BRIEFING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2001/$EGkDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Briefing
12 May 1958, Room 117 Central Building, 4:30 p.m.
As of this writing I recall little of the back-
ground of the briefing and the circumstances surround-
ing it.
I know that Mr. Dulles asked me to do the job,
probably, as a part of an extended series of briefings
to be given by officers of the Clandestine Services.
I. am fairly sure that this was
first visit to the US as Director of the a
position he had not held very long.
The substance of the briefing follows the
principal judgments of National Intelligence Estimates
considered to be current at the time.
For obvious reasons the briefing contained a
lot more solid information regarding Soviet military
matters than the briefing which I had given
- a few months earlier. At the same time it
carefully avoided precise numerical estimates in
- 1 -
2iQ y-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Approved For Release 20011
9UkT
 Approved For Release 2001 /'IaBCR1 ' DP84-00499R000200130001-0
such important end-items as heavy jet bombers, submarines,
and ICBM's.
Reading it over today and doing the translation
into English (the original English text was probably
destroyed when the version was finished) I am
notably pained by paragraph #16 on the Sino-Soviet
relationship and how its endurance is something almost
solemnized in Natural Law. The final poetic sentence
about the biological symbiosis was my own gratuitous
interpolation. To have coordinated this sort of prose
through. the final draft of an NIE would have been
impossible, but I will warrant that the community
would have agreed in the sentiment even while it
rejected the flowery formulation.
As to the - of the text, we had better
luck than with the briefing. This
reads somewhat better, but has its full cargo of in-
felicities of structure and vocabulary. As I go over
it, I. only wish we could do it again and from scratch.
But for the sake of the historical record we have left
it as delivered over the pained remonstrance of the
gifted - lady wh_o has typed i.t for preservation
in this form.
Approved For Release 2001/1gff;iIO-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/'4BCATRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
My English. translation takes some :Liberties with
25X6 the- which is generally apparent with the appear-
ance of words and phrases in square brackets.
Approved For Release 2001/121DA 2DP84-00499R000200130001-0
SECfi
 25X1C Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001g/RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
English translation of the text
of the briefing note in
1. I hope you will permit me to
read rather than speak this short briefing note on
the Soviet Union which we of my office have put together.
What I will give you are some of our estimative
judgments regarding the most important [intelligence]
problems [which we confront]. The judgments rest
upon a considerable volume of information collected
by [US] intelligence and represent the views of the
[intelligence] components of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
2. [Introductory]. Some eighteen months ago
the Bloc experienced a very severe crisis. The [public]
repudiation of stalinist terrorism caused tremors in
the USSR and its satellites and severely shook a
great number of western communists.
3. However the Soviet Union has rewon the lost
ground. It has been able to reaffirm the grip it used
to hold on central Europe. The Bloc as a whole has
regained its habiliments of unity and strength.
Approved For Release 2001/12LQ6jc RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 200'LAt.--RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
4. [With these introductory phrases] I propose
abruptly to launch out into the chain of circumstances
which has permitted the Bloc to achieve a. most remark-
able progress.
5. First I should note Soviet accomplishments
in the development of guided missiles and the extraor-
dinary impression that their success has made through-
out the world. In the underdeveloped countries the
reclame was the greater for the fact that the USSR
itself had been only recently in a comparably under-
developed condition.
6. For the first time the world perceived the
possibility, and that in the near future, of the United
States being vulnerable to a Soviet ICBM attack. .
With this came the realization that a great change
would occur in the relative strength of the two power
blocs. These two factors have nurtured the belief
that the USSR would [henceforward] exercise upon the
US the same sort of restraint that the US has hereto-
fore exercised upon the USSR.
7. The USSR's progress in the realms of science
[and technology] and of economics have helped reaffirm
its political power - both directly and psychologically.
Approved For Release 2001/W6kwDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/8k4R(EiRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
8. In mathematics and in the physical sciences
(within which I include nuclear physics), the USSR has
dramatically demonstrated its talent. It has surpassed
the US in the number of its trained scientists. Moreover
it can deploy its scientific personnel to the service
of its foreign political aims and its military aspira-
tions.
9. The recent rate of growth of Soviet GNP has
been twice that of the US. [It is worth mention that]
Soviet GNP is only 40 percent of that of the US and
that the Soviet population consumes only about 25
percent of [what] the US [population consumes.]
10. The USSR in its ability to limit consumption
and to enforce other of its economic objectives has
been able to overtake the US in certain areas [of the
economy] and will soon overtake the US in others; for
example, the production of machine tools, freight cars,
coal, and cotton textiles. The USSR is [now] in a
position to allocate resources in such a way that its
economic effort in such areas as research, military
preparedness, industrial investment, and foreign aid
are already the match of those of the US. Soviet
military expenditures in recent years, translated
Approved For Release 2001/ W6 0 .;RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 200' / 4 1 i-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
into dollars, are about the same as those of the US,
and Soviet industrial investment is only 15 percent
less.
11. Military Matters: Since the end of World
War II Soviet grand strategy has been greatly influenced
by the fact that the US - its most important potential
enemy - is [geographically] well beyond the reach of
its traditional military power. Therefore the USSR
has channeled much effort towards the building of a
submarine fleet, long-range bomber aircraft, guided
missiles, and [an arsenal] of air defense weapons.
We believe that the Soviets have developed an array of
nuclear weapons for purposes of both long-range
attack and air defense. [We estimate] the number of
their long-range bombers at some 1500 [of all models].
Their submarine force possesses a formidable capability
for torpedo and missile attack. The perfection of
their radar, the growing production of all-weather
fighter [-interceptor] aircraft and their development
of surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles contribute
to the continued growth of their air defense capa-
bilities. The magnitude of the scale and nature of
the Soviet program of missile testing shows a firm,
Approved For Release 2001/1.2104 C.~I4j DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001 /gpjR Pf RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
well-conceived, and rigorously applied plan of action
which we believe [will have] yielded [scientific and
technological] insights of great value - especially
in the area of [non-military] satellites [e.g. sputniks],
ICBM's and [indeed in that of the whole range] of
military missilry. Soviet efforts are being concen-
trated in the field of ballistic missiles and [to a
lesser. extent] in other systems, such as for example,
cruise missiles.
12. The USSR has by no means neglected [the
development of the capability] of forces for operations
on the periphery of the Bloc. It has carefully reor-
ganized and modernized its ground forces; other im-
provements in fire power and mobility are probable
in the future. We contine to estimate that the
number of Soviet line divisions is 175 - with a con-
siderable variation in real strength between division
and division.
13. The Soviets are giving increased attention
to air-borne forces. Their military doctrine and
training [show] them adapting to conditions of nuclear
war as well as conventional.
Approved For Release 2001/W kj RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001,-4/RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
14. The tactical disposition of Soviet forces
would permit their rapid deployment to several widely-
separated theatres of the Eurasian land mass. In
Eastern Europe the Soviets alone dispose 32 line divi-
sions,nnre than 1100 fighter [interceptor] jet
aircraft, and at least 250 light jet bombers. It
goes without saying that the mission of these forces
is not confined to being a military threat to Eastern
Europe; their role in the maintenance of [political]
control over the European Satellites is equally im-
portant.
15. The growth in Soviet military strength is
substantial; however we believe that the Soviet leaders
have given evidence of a sober respect for the superior
military power of the US which has the capability to
inflict unacceptable damage upon the states of the
Bloc. We therefore believe it unlikely that the USSR
and [Communist] China will undertake courses of action
which they judge capable of leading to general war.
The USSR might believe, however, that the growth of
its nuclear power would deter the US and its allies
from running [the kinds of] risks which could lead
Approved For Release 2001/W RWDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 20014/RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
to the outbreak of a new war. From this line of
reasoning it might follow that the Sino-Soviet Bloc
might wish to capitalize upon what it estimates to
be the advantage of greater flexibility of action in
local situations. Thus it is possible that the Bloc
would move to armed action in peripheral areas or in
those areas where the interests of the US appear to
be of secondary inportance. One perceives that this
[would be] the same error which led Stalin to order
the invasion of Korea in 1950.
16. [In the light of the foregoing] we believe
that the main effort of the Sino-Soviet 'Bloc will lie
in the promotion of its goals through non-military
means. In Europe, the Bloc will take an essentially
defensive position, for its moral power in the European
Satellites has been prejudiced while the political and
military power of NATO will [further tend to] limit
its field of action. The Bloc will, [however] continue
to take initiatives in Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East where it will be able to exploit popular desires
for social, economic and political change and [the
widespread urge] to express national identity. In
following these courses the Bloc will deal with
Approved For Release 2001/W6jcj RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/1RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
non-Communist and [even] anti-Communist governments as
readily as with those of ideological kinship.
17. In spite of the substantial growth of the
economic and military strength of the Bloc and despite
its confident stance in matters of [general] foreign
policy, Soviet leaders are confronted by a number of
serious unresolved problems. Their recent successes
in coping with ructions in the Satellites have not
solved the basic problems of growing nationalisms.
18. The monopoly which Moscow enjoyed over
communist thinking was broken with the recognition
of Yugoslavia as a communist state in good standing,
by the emergence of a semi-independent Poland, and the
growth in the power and influence of Communist China.
These changes have loosed forces of instability in
Eastern Europe. At present we believe that the Soviet
leaders may have plans in train to remedy the situa-
tion: especially in Yugoslavia and in Poland. They
have [also] given to Peking an augmented stature and
a very considerable latitude for independent action.
[As of] today it would be extremely difficult for
Soviet leaders to return to the Stalinist methods of
imposing a [general] conformism. The likelihood of
Approved For Release 2001/w0! k w - DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
disruptions in the Satellites in coming years seem
reduced, but the action of forces freed by the death
of Stalin will persist. It is likely that changes
in the relationship between the several states of the
Bloc will take place gradually.
19. One of the principal sources of Soviet
strength lies in the loyalty to the Bloc which Com-
munist China professes. The Chinese leaders have
borrowed certain aspects of Soviet domestic policy and
adapted them to the Chinese scene. But we believe
that their goal is to build a society modeled on the
Soviet. In matters of foreign policy we perceive an
almost exact identity of the Chinese with the Soviet.
While admitting the possibility of friction we
believe that their alliance [of the two powers]
is solid, built [as it is] on a common ideology, a
common concern to eliminate western influence from
Asia, and [strengthened] by the necessity borne of
a strong interdependence. The relationship is a sort
of symbiosis - almost biological - like that which
exists between the gold fish and the water plants
[of a balanced acquarium.]
Approved For Release 2001/W WDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 20019ppI -RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
20. As to the Soviet Union itself whose speedy
growth in economic power and in scientific accomplish-
ment is impressive, we [nevertheless] noi:.e that it
will be more and more handicapped in its endeavors to
solve the problems inherent in its complex industrial
society by the built-in inflexibilities of its communist
regime. Already the Soviet.leaders are not able to
.require the-great outlay of worker effort without
giving to the labor force a greater share of the
product. This problem cannot but slow the pace of economic
growth. The Party has already felt the weight of a
significant opposition to its monopoly of power. So
long as the Free World is able to maintain a balance
of forces and [so long] as it can hinder the communists
from their continual encroachments upon the rights of
others, we believe that the Soviets' own internal
problems will bring about an evolution in the political
system of the USSR. We believe that Khrushchev has
strengthened his position of control and that of the
Party. But we foresee a continuation in the struggle
for power which we believe may result in a shakeup among
the leadership.
Approved For Release 2001 11 J C DP84-00499R000200130001-0
SE C k"-
 Approved For Release 2001/8p"R q'RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Briefing of
Noon - Director's Conference Room
Administration Building: 15 January 1958
The title of the briefing, had there been one,
would have been a quick tour of the world's horizon
with special emphasis upon the things to which the
US though should be especially alert.
The text as it appears hereafter is as delivered
in - The English version is a translation back
from the not the original from which the
was derived. This was cheerfully thrown away
when it had served its purpose fifteen years ago.
Unfortunately if I ever knew the details sur-
rounding the event, I have since forgotten them.
About all I can recall is receiving word from Mr.
Dulles that would be in 'Washington
in mid-January of 1958, that he would come to the
Agency for a general briefing, and that I was to
prepare a short presentation in - which would 25X1A
encompass the principal conclusions of current National
Intelligence Estimates. As to substance I received
almost no instructions. Had it been necessary, I
Approved For Release 2001/1 Rt DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 200154/ftRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
would have been told to avoid quoting estimated
numbers of important items of Soviet and Chinese
armament, but since I knew that
I needed no such word of warning.
As far as the actual formulations are concerned,
they are as close to the English originals as we
could make them. We did not, repeat not, concoct a
set of new estimates to serve the political purposes
of our government. On the other hand, it would be
silly to suggest that the choice of what was to be
said and the distribution of emphasis was wholly
blind. I knew why was on a state'
visit and the crux of what the US government wished
to convey to him. I knew that Secretary Dulles and
other important officers of the administration knew
of the precarious situation in _ and wished to
give an outward sign of US moral
backing and, incidentally, a little Dutch uncle's
advice about the dangers which lay in his easy-going
relationship with the local communists. (This I
understand was administered in no uncertain fashion
at the dinner of with
Approved For Release 2001/W,6kyf DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/(ffDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Mr. J. F. Dulles the host). I therefore will not
pretend that the briefing was a Far Eastern equivalent
of something prepared for the ears of, say, the
The technical problems of putting the briefing
into were a bit more than I had bargained for.
Happily there was only one line in which the brief-
ing touched upon the new weapons, nuclear warheads,
long-range bombers, and what we called in 1958,
"guided missiles."
But finding sound
equivalents for what
had already become cliches in the language of the
Cold War was more difficult. The - of the
person who did the first translation from the English
text was that of a twenty-five or
thirty years back, and it just wouldn't wash. It
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2001/1~VC DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/' 11 RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
got jimmied into final shape with the aid of a number
of speakers. Even so, as I read it. to-day
(February 1973) it is nothing to claim with pride.
In fact it is just not good.
The English translation reads better because
I have made it come out that way. My new inter-
polations (February 1973) appear in square brackets.
I remember little of the actual briefing except
that it took place in the Director's Conference Room
in the (new) Administration Building in the 25th
street campus (old South). Mr. Dulles was present.
My presentation was the first of several (I believe)
and after I had given it, I left the room before
the DDP officers took over, as was the custom. I
gathered from some later remarks of Mr. Dulles that
Approved For Release 2001/1
, VC. i1klDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/'RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
an important part of the message which was conveyed
was that the communists in _ were up to no good
and that should be wary. Mr. Dulles
told me that seemed to have taken the
admonitions of the briefing and what Secretary Dulles
had told him two days earlier in stride. He re-
marked to our Mr. Dulles that he knew all about the
communists and was not too alarmed about their
secret subversive capabilities: after all their
leader, 25X1A
with whom he had a candid relationship. 25X6
MMM
12 March
Approved For Release 2001/1 2 JI DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 25X1C Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/1g ftkt iDP84-00499R000200130001-0
1. Our director has requested that I present
to certain of the most important
[substantive] conclusions which derive from the work
of his organization. These relate to those parts
of the world where the situation is critical. They
rest upon a wealth of information which we have
collected and represent the basic judgments of all
components of the Central Intelligence Agency. _
will permit me to remark that I ten honored
in the performance of this task. The shortness of
time at our command will allow for only a partial
tour d'horizon and I therefore propose to confine
myself only to those parts of the world which hold
an immediate concern for our two governments.
2. This briefing is similar to those which our
Director gives to the President and the National
Security Council when the latter is considering
important foreign policy matters. At such meetings
the Director carefully limits himself to a discussion
of problems whose present or future significance
warrants the attention of the Council. In light of
Approved For Release 2001/1 R1 1DP84-00499R000200130001-0
JL~ -L
 Approved For Release 2001/4RCRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
the importance which our two governments attach to the
Far East, I will therefore focus my attention upon
the USSR, [Communist] China, and the countries of
Asia.
3. The continuing growth of the military and
economic strength of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is a
danger which preoccupies all of the Free World.
Neither the new leaders of the countries of the Bloc
nor the changes in tactics which they have shown
in recent years permits us to conclude that the
communists have abandoned their goal of imposing
their system upon the Free World by force or by
subversion. We believe that in their thinking the
notion of irreconcilable conflict remains in force.
If they have substituted the principle of "peaceful
coexistence" for the Korean type of military adventurism,
it is only because they are led in this direction by
the continuously growing power of nuclear arms.
4. The growth of Soviet military strength is
considerable as witness their production of nuclear
weapons, heavy bomber [aircraft], and guided missiles.
We believe, however, that the Soviet leaders have
given proof of a sober respect for superior power of
Approved For Release 2001/12 VC. jl DP84-00499R000200130001-0
A-j -L
 Approved For Release 2001 /1g kt f DP84-00499R000200130001-0
IIA-A
the US - a power which rests upon our capability to
respond [to an act of armed agression] with a
visitation of unacceptable damage. Thus we believe
it unlikely that the USSR and [Communist] China will
undertake actions which they estimate likely to lead
to general war. The USSR might believe, to be sure,
that the growth of its own nuclear power will suffice
to inhibit the US and its allies [from courses of
action] which incur the risks of a new war. It might
follow therefrom that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will
wish to exploit local situations in which their
greater flexibility of action gives them an advantage.
Therefore the Bloc might go so far as to use armed
strength in peripheral areas where they believe the
interests of the US are secondary. It is [would be]
the same error, hick
led Stalin to order the invasion of Korea in 1950.
5. In fine, we believe that the Sino-Soviet
Bloc will put its major effort into the promotion
of its interests by non-military means. In Europe
it will [probably] adopt some sort of defensive
stance for its shaky moral position within the
satellites; the political and military strength of
Approved For Release 2001/1Z &C. !! DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/152t:DP84-00499R000200130001-0
NATO will limit its field of action. The Bloc will
[however] continue to take initiatives in Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East where it can exploit
desires of the peoples to express their national
identity, to better their economic condition, to
enjoy political liberty, and to push on with social
reform. In pursuit of this goal the Bloc will
negotiate with non- and [even] anti-communist govern-
ments as readily as with those more favorably dis-
posed.
6. The USSR finds one of its principal sources
of strength in the loyalty which [Communist] China
professes for it. The Chinese Communists have
adopted with modifications certain aspects of Soviet
domestic policy and have shaped them to the conditions
of their own country. However, we believe that
their aim is to build a society on the Soviet model
and that taken together, the foreign policy objectives
of the two states are almost identical. [Although
we perceive] the possibility of certain conflicts
between the two, we believe that their alliance
is a solid one: built [as it is] upon a common
ideology, with a common concern to eliminate
Approved For Release 2001/1:~RIDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Ev"
 Approved For Release 2001/'VtkGffDP84-00499R000200130001-0
western influence in Asia, and with the necessity
for cooperation which is born of a strong inter-
dependence.
7. Whatever the power and growing prestige of
the USSR and Communist China we believe that they
will confront serious domestic problems. The Soviet
Union succeeded in putting down the revolt of the
Hungarian working class thanks only to the inter-
vention of the Red Army, the Polish government has
successfully resisted the authority of Moscow and
continues to pose serious problems for the USSR.
We believe that the absence of any overall popular
support in Eastern Europe and above all in the DDR to
the [local] communist regimes will continue as a
latent danger to the system of Soviet Satellites.
8. As to the USSR itself, although we are
impressed by the speed in the growth of its power
and scientific achievement, we see it more and more
handicapped by the incompatibilities between a com-
plex industrial society and the inflexible political
institutions of a communist regime. It is no longer
possible for the Soviet leaders to make the heavy
demands of the past upon the labor force without
yielding a larger share of the fruits. Already [an
Approved For Release 2001/1:/
tt.iIDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001 pbt RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
awareness of this] problem has slowed the pace of
economic development. The Party has already felt
the weight of the opposition to its monopoly of
power. As long as the Free World is able to maintain
an equilibrium of forces and can impede the
communists in their continuous encroachments upon
the rights of others, we believe that built-in
problems will lead to an evolution of the Soviet
political system. We believe that Khrushchev has
strengthened his own position of control and that
of the Party. But we believe that the [internal]
power struggle will continue and that in years to
come we perceive the possibility of unexpected
changes in the leadership.
9. As to Communist China, the establishment
of effective political control over its metropolitan
territory, the creation of a modern military force
(thanks [in part] to Soviet materiel), and its
economic development constitute [the principal]
dramatic successes which it has achieved since 1949.
10. Today [Communist] China's steel capacity
at 5 million tons represents an increase of 300
percent over 1952. Eighty percent of Communist China's
Approved For Release 2001/16kcDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 200151/EFtRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
foreign trade is with the countries of the Bloc and
makes possible the import of things essential for
the development of its heavy industry.
11. While consolidating their control of
the country and in endeavoring to make over the
society, the Chinese leaders have lost the popular
support which they had won in 1950. We believe,
however, that police controls are sufficient to
enforce the regime's will and notably to neutralize
[sociall resiveness caused by the requisition of
grain necessary to sustain investments in heavy
industry. But the matter of impositions upon the
peasantry for the sake of economic expansion is
always something which could cause serious schisms
within the government of Mao-Tse-tung.
This ends my presentation
concerning the power and problems of the communist
bloc. I need not stress the importance of these
phenomena as they affect the formulation of foreign
policy within the Free World.
12. In the long run and of equally great
importance are the questions of political independence,
economic development, and social reform in the vast
Approved For Release 2001/~CDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001 /~ 44RC RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The
Bandung Conference has clearly demonstrated the
attitudes and aspirations of the peoples of this
part of the world. The communist Bloc seems to
believe that with its economic and military aid and
its promises of anti-colonialist support it can easily
penetrate these regions. Communist China, on its
part, plans to effect this penetration proclaiming
itself the Big Brother in Asia or a non-White State
which must [also] face up to the common problem.
On a par with this disruption we find the subversion
which is carried out in large part by a whole
series of [communist] front organizations.
13. We believe that the communists will achieve
new successes in their exploitation of the hopes and
fears of the [countries of the ] region; on the
other hand we perceive numerous native forces which
are resisting the communist take-over. In Vietnam,
Burma, and Malaysia, we see a substantial effort to
develop those strengths which will protect against the
armed threat of the communists. We observe a
sustained endeavor in their work to counter communist
Approved For Release 2001/W WDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001gEL4RINTRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
communist propaganda by bettering the standard of
life in their countries. The Republic of the
Philippines has scored notable progress in this and
other respects. There, a democratic political arrange-
ment works, and better still, the Philippines renders
a notable service to its neighbors in sharing with
them its experience and its achievements.
14. We estimate that Japan has gone past its
pre-war rate of production; more, it has arrived at
a high degree of political stability. In these cir-
cumstances the Japanese communist party has been able
to develop only very modest secret paramilitary forces.
It has also had its difficulties in building up a
skillful leadership for its overt operations. Japan
offers to the countries of Asia growing possibilities
for reciprocally advantageous trade. We do not
believe that Japan can approach its pre-war volume of
trade with [Communist] China. We believe therefore
that Japan will make great efforts to expand its trade
to [the countries of] South and Southeast Asia.
15. We believe that India can lead the way for
the states of Asia. However, it will realize its
potential only if its ambitious.plans for economic
Approved For Release 2001/~C,~2DP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/WDP84-00499R000200130001-0
development succeed. it faces many difficulties.
We have noted a loss of vitality within Nehru's Congress
Party and some ground gaining by the [Indian] communists
who have demonstrated their strength in their elect-
oral victory last year in the state of Kerala. We
believe that the next few years will be critical ones
for India and that substantial foreign aid will be
necessary for the continued progress of its economic
program. The matter of foreign aid is not only of
greatest importance to the future of India, but to
that of the other states of Asia as well.
16. Finally, the crisis in Indonesia presents
one of the most dangerous of the Asian problems. [We
perceive] in this situation a number of possibilities,
all of them grave: for example a failure or dis-
appearance of the central power; the dispersal of
[central] control to the local governments of the
islands, the growth of the influence of the Communist
Bloc which we believe might be taken on by local
communist parties, dissident groups, or even by the
armed forces. One of the reasons behind the present
confusion is the failure of the Dutch to leave be-
hind enough capable administrators, technicians, and
Approved For Release 2001/1 2r(; tRDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/1S2ftfDP84-00499R000200130001-0
sophisticated political leaders. A hypersensitivity
on the part of the Indonesians to western influence
has, [of course,] impeded an efficient utilization
of the foreign assistance available.
Demagogic appeals to anti-Dutch sentiment has
begun to replace constructive efforts towards
economic progress. The absence of a unifying spirit
between the nationalist and Moslem parties has per-
mitted the communists to capitalize upon the situation
and in criticizing administrative corruption and the
lack of progress to put forward their own plans of
action.
In Java the power of the communists has grown
greatly, but whether or not they hope to try to
seize power during the present year will probably
depend on advice from Moscow and Peking. Leaders in
the Sino-Soviet Bloc probably fear that a premature
attempt in Java might precipitate counter blows in
Sumatra and in such a fashion discredit their efforts
to gain adherents elsewhere in Asia and the Middle
East.
Approved For Release 2001/1? -/RIDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
870 15 Jan 58
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84
CASE FILE CHARGE-OUT
INSTRUCTIONS _
2bV 3ta y dq,~pl of charged out folder.
I orizon in returned file folder.
CARD
FORM NO. i 19 REPLACES,c p -.o,~et$for Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-00499R000200130001-0
I AUG 54 WHICH Mir a usEO. (7)
 CASE FILE (DESCRIPTION Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84 00499 R0002001309O7RUicTIONS _
dmw
Place card upright in place of charged out folder.
place card horizontally in returned file folder.
CASE FILE
?R~ D ~l,~T
Approved For Release 2001/12/0CC H I 4-0CAR8000200130001-0
rVHM NO. 119 REPLACES FORM.36.152
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. ;,~?y' (7)