WHY 'SPY' AGENCIES ARE BEING SHAKEN UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000200160001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 7, 1973
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Appr Jofi ya2p/A W A
84--0 QP4=00 60001 -
GtNCIES 7
ARE BEING SHAKEN UP
. Drastic changes are aimed at
ending rivalries and improving
the usefulness of U. S. intelli-
gence. One result: Some inner
workings are being disclosed.
The supersecret U. S. intelligence ap-
paratus is being rocked from within on
a scale never before so visible to the
public.
What set off the tremor is a major
overhaul, now in progress, of the ma-
chinery that produces the worldwide
intelligence assessments on which crucial
national decisions are based.
Under James R. Schlesinger, the new
Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and overseer, also, of the vast
U. S. information-gathering network-mil-
itary as well as civilian-significant
changes are being made. They have
these objectives:
? To shake up the whole system and
sharply improve its usefulness to the
President and his top advisers.
? To process vital intelligence more
effectively, at less cost.
Mr. Schlesinger cracked down on
CIA, his home base, first. Now he is
expected to focus on other parts of the
intelligence community-military and
civilian.
Payroll reductions. In the reorga-
nization process, wholesale firings have
occurred at the CIA-a cutback, sources
say, of perhaps more than 1,000 of the
agency's estimated 15,000 employes.
Some professionals assert that Mr.
Schlesinger is bent on rooting out an
"intellectually arrogant" clique that has
been riding high in the CIA hierarchy
for years.
Others counter that the chief purpose
of the housecleanings is to enable the
Nixon Administration to "politicize" the
intelligence mechanism to its own ideo-
logical shape-and use Mr. Schlesinger
to do it.
Both charges are vigorously denied
by responsible people on all sides. In-
stead, the charges are cited as examples
of the bitter bureaucratic infighting go-
ing on in Washington-and spreading
into the intelligence system.
On one front, heated feuding between
the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense In-
telligence Agency-DIA-is out in the
open,
d Central Intelligence Agency,. top-secret Government organization,
responsible only to the White House, collects and evaluates intelligence
information, runs clandestine missions abroad, conducts espionage and
counterespionage.
HS/HC-,f 73
Pentagon intelligence specialists, trying
to regain control of assessing military
threats to the U. S., are citing what they
characterize as examples of blunders and
bias by the CIA.
The military critics admit that their
own mistakes a decade and more ago
obliged the Government to turn to the
civilian CIA for the main assessments
on military threats. But now, the mili-
tary men contend that DIA has been
revamped, is more objective-and less of
a lobby designed to scare Congress into
voting higher defense budgets.
Against that background of turbu-
lence, Mr. Schlesinger is moving to
carry out the sweeping reorganization
of the U. S. intelligence community orig-
inally ordered by President Nixon a
year and a half ago-in November, 1971.
Knowledgeable sources say that Rich-
ard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran,
was replaced by Mr. Schlesinger as CIA
Director because he failed to carry out
the overhaul mandate to Mr. Nixon's
satisfaction.
A top man in the intelligence network
put it this way: "The President and his
national-security adviser, Henry Kis.
singer, just didn't think they were getting
their money's worth."
The reorganization plan, in fact, is
Mr. Schlesinger's own handiwork. Ile
drafted it while serving as Assistant
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget. Later, he was named
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission-the job from which he was
transferred to his present post as Amer-
ica's "superspy."
Like Mr. Helms before him, Mr.
Schlesinger is not only Director of the
CIA but also Director of Central Intel-
ligence-DCI. That makes him boss of
all American intelligence operations.
New faces. One thing that Mr.
Schlesinger has done is to put together
what he calls the intelligence communi-
ty staff, with offices on the top floor of
the CIA headquarters building in a
'Virginia suburb of Washington.
Significantly, two military-intelligence
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE lIE! VJOflN ND
James Schlesinger, Director of
Central Intelligence, presides
over the U. S. Intelligence
Board, which sets intelligence
requirements and priorities.
Represented on the board are-
 CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who
oversees all U. S. intelligence, desig-
nated two military men among deputies.
experts have been assigned to that staff
as Mr. Schlesinger's deputies. One is
Maj. Gen. Lew Allen, of the Air Force,
who has been nominated for promotion
to lieutenant general. The other is Maj.
Gen. Daniel O. Graham, of the Army,
a career intelligence officer.
General Graham, who has been dep-
uty director for estimates in the Penta-
gon's DIA, sounded a call in an article
he wrote recently for "Army" magazine
advocating reassertion of a dominant
role for the military in estimating security
threats. May 1 was set,as the date of his
move to Mr. Schlesinger's staff.
As the shake-up of the intelligence
establishment continues, charges and
countercharges are giving Americans a
rare look at its inner workings and hot
rivalries. For example-
s Military men are alleging that "bi-
as" of top-level CIA evaluators colors
final estimates sent on to the President
and his aides.
One case cited by a critic of the
CIA:
"An estimate entitled `New Order
in Brazil' was prepared as a basis for
Defense Intelligence
Agency, co-ordinating
intelligence efforts
of Army, Navy and
Air Force, assesses
armed forces and
Weapons of friend
02 016 he aide who blocked
84=-0f%A,Q
I
/ ? e r mcous estimate "won
Maj. Gen. Lew Allen Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham
policy decisions. Use of the term 'New
Order' in the title was like overprinting
a Nazi swastika on the cover. It paint-
ed the blackest possible picture of the
present Brazilian Government, making
Brazil look like an imminent threat to
the U. S. If the President had acted on
that report, he would have cut all aid
to Brazil."
? The CIA is accused of failing to
use information it had in hand to alert
the White House to Russia's acute food
shortage last year. The point made is
that the Soviets were able to negotiate
a billion-dollar grain deal with the
U. S. on terms favorable to the Krem-
lin-and unfavorable to the American
housewife, who had . to pay more for
bread.
The CIA answers this charge by con-
tending that the information was passed
along to the Department of Agriculture,
which, in the CIA view, failed to act
on it promptly enough.
? A military intelligence official says
that before the Soviet invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in 1968, the CIA director of
estimates offered a report prepared for
the President saying there would be no
invasion. An aide, disagreeing, used
various stratagems to avoid forwarding
the report. The delay prevented embar-
rassment for the CIA when the Russians
did invade, but, according to the
tY~
National Security
Agency codes and
decodes U. S. messages,
breaks foreign codes,
monitors foreign
communications,
conducts electronic
surveillance.
State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence
and Research makes
sure final intelligence
of political and
economic trends
abroad.
? In Vietnam, it is now
revealed, CIA and DIA were
often at odds. For instance,
they agreed that some Com-
munist arms were reaching
South Vietnam through the
Cambodian port of Sihanouk-
ville, but both were "wildly
wrong" on how much. But an
official, not in intelligence,
recalls that CIA was "much
further wrong" than DIA-al-
though each was on the low
side.
Another charge by critics of the
CIA: After the Tet offensive of 1968,
CIA reported Communists had seized
vast portions of the countryside, because
contact was lost with most sources out-
side the cities. This assumption was dis-
proved by on-the-spot checks by DIA
teams in helicopters.
An illustration of conflict between
civilian and military analysts:
In a recent national estimate, the
CIA took the position that Japan would
never consider arming itself with nuclear
weapons. The DIA argued that the Jap-
anese were keeping abreast of nuclear
technology and would not hesitate to
"go nuclear" if Tokyo felt that was
necessary for survival.
When the document was brought to
Mr. Schlesinger, an insider says, the
CIA analysts emphasized that they had
put their views first, as the current
position, and the DIA estimates were
relegated to the back pages. Mr. Schles-
inger was said to have, "hit the roof" and
to have ordered that the military view
be given equal prominence.
? General Graham, in his writing in
"Army" magazine, admits serious DIA
shortcomings in the past. He charges
that Pentagon intelligence has damaged
its own status by inflating its estimates
of threats to the "worst case" possible-
(continued on next page)
NEC
Atomic Energy
Commission detects
and monitors nuclear
tests by other
countries, gathers
information on
their nuc)czr
Federal Bureau
of Investigation
conducts
counterespionage
within
U.S., combats
sabo'rrc.
In addition, Treasur W(cFn?r if?ee 4o-13/QAdt -rf P #d4~a?R~S~P~APBL t es.
 ment typical of this view-
-wide World Photo
Overhaul of U. S. intelligence network is creating ten-
sion at CIA's massive headquarters near Washington.
"SPY" SHAKE-UP
[continued from preceding page]
in order to get more money from Con-
gress. He claims that this tendency has
been largely eliminated.
General Graham also charges that,
in the past, military intelligence has
been too prone to tailor its assessments
to the need "users" have for intelli-
gence that "supports the program."
Assessing blame. In some instances,
blame is being heaped upon both civil-
ian and military intelligence agencies.
One thing pointed out is that the entire
U. S. intelligence community-despite
warnings from some agents-refused to
believe that Soviet boss Nikita Khrush-
chev would dare to risk putting offen-
sive missiles in Cuba in 1962.
Khrushchev did just that, however,
and the "missile crisis" resulted.
Some of the military intelligence ex-
perts now insisting on a stronger voice
in the evaluation of raw data concede
that, in the past, the armed forces have
been supplied with exaggerated esti-
mates of the Soviet threat-such as the
"missile gap" of a decade ago that
turned out to be nonexistent.
It is pointed out, however, that the
DIA has had a thorough housecleaning
in recent years.
"Time to reassert." In his article
for "Army" magazine, General Graham
wrote:
. I think the time is ripe for the
military profession to reassert its tradi-
tional role in the function of describing
military threats to national security. Both
the military user and the military pro-
ducer of strategic intelligence have
come a long way since the 'missile gap'
days. DIA has hit its stride in the pro-
duction of respectable military esti-
mates."
Many CIA
middle ranks
/12/nt:GIA-RDP84-00499
"What is happening is
that those who seek to
present intelligence as it
is, rather than as the situa-
tion is seen by those sup-
porting specific policies,
are being plucked out."
Aides of Mr.'Schlesinger
deny that ho has any intou-
tion of "politicizing" the
agency. They point out
that at his' confirmation
hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Commit-
tee he said he was deter-
mined to maintain the in-
dependence and integrity
of intelligence evaluations.
Within the Nixon Ad-
ministration, dissatisfaction with the CIA
has centered particularly in the Na-
tional Security Council staff, which is
under the direction of Mr. Kissinger.
The main complaint has been that
evaluations of raw intelligence often re-
flected the biases of top men.
To that, one CIA man retorts:
"We feel that we do a better job of
evaluating raw intelligence without bias
than the military does-or, for that mat-
ter, than people like Kissinger who are
defending a specific policy."
The argument is made that-particu-
larly since the days when the late Allen
Dulles was its Director-the CIA's "con-
trolling voice" in the intelligence com-
munity has sought intelligence estimates
unaffected by the policies of the Ad-
ministration in power, the Pentagon, the
so-called military-industrial complex, or
any other group.
Changes in the works. Whatever
the merits of the arguments now boil-
ing, drastic changes are being made by
Mr. Schlesinger.
They include:
1. To reduce costs, overlapping intel-
ligence agencies are to submit "bids" on
operations that are assigned by President
Nixon and the National Security Coun-
cil. The Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee, set up under the 1971 re-
organization plan, is to consider the
competing "bids" and accept the least
expensive if the bidder can convince
the Committee that his agency can do
the job.
2. Mr. Schlesinger is making it clear
that he will exercise fully his authority
over all of the intelligence services. In
the past, this has been a difficult prob-
lem for the Director of Central
Intelligence, because the Defense De-
partment gets most of the money and
most of the manpower.
3. As DCI, Mr. Schlesinger will de-
cide which of the U. S. intelligence agen-
professionals in top and cies-military and civilian-will carry out and cars" of the United States around
arc u Ap 'Dover or kelepase Nb i4byGt~'i~- 8420499*06160160001-7 (END]
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 7, 1973
4. Each agency is to I.., l..a.t f,aily
,o, sIftrjl4he others are. doing.
E s s are combing through
I operations to determine how to use
fewer men and spend less money.
"To be continued." Some projects
are being phased out as inefficient or
outmoded. One report indicated a sharp
curtailment in clandestine operations.
But an insider commented:
"They may not talk about these as
t ach as they did, but like it or not,
those activities are part of the way of
life in the world today, and they will
be continued."
One revision put into effect by Mr.
Schlesinger has to do with preparation
of CIA reports requested by the Presi-
dent and other high officials.
Condensed intelligence. Previously,
such requests were answered with de-
tailed studies-20, 30, or even 50 pages
long. Now, the reports run no longer
than three double-spaced pages. A CIA
official explained:
"Instructions from Schlesinger are to
answer the questions asked-and no
more. No background. No historical dis-
cussion. Just keep in mind that the
President or the Secretary of the Treas-
ury or whoever else asks the questions
is a busy man. Ile rarely has time to
read long reports. What he needs is
for use right now-today-in order to
make a decision,"
The telephone number of the analyst
or working group responsible for the re-
port appears on the document, so if
more information is needed, it can be
obtained without delay.
In line with Mr. Nixon's efforts to re-
duce federal spending, the intelligence
agencies are under orders to reduce
costs.
just how much is being spent to piece
together the information essential to na-
tional security is not a matter of public
knowledge.
A 6.2 billion cost? Senator William
Proxmire (Dem.), of Wisconsin, esti-
mated recently that the cost of gather-
ing military and civilian intelligence is
6.2 billion dollars a year. But Albert C.
Haul, Assistant Defense Secretary for
Intelligence, said that Mr. Proxmire's
figure is "just plain wrong."
Without hinting at the actual figures,
Mr. Hall said that the Pentagon's intel-'
ligence budget has been cut by about a
third in the last three years.
Other sources say that manpower in
the CIA and the other intelligence serv-
ices, including the National Security
Agency, now totals less than 125,000-
a reduction of more than 25,000 since
197' 1.
Thus, a money crunch and diminished
manpower are added problems at a time
of sharp change and open conflict for
the agencies which function as the "eyes
 Approved For FeJease 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499800200160001,7
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, April 28,1973 E 31
Bureaucracy :Engulfs mounded Knee
By Jack Anderson
The bureaucratic build-up
outside Wounded Knee' is a
testament to the government's
way of doing things., No less
than 400 federal officials have
descended upon the small
South Dakota village to nego-
tiate, mediate, consult and oc-
casionally exchange gunfire
with the Indian occupiers',
Cost to the' taxpayers: around
$2.7 million.
Yet at this writing, the Indi=
ans remain .armed and angry.
Take the problem of road-
blocks, for example. The daily
crisis reports from Wounded
Knee, intended for Justice De-
partment eyes only, tell how
armed local residents threw
up their own vigilante road-
block. Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral J. Stanley Pottinger "met
with them at the roadblock
shortly after it was established
but failed to talk it down," de-
clares a crisis report.
Next day, the vigilante
group refused to allow the
Community Relations Serv-
ice's pence-keeping team into
Wounded Knee. while "no
ORS personnel were in
Wounded Knee" to restrain
the militants, a "most serious
incident" took place. Accord-
ing to a report, the Incident
"Involved the alleged looting
of a rancher's home and cattle
by WK (Wounded Knee) occu-
pants." Three days later seri-
ous shooting broke out, and
one militant Indian' was crit-
ically injured.
Still, Pottinger took no ac-
tion against the unauthorized
roadblock. "Pottinger has indi-
Bated to CRS . and at staff
briefings,", states a report,
"that he' is inclined to arrest
the leaders of the roadblock,
but most other agencies advise
against it for purposes of pub-
lic relations or convenience."
Explaining what is meant by
"convenience," the report tells
of "a planned march on WK
by clergymen and others
(Easter) weekend. The govern-
ment would rather have the
marchers detained by a citi-
zens' roadblock than by an
FBI one."
The Easter march fizzled,
and Pottinger finally ordered
the roadblock removed. But
meanwhile, he was having
trouble with the government's
own roadblocks. He obtained
an order from Wshington to
put all federal roadblocks and
bunkers under the command
of U.S. marshals.
"Previously," notes a report,
"the marshals, the FBI and
the. BIA police each manned
their own units, and it was dif-
ficult to verify and control the
1x0iiotttod iot+ltlt i im Qf todtsi'gl
vehicles and troops (mostly
FBI and BIA police) moving
into the WK perimeter."
The CRS peace-keeping
team has now returned, to
Wounded Knee. But the Indi-
ans and the federal officers
are still manning their armed
blinkers. As one federal offi-
cial put it, "We're now back to
zero again."
Military Martinet
Maj.,Gen. Daniel Graham, a
short, ramrod-straight authori-
tarian, is moving from the De-
fense Intelligence 4gency to
the ? Central Intelligence
Agency to take charge of stra-
tegic estimates. '
He has already alarmed CIA
hands by writing in Army
Magazine that vital security
estimates should be made by
military analysts, although lie
acknowledges that DIA esti-
mates have been slanted in
the past to please the Penta-
gon bosses and the CIA esti-
mates have been more accu-
rate.
The alarm hasn't been al-
layed any by reports reaching
CIA headquarters of his con-
duct as head of the Wakefield
(Va.) High School PTA.
Ile circulated a memo, for
example, urging that five
teachers be fired and eight
others be enlisted as inform-
ers. He wanted them to keep
an eye on suspicious teachers
and students. The Graham fac-
tion also brought pressure to
oust the school's able princi-
pal, who, finally left voluntar-
ily ,
In one stormy PTA meeting
after another, Graham has
fought student privileges in-
cluding the right to partici-
pate fully in PTA activities.
So vehement is he at PTA
meetings that some neighbor-
hood government officials, are
afraid to argue with him for
fear he'll retaliate against
them in their 'jobs. In re-
sponse to our inquiries, Gra-
ham sent word through his
secretary that he, wouldn't
speak with us.
Inside Nort11' Korea-Visi-
tors just back from North Ko-
rea remind us that Kim II
Sung's Red regime is still one
of the most oppressive on
earth. They describe the towns
as drab, the social life as ste-
rile, the people as' regimented
and the atmosphere as harsh.
individually, the North Kore-
ans were friendly, and curious.
But in the presence of others,
they became stiff and strident.
Their private opinions sud-
denly conformed to the rigid
official line. North and South
Korean delegations, mean-'
while, are preparing for an-
other round of negotiations.
Sikkim Strife - Bush-hush
reports smuggled out of the
Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim
charge that India is financing
riots against the regime of
King Palden Thondup Nam-
gyal as part of a plot to take
full control of his land. The
dashing king became a special
favorite of Americans when he
married a pretty New Yorker,
Hope Cooke. Lately, demon-
strations have shaken his mon-
archy, and Indian troops have
crossed the border "in t1,: in-
terest of law and order." Insid-
ers close to the royal family
have gotten word to us that,
even as the troops moved in,
Indian political officer K.S.
Baipat began to pressure the
king to "hand over all power"
to India
t 1943. United Feature Syndicate
' Approved For Release 2.001112/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200160001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000
Strategic Intelligence
A Soldier's Job
Estimating
The Threat:
Tn his landmark book, The Soldier and the State, description out of military hands. Now is the
Professor Samuel P. Huntington draws our time to face these facts, . and to take the attitude
attention to an extremely important and some- and the necessary steps to correct the situation.
times neglected fact:
The military institutions of any society are
shaped by two forces: a functional imperative
stemming from the threats to the society's secur-
ity, and a social imperative arising from the
social forces, ideologies, and institutions domi-
nant within the society... .
So, the reason for the existence of our armed
forces is to counter threats to our security, and the
function, composition and size of those forces
depend on the perception of threats by the na-
tional leadership. If the military profession loses
its role in describing these threats to national
security, it surrenders much of its influence in
decisions about military strategy, military force
structure and the nature of its own armaments.
We have in the past ten years come perilously
close to losing this vital role. The impact of the
intelligence views of the Department of Defense
was progressively weakened between 1960 and
1970, and the voice of civilian agencies in all
facets of military intelligence became progressively
more dominant. The military budgets carried the
ones of heavy outlays for intelligence collection,
but the key intelligence judgments derived from
this costly effort were for the most part made in
other agencies.
This situation can be too easily dismissed as
the result of bureaucratic maneuvering, of "whiz
kids" ignoring military advice, or of the general
growth of anti-military sentiment in and out of
government. The fact is that the muting of the
military voice in military intelligence was largely
of our own doing. Military professionals-both
users and producers of intelligence--through
failure to understand the strategic intelligence
function, downgrading of the role of intelligence
in general and sometimes abusing the intelligence
process, have in the past produced the best argu-
ments for taking the responsibility for threat
One has little difficulty in arguing the need for
good tactical intelligence among Military pro-
fessionals these days. One prime lesson learned
in Vietnam was the fact that superior military
force cannot be brought to bear in the absence of
good intelligence. The Army has acted and is
still acting vigorously to insure that good tactical
intelligence will he available to commanders in
all levels of warFare. However, we are concerned
here with an area about which there is less agree-
ment-strategic intelligence.
Strategic intelligence is that which is used to
make strategic decisions. This fact is often lost
sight of among planners and decision-makers-
There is a tendency to think of intelligence
gathered by Washington-controlled resources as
"strategic" and that gathered by the commands
as "tactical" or "operational" intelligence. This
is nonsense. 11' intelligence is used to make
tactical decisions, it is tactical intelligence; if it
is used to make strategic decisions, it is strategic
intelligence. The means by which it is collected
is quite beside the point. For example, in 1950,
when front-line troops reported the fact that the
Chinese were crossing the Yalu, it was tactical
intelligence to all levels of command in Korea,
but strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washing-
ton. On the other hand, knowledge of a new
surface-to-air missile in country X is strategic
intelligence to national planners but it is tactical
intelligence to any air unit which may operate in
the area.
It is extremely important to get this matter
straight. If we don't, we will continue to have
expensive bureaucratic squabbles about intelli-
gence resources, based on spurious arguments
about control echelons. Commands will jealously
guard intelligence resources on the grounds of
"tactical" intelligence requirements and Washing-
Ap ro1v?al7For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200160001-7
 After the well-publicized 'missile gap' failures of the late
'50s, the position of the uniformed services in national
intelligence matters went into a long decline,. The
pendulum is now swinging back, particularly in the critical
area of estimating the strength of potential enemies.
By Maj. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham
ton intelligence agencies will fail to see that their
refined "Straub uric collection Systems are producing
a great deal of tactical intelligence, neglecting
the need for (imck dissemination to the commands.
the definitional dilemma is compounded some-
what by tactical decisions that are often made in
Wa.shinglon I'liis fact of military life today means
that niilit;u-v intelligence organizations in Wash-
ington find tlicnrselves hip-deep inn the tactical
intelligence hrisincss, traditionally the purview of
conunauuicrs in the field. Further, there is the
unfortnucte tendency among intelligence pro-
ducers and users to associate the term "strategic"
exclusively uu ith intercontinental nuclear-strike
matters. I'or iost:once, von would find few intelli-
genre officers in the targeting business who would
not consider their product "strategic" intelligence.
Ill but, it is nob it is essentially tactical intelli--
geuce stored np against the contingency of ex-
ecuting the SIOI' (Single Integrated Operational
Plan) .
r1`he general conceptual confusion between tac-
tical and strategic intelligence is jeopardizing
the conunanrders, control oI, their intelligence
assets. But a more serious intelligence problem,
in nn vies-, is the danger of the military profession
as a whole losing the function of defining the
military tin-cat for the national leadership. The
basic problem is one of confidence in the military
intelligence product within the services, the De-
partment of )dense and the other departments
of govcrnmeut.
The intelligence products of greatest impact in
the national decision-making arena are the esti-
mates. "These contain the intelligence which most
heavilh influences strategic decisions. They are
usually predictive in nature, pulling together basic
order-of-battle. technical, doctrinal, economic and
political intelligence to describe overall military
postures of foreign powers. The estimates project
military threats from the present out two, five
and tern years. '.Military planners are heavily de-
Approved Frr?Ia1 12/041 CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ0200160001-7
pendent on these estimates in force structuring,
force development and weapons development.
It is in this area that we military professionals
have been in danger of losing our shirts to civilian
agencies. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable
body of opinion among decision-makers, in and
out of the DOD, which regards threat estimates
prepared by the military as being self-serving,
budget-oriented and generally inflated. This gives
rise to a tendency to turn to some other source
for "objective" threat assessments. 'I'll(- suspicion
exists not only with regard to broad strategic
estimates-for example, trends in the manned
bomber threat-but to such detailed military
estimates as the ability of the 5ovict field army
to sustain itself in the field under various assumed
levels of combat. The trend toward independent
analysis has been gathering over the past ten years
and there are now analytical staffs in the civilian
intelligence community paralleling those of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on almost
every military intelligence subject.
T he responsibility for this situation to a large de-
gree rests with the military side of the house,
not with the civilian agencies. The lack of confi-
dence in the threat estimates emanating from
military intelligence agencies which caused users
to request outside opinion in the early 1960s, is
fully understandable. It stemmed from a series
of bad overestimates, later dubbed "bomber gap,"
"missile gap," and "megaton gap." These and
other seriously inflated estimates of' less notoriety
have hung like albatrosses around the necks of
military intelligence officers ever since.
In its first several years of existence, DIA was
plagued by the prevalent notion, even in the DOD
staff, that the agency could not be counted upon
for an objective threat assessment. This suspicion
was reinforced by the fact that DIA (lid not
perform well in the estimating area. The agency
was harried by a combination oaf birth pains and
the burgeoning demands for essentially tactical
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U.S. Air Force
A singular lesson of Vietnam was that superior military force avails little
without good intelligence: 11th Armored Cavalry troops make ready to launch
an assault on entrenched enemy forces northwest of Saigon after
receiving intelligence and subsequent air support.
intelligence in support of Washington-level deci-
sions on the Vietnam war. The estimates function
simply muddled along until the Agency was re-
or.gauized in 1970 by Gen. Donald V. Bennett,
I"SA. Meanwhile, planners and decision-makers
had become accustomed to going elsewhere for
their threat estimates.
t first blush, it would appear that the blame for
this situation can be laid at the feet of intelli-
gencc officers-lust in armed services intelligence
agencies and then in DIA. But this is too simple;
tLc military intelligence user must take his lumps
As \% (Ill. Too often the user has not been content
with an objective judgment from his intelligence
officer--he has wanted the answer that "supports
the program." While planner pressure on intelli-
gence estimates is not nearly as blatant or wide-
spread as some quarters would contend, there has
hccn enough of it to make it tough to regain full
onfidence in the military intelligence effort.
In the service staffs the fact that the position
of the intelligence chief is a notch under the
other key staff chiefs almost invites planner pres-
sures on intelligence. It takes a pretty tough-
11 1.j. (;I,N. DANI BI. O. GRAHAM, a 1946 grad-
flat e of the U.S. Military Academy, now deputy
director for estimates in the Defense Intelligence
agency, has served in several posts in the Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
and the Central Intelligence Agency, and corn-
mauded the '319th Military Intelligence Battal-
ion in U.S. Army Pacific. In Vietnam he was
chief of the Current Intelligence, Indications
and Estimates Division, Directorate of Intelli-
gence Production, in the office of J2, U.S. Mili-
lary Assistance Command.
minded assistant chief of staff for intelligence to
defend all estimate that runs counter to the well-
laid plans of the rest of the general staff. In some
ways, planner pressure is worse when it arises in
the joint staff arena Planners of all services
"coordinating" an intelligence estimate are quite
capable of reducing it to lowest common de-
nominator mush. There are still some "old hands"
in intelligence who are so inured to yielding
before user pressures that they automatically pro-
duce threat estimates designed to please, or at
least certain not to offend. These types are getting
fewer, but they still exist.
When intelligence yields to consumer pressure,
it cannot remain credible. When intelligence
estimates are reduced to bland judgments accept-
able to all planners, it is difficult to justify the
expensive outlay of resources to collect intelli-
gence. Such inoffensive pap can be produced
without evidence..
Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture out-
lined above has brightened measurably over the
past few years. The stature of intelligence esti-
mates produced by the military has increased
considerably and the accusations of bias have
abated. Several factors account for this: DIA
pulled up its socks and put proper emphasis on
the estimates job; a new crop of more professional,
less conformist ;ntelligenec officers is available
for estimating work and, most important, there
is a new appreciation of the intelligence function
among our military customers.
`lie Defense Intelligence Agency was reorgan-
nized in November, 1970. One of the key
changes was tli." establishment of a separate
directorate charged with the production of defense
intelligence estimates. One of the prune reasons
for this move was the fact that there was, prac-
tically speaking, no way to discover the views of
the DIA director on important estimative matters.
DIA views were submerged in the text of national
estimates (NIE's j prepared at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (C: IA) and coordinated with all
Washington intelligence agencies, or in the text
of joint estimates which were coordinated with
the service planners. The only exception to this
rule was the rare dissent to a national estimate
when a specific view of the DIA director was
noted at the bottom of the page. DIA's institu-
tional anonymity was, in large part, a product of
the original service objections to the creation of
the agency. "Running with the pack" was the
one way to avoid collision with the individual
services. It was bureaucratically much safer to
have anv substantive argument be between a
service and the "intelligence community" than
between a service and DIA. The trouble was that
this attitude put ;ivilian agencies in the position
of final arbiters of any disagreements inside DOD
on threat definition.
The new DIA directorate for estimates per-
mitted proper attention to the estimating function.
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tinder the old scrap, the estimates job was tinder
the directorate for production, which was also
charged with answering the daily intelligence
mail. The heavy demand for current intelligence
on Vietnam, the Middle East and other crisis
areas was too rnc[ent and too time consuming to
lmrnrit much effort oil the more scholarly problem
of estimates. 'l'he new directorate created an
adversary process on substantive issues within
DIA, The estimators, who must defend DIA views
in the ])Of) and national intelligence arena, fre-
(lewntly challenge the results of analysis from the
other DIA directorates. This necessary friction
causes key intelligence judgments to be thoroughly
scrubbed internally, ensuring that DIA won't find
itself out on a limb defending a weak argument
of some single analyst, a situation which prevailed
all too often under the old setup.
The new crop of analysts and estimators available
to both the service intelligence offices and to
DIA are indispensable to a new effort to regain
respectability for military threat estimates. Intelli-
gence specialist programs within the services-
and here the Army must he singled out as having
the most effective program-are paying off in the
form of real professionals capable of making objec-
tive assessments of the evidence on hand and
defending the intelligence product among their
fellow officers. On the civilian side, the new
generation of analysts who have entered DIA are
not afflicted with an overriding defensive attitude
about service intelligence opinions. Many of the
old hands used to react with arguments about the
1)1A "charter," rather than counter differing in-
telligence views with good substantive analysis.
fn the long rrrn, however, the most telling
factor in the improvement of military intelligence
estimates is the increasing awareness among con-
sumers that the only useful intelligence is objec-
tive intelligence. 'I here was a time when the
rule-ofthumb for acceptability of threat estimates
am on.g platrue'ts 5aas the bigger, the better."
Intelligcucc estimates which failed to maximize
enemy threats in both sum and detail were likely
to craw tiro is "wishful thinking." More often
than uot_ military intelligence people came to
heel Imder "11( 11 criticism and stumped hard for
the "worst (am- view. These old attitudes are
waling oow rid simplistic demands for the
scary'sl posstblc threat estimates are much less
prcv,ilclit .iiIi ig users. Some hard lessons have
bcru Ieatocll
\filit,ii plu,iners have seen some unfortunate
results of niii,iiccl estimates over the past several
.\ears \\ 'ill 1c 14,11d co Vietnam. it became pain-
. rally ,hsious that "worst-case,, assessments of
curnr~ ~cipulri~ties by Washington estimators gave
the i I'm, one ~.rtijnessum that the more casualties
we m1 icted .;ii rile Viet Cong and North Viet-
natncse. th, irow,t;er they got. AVIlen theater in-
tclligr,ncc rio (I to offset this by stressing the
,yiderice of Ihi telling ('fleets of Allied operations
U. S. Army
In 1950, when front-line troops reported that Chinese forces were
crossing the Yalu River, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of
command in Korea; it was strategic intelligence to Tokyo and
Washington. Here, U.S. 2nd Division troops climb aboard a tank
as they withdraw following an attack by Chinese Communist forces
in December, 1950.
U.S. Air Iorce
Officers in the targeting business generally regard their
product, such as this analyzed aerial photo of Hanoi
raiiway yards and POL targets, as strategic intelligence.
Others contend it is more usually tactical intelligence.
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In 1970 Gen. Donald V.
Bennett reorganized DIA in
order to produce better
intelligence, particularly in
respect to threat estimates.
on the enemy, the effort was branded as a lot of
unwarranted, policy-oriented optimism. In Feb-
ruary, 1968, the communists corroborated the esti-
mate that they were in desperate straits by launch-
ing the militarily disastrous Tet offensive. That
fact was overlooked by almost everyone, however,
most preferring to believe the new gloomy esti-
mates (later proved grossly overstated) that the
VC, although defeated near the cities, had "taken
over the countryside."
Many Pentagon planners have also learned that
worst-case' estimates can be used to squelch
military programs just as easily as to support them.
A proposed program can be made to look like a
total waste if its opponents are given free rein to
postulate the size and sophistication of future
threats to the system. Overestimates of future
Soviet strategic missile capabilities killed the U.S.
counterforce strategy at least four years before
the strategy became invalidated by real Soviet
capabilities.
The advent of arms limitation agreements
sharply underscored some additional problems of
inflated intelligence estimates. The "horse-trading"
aspect of these negotiations raises the very real
possibility of trading off actual friendly capabilities
for encnn? "capabilities" existing only on paper
in our own intelligence estimates.
These examples lead to another important point
that is beginning to be understood in military
planner circles: Estimates of future enemy forces
and hardware are by nature estimates of intent-
not just of capability. The old arguments about
"capability versus intent" are heard less now in
DOD. It remains true that intelligence should
emphasize capability in descriptions of current
and near-future enemy forces. But the minute
you tackle the usual problem of estimating enemy
forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future,
you have entered the realm of intent. For ex-
ample, since World War II the Soviets have never,
to our knowledge, deployed forces or fielded hard-
ware as fast as their total capability permitted. To
estimate that they would do so with regard to
some weapon system or type of force in the future
would make little sense. Indeed, all estimates of
I iturc Soviet forces derive from an attempt to
discern what part of their total capability the
Soviets intend to use in military programs and
which programs they intend to emphasize. This
is not a very difficult-to-fathom verity of intelli-
gence estimating. It is remarkable how long it
has taken some of our military users to wise up
to it.
While not all users of intelligence in DOD have
learned the pitfalls of trying to make intelligence
"fit the program," most have. Today there is a
much improved market for objective intelligence
judgments and this is a most hopeful sign in the
field of military intelligence. When we get to the
point where the strategic intelligence officer knows
that his prime customers are going to raise the
same amout of hell about overstatement as about
understatement of threats, the objectivity of in-
telligence estimates will be almost automatic.
Objective intelligence is a goal to be devoutly
pursued by the entire military profession. How-
ever, an important word of caution is in order:
An objective intelligence judgment is not neces-
sarily a valid judgment. Validity depends on the
evidence available to the intelligence people and
the quality of the analysis applied to that evidence.
Any planner or decision-maker not convinced that
there is good evidence and good analysis behind
an intelligence judgment should feel perfectly free
to reject it. And the intelligence officer should
not get his nose out of joint if his product is not
always accepted as gospel. However, the user
cannot insist that the intelligence officer recant
and change his best judgment. If he does this, he
corrupts the whole system.
To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the
military profession to reassert its traditional role in
the function of describing military threats to na-
tional security. Both the military user and the
military producer of strategic intelligence have
come a long way since the "missile-gap" days.
DIA has hit its stride in the production of respect-
able military estimates. While there will always
be a legitimate reason for independent judgments
from outside DOD on issues of critical importance
to national decision-makers, there is no longer a
need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts
in other agencies. The best assist the Army can
give to such an effort is to insist on objective
strategic intelligence, cooperate with DIA in pro-
ducing it, and put good officers in the strategic
intelligence field.
Pecking Order
A a old soldier who saw service during the days
of the horse cavalry tells about the time at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan., when a sergeant and a
private lie knew were on a wagon detail from a
bivouac area to a nearby farm.
Several guard points had been set up on the
road leading out of the field training exercise area
in which the bivouac was located and at each the
sergeant driving was challenged. To each "Who
goes there?" he would reply:
"Sgt. Jones and wagon with horse manure and
a private."
The passenger said nothing the first two times,
but as they approached the third and last barrier,
the soldier asked respectfully:
"Sergeant. when you talk about the wagon this
time, how about putting me first?"
L-r. COL. Tom HAMRICK
U.S. Army, retired
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