IMPENDING CIA BLOODLETTING?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210045-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2014
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 7, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Iv
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210045-8
7 Dec 1972
Impending CIA bloodletting?
It would be easier to evaluate the
partially. "confirmed" rumor that
'Richard M. Helms is about to bow
--l?:. pressure to resign as Director of
Central Intelligence Agency if
? one were able to get some kind of
fix on the CIA itself. The virtually
iniPenetrable secrecy that surrounds
::....every phase of CIA activities, how-
'ever, reduces one to an evaluation of
'such extraneous but relevant facts
are available, and there is no ex-
i:e'ess of comfort in any of these.
is disconcerting to learn, for'
example, that the background of Mr.
....Helms's dissatisfaction (or president
Nixon's dissatisfaction with him)
disPutes with both Henry.
D.KiSsinger; Mr. 'Nixon's foreign policy
adviser, and Melvin Laird, the retir-
:Ang Secretary of Defense.
Mr: Laird's quarrel with Mr.
Helms reportedly stems from their
'''--disagreement in 1969 when Mr. Laird
insisted that the Soviets were ma-
lieuvering to attain a "first-strike
?
-Capability" against the US and Mr.
Helms insisted. that Moscow had in
no way :shifted from its traditional
emphasis on defense. That we are all
-still'here may not prove conclusive-
ly that Mr. Laird was wrong and Mr.
. ?Helms .was right, but we ARE. still
here
His dispute with Mr. Kissinger, or
. vice versa, was predictable a year ago
when Mr. Nixon set up an intelli-
gence committee within the National
? ?'Security Council and 'made Mr. Kis-
.,..singer its head. Whether Mr. Nixon is
'perhaps giving Mr. .Kissinger too?
.:`inuch authority and is spreading him
`-`16o thin would be a subjective judg-
ment -incapable, for now at least, of
f...objective proof.
?? But 'the reputed Kissinger objec-
tion .that Mr. Helms "was not sup-
"porting the Administration" in corn-
":"Mittee councils raises an interesting '
question. The CIA director's chief
:function, one would think, is hot to
support the Administration or Dr.
Kissinger either, when the facts as he
knows them dictate otherwise. His
job is to let?the facts fall where they
may.
Mr. Nixon spoke highly of Mr.
Helms just a year ago when? he an-
nounced. that Mr. Helms would as-
sume "enhanced leadership" in plan-
ning,' reviewing, coordinating and
evaluating all intelligence programs
and activies. By, most estimates, he
had earned the accolade.
- For one thing, he had both the
wisdom and the courage to oppose
the CIA's disastrous attempt to in- -
vade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in
1961, opposing not only the then CIA
hierarchy but also the admirals and
generals in the Pentagon. President
Kennedy. thereafter was as leery of
Pentagon 'counsel as Mr. Helms had
been. "If. it wasn't for the By of
Pigs, I might have sent. Marines into .
Laos in 1961, as a lot of people
around here. wanted me to do."
Mr. -Helms showed his perspicac-
ity also in 1967 when Air Force in-
telligence insisted that bombing
,would bring North Vietnam to its
kness, and Mr. Helms said that it'
would unite the North Vietnamese
and firm. up their resolve to fight to
the death if necessary. Lyndon John- A
:son could have saved his Presidency
and .the war could have been ended
long ago -if the White .House had
listened to the facts of the situation
? rather than the politics of it.
One 'does not lightly endorse a
secret polke agency even when, as .
in the ? case -of the CIA under Mr.....
Helms, "we do not target on Amer-
ican citizens." But so long as super- ?
spies are one of the facts of inter-
national life, one rests somewhat
more oinfortably when the top spy, ?
so far as one is able to judge, is
competent and conscientious and
sticks to the hard facts without
, bending to political winds.
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210045-8