Government Facilities
Telegraph channels, either U. S. Government-
owned or leased, operated by an agency of the U. S.
Government for the transmission of official U. S.
Government telegrams.
Headquarters
Home office of Central Intelligence Agency.
Indicator
In Communications:
a. An external indicator which identifies
the system in which the message is enciphered.
b. An internal indicator which prescribes
the internal routing of a message.
Minimize
A code word used for imposing a restriction
on non-urgent telegraphic traffic to a post or
area and signifying that normal conditions do not
exist and message traffic must be curtailed and
controlled.
"MONSTER"
A machine for processing one-time pad ciphers.
Multiple addressee message
A message sent to more than one addressee
for action or information where each addressee
must know that the others are addressees.
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S E C R E T
Network
An organization of stations capable of
intercommunication but not necessarily on the
same channel.
Nulls
Symbols included in a cipher that mean
nothing and are intended to confuse interceptors.
Off--line
A method of operation in which the processes
of encryption and transmission (or reception and
decryption) are performed in separate steps rather
than automatically and simultaneously.
On-line
An automatic method of encryption associated
with a particular transmission system, whereby
signals are encrypted and passed direct to a channel/
circuit to automatically operate compatible equip-
ment at one or more distant stations.
One-time system
A method of encipherment which consists of
a random key used only once.
Paraphrasing
The changing of the phraseology of a message
without changing its meaning. Paraphrasing is
accomplished by reqriting the message; changing
the position of words and phrases within a sen-
tence; using synonyms or equivalent expressions;
and changing the order of paragraphs, but retaining
the original paragraph numbers.
Project
An approved clandestine operation.
S E C R E T
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Radio circuit
A single radio communications link, including
radio operations, signal plan, crystals, crypto-
graphic material, secure operating sites, and
radio transmitting and receiving equipment at
both ends of the link; e.g., base station and
clandestine field set.
Radnote
A cable concerning the technical operation
of the communications system.
Rotor machine
A progressive-key system of wired codewheels
which produces scrambled plain text characters.
A one-time tape machine for on-line/off-line
cipher operation.
Strip system
A slide form cipher device.
Superencryption
An enciphering of what already is a
cryptogram; e.g., enciphering a one-time pad
message in an on-line machine system.
Tape relay
The procedure employed for the handling
of messages by manual, semiautomatic, or fully
automatic relay systems.
Telecommunication
Any transmission, emission, or reception
of signals, signs, writing, images, and sounds,
or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio,
visual, or other electromagnetic systems.
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Telecon
A teleconference or teletype conference
between stations. Senior officials at one station
confer with senior officials at distant stations
via manually patched teletype facilities.
Telex, TWX (Teleprinter Exchange Service)
A commercial subscriber teleprinter exchange
service on a time call basis which permits tele-
typewriter communication on the same basis as
telephone service (subscribers operating through
central switchboards) to stations within the same
country or in other countries.
The transientless teletype cipher machine
designed to prevent compromise by electrical means.
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APPENDIX-F
Illustrations
Page
Figure 1. Organization Chart of S/Cr, 1956 7
Figure 2. Organization Chart of S/C, 1962 36
Figure 3. Organization Chart of S/C, 1966 48
Figure 4. T/O Personnel, 195154 78
Figure 5. Average Employment, 1955-61 79
Figure 6. Average Employment, 196166 80
Figure 7. Graph - Average Employment,
1951-66 81
Figure 8. Diary of a CT/C 66
Figure 9. Major Crypto/Terminal Equip-
ment, 195166 83
Figure 10. Groups Per Man-Hour, circa
1962
Figure 11. The Vigenere Tableau 88
Figure 12. Signal Center Circuitry, circa
1958 94
Figure 13. Field Stations Supported,
1951-66 99
Figure 14. Agency Network, 1963 107
Figure 15. Signal Center Circuitry
1966 112
Figure 16. IN/OUT Group/Word Counts, "L"
and "Q", 1951-62 114-116
Figure 17. Terminated/Originated Messages,
Langley, 1962-66 118-120
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Figure 18. Numbers Assigned to CIA Mes-
sages 125-126
Figure 19. Types of Service Messages 128-135
Figure 20. Tracer HQS Originated Message 138
Figure 21. Electrical Dissemination CY1966 149
Figure 22. OCI COMINT Teletype Net
6 September 1956
Figure 23. USIB Broadcast - circa 1959-60 167
Figure 24.
"Q" Building Circuits, 1960-61
Figure 27. CRITIC Traffic Flow (COMINT)
1962
Figure 28. CRITIC Traffic Flow
(Non-COMINT) 1962
Figure 29. Routing of CIA Originated
CRITIC Messages, 1966
189-190
191-192
195
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Figure 32. Contingency Circuitry
Figure 33. ICS Net
Figure 34. Domestic Mobile Radio Nets
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Attachments
A. Memorandum for ADSO from DCI, 27 June 1951.
B. Memorandum for DCI from ADCO, Subject:
Establishment of a CIA Message Center,
9 July 1952.
C. Office of Communications Signal Center,
Organization and General Operating Procedures,
1956.
D. Memo to All Signal Center Personnel from
Chief, Signal Centers, Subject: Signal Center
Reorganization, 27 January 1960.
E. Office of Communications Memorandum No. 33-59,
Subject: Trail Establishment of Signal Center
Operations Staff, 12 November 1959.
F. Memorandum for Chief, Signal Centers, OC,
Task Force Report, 29 January 1963.
G. Memorandum to All Staffs and Divisions, OC
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG-M 63-002,
Subject: Reorganization of Signal Center,
3 January 1963.
H. Memo for Chief,--Records Management Staff, OC
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, Subject:
Domestic Activities, 20 April 1965.
I. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans),
Deputy Director (.Intelligence), Deputy
Director (Research), Subject: After-Hours
Contacts - Office of Communications, 25 April
1962.
J. Memorandum for DD/S from Deputy Director of
Communications, Subject: Intelligence Support
in Crisis Situations, 15 June 1965.
K. Office of Communications Order No. 1-56,
Subject: Continuation of Essential Activities
During Other Than Normal Working Hours, 6
January 1956.
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L. Office of Communications Order No. 40-65,
Subject: Office of Communications, After-
Hours Coverage, 24 November 1965.
M. Memorandum to Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick from
Chief, Communications Division, Subject:
Communications Personnel, 27 June 1951, -
attached Memorandum to ADSO from Chief,
Communications Division, Subject: Communi-
cations Personnel, 20 June 19 1, and Memo-
randum for Subject:
Personnel, 23 June 1951.
N.
Memorandum to Director/OC from Chief, Sign
Center, Subject: Critical Conditions Exis
in Signal Center, 12 July 1951.
al
ting
0.
Office of Co
mmunications Ord
er No. 1-54,
Subject: Pe
rsonnel Ceiling
of the Office
of
P.
Communicatio
Memorandum t
OC-DO/SCB/P&
ns, 21 January 1
o Chief, OC-DO/S
AS, Subject: Th
954.
CE from Chief,
e Communicatio
ns
Q.
Revolution a
Memo for Chi
from Chief,
Recruitment
nd the CT/C, 24
ef, Administrati
Signal Centers,
of Contingency F
March 1969.
on Staff, OC,
OC, Subject:
orce, 21 Novem
ber
1962.
R. Memo for Director of Communications from Chief,
Signal Centers, OC, Subject: Personnel Ceiling,
28 March 1963.,
S. Background Paper No. 8, Office of Communications
Presentation to the Agency Planning Group for
Mechanically Integrated Reporting and Communi-
cations S stem, presented by
anuary 1959.
T. Memo for Chief, Communications Security Staff,
OC, from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, Subject:
HL-6 Operational Report, 29 November 1962.
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U. Memo for Chief, OC-MD from Chief, Signal
Centers, OC, SIG-M 63-018, Subject: Amount
of Traffic One Operator Can Poke, 14 February
1963.
V. Memo for Chief, Telecommunications Staff,
OC, from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG-M
63-095, Subject: Farrington Scanner, 16
August 1963.
W. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Support
from Director of Communications, OC-3954,
Subject: Proposed Item for the Support
Bulletin, 29 June 1965.
X. Description of LDX, 1 March 1966.
Y. Communications from Deputy
Director for Support, Subject: Cable Re-
leasing, 21 December 1966.
Z. Memo to DD/P from Acting Director of
Communications, Subject: Reduction of
Cable Traffic, 15 August 1951.
AA. Memorandum for DCI from Assistant Director
for Communications, OC-3962, Subject: Re-
duction of Cable Traffic, January 1954.
BB. Memorandum for--DCI from Assistant Director
for Communications, OC-3963, Subject: Re-
duction of Cable Traffic, February 1954.
CC. Cable Writing Refresher Course (Outline of
Proposed Agenda), April 1956.
DD. Memo to Chief, Telecommunications Staff,
OC, from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG-M
65-111, Subject: Procedural Instructions,
7 May 1965.
EE. Memo to Chief, Telecommunications Staff, OC,
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SC-M 66-339,
Subject: Communications Improvement Notice,
7 December 1966.
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FF. Signal Center Directive No. 44-66, Subject:
Check for Missing Check Numbers, 18 July 1966.
GG. Memo to Chief, Telecommunications Staff, OC,
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG--M 65-006,
Subject: Elimination of Check Numbers on
AXANET Service Messages, 7 January 1965.
HH. Incoming and Outgoing Message Formats, 1966.
II. Dispatch to Chiefs of Stations and Bases from
Deputy Chief, KUBARK, Book Dispatch 5524,
Subject: Use of KUBARK Communications Channels,
13 June 1966.
JJ. Dispatch from Chief, KUCLUB, OC-66-120,
Subject: Telecommunications/Procedures for
Handling Certain Non-KUBARK Messages Via
KUBARK Communications Facilities, 27 June
1966.
KK. Memorandum to Chief, Telecommunications
Staff, OC, and Chief, Engineering Staff, OC,
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG-M 65-091,
Subject: Proposal for the Paging of Messages,
25 April 1965.
LL. Memorandum from Chief, Management Staff for
Deputy Director (Support), Subject: Signal
Center/Cable Secretariat Operations, 7 Feb-
ruary 1958.
MM. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Support
from Director of Communications, Subject:
Proposed Item for Support Bulletin, 26 May
1966.
NN. Memorandum for Assistant Director for Current
Intelligence, Director of Communications
through Deputy Director (Intelligence) from
Deputy Director (Support), Subject: Staffing
for Special Intelligence Communications Center
Presently Located in the Office of Current
-Intelligence, 7 July 1958.
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00.
PP.
Staff Study - Communications Facilities Re-
quired for the Handling of Special Traffic,
January 1956.
Memorandum for DCO from Chief of Operations,
DD/P, DD/P 3-7398, Subject: A New Suggested
Method of Rapid Communications Between Head-
quarters and Field, 3 February 1958.
QQ.
Memorandum for Chief of Operations, DD/P from
DCO, OC-7459, Subject: Enciphering Pouches
between Headquarters and Field, 21 February
1958.
RR.
Memorandum for C/S, EE, WE, FE, FI fromi
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Subject: Area Division Processing of
Telet
-
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SS.
apes and Reports, 29 January 196(
Memo from Signal Center Staff to SCO,
103, Subject: Change in Si Signal Center
T
.
SC-O-O-
Pro-
cedures for Handling
(Reports) Tele- 25X1
tape's, 3 February 1960.
TT.
Memorandum to Chief, Signal Centers from Chief,
Communications Security Staff/OC, CSD 9-751,
Subject: Office of Communications Telet
ape
Program, 28 December 1959.
UU. Memo to Deputy Director of Communications
from Teletape Coordinating Officer, Subject:
Personnel and Circuit Requirements for Teletape
Processing, 9 January 1962.
VV. Memorandum for the Record from DDP/SG, SG-65--360,
Subject: Teletape System Status Report, 28 May
1965.
WW. Memorandum for Chief, Far Eastern Division
from DCO, OC-4543, Subject: Transmittal of
Dispatches, 20 April 1966.
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CCC. Director of Central Intelligence Directive
No. 1/8, Subject: Handling of Critical
Intelligence (Effective 29 April 1958).
DDD. OCI Notice No. 50-200, Subject: The Critic
System, 15 January 1962.
EEE. Emergency Transmission of Critic Messages
via Long Distance, Short Title:
July 1964.
FFF. Memorandum for-the Record by
Subject: Flood Alert, 30 March
1961.
GGG. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans)
from DCO, SIG-M 62-116, Subject: Effective-
ness of Plan MINIMIZE, 15 November 1962.
HHH. Memo to DCO from Chief, Signal Centers, OC,
SIG-M 62-115, Subject: Post Mortem on
Lessons Learned, 15 November 1962.
III. Memo to DCO from Chief, Signal Centers, OC,
SIG-M 65-131, Subject: "Lessons Learned"
from the Crisis in the Dominican Republic,
20 May 1965.
269
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JJJ. Dispatch to Chiefs of Certain Stations and
Bases from Chief, KUCLUB, OC 65-199, Subject:
SPEEDCAST, 16 July 1965.
KKK. Memo to DCO from Chief, Signal Centers, OC,
SIG-M 66-032, Newsletter Item, 3 February
1966.
LLL. Memo to Chief, Administration Staff, OC,
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG-M
66-063, Subject: Emergency Supplies,
24 February 1966.
PPP. Memo to Chief,. Telecommunications Staff, OC
from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG--M 64-070,
Subject: Emergency Communication
17 April 1964.
RRR. Memo to Intelligence Information Staff, OCI
from Chief, Telecommunications Staff, OC,
T-M64-605, Subject: Move of CIA Alternate
Signal Center (ASC) Communications Facilities,
14 September 1964.
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UUU. Memo to Chief, Communications Security Staff,
OC from Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SIG--M
65-102, Subject: Review of Motor Pool Radio
Voice Networks
Nets),
F
VVV. DCI/SO Mobile Voice Communications Network
Situation Summary, 30 April 1965.
XXX. Memo to Chief, Operations Support Staff,
OC from Chief, Signal Centers, OC SIG-M
65-220, Subject: Manning of thel
Signal Center during an Emergency Situa-
tion, 10 August 1965.
YYY. Memo to DCO from Chief, Signal Centers,
OC, SIG-M 66-096, Subject: Emergency
Planning, 1 April 1966. -
ZZZ. Memo to Chairman of the Ceiling Board from
Chief, Signal Centers, OC, SC-M-66197,
Subject: Request for Slot for lI 28 June
1966.
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Source References
APPENDIX-Ii.
1. Memorandum for ADSO from DCI, 27 June 1951.
File: Job 66-654, Box 1, Folder 6, Archives.
Attachment A.
2. Office of Communications, 1 May 1959.
Copy 13 on file in Signal Center.
3. Memorandum from ADCO for DCI, Subject:
Establishment of a CIA Message Center,
9 July 1952. Attachment B.
4. Office of Communications Signal Center,
Organization and General Operating Procedures
1956. Attachment C.
5. Recollection of
view, 1 December 1970.
6. Recollection of . Inter-
view, 18 December 1970.
7. Recollection of I Inter-
view, 3 March 1971.
8. Office of Communications Memorandum No. 33-59,
Subject: Trial Establishment of Signal Ce to er
Operations Staff, 12 November 1959. File:
Job 66-793, Box 1, Folder 12, Archives.
Attachment E.
9. Interview,
4 February 1971.
10. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans),
Deputy Director (Intelligence), Deputy Direc-
tor (Research), Subject: After-Hours Contacts
Office of Communications, 25 April 1962.
File: Job 66-654, Box 1, Folder 4, Archives.
Attachment I.
11. Memorandum for DD/S from Deputy Director of
Communications, Subject: Intelligence Support
in Crisis Situations, 15 June 1965. Attachment J.
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12. Office of Communications Order No. 1-56,
Subject: Continuation of Essential Activ-
ities During Other Than Normal Working
Hours, 6 January 1956. File: Job 66-793,
Box 2, Folder 2, Archives. Attachment K.
13. Office of Communications Order No. 40-65,
Subject: Office of Communications, After-
Hours Coverage, 24 November 1965. File:
Job 66-793, Box 1, Folder 2, Archives.
Attachment L.
14. Recollection ofi Inter-
view, 9 March 1911.
15. Memorandum to Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick from
Chief, Communications Division, Subject:
Communications Personnel, 27 June 1951, --
attached Memorandum to ADSO from Chief,
Communications Division, Subject: Communi-
cations Personnel, 20 June 1951, and Memo-
randum for Subject:
Personnel, 23 June 1951.
Above documents filed: Job 66-654, Box 1,
Folder 6, Archives. Attachment M.
16. Memorandum to Director/OC from Chief, Signal
Center, Subject: Critical Conditions Existing
in Signal Center, 12 July 1951. File: Job
66-654, Box 1, Folder 6, Archives. Attach-
ment N.
17. Recollections of
view, 2 December 1970.
18. Office of Communications Order No. 1-54,
Subject: Personnel Ceiling of the Office
of Communications, 21 January 1954. File;
Job 66-793, Box 2, Folder 4, Archives.
Attachment 0.
19. Memorandum for Chief, OC-DO/SCB from Chief,
OC--DO/SCB/P&AS, Subject: The Communications
Revolution and the. CT/C, 24 March 1969.
Attachment P.
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20. Memo for Chief, Administration Staff, OC from
Chief, Signal Centers, OC, Subject: Recruit-
ment of Contingency Force, 21 November 1962.
Attachment Q.
21. Interview,
3 March 1971.
22. Memo for Director of Communications from Chief,
Signal Centers, OC, Subject: Personnel Ceiling,
28 March 1963. Attachment R.
23. Memo to DD/P from Acting Director of Communi-
cations, Subject: Reduction of Cable Traffic,
15 August 1951. File: Job 66-654, Box 1,
Folder 6, Archives. Attachment Z.
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1ECRET
A
pproved For Release 2004/108CIA-RDP84-00499R000400080001-4
 SECRET (When Filled In)
f f . of Comm
is nal Cent
telease T
Cryptography, Security
Logistics,SIGINT,COMINT
O C,p UUMENT
Has, &
Inior:7.dwide
9FX1
Spec. Tntell,CRITIC
Telepquch
Communications
~ E: Sept. 67 25X1
Commo personnel
DENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)
_DRATT, Chap. III, Section F. of The Headquarters Signal Center --
The Expansion Period 1951-66. (274 pages)
^NST AC
~ bomprehensive account of the trials and tribulations of Hqs. Center in their ever-changing activity over a 15 year period, including
many crises, i.e.; Iran, Guatemala, Hungary, Suez, Lebanon, Indochina, U-2,
Bay of Pigs, Berlin Wall, Laos, Powers/Abel, Cuban Missile, Dominican and
the '66 Blizzard. Cable traffic was never affected during any of this
activity. It also describes the many problems encountered in the move to
Langley (Hqs.) from "L" and "Q" Bldg. in Mid-61. There are many detailed
charts and graphs which expand the text.
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CLASS.: SECRET
NO.i
HS/UC- ~a
11?69 2523 E.'TIEM: '""IOU' HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET 113.15)
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a card upright in place of (
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