A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400120013-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 21, 1945
• Content Type: PREL

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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FOR THE PRESS DECEMBER 21, 1945
NO. 953
CONFIDENTIAL
FUTURE RELEASE
NOTE DATE
`~ and Intelligence, will present the State Department's
3. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the
NBC University of the Air.
ANNOUNCER: Here are HEADLINES FROM WASHINGTON:
COLONEL McCORMACK of STATE DEPARTMENT OUTLINES PLAN FOR
A UNIFIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; ADVOCATES A NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY TO PLAN A GOVERNMENT-WIDE
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND INSURE THAT IT WILL BE CARRIED
OUT. `
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BENTON SAYS AN ADEQUATE
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR FOREIGN INFORMA-
TION SERVICE; ADVOCATES MAKING A MAXIMUM OF INFORMATION
ON OTHER COUNTRIES AVAILABLE TO AMERICAN PUBLIC.
This is the second of a new group of State Department
broadcasts, presented by the NBC University of the Air
as part of a larger series on OUR FOREIGN POLICY. This
time Mr, William Benton, Assistant Secretary. of State
for Public Affairs, and. Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research
000182 proposal
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CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT ?:00 P.M., E.S.T.,
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1945, NOT TO BE PRE-,
VTOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.
Following is the text of an NBC Network broadcast, the
second in a group of State Department. programs and the 45th
in a larger series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY.
Subject: "A National Intelligence Program"
Participants; 1. The Honorable William Benton, Assistant
Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
2. Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State in charge of
Research and Intelligence.
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proposal for a unified intelligence system. Sterling
Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air, will
be chairman of the discussion, Mr. Fisher --
FISHER; A good many.of us, when we hear the word "intelli-
gence", think of IQ's and mental tests, I think it would
be well to start off, like Socrates, with a definition of
the term, Do you want to try your hand at it, Mr. Bentcn?
BENTON: I think I ought to say first, Mr. Fisher, that my
main Interest in intelligence -- as we are using the word
here -- is in-its usefulness to my task of transmitting
a maximum of information to the people, through education,
through reports on foreign affairs, through building
better understanding of ourselves.and of other peoples.
As we said last week, this is now.a fundamental part of
American foreign policy,
FISHER: It's really too bad the.word "intelligence" has so
many meanings. ,.f
,,:,BENTON: Of course, there are may interpretations of
intelligence, depending on where you sit and what you're
looking at. I'm sure Hitler never thought Roosevelt
intelligent, We tend to think anyone who disagrees with
us is unintelligent, But that's not the sense in which
were using the term here... This program is mainly
Col,. McCormack'-s program -- the Washington Colonel
McCormack, not the Chicago one. During the war Colonel
McCormack has been Director of Intelligence for the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service of the War Department. Let's
is not of the "cloak and dagger" type,.
ask him for his definition of "intelligence".
MCCORMACK: *ell, I might start off by saying.what intelligence
isn't -- it isn't primarily -- or even to any larger
extent --- the "cloak and' dagger" stuff that you read
about in the spy books; at least peacetime, intelligence
FISHER. What
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FISH8R1 That do you mead by '1c~gpk, and d4gger'1, type,
CO16nel Xodor ao1c?
MCCORMAQI. I mean the'. sort of thing the QSS :~.. the Of ice of
$tra.tegie ervioee -~ did In ma.l ng aAnt et with
Marshal Titoi s pa;rtle4ns in Kugoale.~r or with the
resistance movements of Burma and Stem.
FISHER: If you-Ire going to start by describing what intel-
ligence is not, Colonel, you might tell us a little about
one of these cloak and dagger cases -- to show how wartime
operations differ from peacetime intelligence.
MCCORMACK: The Yugoslav opera.tion is a good example, In
October 1943, Major Louis Huot of the OSS wentF to Bari,
Italy, to establish a base. From there he went into
Yugoslavia, to make contact with Tito and arrange for a
supply line into partisan territory. OSS located its
supply base. on the island of Via off the Dalmatian coast,
which the Partisans held. A regular shipping line was
then extended to Via, the ships travelling by night in
the enemy-held waters. As many as 20 ships were en route
at one time. From the coast, a fleet.of heavy; trucks
carried supplies through territory heavily garrisoned by
the Germans' and into the hills, where the Partisans had
their bases, During the winter of 1943-,44 OSS shipped
into the Partisans about 19,000 rifles, 165,000 hand
grenades, aver 600 machine guns, and thousands of bales
of shoes and clothing. Quite ,an operation ...Y
FISHER: Running guns is a. good. example, then, of what pea.ce-
time intelligence is not.
MCCORMACK' Exs,ctly. Our hardest Job is toQvercome this
romantic but false idea of what'intelligence work is.
The notion that it is all gun--running, espionage and
eabotage'.is still very prevalent.
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BENTQN-.Of.course, Colonelo some good, intelligence came out
of that ..Yugoslav operation.,, I remember hearing how the
OSS. brought back valuable information about the German
mine fields', the Yugoslav battle-order, the. relative
strength of the Partisans and the smaller army of General
Miha.ilovic, and even about Marshal Tito and, the members of
his 'government
MCCORMACI.f Yes, Mr. Benton, that was a, good example of wartime
intelligence work. But-it if, not the sort of intelligence
work that you do in peacetime.
FISHER: But, Colonel McCormack, isn1t the OSS -- the so-called
cloak and dagger outfit -- the nucleus of the intelligence
organization for which you are responsible in the State
Department ?
MCCORMACK: No, Mr. Fisher, the operations. end of the 0SS
which'during the war carried on secret Intelligence,
sabotage and that sort of thing --_ has all gone over to
the War Department, to be absorbed into normal peacetime
work, What the State Department has taken over is,the
Research and Analysis organization.- th'e outfit whose
business it is, you might say, to turn information into
intelligence -- to take the mass of incoming material and
get, the truth out of it, . That. job,--- and I cannot emp.ha--
size this too. strongly -- is the critical' and vital phase
of intelligence work. Incoming information is good, bad
and indifferent, and it is useless unless it is pieced
together., checked and re--checked,- so that the bad and the
indifferent information is weeded out.
FISHER: It seems to me that we have arrived at a rough
description of what we mean by intelligence -- even if we
got .there,' by the back door, as it were.
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MoCORMACK I' might put it this way:
Foreign intelligence --
and we are talking only about foreign intelligence -- is
the sum total of all information about foreign countries
which is relevant to the `policies and ,problems of the
Government,
FISHER:.-Under that definition it.would seem to me- that in-
telligence covers the whole range of human knowledge.
McCORMACK: It does. It ranges from estimates,, say, of the
political intentions of a revolutionary party ;in some
country to the most detailed kind of information, such
as the depth of water at a particular point on a beach
where conceivably military operations might some day
occur,
FISHER: Mr: Benton, what would you add to that?
BENTON: I think, 1r. Fisher, we mean by intelligence ---
foreign intelligence -- accurate, complete and timely
information about foreign countries. Whenever you have
a problem, you need information intelligence ---- to
help you arrive at the right answer. In fact, you need
that kind of Intelligence, and also intelligence of the
ordinary garden variety -- commpn. sense --- to help you
use your information, The best intelligence in, the
world -- I'm talking about information now - doesn't
help a man who won't believe it, won't aptly it, won't
use his common sense. The British, back in the late
1930's, had one of the best intelligence.systems in the
world but I gather that their top policy-makers
didn't use their intelligence about Germany. For that
matter, I'm not sure that we have always used ou.r In-
telligence to good advantage,
FISHER: Yes,
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must 1'add `common sense to, intelligence,
Is some, ,examples of the sort
we?ll.'be needing?
on that, But can you give
of peace,-time intelligence
BENTON: Well, take the International information service that
the State'Department will be operating abroad. You
cran't do a first--rate job of that without knowing what
foreign peoples want to knov,T and understand about us.
What, for example, confuses and puzzles them about
America? We want to project the image of America abroad.
We,want to explain American foreign policy and the basis
for it. Thie will:. be. a contribution to world peace,
because peace is. based on understandIn But, we can't
succeed unless we have a very' good knowledge of the
peoples to whom we are talking,' and their attitudes.
MoCORMACK In, other words, Bill, if you are going to broad-
cast to people, you must talk-to them not.only in their
own language, but in terms they will understand. So
you must know them.
BENTON: We must know them if we are, to tell them about us,
We can't address a vacuum. We must have a maximum flow
of informat.ion'coming ip. And I believe the intelligence
we get about foreign countries should be shared generally
with members of the American public -- to help them
understand other peoples.
FISHER: And for this we nAed intelligence about our closest
allies as well as about other nations, Mr, Benton,
BENTON:, Yes, Mr. Fisher; a good exam~le, of that is the
proposed British loan. Our representatives in those
negotiations. were supplied with a 'thick handbook of
facts -- intelligence about economic conditions in.
Great' Britain,
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Great Britain, her resources, the effect of the war On
her economy, the type of help, she needed to get.back on
her fep't,, and what she could. reasonably be expected to
contribute to the bargain: ,When'.the ie Atiations began
both the' British and Amerioa.ns were 'u .ly. aware that the
other party knew all economic factors involved. This was
no poker game where any party could or had,to maintain a
bluff. Beginning with all the cards on .the table, the
negotiators were able to spend their entire efforts on
coming to an agreement that would benefit both parties
and
the world at large.
FISHER: Mr.?McCormack, what would you'add to that?
McCORMACK Well, I might state the 'objectives of our foreign
intelligence.--- why we need accurate and complete informa-
tion about foreign countries. The first objective is to.
know and understand the other countries and peoples of .
the world well enough to live .with them in peace ,-~- to
shape our policy, as it affectsothe,r peoples, toward
the aims of peace,. The second objective is to be pre-
pared for war if it occurs.
BENTON That's a mighty clear statement of.our objectives,
Al. I would like to point out one thing more: A great
deal of the work that is done in gathering intelligence
is prosaic, routine, day-to--day reading of newspapers,
reports, radio broadcasts, technical journals, and so on.
Thero's nothing very glamorous about this, But it's a
basic part of a government's intelligence operation.
FISHER: That's where the professors come in, I suppose,
BENTON: There are some who make snide remarks about the
"professors" in OSS and government departments..
The fact
is, they are among the ablest intelligence officers WO
have --- and in private life their research, their
scholarly
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scholarly journals, and so on, are goldmi4es of informa-
tion for anyone who. will take the trouble to read them
and try to understand what they are saying. It's`
necessary Ito accumulate such a back .og off' inf or mation
that when you need a fact, it's there .--~ you know where
to, find it. And 90 percent or more of Intelligence is
freely available to anyone who wants it. You can get it
in` libraries' and bookshops and on newsstands, from indi-
viduals or from our accredited missic;n abroad. It's
open intelligence.
FISHER.' Do you agree on this point, Cal: McCormack?
McCORMACK: Yes, most of the intelligence this government
needs to carry on its peacetime foreign relations is
available here and in other countries. It may'take' hard
work to find it and put it together, but it is there, in.
sources that are open and above-board? We. don't have to
drop. in a secret agent by,parachute to get the business,
trade, political and most of the other information we
need,
BENTON: Other nations know that intelligence work is not as
sinister as it. sounds to some.Americans. Other govern-
ments know that intelligence, quickly gathered and bare-
fully analyzed, is the'foundation for open and'honest
peacetime dealings. I believe that intelligence should
be freely exchanged among nations. I hope other nations
will have the sort of intelligence operations over here
that will give them a real. understanding of America.
I''m not talking,about military secrets here,. of course,
but about basic knowledge of America,
FISHER: There's one question that needs to be answered,
though, Colonel McCormack. We had our intelligence
agencies before the war. Didn't they serve their
purpose pretty well?
CORMACK< ?Fell
M
,
o
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McCORMACK: Well, Mr. Fisher, it's true that we have vast
resources in this Government and this nation for intelli-
gence, but we were not making anything like full use of
them before the war. For example; At least 80 percent
of the information used in the sir war against the Japan-
ese homeland was physically within the United States when
the war started. It was in the files of the Army, Navy,
various branches of the Government --- in the files of
banks, Insurance companies, engineering' end construction
companies, business firms of all kinds, religious organi-
.zations, and even in the minds and private records of
individuals. But to find all that information, put it
together and make it-mean .something took about two and
a half years. If we are threatened with war again, we
are not likely to have two and one-half years for prepara-
tion of essential intelligence. We may not'have even two
and' one--half months. Therefore, we propose to have our
intelligence ready for any emergency.
FISHER: I'M sure all Americans will second that.
McCORMACK; I should add this: Cur physical scientists, our
social scientists ,--- our specialists and experts know
a great deal about the physical world and the peoples of
the world, but we do not know everything. When something
new comes along,, like the atomic bomb, new needs for
intelligence arise. And on any subject that you want to
name there is still a lot to be learned.
BENTON: I ,can illustrate that point, Not long ago a Govern-
ment geographer made a map of the world's mineral
resources, in terms of our knowledge. of them. Where we
were well--informed, he drew the area iii black; where our
information was only fair, he used dark gray, and where
we had comparatively little Information'. light gray. And
most of the surface of the earth was in light gray.'
McCQRMACK, And
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McCORMACK: And that's a pretty serious matter, Bill,,when you
consider the importance of the rare metals.
FISHER: Did our intelligence compare favorably with that of.
other countries during the war,..Col. McCormack?.
`McCORMACK: Very favorably, I would say. We made our mistakes
in intelligence, of course, just as in other fields, We
were slow in getting started; but at the critical periods
of the war our intelligence was good. On the whole, the
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intelligence of the Allies in Europe was considerably
better than that of the Germans, and in the Pacific it
was vastly superior to that of the Japanese.. During the
last year of the war we actually knew more about the
Japanese than they knew about themselves, in such import-
ant matters as the dispositions and activities of their
armed forces and their, shipping, for example.
FISHER! Has the Pearl Harbor Investigation brought out any
important lessons about intelligence?
Mc.CORMACK: Well, it has given further support to one basic
doctrine.of the Army and Navy,, namely,.; that in intelli
gence.:work the thing that you must Worry about is not so
much what you think the enemy is~going.to,do, but:what
might be,.capabl,eof doing. You .must prepare yourself
again.st'everything that. he has the capacity to do, and
not merely what you think he ,is going to do..;
he
BENTON What concerns 'me most is ,the' need for more accurate '
and, up; to-.the-minute.,information on the things that people
live -~-, their cultural traditions and their current
attitudes. That'p,not oloak-and-dagger stuff; and it may
sound. dull,' but, it' s important to us not only ' in our
broadcasting . ana ,information work, but. for the State
Department in formulating foreign?policy
FISHER:.
other words, you can't have a sound, policy without
for
and, that includes accurate informa.>
tion,;about the peoples as'
other 'countri.es
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BENTON:' ,'That's right
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FISHER+ We, gentlemen, you've certainly established the need
for good intelligence. The key auestion, then,, is how to
get it ?-- how to improve our facilities for gathering
information and channeling it to. the people who need it..
Colonel McCormack, I understand that. you're in favor of
a unified' intelligence service,
__McCORMACK; That, Mr. Fisher, is like saying you are for sun-
shine or mother love. Everybody is for unified intelligence.
There are, however, a. number of different views as to how
to go about it.
FISHER; Do you support the proposal for one big intelligence
agency, to take in all those now in the field?
Mf.CORMACK:. No,, and I consider that proposal unrealistic,
because the subject matter of intelligence is too varied
and too complicated, and because intelligence work must
be done where the' decisions are made, and by those who are
specialists in each field. No one would think of taking
medical intelligence, for example, away from. the Medical
Corps and putting it in some big agency.
.Certainly the
Army and Navy would not turn over.military intelligence
to a central agency. I have always thought that the
proposal for one big intelligence organization, separated
from the operating departments of the government, was. like
a proposal', that all the lawyers in Washington should
turn over the, preparation of their cases to a central
organization.
FISHER; But how,,then, do you propose t
'get. unified .Intelli-
Bence?
McCORMACK; I, would propose to' get i,t `by.,.using the, existing
resources of all the government departmento >~- by a system
that . will. encourage the research and intelligence organiza-
tions'o.f the Government to do their best job possible in
their own+:.fi,e.lds and to make the results freely available
to one. another.
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u'!d ha're a sort not coordinating agency, Colonel?
tot's steer clear of that word "coordinate,"
Mrt ;,Fisher, or Bill here may throw the old gag at me,
about 'a"boordinator to coordinate the coordinators."
That concept of a "coordinating agency" is based on the
mistaken idea. that all you have to do is set the fLcts
to-'flowinglike water through a pipe, and then sit,around
andeoord.inate them, Actually, It I s not that easy,
FISHER: But you're a.gainet creating one central agency even
think the collection and basic analysis in each field of
intelligence, should be assigned to the agency having the
primary responsibility in that field. But it should
collect and analyze. the information in that field. required
by all other agencies and "should. make it available to
all agencies that have need for it. Once an intelligence
agency becomes aware of the fact that it has another agency
asa customer, it generally does a, good job of tailoring
its work to the needs of that customer.
BENTON; That's
to process all intelligence,
McC0RMACK I'm against the idea that you have one place into
which all information flows, yes: To me that seems
i,mpractica.ble~ In the first place, you would have to
have a perfectly' enormous organization; and second, you
cannot and should not remove the 'intelligence operation
from the, agencies where day to day policy decisions have
to be made.
FISHER: How would you handle it, then?
McCORMIACK: I would set up a mechanism to make sure that any-
one in the government who needs intelligence, gets it,
The nature of this business is such that everybody is.
everybody else's customer. I want to see that intelli-
genoe flows easily from one department, to another. I
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BENTON; That's the job-that most needs doing - - defining the
market for intelligence within the government.. And let's
hope t1xe' government will use the information -r with a lot
`of `common sense!
icCQ ~,ACK: Take weather Intelligence.' Very few people realize
how important that Is.. The job of getting t-~d.information
Board,''the Maritime Commission;, various agencies in the
Department of Commerce, shipping ,end air'transport
companies,.'and; in fact, every agency. engaged in foreign
rests with the Weather Bureau end; especially in wartime,
with the Army Air Forces and the Navy. But the customers
for weather intelligence. include the Civil Aeronautics
operations.
BENTON think, Sterling, that you might ask Colonel
~MoCormack about the Departments specific proposals.
FISHER:,,-By all means. Exactly what kind of organization do
.you propose, Colonel?
McCORMACK: We propose to create 'a. National Intelligence
Authority, presided over by,the Secretaries of State,
Wa.r.and Navy, with the Secretary of.State as Chairman.
The heads of other departments and agencies would be
brought in when problems that-.concern them are up for
discussion, but the State, War andNavy Secretaries
would be permanent members,
FISHER: That sounds like a centralized agency to me.'
McCORMACK: 'We do propose to unify and centralize the planning
of,intelli,gence,work in the government, and the job of
eeing.to it that the plans are carried out. But not by
setting up a large and expensive agency on top of those
that are already operating,
BENTON:, In 'other words, the plan is to harness all intelli-
gence resources in the government by getting more effec-
tive cooperation among departments.
McCORMACK: That's
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McCORMACK:. That"s right. And by making sure that every field
of intelligence is being covered by the agency best able
to do the job,
FISHER: Colonel McCormack, who would actually run the
Authority? The Secretary of State would surely be tons
busy to give it much of his time.
McCORi1 CK; There would be a director or executive secretary,
with a full--time staff drawn from the interested depart-
.ments, who would be responsible for the preparation and
.execution of the intelligence program,
FISHER: From what you say about the'
range of subjects that
foreign intelligence covers, your executive and his staff
will have a big job,
1MTCCOFJ''a0K: They would -- too 'big a job' to be done by a single
Staff. We therefore propose to set up interdepartmental
working committees for each of the principal fields
of intelligence -- political intelligence, military,
economic, ;geographic, scientific and technological'.,
sociological, etc,. In each case the department of primary
interest would furnish a full-time chairman and any nec--
cessa.ry.staff. The job of each committee would be to
planethe intelligence program in.,its own field on a
government.-wide basis; to allocate responsibilities fo r
the work among the agencies best able to do the work; to
insure.that the results are available to al?1 who need
thein;~ and to provide a continuous mechanism for review-
ing the, state of our intelligence on any subject, and for
recommending means for improving it. It would be the job
of the Executive Secretary and his.staffto review\the
work of these committees and bring it together, so as to
insure that the Government's program covers the whole
field of foreign intelligence, and that every participating
agency is doing the job assigned to it.
FISHER; Let's
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FISHER: 'Let's take the sociological committee. Who would be
represented on that?
McCORMACK: The State, War and Navy Departments, .as well as
several others --- say Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, the
Federal Security Agency, possibly others.
FISHER: And what sort of intelligence would the sociological
committee be interested in? The study of groups in foreign
countries?
McCORMACK: Yes, and various other types of practical know edge.
Such measurable facts as population, size and rate of
growth, birth.and death rates, racial characteristics,
military manpower; migration, education, health and living
standards, family structure, and many other things.
FISHER: Colonel McCormack, wouldn't there also be some types
.of intelligence operations designed to protect. us from
foreign spies and saboteurs?
McCORMACK: Yes, that is called security intelligence, and
there would be similar arrangements for it. Take the
matter , of controlling the movement of alienclin and, out of
the country Here several departments are' involved.
State is concerned. with passport, control and yiea.s; FBI
with keeping subversive aliens out o'f.:,the country;
Treasury with.viola.tions of the customs and revenue laws.
The Intelligence Authority would provide machinery .for
all those agencies to cooperate in planning their intelli-
gence .,jobs.
BENTON: I think we should make this'clear, Al: The proposed
Authority will be concerned only with foreign intelligence
that; is, those .aspects affecting our relations with
other, nations. It will steer clear of domestic matters.
McCORNIACK; That's right, Bill. It will ,have nothing to do with
polictri,g, or. law enforcement -- and that's' as It should be,
because a foreign 'national intelligence organization has
no business meddling in oui domestic affairs.
,FISHER: It
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FISHER:'Now, Colonel McCormack, would this proposed National
Intelligence Authority.have any operations of its own?
McCORMACKi' It might. There are some service functions that
can be performed by cne agency 'on behalf of everybody,
serving many'departments. The Foreign Broadcast Intelli-
gence 'Service, for example, which listens to foreign
radio broadoasts. That is a very important source of
information about the Governments and people of other
countries -- about whet they are doing and thinking. It
yields information that can be obtained in no other way,
and you get the information without delay.
FISHER: I understand the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence
Service nearly expired about two weeks ago, Colonel, for
lack of funds.
MoCORMACK; It was a close call, We almost lost one of our
most valuable intelligence agencies. The State Depart-
ment didn't have funds to take it over, but G-2 -- Mili-
tary Intelligence ---- has arranged to carry it until
June 30, After that, perhaps the.National Intelligence
Authority -- or the State Department -- may be able to
take it over..
BENTON; We need those reports on foreign radio for use in
our own broadcasting, They are indispensable. And I'm
sure Military Intelligence appreciates the importance of
radio monitoring after the experience of the war.
McCORMAC#C; 'Xe.e, Bill, during the war it gave the answer. to
many an intelligence puzzle, sometimes in''a wholly
unexpected 'way. For instance..- Early"this year we were
trying,hard to find out where the Japs had.hidden their
tetra-ethyl lend plants -- their 'source of ethyl fluid
aviation gasoline. To make that product you need
sodium and' lead ---- ,the two essential. ingredients. Well,
spotted,a Jap radio, anno14119ement that the
Emperor
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Emperor had .decorated a number of scientists. for their
war work, There were two chemists on the list who lived
,in`the.same.town --- the small, and not very important
city of, Koriyama.' And here was. the clue 'One chemist
worked 'for the Nippon Soda Company,' the other for the
Mitsubishi Lead Company., So Koriyama could be producing
N
sodium and lead, and if so, the odds, were that it
produced ethyl fluid. General LeMay sent his boys up
to take pictures; the oil experts studied them; and
there was the ethyl plant, big as life. But not for
long. It was rubble and ashes after one. visit from the
B-.291s. But it would be standing 'today if we had missed
intelligence work: Colonel McCormack, where would your
Research and Intelligence Office in the State Department
fit into the picture? '
McCORMACK It will fill a long-felt need for such services
in the Department, In doing so, it will use its own
sources of information as well'as the intelligence
reports of other agencies, We couldn't possibly have a
staff large enough to do the whole job ourselves. ?Ale
must rely on the Army, Navy, Agriculture,, Commerce and
other agencies for much of the information we need.,
the clue in the broadcast,
FISHER: That's a striking example of'war intelligence.
But to come back to the-problem ' of.un.ifying our`
FISHER: Do the Army and Navy, intelligence reports come to the
State Department automatically, or do you. have to ask for
.them?
McCORMACK: Most of them
don',t preternd to 'be
State Department will
only
are all channeled to, us.
a clearing house for all intelli-
such reports as we can ,use, on. a
Under the'.propose,d
intelligence, authority,
be represented on"mopt, of the
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working committees, since its Interests. are; ''so wide. So
it. will, be in close touch with everything that goes On' in
the. intelligence field.
Of course, there are precedents for this,''An inter-
departmental committee on intelligence - the Joint
Intelligence Committee -- was set up during the war.
MoCORMACK; Yes, and it worked well, Bill, as far as it went.
It was, however, an agency,of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
designed to serve their particular needs, It was not
intended --~. and it did not attempt --,to do a complete
intelligence job on a. Government-wide basis,
FISHER*,. Hasn't the State Department had some differences of
opinion,with the Army and Navy intelligence. people.
Colonel, where it came to defining the scope of the
proposed new authority?
McCORMACK: I wouldn't put it. that way, Mr, Fisher, The sub-
ject is complicated, and naturally there are different
views ---~ not only among the departments but within each
one .~-- as to the machinery that will work best. The
Secretary of State, as directed by the President, propos-
ed a plan. Later he modified it in a number of respects
to'meet the views of'the.Army and Navy, The modifica-
tions didn't hurt it; I think they Improved It. One or
two points are still under discussion, but I hope that
complete agreement will. soon be reached, and that the
final result will be the best thought. of three Depart-
ments, If it is, the plan will have good promise of
success. The important thing ---- and this I stress is that the departments are agreed on the objectives and
are working hard to find the beet answer for the govern-
ment ,as a whole,
FISHER: Now,
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S
FISHER: Nvwy Mr. McCormack, how much is all `this going to
cost? That's a ,question the House Appropriations
Committee will ask you.
MCCORKACK:. Well, Mr. Fisher, that is a very searching question.
I. would like to answer it in two parts: How much can we
afford to pay for good intelligence, and how much we
are., now planning to spend,
As to the first , question, suppose that during,the
1930s the democratic powers had really understood the
capabilities of Hitlerts'Germany and that we had all
.armed ourselves, and shaped our foreign policies, to
prevent the course of action that led to war. I ow much
could we have afforded to pay for intelligence which
would have averted the war? Well, if we had spent .50
billion dollars on it, it would'have?been dirt cheap.
So, I say,that this country can afford to spend for
good.foreign intelligence a great deal more money than
good intelligence will ever cost.
As for the more, practical;questio.n ,-- how much we
are planning to spend -- the State Departments Intel-
ligence. program for the next fiscal year calls for about
6 million dollars. Maybe that is too little, and if it
is, we shall go to the Congress and ask for more, But,
for the time being we are. proposing to plan the work
on along-range basis, to start on a modest scale, and
to make the fullest use of the Government's existing
resources for intelligence work.
BENTON:. Six million dollars per year sounds..like a modest sum
to me, -hen you consider that -a maj o.r war costs more than
that-per hour'.
FISHER: To summarize. what you.have said, then., we ;stand in
need of a good, efficient, unified intelligence service.
It won't all be like the war-time,operations' of the cloak
and.dagger boys;, for the most part it will be much less
romantic. But it will be none the less' difficult, and
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it will be important because it will furnish the basis
not only for our outgoing information. program, but also
for making.,decisions on our foreign policy. Colonel
McCormack,' you 'don ! t favor putting all government intel-
ligence into one big agency., Instead, you advoca.te,a
national ;intelligence authority which will harness the
vast,Antelligence, resources of this government Ina
cooperative program --- a program designed to assist this
nation as a leader in world affairs.
MCCCRMACK.:, That's right, Mr. Fisher. We don't want a new
agcJncy; we want to improve the work of existing agencies,
and see that the intelligence they get is accurate,
timely and relevant.
BENTON: ,,And I's made available to the general public as well
as the. government, in order to improve understanding among
nations.: This-'will help to'.bring the conscience and the
common sense of. the average citizen into the making of
our foreign policy.
MCCOR.1NACK; Mr. Fisher, you know the old saw about the three
kinds of intelligence --~- human, 'military and divine.
Well, we can't expect to approach the divine level, but we
can harness human and military intelligence for-the high
purposes Of national security and international peke.
FISHER: Well, thank you Colonel, and thank you, Mr.. Secretary,
for bringing us this interesting forecast of our post-war
intelligence, service.
ANNOUNCER That.wa.s'Sterling Fisher of NBC's University of the
Air. He has been Interviewing Assistant Secretary of State
William Benton and Colonel Alfred McCormack, Special Assist-
ant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and
Intelligence, on the question of a unified intelligence
service, The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden
Menefee;
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Next-week we shall present the third of this new
group of State Department broadcasts. Assistant Secre-
tary of State Donald Russell, who is responsible for
administration 'in.the Department, and Mr. Selden Chapin,
Director of the Foreign Service, will discuss the postwar
plans of the United States Foreign. Service.
This has been the 45th in a series entitled OUR
FOREIGN POLICY, presented as a public service by the
NBC University of the Air and broadcast to our service-
men and women,. wherever they are stationed, through the
facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. You can
obtain printed copies of these broadoasts'at ten cents
each in coin, If you would like to receive copies of
thirteen consecutive reprints, send one dollar to cover
the cost of printing and mailing. Address your orders to
the' NBC. University of _the Air, Radio City, New York 20,
New'York (Let me repeat that address for those of you
who wish to write it down: send your order to the NBC
University of .the Air, Radio City, New York 20) New York.
Ten cent's in coin for one broadcast, one dollar for a
series of thirteen broadcasts. Special rates are
available for large orders.) NBC also invites,your
questions and comments.
Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from Washington, D.
THIS IS THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY,
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