LETTER TO MR. LAWRENCE K. WHITE FROM JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000200150003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 20, 1972
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315
IN REPLY REFER TO
Mr. Lawrence K. White
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia 23365
80OCT1972
Dear Mr. White:
One of our historians, Dr. Ronald Spector, has completed a monograph
on the subject of the United States Army in Indo-China 1942-1945.
This monograph was originally intended for internal use but in view of
the current interest in the subject the office is considering publica-
tion of the monograph. Since Dr. Spector utilized a small number of
O.S.S. documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency we would-appre-
ciate receiving an informal opinion from you on any security problems
which might be involved in publication of the monograph.
Sincerely,
1 Inca
Monograph, "U.S. Army in
Indo-China 1942-1945"
*Army and State Dept reviews
completed*
JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief , of. Military His to,
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CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER
I.
"...DO,NOTHING IN REGARD TO INDO-CHINA"...........
1
II.
"...ALLRIGHT TO HELP" ............................
14
III.
"...AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR OSS".............
26
IV.,
TOWARD AN INDO-CHINA POLICY.......................
37
V.
"AMERICANS... NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL
POLITICAL STRUGGLE..." ............................
47
VI.
GENERAL GALLAGHER IN HANOI..;................,......
62
VII.
"THERE IS A SORT OF DRUGSTORE REVOLUTION GOJ!ING ON
HERE" ......................................1........
76
UENC A S S I F I E D
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 "...DO NOTHING IN REGARD TO INDO-CHINA"
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From. Pearl Harbor until V-J Day Indo-China was of comparatively
little political or military interest to the United States. During 1942
American military leaders were far too busy with urgent matters in
the Pacific and North Africa to give much thought to what was, in
effect, a minor part of a minor theatre (CBI.) Military and political
intelligence em/nating from Indo-China during this ;period was likewise
meagre and unencouraging.
1943 the files on Indo-China contained four articles from Asia
Professor Kenneth P. Landon recalls thati in STATINTL
11
M azine. Interview with Kenneth P. Landon, January 29, 1972.
Although still under the French flag, with a Vichy French govern-
ment and administration, the area, for all practical purposes, had
been under Japanese control since the summer of 1941. In the weeks
after Pearl Harbor the Japanese had used Indo-China as a staging area
and base for their attacks on allied positions in China and Southeast
Asia; a fact which the Americans were to remember in their future
dealings with the French.
.Official American policy regarding Indo-China appeared to favor
continued recognition of French sovereignty in the area. In April 1942
Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that the United States
"recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France... over
French possessions overseas:" Somewhat more effusively Ambassador
Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1942.
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M.I.D. files contain only one item on Indo-China for 3.942.
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Robert Murphy assured General Henri Giraud that "the restoration of
France, in all her grandeur, and in all the are which she possessed
before the war in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims
of the United Nations... French soveiig~ty should be re-established "7
as soon as possible over all territories, Metropolitan as well as
colonial..."
'"'William L. Langer Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Harper, 1966)
p. 33.
Unfortunately American policy was not nearly so clear-cut and
unequivocal as these statements suggest. President Franklin Roosevelt
possessed strong, if somewhat vague, views about the future of Indo-
China. The President firmly believed that Indo-China should not be
returned to France at the end of the war but should be given a
trusteeship status, with China or perhaps Britain as the trustee.
Roosevelt frequently observed that "after 100 years of French rule the
inhabitants (of Indo-China) were worse off than they had been before."*
"U.S. Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, (Washington; GPO 1971),
vol. 7, p. 25, p. 30. Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell
Sloan and Pearce,.1946), p. 115.
In conversations with his advisors and with foreign diplomats and
at wartime. conferences Roosevelt made it clear that he was opposed to
the return of Indo-China to France. "I saw Halifax: (the British
Ambassador to the United States) last week and told him that it was
perfectly true that I had for over a year expresse'. the opinion that
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Indo-China should not go back to France." wrote Roosevelt to Hull in
January, 1944, "...it should be administered by an international
trusteeship. France has had the country one hundred years, and the
people are worse off than they were at the beginning."
"Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Secretary of State"
January 24, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States 1944.
Roosevelt similarly turned thumbs down on any plans to use French
troops in the liberation of Indo-China. With the concurrence of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff he refused to authorize the allocation of
shipping to the French to transport an expeditionary corps to Southeast
Asia. ` The President also refused to consider evert low-level intelligence
Joseph Drachman United States Policy Toward Vietnam (Madison:
Farleigh Dickinson Press: 1970), p. 71.
and commando type operations in Indo-China if they involved French
participation. In October, 1944, Roosevelt told Secretary of State
Hull that "we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups, or
in any other way in relation to Indo-China"*
"Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State"
October 16, 1944 Foreign Relations 1944.
A good deal, however, had already been done. Allied commanders
in the Far East were anxious to obtain military intelligence relating
to Indo-China and for this purpose some measure of co-operation with
the French was deemed necessary. It was also widely believed that
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both the Vietnamese and the French in Indo-China were restive under
their Japanese masters and that their services might be enlisted for
various types of espionage and fifth column activitLes. American
commanders in China and India did not deliberately ,set out tocon-
travene or circumvent American policy in Indo-China. That policy was
sufficiently vague and ambiguous to allow for a vide variety of
interpretations and local commanders were not normally kept informed
of its latest twists and modifications. The need for tacti.cal
intelligence was sometimes urgent; the instructions from Washington
were few and uncertain. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that from
1943 onward Americans in the Far East continuously violated the letter,
if not the spirit, of FDR's dictum that we should "do nothing in
regard to Indo-China"
Among the first to take an active interest in Vietnam was Navy
Commodore Mil E. "Mary" Miles. As commander of Navy Group China,
Miles presided over a kaleidoscopic organization with responsibility
for liaison, training, espionage, guerrilla warfare and support of
naval operations.
For a discussion of the activities of Navy Group China see
Milton E. Miles, A bifferent Kind of War (New York: MacMillan, 1966),
and Oscar P. Fit erald "Naval,Group China: A study of Guerrilla
Warfare During World War II," GeYAgetown M.A. thesis 1968.
He also served as Deputy Director of a joint Chinese American espionage
group known as the Sino-American Co-operation Organization led by the
UNCLASSIFIED
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Chinese master-spy General Tai Li. Early in 1943 Miles conceived a
plan to set up an agent net in Indo-China by utilizing "a French
group which had no ties either with Vichy or De Gaulle," Miles believed
the Gaulists would be "persona non grata" to both the Chinese in
1
south China and the Vietnamese in northern Indo-China where he proposed
The man Miles chose to head his operation was a Franch naval
officer, Commander Robert Meynier, a supporter of General Henri Giraud,
.the American-sponsored-Governor of French North Africa. Like Giraud,
Meynier was a war hero, was anti-German, anti-British and strongly
pro-American. More important he was married to a woman with important
connections among the Vietnamese mandarin class. The other Frenchmen
in Meynier, espionage group had extensive contacts among the French
officers in Vietnam.
Almost from the start the Meynier Group found its operation ham-
pered and circumscribed by the French Military Mission in Chungking
which was Gaulist in its loyalties. Ironically the Vichyite French
in Indo-China were also suspicious of the Meynier Group because of
its association with the Gaul! sts in Chungking.
Despite these handicaps Meynier was not wholly unsuccessful.
Before his recall to France in 1944 he succeeded in establishing a
network of agents inside Indo-China. Many of these agents operated
from inside French government agencies or even inside the French
intelligence office, "the Deuxieme Bureau." They sent back a steady
z
stream of information on field fortifications, troop movements, and
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shipping routes. Other agents, operating as ccast watchers,
reported to the 14th Air Force on the movement of Japanese ships
and convoys.` More significantly Meynier's agents provided Naval
(C) Miles "Report on the activities of SACO Directed toward
Indo-China;" pp. 1-22 and passim, Milton E. Miles Papers, Office of
Naval History.
Group China and the O.S.S. with the first accurate, up-to date poli-
a~ Cp
tical information on Indo-China American officials had had since
h
Pearl Harbor. These agents stressed the fact that the Vietnamese would
not be willing to continue as a French colony after the defeat of
Japan. A member of Meynie.r's group who visited Lan.gson in mid-February,
1944, reported that it was "foolish optimism to believe that, at the
end of the war, the Annamites are prepared to continue to join their
fate to the French colonial government.... Revolutionaries,.;national or
communist, are very active in Cochin-China....T'le Annamites place a
great deal of hope'and faith in the United States."* Even so conservative
(U) Miles, "Report on Activities" p. 27.
an observer as Mme. Meynier1 whose contacts were among the higher ranks
of the mandarin and business classy tated flatly in a report to Miles
that "the evident goal of all Nationalist Cochin-Chinese is to pre-
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pare the independence of their country. The various parties differ
only in the procedure to be followed..."*
Mme Meynier to Miles n.d. Miles Papers.
Thus as early as 1943 the essential facts about the political
situation in Vietnam were available to American commanders. These
facts, namely: that the Vietnamese were determined to hate indepen-
dence, that they would fight for it, and that they looked ,to the
United States for support, were never clearly understood at the various
command levels in the Far East, nor, for that matter, in Washington,
until well after V-J Day. It is not known whether Miles attempted to
communicate the political information he had acquired to his superiors.
In any case, Americans generals and diplomats in. the years ahead
were to learn rather more painfully and at considerable cost, the
same facts that Miles had.learned from Mme. Meynier in 1943.
Far more important to Allied espionage in Indo-China than Navy
Group China was a mysterious network known as "the GBT group." This
was a complicated organization which carried out its operations with
the co-operation of the British and American military attaches in
Chungking and the Chinese G-2.* The Group was older than, and inde-
{C) General Wedemeyers Data Book, Section 20, Office Chief of
A.
Military History, Washington, D.C.
pendent of Naval Group China, although both had ties to the O.S.S.
The operating head of the GBT group was Lawrence L. Gordon, a Canadian
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citizen who had worked for many years in Vietnam as an employee of the
Texas Oil Company. After Pearl Harbor his services had been obtained
for U.S. Army intelligence.
The main function of the GBT Group, which maintained an agent net
throughout Vietnam] as the rescue of Allied pilots shot down over
Indo-China. On occasion they were even able to engineer the escape of
British and American flyers from prisoner-of-war camps. The Group
also furnished valuable target information to the 14th Air Force.
Unlike other Allied intelligence organizations in southern
China, the GBT Group established relations not only with the French
in Indo-China but also with the revolutionary nationalist group of
Vietnamese known as the Vietminh. The Vietminh, or Viet Nam Doc Lap
Dong Minh H
was an association of nationalist organizations dominated
by the Indo-Chinese Communist party. It had been organized in the
spring of 1941 by a group of Vietnamese exiles in south China led by
Ho Chi Minh, a veteran revolutionary.
The Chinese, who had their own plans for Vietnam, arrested Ho in
August, 1942, and established their own Vietnamese independence move-
ment, the Dong Minh Hoi. But the Dong Minh Hoi lacked able leadership
and faced stiff opposition from the Vietminh. In September, 1943,
Chang Fa Kwei, the Chinese warlord General who commanded the Fourth
War Area, decided to try a new tack. He had Ho released from prison
and made him head of the Dong Minh Hoi with a subsidy of 100,000
Chinese dollars a month. The Vietminh ostensibly became a part of
the Dong Minh Hoi but, in fact, soon controlled it. Utilizing the
Chinese subsidy, and with the co-operation of Tho mountain tribesmen,
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the Vietminh established an impressive underground network throughout
American diplomats and consular official in South China were dimly
aware of the activities of the Vietnamese nationalists but generally
discounted. them as of no significance.* In January, 1944, in a report
e,
(U) e.g. Atcheson (charge d' Affairs Chungking) to Secretary of
State, 31 May 1943, 31 July 1943, Record Group (hereafter "R.G.") 59
which circulated throughout the Far East Division of the State Depart-
ment, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss expressed the opinion that the
"Chinese-sponsored Annamite activities are of little importance."
William R. Langdon, American consuiJgeneral at Kunming, after a
conversation with Vietminh leaders, observed that "these groups are
of no real importance in the Indo-China question."""
(U) Report of
7 September 1944, enclosure
C.E. Gauss to,Secretary of State, 9 September 1944, R.G. 59,
National Archives.
American military leaders in China took the Vietminh more seriously.
By the fall of 1944 American money and supplies were being channeled
to the Vietminh through the GBT group.* In November, 1944, Marine
Robert Shaplen reports that Ho Chi Minh and his associates
,made a total of four visits to Kunming during 1944 in the course of
which he talked with representatives of the O S.S. and with Major
IQEO
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General Claire L. Chenult commander of the 14th Air Force; Shaplen,
The Lost Revolution, (New York: Harper, 1966), pp., 33-34 General
Albert C. Wedemeyer in conversation with this author recalls that
the Vietminh sometime in late 1944.
Lieutenant Charles Fenn, the O.S.S. liaison officer with GBT Group,
reported approvingly that"... the only Annamites who do anything but
talk-are the Communists... they appear to have the usual Communist
0
energy as apposed to the natural Annamite indolence."
(U) Report by Lt. Charles Fenn USMCR, enclosure to Lt. Col.
J. B. de Sibour to John P. Davies, 23 November 1944. F.I.C. Book 1,
Wedemeyer Files, R.G. 407.
The American military contacts with the Vietminh and the French
underground, such as they were, aroused the wrath of the new Ambassador
to China General Patrick J. Hurley. Like Roosevelt\ a strong anti-
colonialist, Hurley was suspicious of all British and French clandestine
activities in Southeast Asia. "I indicated to Hurley that I had given
you permission to issue some equipment to certain forces in Indo-China
as requested by Colonel Gordon," wrote General Albert C. Wedemeyer to
the commander of the 14th Air Force, "He was not pleased by my action
although I mentioned the intelligence contribution, which you desire
very much and which caused me to approve the request... However,
General Hurley has had increasing evidence that the British French and
Dutch are working-for the attainment of imperialistic policies and he
felt we should do nothing to assist them in their endeavors which run
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counter to U.S. policy."*
(C) Wedemeyer to General Claire E. Chenault, December 27, 1945,
Wedemeyer Files, R.G. 407.
Hurley's position appears to have faithfully reflected President
Roosevelt's own views. When the British government protested in
December 1944 that "it would be difficult to deny :French participation
in the liberation of Indo-China," Roosevelt instructed Secretary of
State Stettinius that."I still do not want to get mixed up in any
Indo-China decision. It is~a matter for.post-war....I do not want
to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of
Indo-China."* There is nevertheless strong evidence that the 14th
Roosevelt to Stettinius, Jan 1, 1945 Foreign Relations 1945
Air Force and other American units in China continued to co-operate
to a limited extent with both the French and the Vietminh. inside Indo-
China in order to obtain needed intelligence ad to aid in rescue of
downed pilots.* When General Wedemeyer assumed command of China Theatre
W In late January 1945 a group described as "the Free French under-
ground" provided the Navy and the Fourteenth Air Force with "pinpoint
targets in the Saigon area." Records of G-2 14th AF Indo-China File.
Records of 14th AF.
he found the relations between the Free French in Kunming and the 14th
Air Force to be "very co-operative and friendly" and believed that
"anAppreugd*ortR g oQ" 31 C RD Ob4m99R 1dD2Ot 1 03Q4nizance
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of General Stilwell.'
Interview with Wedemeyer.
By Feburary, 1945, the President himself had changed his stand
somewhat. At Yalta he told the Joint Chie of Staff that "he favored
anything that was against the Japanese in Indo-China so long as the
United States was not aligned with the French.`"* This appeared to
Charles Romanus & Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, -
(Washington: Governn nt Printing Office, 1969) p. 20.
open the way for American intelligence operations in Indo-China but
just at this juncture an event occured which was to fundamentally
alter both the political situation in Indo-China and American involve-
ment there.
UNCLASSIFIED
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".... ALLRIGHT TO HELP"
1!'. r~,~aa~
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At eight o'clock on the evening of March 9, 1945, the Japanese
ambassador to French Indo-China presented Admiral Jean Decoux, the
Governor General, with an ultimatum demanding that direct control of
the government police and armed forces of the colony be turned over
to the Japanese.
Two hours later Japanese forces moved against French forts and
garrisons all over Indo-China. Most were quickly disarmed, but a few
offered ,fierce, although brief, resistance and a sizeable body of
men stationed in the north managed to make their way into the mountainous
jungle areas of Western Tonkin and Laos where they attempted to-'con-
duct a guerrilla-type resistance.
The Japanese coup of March, 1945, marked an important turning
point in the history of Indo-China. It signaled the end of the painful
French pretense to sovereignty in Indo-China and provided new
opportunities to the Vietminh and other nationalists to expand their
activities and add to their following. At the same time it breated
untold difficulties for the Free French government of General Charles
De Gaulle, newly installed in Paris, which was at pains to obtain
recognition from the Allies of its claim to continued sovereignty in
Indo-China.
Devastating as it was, the Japanese coup of March 9th did not come
as a complete surprise to American officials concerned-with East
Asia. As early as September, 1944, a State Department expert on
Southeast Asia had advised the President in a draft memo that."It is
(~ p
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thought the Japanese may shortly disarm the French and take over the
country.' William Powell, the OWI Air Liaison Representative in
Chief, Southwest Pacific Division, draft memo for the Presi-
dent, 8 September 44, National Archives R.G. 59.
Chungking, reported that "all of us out here anticipate quite an
upheaval in Indo-China."*
(U) Powell to Clarence Gauss 6 September 1944, enclosures to
Gauss to Secretary of State, .9 September 1945, R.G. 59.
As the outlook for Indo-China became more anxious, French officials
in Kunming "made strenuous efforts to determine the. possible lines of
action the United States might take."* On February 2, 1945, General
(U) China Theatre History Vol. 1. Chapter 5 p. 24.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of the United States Forces in. China
Theatre, was approached by the French military attache in Chungking
who expressed anxiety over the possibility of a Japanese military
take-over in Indo-China. Should this occur, the attache believed
that. the French forces would retreat to the mountains, there to carry
on guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. The attache asked whether,
under these circumstances, the United States would be prepared to
give assistance to such troops.
Wedemeyer was noncommittal, merely indicating to the French
representative that the matter was one for higher level decision. The
UNCLASSIFIED
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American General was aware that the question of American co-operation
with the French in Indo-China was a very delicate one and that the
President himself held strong views on the subject. He cabled
Washington for guidance; but the State and War Departments could "only
reiterate the President's policy" of non-involvement in Indo-China
matters.
Nevertheless the President's position had already begun to
change somewhat. At Yalta he told the Join l Chiefs that 'he was "in
favor of anything that is against the Japanese in Indo-China f.rovided
that we do not align ourselves with the French.`"" Accordingly Brigadier
W Memo by Gen Gross, 20 Feburary 1945, Wedemeyer F.I.C. Book II;
Foreign Relations Vol. VI. 1945, p: 297.
General Melvin E. Gross, the Acting Chief of Staff, China Theatre,
was able to-instruct his commanders on February 20 that "appropriate
and feasible help," such as the delivery of medical supplies, might
be rendered to Free French guerrillas who made their way to the
Chinese border.?. The matter of their entry into China, however, "should
be settled directly between the Chinese and the French."* On March 7,
(U) China Theatre History Vol. 1 Chapter 5 p. 30.
China Theatre headquarters further cautioned commanders that "any
help or aid given to the French by us shall be in such a way that it
cannot possibly be construed as furthering the political aims of the
French ....The governing factor is that the action be in futherance
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of our military objectives and not a matter of convenience to the
French or to any other nation."* Two days later the Japanese struck.
(U) Chenault to Gross 9 March 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
The first news.of the Japanese coup received by Americans in the
China Theatre was a radio message from the French garrison at Langson
transmitted about midnight on the 9th of March. The message reported
a heavy Japanese attack on the garrison and speculated that an "overall
attack" on all French units in Indo-China was probably underway., The
defenders requested American air strikes on certain designated'targets
in their sea. General Wedemeyer was at this time on a visit to
Washington in order to present his plan for a drive to the China Coast
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.* In his absence Major General Robert
Romanus & Sunderland op. cit., pp. 335-338.
McClure had assumed the duties of CG, China Theatre.
Immediately after receiving the French radio, Major General Claire
L. Chenault, commanding the-14th Air Force, requested permission to
provide the air assistance which the French had asked for and "to
co-operate directly with the French authorities in Kunming" to conduct
attacks in Indo-China generally. A few hours later Theatre Headquarters
replied to Chenault. "This is about your CAK 7219. Go ahead.
Co-operate completely with the French. You can use Poseh airfield.
Give them hell."* In a later message Theatre Headquarters added that
Gross to Chenault, DFB 3404110, March 1945. Wedemeyer Files.
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its authorization to co-operate with the French "pertains entirely to
the present emergency."
At the same time that China Theatre was giving the green light
to the 14th Air Force, General Wedemeyer was receiving a very different
type of directive in Washington. In a private conference with
President Roosevelt, Wedemeyer learned that the chief executive was
"determined that there would be no military assistance to the French
in Indo-China."* The General later recalled that Roosevelt' hoped "to
Interview with General Albert C. Wedemeyer 2 February 1945.
discontinue colonization (colonialism) in Southeast Asia area."*
Wedemeyer later expressed "surprise" when he saw the contents of
General Gross's telegram and observed that had he been present at
Chungking in person he would not have granted such sweeping authority
to his commanders to aid the French. ` Wedemeyer, however, was not in
China and Gross's telegram had set in motion a chain of events which
was to result in the continued active involvement of the United States
forces in Indo-China from that day until the Japanese surrender.
While-his planes were preparing to aid the French, General Chenault
also succeeded in persuading Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek to allow
French military units fleeing the Japanese to enter China. The Chinese
authorities further agreed that "if stiff resistance is put up by the
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French against the Japanese, military assistance may be rendered."
"Minutes of Meeting of National Military Council" 10 March
1945; Gen. Hsu Yung to Gen. Gross,16 March 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
As the fighting in Indo-China became more desperate, French
requests for assistance increased. The French underground network
in Vietnam, which had provided 14 Air Force with intelligence and
rescued downed pilots, was being rapidly wiped out. On March 11, a
group of about 1,000 Vietnamese colonial troops with 20 Frencl. officers
was attempting to slowly fight its way out of Vietnam to the Chinese
border. The group was commanded by a Colonel Le c) who in the past
had operated an underground radio station which had. provided "valuable
to the 14th Air Force.* Colonel LeCog''now, requested
direct American air support for his troops.
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(U) Chenault to Marshall for Hull Mar-l1 1945, F.I.C. Book.
Up to this time 14th Air Force had restricted itself to general bombing
of a number of specific Japanese military target in I-C.
At about the same time that. Chenault and G:ross's message arrived
in Washington, the French Ambassador, M. Henri Bonnet, called upon
the Secretary of State to request "all possible support" from the
U.S. to the French resistance fighters in Indo-China. The French
request spoke of "immediate tactical and material assistance in'every
field: direct support of operations and the parachuting of arms,
medical supplies, quinine and food."* Bonnet was apparently not
Foreign Relations 1945, Vol VI pp. 290-299.
aware that Chenault's planes were already flying missions in support
The following evening General De Gaulle, in a conversation with
the American Ambassador, expressed concern over reports that the
Americans and British had failed to come to the aid of the French in
Vietnam. Ambassador Caffery passed along De Gaulle's complaints to
Washington.'
Caffery to SECSTATE 13 Marcy l945_F2rei&n Relations 1945
Vol VI. p. 300.
All of these requests and pleas were before Secretary of State
Edward R. Stettinius on March 16 when, in a memorandum for the Presi-
dent, he discussed the question of American aid for Indo-China.
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Settinius believed that the French were attempting to make the United
States "appear responsible for the weakness of their resistance to
the Japanese." He suggested that "we combat this trend by making
public our desire to render such assistance as may be warranted by
the circumstances..." The Secretary of State hoped that Roosevelt
would agree to a public statement by the American government on its
actions to aid the French.`
Settinius, Memo for the Pres. 16 . March, 1945," U.S. Vietnam
Relations Vol. 7, pp. 66.
The President did not agree to the proposal for a public statement)
but he did give his consent to continued aid to the resistance fighters.
Consequently, on the evening of March 18, Major General Thomas C.
Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, phoned General Wedemeyer's
home with a message from Admiral Leahy about Indo-China. According
to Brigadier General Paul Carraway who took the call, "Leahy said it
was sllright to help the Frogs, providing such help does not interfere
with our operations."*
(U) Car,
to Wedemeyer 19 March 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
Carraway tried unsuccessfully to get in touch with General
Wedemeyer who was visiting friends in Harper's Ferry, West Virginia.
After trying most of the night to reach the general, Carraway himself
drafted and sent a message "Urgent," "Priority," to General Chenault.
"The U.S. Government present attitude is to aid the French providing
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such assistance does not interfere with operations now planned... opera-
tions against the Japanese to aid the French may be under-taken by the
Fourteenth Air Force."*
Memo for General Wedemeyer 20 March 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
Although the United States was now definitely committed to aiding
the Indo-China Resistance, the French government continued to express
dissatisfaction about the extent and type of American support. On
March 24th General De Gaulle told the American Ambassador in iris
.that no supplies'had been dropped to the resistance fighters in Indo-
China and added that he could only assume that "this government, as a
matter of policy, does not want to help the French,"* De Gaulle's
Caffery to SECSTATE 24 March 1945 Foreign Relations 1945
Vol. VI p. 302.
complaints were in part justified. A report from General Chenault
revealed that between March 12 and March 28 the 14th Air Force had
flown a total of 34 missions into Indo-China comprising 98 aircraft
sorties of wh:ch.43 were bombing, 24 offensive reconnaissance, and 31
regular reconnaissance. Twenty-eight of these sorties were "in
response to direct.,request by the French." Chenault cited "bad weather,
non-availability of surplus equipment, and the fluidity of the situation"
to explain the paucity of American air support.*
Chenault to War Dept. 14 April 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
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The Air Force Commander's report did not speak of supplies and
indeed the extreme scarcity of all types of equipment in the China
Theatre, which. was forced to rely for its supplies on the long and
hazardous flights over the "hump" of the Himalaya Mountains, precluded
the allocation of any of these scarce items to the French. Prior
to April only small amounts of blankets and medical, supplies had been
dropped to them.` By the beginning of April, however, the State
Ibid.
Department was becoming increasingly concerned over French complaints
and H. Freeman Mathews, head of the Department`s European division
informally suggested to the War Department that "even a token drop of
supplies would assist in refuting the allegations. and accusations"
that the United States had no-desire to give assistance to the French
Resistance fighters. Accordingly, the War Department instructed the
Commanding General, China Theatre, that requests for supplies by the
Resistance might be honored "providing they represent only a negligible
diversion from Theatre's planned operations and entail no additional
commitments."*
Hull to Wedemeyer 7 April 1945 Wedemeyer Files.
General Wedemeyer, who was hard put to supply his own forces, was
still in no position to supply the scarce items, such as gasoline,
.requested by the French. Although a limited number of items were dropped
to the French during April, General Wedemeyer was still obliged as late as
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21 April to turn down requests for additional supplies other than
medicine.` The French, unaware of the War Department's instructions
Wedemeyer to Sabattier, 21 April 1945, Wedemeyer Files.
to General Wedemeyer, were quick to attribute the lack of supplies to
the deliberate policies of the American government.
From the foregoing it is clear that the view that the United States
deliberately limited and delayed its help to the French during the
Japanese takeover, a view accepted by most historians of Indo-China,
is in fact far from the truth. The Japanese co-up instead marked the
beginning of a more active and direct United States role in the
affairs of Indo-China.
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One important effect of the Japanese takeover in March, 1945 was,
as we have seen, to disrupt the normal intelligence channels available
to China Theatre. Individuals who had served as long-established.
sources of information suddenly disappered or were arrested. The whole
intelligence network which had been carefully built upon sources within
the French administration and the military was now, of course, quite
inoperable.
25)(1
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peoples. *
(U) Grew to Director OSS. 19 July 1945 R.G. 59.
In a few weeks the United States had thus moved from a non-
committal policy of aloofness to one of active co-operation with
both the French and the Vietnamese nationalists. This shift was made
s
under the broad formula of "any foe of the Japanese is a friend of
ours," yet the.basic outlines of American policy towards Indo-China
particularly towards,the post-war fate of the colony remained co be.
decided. Until this was accomplished, the Army and Air Force commanders
on the scene would still be subject to contradictory instructions
and sudden changes in direction.
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The Japanese coup which had precipitated the shift in American
military policy towards Indo-China had also prompted a re-examination
in Washington of basic American policy towards the area. There was
a general feeling in State and War Department circles that this was
no longer a matter which could be left "for postwar" but that certain
basic decisions would have have to be made well before the Ax.s
surrender. On March 13, 1945, the State, War and Navy Co-ordinating
Committee discussed the situation in Indo-China and, concluded that
"failing to take action in this area with U.S. forces mayleac to .,,.a
situation where inaction by the United States has the practical effect
of indicating lack of American interest in this area and giving
greater influence to the British and the French...."* The SWNCC
(C) "Minutes of Meeting of the State-War & Navy Co-ordinating
Committee,.13 March 1945," SWNCC 32/1/0 R.J. 165. National Archives.
recommended that the Secretary of State should endeavor to obtain a
"clarification" of U.S. policy towards Indo-China from the President.*
Before any action..-could be taken, however, President Roosevelt was
dead and; his.vice-president, Harry S. Truman, had assumed the presidency.
On April 13, 1945, one day after Roosevelt's death, Under Secretary
the Army Robert A. Lovett told the State, War and Navy Committee
that it was "essential" that F.D.R.'s prohibition on the formulation
of a definite Indo-China policy until "post-war" be reconsidered.
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Lovett pointed out that the lack of a definite policy was "a source
of serious embarrassment to the military." Adrairal Fenard, the head
of the French military mission, had taken advamtage: of the lack of
a definite American policy to submit questions to various agencies
of the U.S. government and "by obtaining negative or even non-committal
answers has been in effect writing American policy in Indo-China."
(C) "Minutes of the Meeting of State, War and Navy Co-Ordinating
Committee, 13 April 1945." Records of State, War and Navy Co-Ordinating
Committee R.G. 165 ritional Archives. ?
The State Department representative on the Statce, War and Navy Co-
Ordinating Committee observed that the department's Sub-Committee on
the Far East "had been so far unable to agree upon a firm Indo-China
.:policy "due to a divergence of views."'
The "divergence of views" referred to was basically a split
between those few members of the department who, often for reasons
different from those of the President, supported the Roosevelt policy
of opposition to colonialism and a U.N. trusteeship for Indo-China
and the majority of the foreign policy establishment who opposed
Roosevelt's scheme as probably unworkable and definitely dangerous
U.S. relations with France. The principal opponents of a French
return to Indo-China were William R. Langdon, the American consul at
Kunming; Kenneth P. Landon, the desk officer for Southeast Asia in the
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State Department's South West Pacific Division; and Abbott Low Moffatt,
As early as September, 1944, in a memorandum which circulated
i
throughout the department, Langdon had reported that "the Annamites
are generally dissastisfied with French rule" and had recommended
that the United States "should capitalize on our (military) position
to obtain for the Annamites some substantial political rights such as
local and colonial assemblies, customs autonomy and a civil service."
Langdon was even more concerned to end what he referred 'c_as "the
greedy exclusionist commercial policy of the French in Indo-China."*
William R. Langdon to SEC State, 19 September 1944, September
20, 1944. R. G. 59 National Archi
He called for the conversion of Haiphong to a free port and unrestricted
transit facilities between Haiphong and China. Landon on the other
hand was uninterested in the economic aspects, but had early decided
that colonialism in Southeast wassfinished. While Langdon called for
"political rights" for the Vietnamese, Landon favored complete self-
government, perhaps under a U.N. trusteeship.*
Interview with Kenneth P. Landon, 29 Nov 1971, 19 January 1972.
Abbott Low Moffatt incorported these views in a draft memorandum
on,:April 28, 1945, which noted that the United States should remind
the French government of three facts: first, that "the collaboration
of French Indo-China with the.enemy has intensified our military
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problems;" second, that "the United States commercial relations in
Southeast Asia will be of increasing importance to its peacetime
economy;" and t, that""the trend toward self-rule in this area
will be inexorable" after the end of the war. Moffatt's memo called
for a trusteeship, and end of economic discrimination in favor of
France, and the return of the Kwangcho leasehold to China, as well as
"an equitable settlement of the Indo-China Thailand border
ethnic lines."*
Moffatt "Draft Memo for the French Government" 20 April 1945
"anti-colonialists." Against them were ranged the vast majority of
State Department policy makers, including all of the senior officials.
.These men thought primarily in terms of American relations with Europe
along
These were the views of what might be called the State Department's
and were anxious to avoid any undertaking that would tend to exa cerbate
the United States' already strained relations with, France.
no sympathy (among high level officials) in State at all for Roosevelt's
Indo-China policy," Kenneth P. Landon later recalled.* Consequently,
x Landon interview, 29 November 1971.
the final State Department memorandum was a very different document from
that drafted by Landon. It pointed out that the U.S. was already publicly
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committed to the recognition of French sovereignty over all her former
possessions and urged the abandonment of any further attempt to
prevent, or set conditions upon, the return of Indo-China to France.
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Further efforts in this direction would only serve to alienate the
British and French and would "run counter to our policy of aiding
France to regain her position in the world."
With the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State
Department recommended that "the United States should not oppose the
restoration of Indo-China to France nor take any action which it is
not prepared to take toward any other Allied possession," and should
not object to any assistance which the British, operating from South
East Asia Command, proposed to give to the French in Indo-China.*
Dept, of State "Draft Memorandum for the President," 28 April
1945; JLS 1200/14, R.G. 165.
Nor should the United States continue to oppose French proposals for
participating in the war against Japan. Such proposals should be
considered solely "on their military merits."*
There is no evidence that the State Department's memorandum ever
became, per se, the Indo-China policy of the United States. Over the
next few weeks, however, the actions and attitudes of Washington were,
to closely parallel those of the memorandum. The result was to be,
at least at the Washington level, an abandonment of any attempt to
prevent the French return to Southeast Asia. At the San Francisco
Conference, which convened on April 26, 1945, to discuss the post-war
structure of the United Nations, the United States failed to press
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for a U.N. trusteeship for Indo-China. Two weeks later, on May 8,
Secretary of State Stettinus told Georges Bidault, the French Foreign
Minister, that "the record is entirely innocent of any official state-
ment of the U.S. government questioning, even by implication, French
sovereignty over Indo-China."*
Foreign Relations 1945, Volume V, pp. 557-568.
At the same time, the State, War, and Navy Co-ordinating com-
mittee had finally agreed upon an approach to Indo-China. This was
incorporated into a long report on "Politico-Military Problems,'in the
Far East and Initial Post Defeat Policy Relating to Japan," which the
Secretary of State sent to President Truman for approval on June 2, 1945.
While conceitding that "independence sentiment in the area is believed
to be inereas'ingly strong," the report declared that "the United States
recognizes French sovereignty over Indo-China."*
Foreign Relations 1945, Volume VI, p. 307.
The period from April to June, 1945, thus witnessed a sharp
reversal of President Roosevelt's Indo-China policy. The death of
the President was, of course, an important factor in. this turn of
events. More important, however, was the vagueness of the policy
itself. As Chester Cooper observed, "It was not that Truman or the
Secretary of State consciously decided against pursuing Roosevelt's
trusteeship plan - either as a unilateral American policy or through
the new United Nations. The problem was that, at the time, there was
nothing very much to go on. Roosevelt himself probably had not reached
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firm decision on Indochina's future."* Many American policy-makers
Chester Cooper The Lost Crusade (New York 1970) p. 38.
even insisted that there had been "no real change" in U.S. Indo-China
policy. In retrospect, however, it is clear that Roosevelt's death
marked the end of any American opposition to a French return to Indo-
china.
None of this was apparent to American leaders in the Far East
who were not privy to'the high-level deliberations in Washington.
During the weeks when U.S. Indo-China policy was being carefully
reassessed, General Wedemeyer was engaged in a bitter dispute with
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander-in-chief of Southeast Asia
Command over command boundaries in Southeast Asia. Since 1944 SEAC
had conducted air operations and intelligence missions into Indo-China
over the protests of General Wedemeyer,.who claimed that Indo-China
was properly a part of China Theatre Command and that any British
operations there ought to be co-ordinated with, and approved by, him.
Late in March, General Wedemeyer visited SEAC headquarters at Kandy,
Ceylon, to discuss the question of Indo-China operations with Lord
Mountbatten. He departed believing firmly that Mountbatten had agreed
not to conduct further operations in Indo-China unless they were
approved by China Theatre.*
"Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide" n.d.
July 1945," Foremen Relations 1945: The Conference of Berlin Vol. 1. p. 918.
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Lord Louis and the British believed, however, that they were only
committed to informing Wedemeyer about their operations in Indo-China.*
When Mountbatten informed China Theatre in May that he proposed to fly
26 sorties into Indo-China in support of the French, Wedemeyer was
furious. "It had never occurred to me" he wired to Lord Louis "that
you would presume that you have authority to operate in an area
contiguous to your own without cognizance and full authority of the
commander of that area... Your decision... is a direct violation of
the intent of our respective directives.""
"
(U) Wedemeyer to Mountbatten, 25 May 1945, F.I.C. Book I.
Wedemeyer's concern was not simply over the question of command
boundaries. In Washington he and Ambassador Hurley had been cautioned
by President Roosevelt to "watch carefully to prevent any British and
French political activities in Indo-China."" Control of clandestine
* Wedemeyer to Marshall, 28 May 1945. Wedemeyer's F.I.C. Book 2
activities in Indochina would enable the British to influence political
developments and alignments in that country. 'General Wedemeyer also feared
that the French guerrillas might not employ their arms against the
Japanese but against their political rivals.*
" i
"Memo by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide" p. 919.
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Wedemeyer summed up his complaints in an "eyes only" letter to
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army. Wedemeyer
believed that the British refusal to recognize Indo-China as being in
the China Theatre, the increased activities of the British in Indochina
and the large French military staff at Southeast Asia Command Headquarters
all,pointed to the existence of "a British and French plan to re-
establish their pre-war political and economic positions in Southeast
Asia."* Ambassador Hurley supported the general with an even stronger
* (U) Wedemeyer to Marshall,~28 May 1945, F.I.C. Book 2.
letter to President Truman. The ambassador called attention to the
British actions in Indo-China and asserted that Lord Mountbatten "is
using American lend-lease supplies and other American resources to
invade Indo-China to defeat what we believe to be American policy,
and to reestablish French imperialism"
Hurley to Harry S. Truman, 28-May 1945 Foreign Relations 1945:
The Conference of Berlin p. 920.
Washington's reply undoubtedly came as a surprise to Hurley and
Wedemeyer. Although the Department of State declared that "there has
been no basic change in [United States] policy," it was pointed out
that decisions reached at the conferences at Yalta and San Francisco
"would preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in Indo-China except
under the French government. The latter seems unlikely."* The
x .
(U) Sec State to Hurley, 7 June 1945 R.G. '165 National Archives.
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Ambassador was informed that the United States now "welcomes French
participation in the Pacific war to the extent practical," and that
French offers of assistance should "be considered on their military
merits." United States forces in China were free to co-operate with
French resistance groups in Indo-China "provided such assistance
does not interfere with requirements of other planned operations."*
General Wedemeyer received a similar telegram from the Chief of
Staff, who advised him that "the State Department's [new] position
eliminates the political necessity of curtailing Lord Mountbatten's
operations in Indo-China." These operations should henceforth "be
judged strictly on their military merits and in relation to the stand
of the Generalissimo.""
(C) Marshall to Wedemeyer, 4 June 1945, Wedemeyer's F.I.C.
Book 2.
So ended the last American attempts, at the command level, to
restrict French and British activities in Indo-China. All participants
agree, however that the change in American policy, such as it was,
never became generally known in China Theatre. General Wedemeyer,
for his part, did not consider the Marshall message a sign of a
fundamental change in American policy but merely another concession to
French pressure for a role in the Pacific war. In his actions towards
Indo-China he considered himself to be still bound by President Roosevelt's
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~Zerba] instructions to him in March. The subtle distinctions and
modifications of the State, War and Navy Co-Ordinating and the State
Department were little known or understood by the men who were to carry
the main burden of responsibility for the Army's operations in Indo-
China as the war drew to a close.
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In accordance with decisions reached by the Allies at Potsdam,
the occupation of Indo-China north of the 16th Parallel was to be the
responsibility of the Chinese. South of the 16th Parallel it would
be the responsibility of the British. Although American military
personnel were to be involved in both occupations, their responsibility
for providing advice and logistic support to the Chinese Armies
naturally made their role in the occupation of northern Indo-China
much more important.
At Chungking General Wedemeyer's Theatre Planning Sectior. began
work in early August on a joint American-Chinese plan for the occupa-
tion of northern Vietnam.* By 7 September a final plan had been
(C) CSM 113, 23 August 1945, China Theatre File, R.G. 407.
.completed and approved by Chiang and General Wedemeyer. The plan was
based upon the assumption: that no United States ground forces would
be committed to the area but that American "liaison and advisory per-
sonnel would accompany the occupation troops to assist the Chinese
commanders."*.1'h e planners believed that the number of occupation
(U) China. Theatre History Chapter 5, p. 28. Office, Chief of
Military History.
forces "should be held to an absolute minimum." Northern Tonkin was
suffering from a severe food shortage caused by flooding of the Red
River and the wartime disruption of the transportation network. A
large body of foreign troops would only serve to aggravate the near-
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The requirement for a minimum force was also based on the belief
that "the Chinese would have to secure their zone only until the
French could re-establish their control." The basis for this extra-
ordinary conclusion is not clear. As we have seen, General Wedemeyer
did not believe that the French would be allowed to return to Indo-
China simply as a matter of course. In his own guidance for the
American liaison teams Wedemeyer stressed the fact that "the ultimate
political fate of Indo-China remains to be dec oed."* Still, there
(U) China Theatre History, ibid.
was much in the public pronouncements of the American government which
could have led the planners to believe that the United States acknow-
ledge French sovereignty in Indo-China. In any case the theatre
planners regarded the occupation of Indo-China as a rather unimportant
side-show next to the pressing problems of Manchuria, Korea,, and
north China.
Interviews with Gen Gallagher, Gen McClure, Reginald Ungern.
In his directive General Wedemeyer had assigned first priority
to the re-occupation of areas of China proper which had fallen under
enemy control, second priority to Korea, Manchuria and Formosa and
third priority to Indo-China.* Three of the four Chinese armies
(C) Op Direction #25 HQ USFCT, 28.August 1945. China Theatre
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assigned to the occupation, the 52d, the 62d and the 93d were, in fact;
scheduled for early redeployment to Formosa and Manchuria after they
completed their task of disarming the Japanese in northern Vietnam.
The fourth Chinese army, the 60th, with a strength of about 38,000
men and a "very good" rating from its American advisors, was to remain
in the country.
In-contrast to the agreed plan which called for "a minimum force,"
some 125,000 to 150,000 Chinese troops were to be stationed in, or
pass through, northern Indo-China between October, 1945, and the spring
of 1946. The 93d Chinese Army never passed through at all. Assigned
to "secure the length of the Red River and relieve the 52d Army at
Hanoi,"* it instead "took up positions in the highlands of Laos, where
(U) China Theatre History p. 31.
no Japanese had ever been, so that it might control the opium poppy
harvest. The division refused to leave Indo-China until September,
1946...when a second crop became available."* All this for the purpose
John T. McAlister Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution (New York:
Doubleday, 1971) p. 211.
of disarming and interning a force of less than 50,000 Japanese.
The reason for the wide divergence between the American plans and
the Chinese actualities lay in the different conceptions of the
occupation held by the Chinese and the Americans. The Americans
looked upon the occupation. of Indo-China as simply an unimportant, but
necessary , b' of post-war housekeep in General Wedemeyer instructed
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his commanders that there was to be "no intimation (given to the press)
that U.S. personnel are in French Indo-China for any mission other
than a humanitarian one."*
(C) Wedemeyer, Radiogram on Censorship, 31 August 1945; China
Theatre Files
To the Chinese, on the other hand, the occupation was, as John E.
McAlister has aptly observed, "a projection of the warloaard politics
of South China onto the revolutionary scene of northern Viet Nam."*.
McAlister, op. cit., p. 209;..
of the. troops chosen for the occupation more than sixty per cent were
Yunnanese soldiers of the warlord general Lung Yun. They were commanded
by his cousin, Lieutenant General Lu Han, who also served as commanding
general of all the occupation troops. The nationalist government in
Chungking wished.to weaken Lung Yun's military strength by sending
the bulk of his troops to Vietnam, and early in the occuaption
took advantage of the situation to depose Lung Yun and appoint Lu Han
as his successor.
'Lu Han neither'. trusted, nor was trusted by, the central government
of China and'pursued his own policies, which were sometimes at variance
with those of Chungking. This important fact, that Lu Han was conducting
the occupation for his own ends and not those of the central government,
was never fully understood by either the Americans or the French.
Basically Lu Han's aims were to enrich himself and his supporters at
,the expense of the Vietnamese, to settle old scores with the French,
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and to manipulate the volatile political forces unleashed by the
Japanese surrender.
General Wedemeyer assigned a small group of Americans drawn from
the Chinese Combat Command as liaison teams with each of the major
components of Lu Han's "First Army Group." All of these teams were
under the direct command of Brigadier General Philip E. Gallagher,
commander First Army Group, Chinese Combat Command, who acted as Lu
Han's advisor.
The Chinese Combat Command had come into being on January 9, 1945,
to train and advise the Chinese units of the new "Alpha" forces, which
were being prepared and equipped by the United States to take the
offensive against the Japanese in China.` Its mission was to "assist
passim.
See Romanus and Sunderland 22. cit., Vol. III pp. 56-67 and
and advise Chinese Commanders" at each command level on their operations.
They were specifically precluded, however, from. "exercising command
over Chinese forces."* The CCC was organized into cadres of about
(U) General Wedemeyer's Data Book p. 12, Wedemeyer Files.
In his instructions to General Gallagher's liaison teams, Major
General Robert B. McClure, commander of CCC, stated that the primary
task of the teams would be to assist and advise the Chinese in the
acceptance of the Japanese surrender and in the subsequent occupation
of Vietnam. Assistance might be rendered in such areas as "troop
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movements, interpretation and execution of surrender terms and evacua-
tion of POW's." The American cadres were to report on the "effectiveness
and spirit of the Chinese enforcement of the terms of surrender" and
to give all possible assistance and supplies to Allied P.O.Ws.
(C) Major General Robert B. McClure "Instructions to CCC
Liaison Teams" 4 September 1945. China Theatre Files
General McClure's instructions said nothing about poli_tical matters.
Indeed, Gallagher and his men neither expected nor received arv explicit
political guidance from any level of command. To them the occupation
Gallagher to Bernard B. Fail, 30 March 1956. Gallagher Papers,
OCMH; Gen Gallagher 13 January, 1972.
was basically a logistical problem involving primarily the prompt
disarming of the Japanese;and the repatriation of Allied prisoners.
As for the political future of Indo-China, many believed it would
eventually go back to France, others expected that it would attain
independence or,,enter a trusteeship status, and others simply did not
know. All were agreed that it was not'a matter of any great moment.
Interviews with Gen. Gallagher, Colonel John H. Stodter, Reginald
Ungern, 18 November 1971; E. S. Waddell 13 January 1972.
General Gallagher arrived in Hanoi September 14, 1945. He had
been preceeded, however, by other elements of his command with the
advance divisions of the Chinese Army and by personnel of the OSS and
Air Ground Aid Service, who were unconnected with the Chinese Combat
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Command.
Among the first Americans to enter Indo-China after the cessation
of hostilities were the members of a joint OSS Air Ground Aid Service*
The Air Ground Aid Service was primarily concerned with the
location and repatriation of Allied pilots shot down over enemy held
territory.
team, code name "Quail," under the command of Captain Archimedes L.
Patti who had previously commanded a wartime OSS mission to Indo-China.
The team, consisted of Patti and three other officers along with
nine enlisted men and five French officers. Patti's primary mission
was to secure the Hanoi airfield, to make preparations for the
Japanese surrender and the arrival of the allied occupation troops,
and to search for American prisoners of war. His secondary mission
was to supply intelligence to Chungking about conditions in Indo-China.
The French contingent was commanded by Major Jean Sainteny, head
of the French intelligence mission in Kunming. As Sainteny saw his
mission he was to prepare the way for a French return to Tonkin.
.Patti's group arrived in Vietnam on August 22, 1945, landing
at Gialam air-field, across the river from Hanoi.* The city which
(C) "Report of G-5 to Shanghai Base Command., 2 January 1946,
China Th'~atre Files."
the Americans entered was in the midst of one of the most important
and dramatic events in the modern history of Vietnam. On August 19,
several hundred.troops of the Vietminh entered the city and proceeded to
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occupy the principal government buildings and the radio station. The
puppet government which the Japanese had installed after their March
takeover, was expelled and five days later, in Hue, the Emperor
Bao Dai, descendant of the last of the Nguyen lords of Vietnam, abdicated
in favor of "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." He received the
new title of "Supreme Political Advisor" to the new nation. On August
30th,,in an impressive ceremony, carefully stage-managed by the Viet-
minh, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam in an address
to a crowd of some 500,000 in Hanoi.
The "August Revolution," as'it soon came to be called, was a
complex phenomenon. It was not a popular uprising, although it did
not lack popular support. It was not staged by the Japanese, although
they did nothing to discourage it and were to prove helpful to the
Vietminh in various ways. It was managed by the communist-dominated
Viet-Minh but it had a broad base of support among the entire educated
elite of Vietnam.
None of this was very well understood by the Americans of the OSS
and the CCC. The familiarity of Americans with Vietnamese nationalism
was small. Intent upon what they conceived to be their "main mission"
of advising the Chinese, repatriating allied P.O.Ws, and disarming
the Japanese, they had little time for, or interest::i:n, the momentous
.events unfolding around them. For this reason their actions were
often misinterpreted and they were sometimes led into errors of conduct
or judgement of which they were only half aware. 7Che Patti mission,
in particular, despite its very minor importance, became the subject
of bitter controversy. ~! nn~~++~~++''
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Major Sainteny was later to accuse Patti of deliberately delaying
the departure of the mission for more than a week after the Japanese
surrender,* and of engaging in anti-French and pro-Vietminh activities.
p. 67.
5ainteny fl1stor re a-un raix Mange)vraris: rayara, iyo.s)
A
Other French writers have accused Patti's men of openly siding with
the Vietminh against the French, of conducting an anti-French propaganda
campaign, and of prospecting for economic advantages for American
business.*
7c
See General G. Sabattier Le Destin de 1'Indochine (Paris 1952)
p. 334-340 and Pierre Maurice Dessinges "Les Intrigues International
en Indo Chine" Le Monde 13 April 1947.
There is little documentary material on the Patti mission and
none that would serve either to confirm or refute these charges.
Everyone who met Patti agreed that he was a volatile and highly
excitable young man whose enthusiasm sometimes outran his judgement.
General Gallagher' characterized him as "an alarmist." "He 'talks
too much" complained the general "tends to freewheel , and loves to
appear mysterious. When Ienter a room I expect to see him come out
from under a rug."" Gallagher's G-2, Colonel John C. Bane, reported
Gallagher to General R. B. McCure, 20 September 1945, Gallagher
papers, OCMH, Washington, D.C. Interview with Gen Gallagher.
that "...some statements of Captain Patti were ill-considered and not
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 in accord with the understood U.S. policy."*
Bane to Gallagher, 15 September 1945, "F.I.C. Files, General
A. C. Wedemeyer Files.
On the other hand, Patti himself had complaints against the
French. On the 28th of September he reported "numerous instances of
Frenchmen, wearing U.S. uniforms and representing themselves as Americans,
engaging in anti-social and obnoxious activities" in order to discredit
U.S. Forces in particular and Americans in general" in the eyes of the
(C) CGUSCT to Gallagher, September 27, 1945 F.I.C. Radios.
.Wedemeyer Files; Gallagher observed caustically that "the French efforts
to represent themselves as Americans was due to a desire to save their
skin." Gallagher. to USFCT 28'Sept 1945, F.I.C. Radios.
Patti also had good reasons for attempting to delay Sainteny's
arrival in Indo-China, if indeed he did so. Both the O.S.S. and C.C.C.
were suspicious,-of Sainteny and believed his presence in Indo-China
would be a destablizing factor. General McClure's Headquarters described
him as "a troublemaker of the first water, seeking only France's
interests at the expense of China-American relations." The General
and his Chinese opposite number, General Ho Ying Chin, believed that
Sainteny might be planning "to seize hostages or cause the assasination
of prominent American or Chinese officials and cite these incidents
as indications of Chinese inefficiency and incapacity to maintain law
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and order (in Indo-China").* They were natura;l.iy anxious to prevent
McClure to Wedemeyer, 21 September 1945, 2 October 1945;
Wedemeyer Files.
this "under cover agent of DeGualle" from entering Vietnam.
In Hanoi Patti's men set up headquarters in the Hotel Metropole
where they were joined, on August 24, by eight :additional men. The
French, "as a protective measure," were interned by the Japanese in
the former palace of the Governor-General.
During the turbulent days of.the August Revolution, the OSS men did
their best to safe-guard the lives of French nationals in Hanoi.* Patti
Drachman op. cit., pp. 141r142 Abbott Low Moffat, "Memorandum
of Conversation with Major A.L.. Patti," 5 December 1946, Record Gp 59.
later thought that only the presence of the armed Americans had pre-
vented a massacre of French civilians by the ainoused Vietnamese.
Moffat pp. Cit.
An American officer observed that the French civilians living in Hanoi
were "terrified of :.the Annamese. Their homes are 'being looted by armed
bands of.Annamese and Frenchmen found on the streets at night are
frequently jailed for short periods."*
LT COL John Bane to Gallagher, 15 Sept 1945, F.I.C. Files
R.G. 407. (U)
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Even more serious was the plight of the French and other European
prisoners in the old Citadel in Hanoi. In August, 1945, there were
about 4,500 prisoners in the Citadel, mainly Foreign Legionnaires who
had been interned after the Japanese takeover in March.* The health
* (U) Colonel Stephen Nordlinger to John C. Bane n.d. Sept 1945.
and sanitary conditions in the Citadel were described by one of Patti's
men as "incredibly bad." The prison hospital, designed towaccommodate
150, had 290 patients, half of them critically ill. The death rate
was running at about six or seven per day.'
(U) Ibid. (C) Report of G-5 to Shanghai Base Command-2 Jan 1946.
These prisoners were the special concern of Colonel Stephen
Nordlinger's Civil Affairs and Military Government Group, a small unit
of about seven officers and thirteen enlisted men who arrived in Hanoi
two days after the O.S.S. mission. Nordlinger's mission was primarily
humanitarian. He was to locate and aid Allied P.O.Ws and "to do every-
thing possible-to secure the humanitarian treatment of all elements of
the civil community..."*
Drachman, op.cit., pp. 140-141.
One:of Nordlinger's first tasks was to try to expand the hospital
capacity of the Citadel as rapidly as possible. By late September his
group and the AGAS had succeeded in providing a 400-bed facility to
replace the old 150-bed'hospital.* From American headquarters in
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(U) Bane to Gallagher 15 September 1942.. F.I.C. Files.
Kunming and from the Red Cross Nordlinger was able to obtain a considerable
.quantity of medical supplies as well as emergency food items, such as
powdered milk.* Nordlinger also persuaded the Vietminh to return
Drachman op. cit. pp. 142-143.
control of all the Hanoi hospitals to French medical personnel.
It seemed to the French in Hanoi that an obvious way to alleviate
.their plight would be to release the able-bodied prisoners in the
Citadel and restore their arms to them. They could then "protect" the
French civilians in the city from the Vietnamese. The Americans,
however, refused to consider the proposal. They believed that to
release and arm the French P.O.Ws would be "a partisan act" which
could easily result in civil war. It was also contrary to their
instructions that "American forces are not to be involved in the
internal political struggle" in Vietnam.* This decision earned the
(C) Report of G-5 to Shanghai Base Command.
United States the lasting enmity of many French "colons," who inter-
preted the American failure to release their prisoners as a sign of
support for the Vietminh.
The French had tried and failed to move General Allessandri's
troops, who had escaped to China after the March coup, back into
Tonkin. A request by the French Military Mission in Washington for
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who explained that "U.S. aircraft are
already fully committed to other urgent tasks" and asserted that "the
movement of French forces from China into Indo-China is a matter
for consideration by the Chinese and French government."*
(C) "Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff," 11 September 1945, CCS644/35 A.G. 165.
This was the situation in mid-September, 1945, when the Chinese
occupation armies entered Hanoi. The Vietminh remained in control.,
the French were helpless to oust them. The Japanese were passive
and the Americans of the OSS and the Civil Affairs group had refused
to act to change the status quo.
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The Chinese armies, hindered by the floodin Le Red River Valley,
I\
advanced slowly into Tonkin and reached Hanoi only on 15 September.
The 62d Army, proceeding farther south, reached its final objectives
only in the first week of October." Arriving with the Chinese, General
(U) China Theatre History, Chapter 15, p. 32.
Gallagher and his staff brought the total number of Americans in Hanoi
to about sixty. The figure included all of the men of the OSS, AGAS aid
Civil Affairs Groups, as well as those under Gallagher's immediate
command.* This tiny group of Americans had by now became the focus
(C) Bane to Gallagher 15 September 1945; F.I.C. papers
Wedemeyer files. (U) "Alert Plan for American Personnel in Hanoi"
24 September 1945 F.I.C. files.
of many extravagant hopes and fears on the part of both the Vietnamese
and the French.
The Vietnamese greeted the arrival of the Americans with great
enthusiasm "as a symbol of liberation, not from the Japanese, but from
decades of French colonial rule."* Fastening on the example of the
(U) Unpublished Report of Arthur Hale, U.S.I.S., November 1945,
copy in Gallagher Papers.
Philippines (which were then about to receive their independence) and
the high sounding declarations of the Atlantic Charter, many Vietnamese
expected that the United States would champion their own revolution.
They hoped that, after independence was achieved, the United States
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would provide a large measure of economic and technical assistance as
well as perhaps some political tutelage.* The French, on the other
This was the impression received by nearly all Americans in
Indo-China at this time. In addition to Hale op. cit., See Gallagher
to McClure 20 September 1945, Gallagher Papers, and Gallagher interview
with author, Reginald Ungern interview with author, Major T.M. Mullen
to Gallagher, 26 September 1945. F.I.C. Files. Records of China Theatre
hand, greeted the Americans as allies and as welcome protectors against
the Vietnamese. "The French are extremely friendly and look to, us
for protection," reported Lieutenant Colonel Bane.
Untroubled by their recent record of collaboration with the Japanese,
the French expected that the Americans would immediately take steps
to return control of the colony to them.* Both groups were to be sorely
Bane op. cit. Hale op. cit.
disappointed. The French disappointment was more immediate, but that
of the Vietnamese was to be more lasting and, in the end, more significant.
It was not the handful of Americans in Hanoi, however, but the
Chinese who, for the moment, held the fate of northern Vietnam in their
hands. Specifically, it was the Yunan war-lord, General Lu Han. The
general, as we have seen, had his own ideas and plans for Indo-China.
These plans did not include aiding the French to regain their colony.
Lu Han flatly refused the advice offered him by Colonel Nordlinger
that the Vietminh forces in Hanoi be disarmed,' and he promptly expelled
Banes to Gallagher 15 September 1945 F I 66020015 Files ggainteny
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the small French mission under Sainten'y from the palace of the
Governor-General. The Chinese made no move either to release the many
French soldiers still held in the Citadel or to interfere in any way
with the day-to-day functioning of the Vietminh government. General
Gallagher, who had received no clear guidance himself about what the
political future of Vietnam was to be, generally approved Lu Han's
actions. He did, however, support Nordlinger's efforts to alleviate
conditions for the French P.O.W's and bring about their early release.'`
Author's interview with General Gallagher.
This was not enough to satisfy the French, who were soon accusing
Gallagher and his staff officers of covertly working to undermine French
interests. "Political significance was read. into everything" said or
done by the Chinese Combat Command, and many Frenchmen saw the actions
of the Americans as part of a great propaganda campaign to impress
the Vietnamese with the wealth and power of the Americans and discredit
the French.`
See particularly the works by Dessinges, Sabattier, and Sainteny
General Gallagher's real feelings about the revolution he was
witnessing are not easy to analyse. Upon his arrival in Hanoi he was
presented with confused and often contradictory reports on the Vietminh
by the officers of the units that had preceeded him. Colonel Nordlinger
and his G-2, LT COL John C. Bane, believed that the Vietminh were a
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Japanese-sponsored organization, had "a menacing attitude," and con-
situted a threat to good order. They urged the occupying authorities
to disarm the Vietminh troops. Once Ho's government had lost its
coercive power "a more democratic organization would probably evolve
under new leadership" to take its place.*
(C) Bane to Gallagher , 15 September 1945. F.I.C. Files.
Major T.M. Mullins of Gallagher's own staff reported that Ho,
although "a disciple of communism," was "pro-American" and "sincere in
his political motives and anxious to co-operate with the Americans."*
(U) Mullins to Gallagher, 26 September 1945, Gallagher Papers.
General Gallagher himself, while recognizing that Ho Chi Minh was "an
i
old revolutionist" and "a product of Moscow," nevertheless understood
that "the Prime Minister and his party represented the real aspirations
of the Vietnamese people for independence.
(U) Gallagher to McClure, 20 September. 1945, Gallagher Papers.
In his conversations with Ho, the general quickly discovered that
the Vietnamese leader looked to the United States for support. "He
looks upon America as the savior of all small nations and is basing
all his actions on the statement in the Atlantic Charter that the.
independence of the smaller nations would be assured by the major
powers ..... I pointed out frankly that my job was not as a representative
of the State Department nor was I interested in the political
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situation... that I was merely working with Lu Flan. Confidentially I
wish the Annamites could be given their independence, but, of course
we have no voice in this matter."
The general's political neutrality was lost on the French. They
knew only that men of their army were still prisoners in the Citadel
and that neither Lu Han nor Gallagher had given any indication that
they recognized French sovereignty in Tonkin.,
On 18 September in a casual conversation with General Gaston Wang
of the Chinese Army, General Gallagher observed that the Vietminh's
opposition to the retsrn of the French was so strong that the entrance
of French troops into northern Indo-China "at this time would probably
initiate armed conflict or disturbances which would make it difficult
for Lu Han to maintain peace and order."* General Wang, who had many
(C) Gallagher to Headquarters, CCC, 21 September 1945.
friends and associates among thekfrench olons,: promptly reported the
conversation to Sainteny, who in turn reported it to Paris.* By the
Gallagher interview with author.
time news of the conversation reached the State Department by way of
was alleged to have said that the Allies had not yet recognized French
conference" between Gallagher, Wang, and Alessandri. General Gallagher
a protest from the Quai d' Orsay, the conversation had become a '.'secret
sovereignty and that premature participation by the French in the
occupation might precipitate a conflict. The General was also alleged
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to have declared that "there could be no question of the restoration of
French sovereignty to Indo-China."*
Headquarters, CCC to Gallagher, 21 September 1945, F.I.C. Files.
General Gallagher rushed to General Wang's apartment and demanded
that the Chinese officer explain the true version of their conversation
and its circumstances.* Wang eventually agreed and Gallagher enclosed
Gallagher interview with author.
his statement in a letter to General McClure denying that he had ever
held a "secret meeting with Wang and Allesandri" and giving what he
considered to be the correct version of his conversation.*
(C) Gallagher to McClure, 21 September 1945.
The General's explanation was accepted by CCC and by General
i
Wedemeyer, who cautioned him to be more circumspect in future con-
versations. x At the same time General McClure informed Gallagher that
(C) CG, China Theatre to Gallagher, 30 September 1945, F.I.C.
the Chinese government "recognized French sovereignty in Indo-China"
and desired that the Generalisimo's "representatives in China facilitate
the resumption of French administration." As for American policy,
"it remains hands off."*
McClure to Gallagher CFBx8092 (no date) September 1945.
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As has been noted, Lu Han and his associates had no intention of
"facilitating" the return of French rule. The warlord general was unim-
pressed by McClure's radio, which Gallagher showed to him. He claimed
to have received no orders of this type from his headquarters and warned
Gallagher that any show of support for the French on his part might turn
the Vietnamese against the Chinese populace in Hanoi.* At a meeting
~,~ (U) Gallagher to McClure, 27 September 1945, Gallagher Papers.
with French representatives on the 21st of September the war-lord
general "emphasized the point that he was in command in north Indo-China
and that he would show no partiality to either French or Annamite."*
x
(U) "Memorandum for the Record" 21 September 1945; Gallagher
Papers.
Lu Han's continued hostility towards-the French could be observed
in his conduct during the formal surrender ceremony in Hanoi at the
end of September. The French General Allesandri, who had flown in
especially for the occasion, was not permitted to -attend in'an official
capacity because of his "unclear position."* He was placed one hundred
King C. Chen Vietnam and China 1938-1954 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1969) p. 125.
and fourteenth among the "guests."*
McAlister Origins p. 212.
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Lu Han also indicated to Gallagher that he did not intend to allow
the French flag to be flown alongside the flags of the other Allied
nations at the surrender ceremony.* A direct appeal from both Gallagher
(C) Gallagher to CG, USFCT, 27 September 1945, F.I.C. radios.
and Allesandri to raise the flag was turned down,.and Lu Han informed
the American general that he would not raise the flag unless specially
ordered to do so by higher headquarters.* Two days later China Theatre
(C) CG, USFCT to Gallagher,, 29 September 1945, F.I.C. radios.
confidentially advised Gallagher that the Chinese high command would
instruct Lu Han to display the French flag at the surrender.* Whether
such an order was ever actually sent to the general in Hanoi cannot
be determined, but in any case, Lu Han did not raise the French flag
at the surrender. He gave as his reason the danger that the sight
of the French banner might touch off rioting by the Vietnamese.*
Allessandri departed the scene in a rage, but, the humiliation of
the French was far from ended. That evening Lu'Han issued a public
proclamation in which he warned "the enemy of Vietnam" that if he
"dared to stir up any bloody tragedy" he would be'severely punished.*
(U) Gallagher to McClure, 27 September 1945, Gallagher Papers.
r.-a ,fi j!i-
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The proclamation was obviously aimed at the French.
Despite Lu Han's continued hostility, General Gallagher did his
best, after the receipt of McClure's message, to improve the position
of the French in Hanoi. On 26 September he met with General Allessandri,
explained the position of the Chinese government in Chungking, and
indicated his willingness to be of assistance.* Allessandri was
"overjoyed" and quickly presented Gallagher with a long list of measures
he wished to see taken by the Chinese. These included the immediate
rearming of the French police and military, the release of all remaining
prisoners in the Citadel, and the return of control of the radio
station and public utilities to the French.
Memorandum by Lieutenant Reginald Ungern, A.O.C. to General
Gallagher Papers.
The Frenchman was also anxious to have Chinese and American
troops sent to protect the Europeans in the outlying towns and cities
of northern Vietnam such as Hoa Binh, Hue, Vinh and Tourane (Danang).*
(C) McKay to Nordlinger, 19 September 1945,.' F.I.C. Miscelleanous
Although the French general was not aware of it, small parties of
Americans were already in these cities, working to help the French.
The first Americans to enter the cities of northern Vietnam were
Y
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elements of Colonel Nordlinger's Civil Affairs Group, under the command
of Captain Thomas McKay, McKay visited Vinh, line and Danang early in
September in search of allied P.O.W's. He appears to have been con-
vinced that the Vietminh, who by this time had seized control of
local government everywhere in the area, were Japanese-controlled
puppets. "In none of the cities visited could the Japs explain why
they permitted a government they did not support and accept to maintain
an Army."* The fact that the Vietminh had obviously obtained many
of their arms from the Japanese served to confirm McKay's suspicions.
Even a gigantic welcoming ceremony held for the Americans by the
Vietminh government at Vinh failed to allay McKay's hostility to the
nationalists. The fact that "everything was prepared for us "seemed
only further proof that the Vietminh were in league with the Japanese
since "only the Japs knew that we were coming."*
were told that they would be held individually and collectively
responsible for any unlawful acts against the French." At Vinh, McKay
responsibl..e for the maintenance of peace and security." The Vietminh
McKay did his best to aid the French civilians he found in the
towns he visited.. His medics gave them medical assistance and distributed
small amounts of medical supplies. He sternly warned the Japanese
that "pending the arrival of the Chinese, the Japanese alone are
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(C) McKay to Nordlinger, 2 October 1945, F.I.C. Miscelleanous
succeeded in persuading the Vietminh to transfer a group of 50 Frenchmen
from a prison camp to more comfortable quarters in a pagoda but failed
in his attempt to have them released altogether.*
American advisors accompanying the Chinese 62d Army likewise
attempted to ameliorate the condition of the French. The troops of
the 62d displayed little interest in the plight of the French, as they
moved across central Tonkin from Tsingsi to Cao Bango, Langson, and
Haiphong, from whence they were to'embark for Manchuria. They made
no move to protect French citizens and property until. the senior
American advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Maris, persuaded the
general in command to provide guards for French civilians and_?to
protect French property.
Files.
Maris to Gallagher, 14, September 1945, F.I.C., Miscellaneous
Maris was even more hostile to the Vietminh than Captain McKay.
He considered all Frenchmen, even those who had been part of the Vichy
regime a short time before, as "allies." "Any action taken against
them would be an act against Allied interests." if the French interests
and "Allied interests" were one and the same, as Maris apparently
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believed, then the Vietminh could only be seen as a threat to the
Allied cause. "I still do not believe" he complained to General
Gallagher, "that the Chinese have gone far enough in assuring that
the communistic elements give no more trouble.... All weapons (must)
be taken from these people who are using them against the interests of
the Allies." He added that the Vietminh "seem to be controlled mainly
by the mob demonstration spirit" and while "very fixed about independence,"
had "no real knowledge of fighting and will scatter at the'first few -
shots."
* Maris to Gallagher, 14 September 1945 F.I.C. Miscellaneous File.
In Hanoi, Gallagher soon found that Lu Han had different ideas
about the Vietminh and the sanctity of "Allied. interests." At Gallagher's
urging the Chinese war-lord grudgingly agreed to release all the
remaining French prisoners of war from the Citadel and also to provide
a small amount of gasoline to the French Military Mission. More than
this he would not do. His reasons were the same: he had received
no clear instructions from his headquarters, and he feared reprisals
against the local Chinese population if his army appeared to be aiding
the French.* When.:Gallagher suggested to Chungking that Lu Han be
(U) "Memorandum of Conference, 5 September 1945" Gallagher
papers, Gallagher to McClure 27 September 1945.
.given firm and unequivocal instructions from the Generalissimo on the
Chinese government's policy, General Wedemeyer replied that this was
\a Chinese matter and that he was unwilling to "initiate any action
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which might be construed as an indication that this [China Theatre]
Headquarters intends to take any part in the Indo-China political
situation.""
(C) CG, China Theatre to Gallagher 4 October 1945 F.I.C.
Chinese and American help to the French, small and ineffective
as it was, was still enough to alarm the Vietminh. General Gallagher
reported "a noticeable change in the attitude of the Annamites toward
the Americans here... since they became aware of the fact that we were
not going to interfere and would probably help the French."* In a
(C) CG, China Theatre to Gallagher, 4 October 1945, F.I.C.
Radios.
meeting with Gallagher and Captain Patti, Prime Minister Ho "expressed
.the fear that the Allies considered Indo-China a conquered country
and that the Chinese came as conquerers." Gallagher and Patti attempted
to reassure him`and also urged Ho to continued his negotiations with
the French over "the present difficulties."
The worst difficulties, however, were still to come. During early
October tension and violence in Hanoi rose nearly to crisis proprotions.
This new level of tension was' directly related to, and influenced by
events in Indo-China south of the 16th parallel.*
~e
(U) Gallagher to McClure, 27 September 1945, Gallagher Papers.
r-t"tiRT^n i, r'?liT'i7r n
... is
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"THERE IS A SORT OF DRUGSTORE REVOLUTION GOING ON HERE"
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South of the 16th parallel the fact that the responsibility for
the occupation lay with the British was of crucial importance. Unlike
the Chinese, the British did nothing to interfere with the resumption
of control by the French. Indeed, in many important ways, they actually
facilitated their return to power.
The British occupation forces under the command of General
Douglas D. Gracey arrived in Saigon around the middle of 'September to
find that city, like Hanoi, in the hands of a nationalist,,revolutionary
government; but-there were important differences. In the nor'h,. the Vietmi:n....
were "the only show in town" with no serious rivals for the leadership
of.the independence movement. In the south they competed for leader-
ship with the Trotskyite Dai Viet party, the old pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc
Party, and the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects. At the time of the
arrival of the occupation forces, the governing "Provisional Executive
Committee for the South" had only four Vietminh members out of_a total
of thirteen.*
x Buttinger op. cit., p. 324.
General Gracey had been given strict instructions by his superior,
Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia
Command not to "interfere in the internal affairs of Indo-China."
Almost from the first, Gracey nevertheless violated both the letter
and the spirit of his instructions. As he was about to leave for
Indo-China, he observed that "the question of the ;government of Indo-
China is exclusively French.' Civil and military control by the French
~n
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is only a matter of weeks."* When he was welcomed by the Vietnamese
leaders upon his arrival in Saigon, Gracey, in his own words, "promptly
kicked them out.""
* Fall, Two Vietnams, p. 64.
From the outset, the general made it clear that, unlike Lu Han and
Gallagher in the north, he was unwilling to work with and thr,ugh the
existing native government. On the contrary, he demanded that all
Vietnamese be disarmed and informed the local Japanese commander,
General Terauchi, that he would be responsible for maintaining "order."
The Nationalists staged a general strike on-17 September in protest
against the actions of the British. Gracey responded on the 20th and
21st with a proclamation of martial law, a suspension of all Vietnamese
newspapers, and a ban on all demonstrations and public meetings. Most
important, he released and rearmed about 1400 French prisoners-of-war
who had been interned in the Saigon area since the Japanese takeover
in March 1945. The French promptly reoccupied all of the public buildings
and evicted the Vietnamese from the post offices and police stations.
Large numbers of Vietnamese were "arrested" and many others were beaten
up or killed by the French.
The Committee of the South answered with a crippling general
strike and widespread acts of sabotage. On the evening of 24 September
members of the Binh Xuyen, a-Mafia-style nationalist political sect,
I
entered a residential section of Saigon called the Cite Herault and
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massacred more than 150 civilians, mostly women and children. From
this point civil war was general throughout the south with British
and even Japanese troops supporting the French against the Vietminh
and other nationalists.
The American role in the south was more spectacular although
much less important than in the north. As early as August 10th OSS
Detachment 404 based on Ceylon had begun plans for an intelligence and
observer group to accompany the Allies to Saigon. This project, which
received the code name "Embankment," had a number of widely d;;vergent
objectives A primary purpose was to locate and.render aid to Allied
.prisoners-of-war, particularly.Amer.icans, and to identify and track
down Japanese war criminals. In addition, the members of the mission
were to "locate and inventory all property of the United States government
and of American citizens, and confiscate or microfilm all Japanese
documents and code books of strategic value." Other objectives of
the mission were to "report on future political trends" and to keep
track of the activities of any anti-Allied or pro-Japanese political
groups.* The.4SS men were instructed to reveal only as much of their
(S) Major Amos D. Moscrip "A Plan to Penetrate Saigon," 10
August 1945, records of OSS, Central Intelligence Agency.
mission objectives to the French authorities "as will not offend
.their sensibilities."
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The man selected to command "Embankment" was Major (later Lieutenant
Colonel) Peter Dewey. Dewey spoke fluent French and had served with
France and North Africa, but his knowledge of current
conditions in Indo-China was spotty. In a memorandum on "French
Policy. in the Far East," prepared for Detachment 4104 in August, 1945,
Dewey made no mention of the nationalist stirrings in Vietnam and
Laos but devoted his attention exclusively to iwhat the French might do.
Like the French themselves, Dewey viewed the question of Indo-China
primarily as a problem between France and her British, American, and
Chinese allies. Dewey pointed out that the French were worried about
the possibility of a joint British-American-Chinese trusteeship for
Indo-China and were determined to place elements of their army in
southern Indo-China as "soon as possible."" The task of the "Embankment"
team was envisioned to be one of accompanying these French units and
observing the French effort in southern Vietnam.
On 1 September, the advance elements of "Embankment," a P.O.W.
evacuation team under Lieutenant Emile R. Connasse, was parachuted
into Saigon. The men were greeted "respectfully" by the Japanese and
allowed to proceed.with their work of locating and. evacuating P.O.Ws.*,
25X1
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Connasse dismissed the Vietnamese establishment of an independent
government as "a drugstore revolution" but did acknowledge that "for
the present their control is complete."*
On the day after their arrival, the Americans were witness to a
massive demonstration and parade by several hundred thousand men and
women organized by the Committee for the South. Intended by the
Vietminh as a demonstration of solidarity, the. parade was soon
manipulated by extremists into an attack on the French residents of
the city. Dozens of French men and women were beaten up or arbitrarily
thrown into jail and their homes looted.
This was the first serious breakdown of public order since the
Committee for the South had taken control and it was to be the last
until well after the arrival of the British and French.* But the
Buttinger op. cit., pp. 320-321, Ellen Hammer The Struggle for
Indochina (Stanford 1954) pp. 108-109.
Americans of the "Embankment" team could not know this. To these
men.who had arrived one day before the riot, the revolutionary govern-
ment seemed naturally prone to violence and disorder. Many of its
actions "appeared crazy or unexplainable."*
Buttinger, Ibid.
The Americans purchased the large Continental. Palace Hotel to
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serve as a refuge for French civilians who claimed, to be in imminent
danger from the lawless Vietnamese. Since the hotel was at that
point American property, the Japanese were obligedl to guard it against
attacks by the Vietnamese.`
(U) Interview with Frank White 26 February 1972.
Colonel Dewey arrived with the remainder of the "Embankment" Team
on the 4th of September and relieved Lieutenant Connasse, who returned
to Ceylon on the 6th. Dewey and his executive officer, Captain Herbert
.Bluechel, continued to do their best to protect French civilians but,
in addition, they established close contact with the leaders of the
independence movement.
After the arrival of the British and French, Dewey was under
considerable pressure to break off his meetings with the Vietnamese.*
(U) White Interview; (S) Major F.M. Small U.S.A., "Memorandum
on the Death of Major Peter Dewey," 25 October 1945; (S) Dewey to HQ
404 14 September 1945.
General Gracey claimed that Dewey was going outside normal command
channels and that his actions would be interpreted by the Vietnamese
as evidence of official American support for the independence movement
in southern Vietnam..* On the 14th of September Gracey formally ordered
White Interview.
the Embankment team to cease all intelligence activities until its
mission in Saigon was "clarified." Dewey complained bitterly about
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this directive to his headquarters and evidently continued his intelligence
activities until his recall on 22 September.
Fighting between the French and British and the Vietnamese was
by this time general, but the Americans had experienced little
difficulty until 24 September when Captain Joseph Coolidge was ambushed
along with a British officer on a trip to Dalat. Coolidge was seriously
wounded and had to be evacuated to Ceylon.
K1
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In Hanoi word of the death of Colonel Dewey caused uneasiness among
the Americans of General Gallagher's command. Prime Minister Ho Chi
Minh hastened to the general's headquarters to express his regrets.
He assurred the Americans that such an incident would occur` in the
north only "over my dead body." The Prime Minister expressed the
intention of writing personally to the State Department to explain the
incident.*
(U) Ungern "Memorandum for the Record" 28 Sept 1945 Gallagher
Despite these assurances, unrest in the city continued to increase
throughout the first two weeks of October. News of the French and
British actions in the south frightened and angered the Vietnamese in
Hanoi. There were numerous reports of beatings and murders of Frenchmen..
At one point Major Sainteny was seized and imprisoned by a Vietnamese
mob when he displayed a French flag on his car. At the insistence of
the Americans he was soon released.
Scattered rioting and unruly street demonstrations continued
throughout the month, climaxing on 23 October with the shooting by a
mob of two French officers. The following day many French families
found themselves without food when all Vietnamese markets and stores
declared a boycott against sales to the French.
In a letter to General McClure, Gallagher observed that "the
situation here is pregnant with possible trouble." The general advised
Lu Han that "...unless.the Provisional government can demonstrate at
once that it can control the population... you will be forced to'assume
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direct control."* Lu Han, however, was no more anxious than before
"Memo for the Record" 26 Oct 45, Gallagher Papers.
to take upon himself the responsibility for governing northern Vietnam.
He was content to leave this thankless task to the Provisional Govern-
ment. As for the French, although he had promised Gallagher that "he
would meet their requests, where possible," the American general
reported that by the end of October Lu Han had given them "damn little."*
For his part the Chinese general complained that the French were "con-
tinually double-dealing" and that he had "very little confidance in
their good faith."* Lu Han flatly refused to allow the French to
broadcast over the radio, which they claimed was being utilized by the
anti-French propaganda. Nor
would the Chinese consider taking control of the radio station away
from the Vietnamese. Lu Han also refused to turn over two large
government buildings to the French military mission.*
W (U) Ungern "Memorandum for the Record" 29 October 1945;
Gallagher Papers.
An uneasy peace reigned in Hanoi, punctuated by sporadic outbursts
of rioting and mob violence. The French, according to Gallagher,
"were itching to get on with the job" of repossessing their colony but
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could not do so in the face of the Chinese occupation army. Despite
the tense atmosphere and sense of impending crisis, General Gallagher
and his staff proceeded with the preparations for the transhipment
of the Chinese troops of the 52d and 62d Chinese Armies north to
Formosa and Manchuria.
To the men of Chinese Combat Command this was their primary mission.
All e1s,e was secondary. From the time that Rear Admiral Elliott Buck-
master's task force anchored off Haiphong, the Americans in northern
Vietnam were obliged to devote a large portion of their attention to
the transfer of the armies. The time and energy they could devote to
internal affairs in Hanoi was correspondingly limited.
General Gallagher sent two of his staff officers, Colonel John
Hutson and Lt. Col. John H. Stodter, to meet with Admiral Buckmaster
at Haiphong to work out the details of the movement. The harbor at
Haiphong had been extensively mined during the war by the U.S. Air
Force. The location of the mines could not now be determined and
they were set to never become inoperative.*
(U) Vice Admiral Elliott Buckmaster to Ronald Spector, 6
November 1971. Historians Files Office of the Chief of Military History.
General Gallagher and General Lu Han believed that to sweep the 11 mines in the inner harr of Haiphong would provide French troopships
with easy access to the docks of the city. This might well help to
bring on the civil war which both the Americans and Chinese hoped to
avoid. Admiral Buckmaster, who was impressed with the gravity of the
political situation, suggested that only the outer approaches to the
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harbor be swept. The ships of his task force could anchor there and
the Chinese troops could be moved to the. Ships in Lighters.* Accordingly
(U) "Memorandum for the Record" 29 October 1945; Memorandum for
Record," 26 October 1945; Gallagher to McClure, 26 October 1945. All
in Gallagher Papers.
.Admiral Buckmaster commandeered. all remaining Japanese minesweepers in
the area and ordered their crews to sweep the mines in the outer harbor,
a task they completed by October 22.
During the last week of October, the first elements of the 52d
Army were loaded aboard seven Liberty ships bound for Formosa and
Manchuria. General Gallagher and his staff personally supervised the
loading of the troops which consumed most of the month of November.
The general returned to Hanoi on the 29th to find a full-blown economic
crisis in progress.
To understand the situation in Hanoi at the end of November it
is important to bear in mind that the Chinese occupation of Vietnam
was, as we have seen, an opportunistic exploitation by a group of
Chinese warlords of a temporarily favorable situation. An important
aspect of the warlord occupation was the deliberate manipulation of
the Vietnamese currency system tc enrich the Chinese. This was
accomplished by arbitrarily setting the exchange rate between the
Chinese dollar and the Vietnamese piaster at 13.33 Chinese dollars to
1 piaster, thus making the value of the Chinese dollar approximately
three times greater in Hanoi then in neighboring Kunming.* The results
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have been graphically described by John McAlister: "....Every airplane
arriving from Kunming brought with it great quantities of money to
be exchanged and in one instance 60 million Chinese dollars were
reported on a single flight. The Chinese began to buy up hotels
shops,'houses and similar sorts of real estate... By these and other
financial operations including loans received from the Bank of Indo-
China the Chinese occupation was estimated to have extracted 400 million
Banks of Indo-China piasters...." This in a country where the total
McAlister op. cit. p. 124.
Gross National Product in 1939 had been around 1.14 billion dollars.
The peculiar financial situation soon caught the attention of
General Gallagher's G-5, Lieutenant Colonel C. Radford Berry, who
predicted that Lu Han's actions would bring about economic chaos. In
a letter to General Gallagher the colonel remonstrated against the
manipulation of the exchange rate, forced loans from the Bank of
Indo-China, and the concurrent use of both Chinese and Vietnamese money
as legal tender. "Continuation of these practices," be predicted.
"will result in the collapse of the currency of Indo-China."*
(U) C. Radford Berry to Gallagher, 18 October 1945, F.I.C.
With considerable naivete Berry attributed the Chinese financial
manipulations to simple ignorance of the mechanics of finance. He
suggested that General Gallagher despatch a memo on the subject to
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Lu Han in order to set him right.` On October 23, Berry optimistially
Berry to Gallagher ibid. Gallagher forwarded Berry's memo to
observed that "it appears [my] memo has caused the Chinese to realize
the gravity of the situation and provoked early action by them looking
to a :remedy."'
(U) Berry to Gallagher, 25 October 1945, F.I.C. files.
Action proceeded but not in the manner envisioned by Colonel
Berry. The Chinese continued with business as usual and, at the end of
October, General Gallagher warned Lu Han that "the situation with
respect to currency, ...is growing steadily worse.,,*
x (U) Gallagher to Lu Han 31 October 1945, Gallagher Papers.
On 14 November, the Chinese demanded that Sainteny arrange with
the Bank of Indo-China to make available at least 600,000 piasters a
day for exchange. They also demanded an immediate loan of 40,000,000,
piasters to meet "urgent military needs."*
King C. Chen op. cit. p. 135.
Sainteny, after some backing and filling,`feit that he had no
choice but to accept the Chinese demands. Not so the French government
of Indo-China which was now functioning again in Saigon. The French
authorities in the south not only rejected any further Chinese levies
but issued a decree on 17 November, withdrawing all 500 piaster bank
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notesnotes from circulation. All of the notes printed during the
Japanese occupation from 9 March to 23 September were declared to be
valueless. All other 500P notes were revalued at '70% of their face
value and were to be deposited in special blocked accounts in the
Bank of Indo-China.
`
"Decree of the High Commissioner of France for Indo-China"
enclosure to Sainteny to Gallagher, 21 November 1945.
The French decree caused consternation and panic among the Chinese
and Vietnamese citizens of Hanoi. Many small tradesmen, merchants and
artisans had put their life savings into one or two of these bills.
There were riots and demonstrations, and large crowds besieged the
offices of the Bank of Indo-China in Hanoi.*
(U) Reginald Ungern "History of the $500 (sic) Note Incident"
unpublished mss in the Gallagher Papers.
The Chinese generals refused to accept the decree of the French
High Commissioner. On 24 November, they notified Sainteny that they
did not recognize the decree as being in effect north of the 16th
parallel. Two days later the Chinese notified M. Baylis, the manager
of the Hanoi Branch of the Bank of Indo-China, that; unless the decree
was rescinded immediately they could no longer be responsible for the
safety of the bank.*
Chen op. cit. p. 136.
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The Vietminh, meanwhile, had organized a mass.demonstration in
front of the Bank of Indo-China. Believing that they had been fired
on by, the demonstrators, the Chinese guards in front of the bank
opened fire on the crowd. Some Vietnamese apparently returned the
fire, and the Chinese responded by tossing hand grenades into the
crowd. In the confused fighting six Vietnamese blamed the French for
the incident, but under pressure from the American advisory group the
Chinese continued to guard the Bank. The Vietminh stepped up their
anti-French propaganda campaign and organized a boycott by Vietnamese
merchants against the French. Since the French were almost totally
dependent on Vietnamese shops for ,food and clothing the boycott caused
considerable hardship.
On 22 November Sainteny, after confering with the French authorities,
announced that "the invalidation of the 500 piaster note is a financial
policy of the French government; no change will be made."'` The Chinese
Chen op. cit. p. 137.
responded by "arresting" the director and the branch manager of the
Bank of Indo-China. .
General Lu Han had absented himself from the city on the pretext
of ill-health. He continued to stay away throughout the entire
period of the financial crisis despite an urgent, radio message from
General Gallagher that his presence in the city was essential.*
* Ungern "History" p. 3.
In his absence the Chinese were commanded by General Yin,
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Lu Han's Deputy Chief of Staff.
At this junction General Gallagher returned to Hanoi from Haiphong.
He immediately met with General Yin at Chinese Army headquarters,
and quickly perceived that, so far as the Chinese army was concerned,
the financial crisis was a hold up designed to coerce the French into
honoring the 500 piaster notes. The American general demanded the
immediate release of the bankers,-pointing out to General Yin that
neither they, nor any other local French official, had the authority
to alter the financial policies of the French government. To break
the deadlock's Gallagher suggested 'a round table meeting between the
tow sides.*
Papers.
(U) "Memorandum for the Record" 29 November 1945, Gallagher
The following afternoon the Frenchmen were released and Sainteny
agreed to meet with the Chinese on 1 December at General Gallagher's
residence. At the meeting the Chinese generals again attempted to
bring pressure on the French by intimating that it "would be very
difficult to maintain local peace in view of the (unpopular) measures
taken by the French"* Sainteny refused to be intimidated and stood
Papers.
(U) "Memorandum for the Record" 2 December 1945, Gallagher
firm. The Chinese next offered to raise the Chinese and Vietnamese
merchant boycott of the French in return for co-operative behavior
on the part of the bank. At this point General Gallagher remarked
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angrily that the two sides "could not solve the banking problem by
having women and children go hungry." He stated that unless the
Chinese Army intended to use the boycott to blackmail the French they
ought to-have it raised at once and volunteered to call personally on
Ho Chi Minh to request that the Vietnamese also end their boycott.*
On this note the meeting ended.
That same afternoon Gallagher met briefly with Prime Mit.isterHo
Chi Minh, who agreed to try to stop the boycott but demanded that the
French indemnify the families of the Vietnamese killed during the
demonstration on 26 November. After leaving the Prime Minister, General
Gallagher again met with the French and Chinese.',' Sainteny announced
that high-level technical experts with full authority to make an
agreement would be sent from Saigon to confer with the Chinese.
After a few days of acrimonious discussion, the two sides finally
agreed upon a joint proclamation which declared that the 500 piaster
notes would continue in circulation north of the 16th parallel.
Persons possessing 500P notes in amounts greater than 5,OOOP were required
to deposit them in;special accounts in the Bank of Indo-China. They
would be allowed a monthly withdrawal of up to 20 per cent of their
balance. Individuals possessing smaller quantities of notes could
exchange them at the Bank for face value.`
The High Commissioner of France for Indo-China to General
Lu Han 5 October 1945; in the Gallagher Papers.
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The 500 piaster note incident was General Gallagher's last major
involvement in the internal affairs of Vietnam. Since early November
China Theatre Command had become increasingly anxious to withdraw
the CCC contingent from Indo-China in order to meet personnel needs
elsewhere. General Gallagher however, believed that the continued
presence of an American officer of flag rank in Hanoi was advisable.
He remained in the capital with a steadily diminishing staff until
December 12, 1945 when he was ordered to close out the American advisory
mission.
For the next 18 months there were to be no more American military
observers in northern Vietnam. The Chinese occupation continued
without benefit of American advise (or restraint) until August 1946
when in return for considerable economic and political concessions on
the part of the French Chiang Kai Shek's troops departed Tonkin. General
warfare followed . between' the French and Vietminh in December 1946
after a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach a compromise.
General Gallagher's mission to Hanoi must certainly rank among the
most difficul.t',assignments of the wartime period. Gallagher and his
men viewed their role as a purely military one of advising the Chinese
Army. In Hanoi they found themselves caught up in a volative political
crises which they only dimly understood. They became focus of extravagant
hopes on the part of both the French and the Vietnamese and their
every action was viewed as politically significant:. In this situation
they were inevitably doomed to disappoint both the French and the
Vietnamese and they did.
UNCLASSIFIED
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The Gallagher mission was the last and perhaps the most important
of a series of American military involvements with Indo-China dating
back to 1943. During the period between'l943 and March 1945 American
commanders felt compelled by their need for thnely intelligence about
Vietnam to cultivate the various political groups involved in the
struggle for control of the country: the Free French, the Vlchyites,
the nationalist Chinese.and the Vietminh. The Japanese take-over in
March 1945 destroyed many of the traditional smerican sources of
intelligence and ultimately led to more direct and. intensive J.S.
involvement in Indo-China. Finally the post-war Allied occupation
of Vietnam.led to"American military participation, as advisors in
the north and as observers in the south.
Little of the fruits of experience derived'from the U.S. Army's three
year involvement in Vietnamese affairs during, 1943-1945 appears to have
been made available to American policy-makers; and American military
men, for their part, usually had a very imperfect understanding of
American policy toward Southeast Asia.
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HISTORICAL STAFF/
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 Indochina
Vietnam
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pApprvmiefkhewel~ase N$ - A -
lassification 'PE ] , 1na c1
cos
DATE:
13 Nov 72
8 Nov 72
20 Oct 72
CLASS.: S
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form. addressee, title k length)
Metro for Exec Dir-Caipt from B. Drell, Chief, CIa Historical Staff. Subj :
Request for CIA Concurrence in Unclassified publication of an official histo
of the US Army in Indochina, 1942-1945 LOCATION:
Metro for Bernard Drell fran S. Kent, sub: Review of R. Spector, The US HS/HC 872 w"
ABSTRACT Arrry in Indochina 1942-1945 fran the point of view of the re eas i i ot
certain passages relating to OSS many of which are based upon the OSS archives.
Letter to Mr. Lawrence K. White, Exec Dir fran James L. Collins, Chief, Military History.
Study titled The United States Army in Indo-thine 1942-1945.
Traces the fornulati_on of US policy towards continued French control of Indochina.
Describes the Japanese takeover of Indochina in Mar 45 and the reluctance of US
to assist France in struggle. Vietnam independence proclaimed on 30 August 45.
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