DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 4, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ell T6 IN Ta^i `['1 LLI ate; C. (J1 G ~ TZ1i~.TUfl
by
Colonel ALlfred.
Lecture delivered, at
The Arny Navy utaff Colle;;e
bashington, D. C.
December 4, 1945
(INT,LLIGENCE)
This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of DCI/HS.
The record copy has-been Ti~~NSi=hR~~~
tp National Archives
Under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date q HRP 8 ?r 2.
This ctqicuvznt has b
approved f r role through
? of
the HISTO IC/i~ " E T FR CCM
the Central. , iligence A cy
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LEV:lOP h~Eb T I1C 11" TThLLI t71 y~ i;r- OR (skid I L1LT ION
by
Colonel Alfred .AcCormaek
Gentlemen, intelligence is divided into three kinds, as you knov,: h.uman, military
and. divine. The human is practiced outside of the government; the military, :~_n the bar
and Navy Departments; end, of' course, the Ota.te Depa.rtrient takes the balance of the
field.
I said to the General and the Admiral on the way up here that I sometimes wondered
whether it was any good to have food intelligence. he did a job over in LVI1S for the
i,ir Forces end. the 1+evy back in the dune of 1945 which had to do with the Korean trans-
portation system. And we. recommended that the 5achun River bridge he knocked out, and
then that there be a series 'of bombings of north-south rail lines with the objective
of depriving southern Korean industries and railroads of coal, all of which. came from
northern Korea.. he had practically perfect information on the pubject. I'ut the war
ended before the second stage of the operation. And shortly after war ended, we div-
ided up Korea with the Russians.' It never occurred to anybody to say, Uncle Joe,
we want southern Korea--but with the coal from the north." So, Uncle Joe closed off
all the lines and we didn't have any coal; we had to get some ships and carry it from
Japan. This is a good case of having your intelligence and not making use of it.
That is one of the big problems--not only to get it but to make use of it.
The current subject, a central intelligence agency, has been brooded about and
talked about a good deal and has-become one of those subjects on which families have
been broken up--brothers cease to speak to brothers; and 'fathers, to sons. I get
a lot of letters from people all over the country advocating various kinds of intel-
ligence organizations.
There are two extremes. In the first place, it is generally conceded that some-
thing ought to be done about intelligence, just as something ought to be done about a
lot of other things. There is a school of opinion of which a certain general. a great
friend of mine, is one exponent--which school holds the view that there ought to be a
central place with $. lot of people, into which all foreign information, whatsoever it
may be, will flow--where it will be, as the Army says, "processed"--and out of which
will come all the information that is needed to run our foreign affairs, and to plan
for the Army and the Navy, and for the other governmental organizations that have to do
with the preservation of peace and the satisfaction of international relations.
I happen not to be an exponent of that theory. 11;1y observations indicate to me
that intelligence must be conducted on the operating level. Take the State Depart-
ment, for example. The man who needs intelligence day in and day out is not the
Secretary of atate. lie (the Secretary of Utate) needs intelligence when he needs it.
But the man who needs good information day in and day out is the man who answers the
cables, the man who writes the notes for the ambassadors to deliver, the fellow whose
actions from day to day create situations that may -- and frequently do-- circumscribe
and determine your foreign policy. You finally, after pursuing aoourse of action, are
left with only two choices, let's say, whereas at the outset you might have had ten.
Intelligence is not an abstract thing. There is no such thing as intelligence in
the abstract. Intelligence is the sum total of information that you need. to have to
solve a problem. You who have had experience using intelligence in the theaters in
connection with actual operations know that.
The deficiencies of intelligence are fairly simple deficiencies. If you analyze
how we were situated at the beginning of the war, our difficulties were fairly simple.
he didn't have any maps, for example. dve just had never gone in for the business'in
this government of collecting maps-of various parts of the world. "econdly, we thought
we knew a lot of things -- that weren't so.
You know you can give an intelligence picture, in two differenct ways. You can go
to the nureau of Mines and you can get a map that will show you the mineral resources
of the world; and they will be your facts on which you are going to base some decisior
let's say. 'Iut Mr. Boggs, the head gee grepher of the State Department, made a differ-
ent kind of a map of the mineral resources of the world. Ile made a map in three tones-
black, dark grey and light grey--of the mineral resources of the world, designed not
to show what they were but how good the information we had in this government was about
mineral resources. In other words, for the United States you put black, because we
think we know pretty much all about it; and where you have fair information, but not
very sure, you put dark grey; and where it is "lousy", you put light grey--and most
of the earth was in light grey. 6o, in dealing with intelligence you not only have
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I don't think the army; nor the Navy, nor the Department of Agriculturo, nor
the State Department, nor the Department of Labor, can go out of the intelligence
business--nor anybody also-who needs foreign information. They have all got to do
their',jobs. For that reason and for a lot of other reasons I am op.l-)osed to super-
imposing on all the existing intelligence agencies another onca,wsickr: is going .to
do their whole job. And living as we do in an imperfect world, we'ought to know that
Congress isn't going to give anybody the money to do such a thing. Or if Congress'
does give them the money, they are going to be darn sure to take the money away from
everybody else--from G-2, ONI.
I had the experience of testifyin 11 before a Congressional committee a couple of
weeks. ago about the need for foreign information and. why they should give us the money.
One of the members of the committee said, "I don't understand why you need, all this
business. Can't the FBI get all this information for you in foreign countries?" hill
'{ Bennett was testifying down there and he said, "vtie need to have an information poram
in foreign countries, particularly", he said, "in Latin America, in Brazil." Mr. Bennett
said, "I have a report that the k''rench are putting on a half-million-dollar information
campaign over the next year; the British are spending somewhere around x300,000; the
iiussians are in there, and it looks like they are going to spend a lot of money. "But",
he said,"I don't want to lay too much stress on this particular report, because I haven'
been able to'authenticate it." An hour or half an hour*later when Dill had finished
his testimony, one of the Congressmen said to him, "U'ir. Bennett, how long have you been
in the State Department'?" end ')ill had to admit he had only been there 30 days. This
fellow said, "I thought you must be a newcomer because you said you weren't able to
authenticate this report from Brazil." He said, "I should think that would be the
easiest thing in the world to do--in fact, I would be surprised if your ambassador isn't
sending you in that information from week to week." vie had to pass the Foreign Agents
Re istration Act in this country to have any remote idea what foreign countries are spen
ding here--and the idea that the ambassador can get that information by askingg in
Brazil is so utterly naive that it is incredible.
If you reject the idea of an agency which is going; to sit on top of everybody else
and do all their work, the question then is ghat should you have? That depends some-
what on how you analyze our difficulties, what you consider the intelligence processes
tobe.
My experience indicates to me that the key operation in intelligence is what
(for want of a better word) you call the,research operation that is performed here
in Wash- ington, or wherever the headquarters may be, on the incoming; information.
Of course, we need. more information--at least, it is nice to have as much information
as you can met--but the information itself is useless unless somebody can sit down and
work on it and met out of it the truth-determine what is right, get the answers to
whatever your operating problems may be. So, the thin,; you want to do in. intelligence
here, in V'+ashington in my view is to stimulate that part of. the operation, encourage thos
people to do a better ,job at it, and spread it around among; the agencies of the gov-
ernmentso it is done by the fellow who is best qualified to do it.
nhen you come to talk about a. centeral intelligence agency of a practical nature,
the first question you have is How are you going to get' the money to run it? having
lived through three Congressional hearings, and also for other reasons, my own view--
End this is also the view of 'the State Department-- is that you should not have an
agency with a separate budget which will be up there for everybody to shoot at. You
oup;ht to have an agency which is an inter-departmental one, the money anti Personnel
Bain,; supplied by the par?'ticipatinm agencies.
Then when you come to that point, you have to decide what department is going to
furnish the man who is the head of it. rind it was my view when I was in the /'Army, and
it is my view at the present time, that that man should be a otate Department official.
The State Department is responsible for your foreign policy; it does more things to
effect your foreign policy. After all, the army and Navy would have preferred to have
the war with Japan occur about six months after it did, but that was impossible because
of the foreign policy pursued by this government. v'ahen we out the Japanese ofd from
oil, when we cut them off' from scrap iron, when we did various other things and then
impounded their funds, we created a situation which made war'inevitable. And the time
that the war was not the making of the .Army and Navy, but of the making; of the State
Department. So, the ultimate responsibility for foreign intell-imerce should be put
where the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy resides, not, to be sure, as a
single responsibility, but as (You might say) a, responsibility of leadership and a
responsibility of seeing that the jobs met done.
How does that organization work with the 1,rmy and Navy and with the other de-
partments of the government? Obviously it must work very closely. I think now the
time has come to unveil the chart. (T lived at (0-2 long enough so I can' t do anythin;
without a chart an"Jmore).
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This (indicating) is a tentative organizational chart for an in telligence-coor-
dinating agency. The name (Na.tional Intelligence t,u 1iorit) is the Army-Navy's title.
`he authority which is ultimately responsible is a Cnbinet committee. The uecret~,ry
of state is chairman, and there are the Secretaries of lhhar and Navy.
There is a certain division of the intelligence field that to my mind is very im-
portant, and that is the division between intell.ir,ence in the positive sense and se-
curity or counter-intelligence. the security organizations of. the government in addi-
tion to the armed services are the numerous agencies of the Treasury Department, the
Coast, Puard, the Secret Service, the Customs, etc., end the Federal .Bureau of Inves-
tigation, which is not only a domestic police organization but now operates in cer-
tain foreign countries.
The division between security and intelligence is one that deserves a lot of
g in the field of counter-intelligence that cap-
thought beca.use, there is somethin%
tivates the imagination and becomes a. disease. 'oth the Army and Navy have suffered
from that disease in the past to such an extent that when the President back in 1941-
'40 or' 41--thought it would be nice to ;get the Army, Davy and i,`bl -to ;ether to see what
could be done about intelligence, they Tot together and they devoted themselves to
nothing whatever except domestic security, and the security, of course, of Hawaii etc.
They laid no attention to the affirmative side of getting information about the world
that you :night need if you were cooing7 to fight a war. We were pretty close to -war io
those days, and as you look back on the, record it seems incredible that that should
have happened. There seems to be a tendency for people who get into the security
business to concentrate 'on that business to the exclusion of what is certainly much
more important.
One of the main proponents of this central agency idea in fact proposed that
there be two authorities at the top instead of one, that you give the intelligence
responsibility to these three people (State, uaar and Navy) and put another authority
to deal with security, giving them (intelligence and security) for coordination pur-
poses a common secretariat.' I think that is a. bit cumberson and probably not desir-
able.
This scheme (shown on chart) calls' for having an official of the State 'Jepart-
ment as the Executive Secretary of, this agency. And I think, perhaps, if' I read you the
prospectus of his proposed powers, that might be quicker than trying to extemporize
on it?
"Under the supervision and direction of the Executive Secretary, the Secre-
tariat shall (a)plan the Authority's program and make recommendations to the
Authority for carrying it out; (b) act as the executive for the Authority in
carrying out such a program and all operating plans approved by the "uthority
including any centralized operations conducted under the Authority; ("c"
omitted by Colonel McCormack); (d) develop and document all other procedures
that exist; (e) provide the authority and committee for secretarial service,
.the maintenance of files and other services."
The first objective of this organization is to look at the whole field of intel-
ligence and adopt a program. hhat do we need? '~Vhe.t haven't we got?
'.i'he Army and Navy and some of the other agencies have just become conscious of the
fact--maybe they became conscious of it some time back,. but it has expressed itself not
in an attempt to Tet up an organization--that our knowledge of the rare metals and the.
location throughout the world is very poor., That is one of the objectives of this ptaa
to find out where we have good information end where we don't have mood information.
It is proposed that the machinery of this agency (Executive Secretary) will be
inter-departmental committees. I don't like the word "committee" and I know all the
things that are bad about committees.
Let's take political intelligence. That is a very important field. Our politica
intelligence has not always been rood; sometimes it has been very bad. he State De-
g). rtment the briar Department and the Davy Department are all engaged in that activity.
G-2 of the War Lepertment puts out e. weekly political analysis of the countries of the
world--one publication on Europe, the "iddle East and Africa; one on the r'ar East and
one on Latin ALmerica--amid they are pretty good books; they have some good people' over
there. The navy does a somewhat similar thing only in a. slightly different way. the
Office of Strategic Oervices, note under the State Department, the Research and Analy-
sis Branch (of OSS) gets out,a bi-weekly political analysis of various countries of
the world. find within the State Department, daily, weekly, semi-monthly and monthly
publications of various kinds are produced.
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One of the functions of this committee (olitical Intelligence Committee) would
be to try to s et up an or ganiza.tion which would unify those activities and reduce the
number of people in them, because all of the three agencies are under pressure to
reduce personnel and that pressure is going to be increased as the "economy move" gets
underway.
That committee (Political Intel Ii(renceCommittee) would pay attention to what kind
of reporting; we get, and they would find, for example, that our ambassadors are not
a.11 equally qualified in political reporting; they would find that the staffs of our
ambassadors and attaches are not all adequate to do the job. They would consider what
type of information that you need of this kind you could get from American business firms
in various parts of the world. tor example, I suppose that our banks in foreign coun-
tries could produce a Food deal of information for us, and that sort of thing.
I will skip the Military Intelligence committee.
Tlext, we have a, committee which is called the Sociological Intelligence Committee
which generally deals with the subject of the peoples of the world. You can open up
the world almanac and find the population of any country in the world stated there but
the range of error in the population statistics, is very considerable. You don't
really know what thepopulation of China is; you only have a vague guess. You know what
the population of the United States is in a general way. The subject o~ populations
and migrations is avery important one--populations pressures on food supplies, etc.
That is the sort of thing this committee would give; its attention to.
You will notice in addition to the three-State, tiuar and Navy,- you have the De-
partment of Agriculture, Cormnerce, Labor, Federal Security Agency. You may wonder why
some of those are on there. Federal Security Agency is-interested in welfare and has
numerous international ramifications. The Department of Labor, likewise. As to the
Department of Agriculture, I might give you. an illustration of two things: f''irst, what
that Department does; and, second, what sort of thin; we have in mind here.
When Mr. Franklin O' Lier wanted to r et a group to do a morale survey of Germany
to find. out what had been affected in the day.bombings, night bombings, area bombings,
various types of operations, he looked. around to see what sort of people we had in the
government. who could' do public-opinion surveys--the ua.llup poll type of thing. He found
that the Deportment d' tgriculture has been in the business a good deal bn er than Dr.
Gallup;. and they are doing; the work all the time and have a. large organization to do
it. '~6, he simply lifted--borrowed--from the Secretary of Agriculture this unit that
went over to do the job.
Might today we have a very serious need for information about what the German
people are really thinking. avhat are their reactions'? How are they affected by their
present situation? bhhat are they likely to do? .'%+e haven't any agency to do the job
right at the moment. Out the Department of Agriculture wants to do the job; they are
prepared to do it. They happen to be about the richest department of the Government.
I will 7f ve you some s tatistics that rather appeal. to me. The State De rtment, not
including; what it got from the OSS and ONI, has doubled in number during the w -r and
has 4,000 people. The Department of Agriculture suffered a drastic decline during
the war on account of the draft and various other things; they are down to 85,000
people. They have 8,000 in Washin?*,toi~at One of dthe thing
em-
little use of that 85,000 people.
ployees.
II
ad of this survey 'business over there, is all Steamed-
h
h
e
e
Dr. Eichler, who is t
up" about intelligence. He has gotten into it for the first time and he now appreciates
this very important field. '"ell, we say, let's make use of him end his facilities.
't'here are lots of other things they can do in that department for us. In the field
of scientific intelligence, for example, on certain phases of that, they have a great
deal to contribute.
You have a ommittee on Foreign Transportat-.on and. Communications. You all f:no"
the importance of the.t; Query military man knows the importance of transportation
and communications. there is an affirmative side to this-- and to all of this (all
committees) , actually. You write a program; you say "This is what we want." That may
involve in the case of (let's say) the rare metals doing some geological surveys lsay)
in Alaska., Canada., South 1AI.merica,China., or wherever it may be. 1,ecommendations as to
what you have to do in order to solve the problem is a very important part of this
ma.china ry.
Next, niom.raphical Records Committee. 'that is a very interesting subject--bio- -
graphical records. `You rather assume that somewhere in the government you can get in
formation on anybody that you want to know about in foreign countries, if he is at all
prorn:tnent person. nut back on the day after our.landins in i,orth Africa I had to
find out the name of the chairman of the German 21rmistice Commission. I tried the
i,):IS; I tried the navy; and I tried the 068; and I tried the State Department. the best
T 41& I a oul L r ad a list of all the Germans in -,_:orocco but
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the file was lost. Then a day later I located in the bowels of the Pentagon
building (now of the Munitions Building) a military attache report of the previous
spring that gave down at the bottom, "7ulich, Chairman KIA". The file of the State
Department turned up in UID and there m us also a list, but it had "Nulich, ,Chairman
General KIA" To my sorrow, after eonsultinrr all the German Army books back to be-
fore the last War I discovered there had never been on officer in the Gerntan Army
with either name. After a couple of days of hard work on the part of three people,
we finally found a book that had in it an appendix that was entitled "General Officers
on Detached Service"; down at the bottom of it, it said Hans ailhelm von 'Nellich,
Chairman, KIA. "hat do you suppose the book was? It was the first edition of the
G-2 ,uerman order of battle.
Also, 1 went into the G-2's office one day. he threw a paper at me and said,
Over hear of this guy?" It was a paper from the chief of the british Imperial Staff
to General 1'"arshall, referring to an Italian, obviously a general, by the name of
-me. Attached to it was a note from the Italian expert, General Strong; (colon, para-
graph) "There is no such general in the Army.", possibly what the name could be and
several versions::were given of it. I had a girl by that time who had set up a Who's
VVho department. Not finding anybody else interested in it, I set it up myself. And
I called her.in and said, "Ever hear of this?" 1-nd she went out and five minutes
later came back with a card which said Ame (stating given name), service with mounted
troops in the- last war, professor at the Italian Military Academy up' to the time when
he in July of that year had been decorated by Mussolini with the highest military
decoration. And what do' you suppose he was? he was the Italian 0-2. He was the
chief intelligence officer of the general staff.
A few experiences like that lead me to believe that you need to have order in
this business. You need to do a systematic job of collecting names end keeping bio-
graphical records. The Navy has a good section on it; the Army has a good section
on it; the State. Department has a small one, and it is just the inherited one from
the OSS.
After all, everything that happens in the world happens in terms of' people. That
is what the world consists of. And it is surprising how much you can got out of a
cable' or report if you know about the bird they are taMng about or the writer of the
report that you can't get if he is just a name and you know nothing more about him.
T he principal mission of this committee (Biographical Records) is to find out
how to coordinate,, the activity of those other people. the navy used to have 180.
.yeomen doing this kind of work end the Army has 200 people in the Vuho's Who section,
and there is a good deal of duplication of effort. I think it is pretty clear the
service to the government could be improved by setting up some kind of machinery
whereby you would either have one operation serving all--which I think is probably
not the answer--or have the kind of coordination we had between two units in the
Army, for example, that did the job where the sources were divided up; and one ex-
ploited one set of sources and,the other, another set, and made their records in
duplicate and exchanged copies. All sorts of devices like that, bringing in the
departments that have specialized interests in people abroad--Labor, in the labor
union people; Commerce, in people onga ;ed' in .trade, etc.
Of course, the importance of the Economic intelligence Committee is obvious.
Right now we ought to have a fully developed program for getting the kind of infor-
mation that you need to do bombing--that kind of a gloomy attitude toward the future,
but obviously you all know it is essential. "e had physically in this country when
the war started almost all the information that we used to bomb Japan. But it took
two and a half years to dig it out, put it together and get it in usable form. 'J'ye
don't want to have to do that again if we have another war.
Next, the Geographic Intelligence Committee. The need for that is obvious. I
suppose if you take the fields of intelligence and study them, you would say our
geographic intelligence in the beginning of the war was probably the most deficient
of all. You all may have heard General Vandogrift say, as he said so often, that he
went into Guadalcanal without a map of the island, that he knew nothing about what
the island consisted of. He had an article from the Encyclopedia Britanniea on the
ship which had some information on the Solomon Islands"and he had hydrographic charts;
There are many facets to geographic intelligence. For example, let's say the
mappin' of China. China has never been mappod in the sense we know modern ma.uning.
I tried to find out recently what progress was being made. The objective we have had
all along through the war was to do the kind of photography you need for mapping-
aerial photography. I found that General Chennault has been able to do about 100 miles
from the coast up the main parts of China, from (say) hangehow to Shanghai. The rest
is yet to he done. I inquired of the "rmy and they said "General MacArthur has a direc-
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Live to do it, apparently he can't do it." 1 haven't looked at that directive, but
I have seer and looked an enough directives to (ienera.l MacArthur to know it says
something like this;. "You are hereby directed to take aerial photographs of china for
mapping purposes. You will do this when it suits you--and if your digestion is good
and you feel in a nice mood. And if you don't do it, it's all right.'" This kind of
a committee (Geographic Intelligence Uomrnittee) would tell General MacArthur to wet
up off his tail and do something about it.
Also, the subject of meteorological intelligence falls. into this category. That
is extremely important to those of you in the air forces now. y'ihen the war came along
the weather bureau was not equipped to serve the air forces. They had to do their own
job. They did a lot of very interesting things and made a lot of progress. For exam-
ple, they went back and, carded the weather. They had IBM (International Business #Via-
chines) Company devise machines to assist then in the carding of the weather. So, they
have the weather carded back to the beginning, of the century. If you have a weather
pattern today and want to find those similar patterns which existed in the past, you
punch the proper buttons and out comes the card. There is a lot of progress that can be
made in weather. 'J'+e don't know all the answers yet. The Russians, for example, have
done a great deal of polar weather research--polar weather research that we haven't don
yet. And there is a fellow connected with the Radio Corporation of America who has
some ideas about weather signs that are very interesting and should be exploited. All
that sort of thing falls under your Geographic Intelligence Committee.
There are many rarAifioations of weather. You all know you have to get you own
weather stations; you have to find out what observations they can 'make. You have to
locate them properly. You wouldn't locate a weather station outside of San "rancisco
so that it would always be foggy every day all summer, because it would give you S.
false notion of what the weather was in that general region. You have to locate your
stations properly; you have to find out what kind of observations they can make; you
have to find out at what altitude observations should be taken. You have to devise
means for exchanging weather `information with other countries. If they won't exchange
it, you have to listen to their weather broadcasts. And if the weather broadcasts are
.not in the clear, you, have to try to read the code. that is just one of many ramifi-
cations of this whole intelligence subject.
Next, the Committee on Scientific and Technological Intelligence. In this
scientific and technological intelligence you have got the atomic bomb and a lot of
other things. "hat about the atomic bomb? How are you going to find out when the
Russians go in for the atomic bomb? and what they do? I am not eoi'g to try to
give you the answer to that question right here today, but i might say this: that I
am told by a man I consider to be the best hussiaxi expert I know, the man who is
head of the Slovanic institute at Solumbia University, that it is his opinion if
theitussians went in for an atomic bomb project on the scale of ours (let's say), a
two-billion-dollar project, you would be able to observe the effect in their stan-
dard of living. better watch the standard of living: which takes you back here
again (Economic Intelligence Committee). And above all these coordinating committees
you have a master coordinating organization (executive Secretary).
The next committee here is the. Qornmittee on acquisition of i'orei,,n Library r+ia-
terials. Here is an interesting committee. That sounds like an easy thing to get--
foreign library material and foreign publications. Strangely enough, it is a very
difficult thing to do.. In the first place, the publication's of foreign countries--
some of them-- are not run quite like those in the United Otates. You could sub-
scribe to them, but you don't always get them. come you can't subscribe to; you have t(
find a way to buy those. You have not only the periodicals and that sort of thing,
but you have the publications of scientific organizations. For example, one of these
fellows said the nice thin; he liked to let was the report of the Italian Agricul-
tural Institute. You would think that is c very good organization, that has been
running for a .long time, and you would think our Department of A-g;riculture would have
(gotten around to getting their report. nell, getting their reports was an extremely
complicated t-ing,`_'ecause they were privately circulated. However, it was done by
arrangements to jive them e quid pro quo.
This organization (Committee on Acquisition of Foreign Library Materials) by
the way has been running for three years and is largely res~.,onsible for the fact
that we have.- in this country now pretty darn good coverage of the press of the
world during the war which for historical purposes is very important.
The last committee on here (Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Com-
mittees) is called the Committee on Recruitment and Training. You all know we
apparently haven't learned anything about what you need, to do when you send a person
out as a military attache or as a naval attache. I won't speak for the Y1avy be-
cause I don' t know what they are doin,. Lut 1 know in the Army they pick them in
the same way they used to. They give therm 30 days to learn how to make e. budget;
how to make out a finance report, and other things; that is all, they know when they
ago out. It is about time we started doizw a. little more than that. It is about time
not on e ws 4'16 e ~11e~ i the :Mate Lepartrnent. That
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goes for the Mete lier.u.rtnc~nt, too. The fellow who is going to be an ambassador
comes in for 30 days and r-gets briefed. The "Briefing" consists of 30 days of the
people wanting to know him entertaining , him at dinner or lunch. It is about time
people you need in this field
we had an organization that determined what kind of
of activity and ;Pet the right people for it and give them a course of instruction;
then follow what they are,doing and tell them how to do their job better. Devise
training programs.
I regard that organization (Committee on 1ecruitment and 'raining) as one of
very; great importance in this whole intelligence picture because you need partic-
ular kinds of animals to do intelligence work--and that roes not only for the col-
lecting of information; it goes also for the research that you have to do on it to
turn it into somet ping.
Coming; to the subject of security (Int(-,rdepa.rtmental Security Coordinating
Committees), I think the names of the committees will give you about all I can tell
you about. them, except for one (Committee on Security Policy). Travel, Control,
Physical Security--plans Ports and harbors, etc.;Security Investigations; informa-
tion Security--security of military information, classified information, etc.; Com-
xnunications becurity, which I am sure you all understand; Economic Security Controls,
which title is borrowed from theState Department organization and the Treasury De-
partment organization tl',at are trying to prevent the Germans from getting into
Latin America, and all that sort of thing; and theCoramittee on Censorship Planning.
That Committee (Committee on Censorship .Planning) is su,-,.-,ested by Mr. Byron
Price who says that we learned a lot during the war about censorship. Vve learned
the techniques and we learned a lot of things about secret-writing and secret-inks
and all that sort of thing. he have ;.rot a lot of equipment and it shouldn't all
be thron away. yo, he suggests, and the oureau of the3udget suggests, that a
committee be set up which will have the job of planning for censorship if, as,
and when you may need it. And, of course, the subject of planning has infinite
possibilities in this subject.
Committee on Security Policy; that is a. countermeasures committee under a
fancy name. }'heir job is to determine what to do about the security problems that
are caused 1:y other fellows trying; to get into your intelligence organizations,etc.
Over here (Centralized Activities --such as SI and CE under Director of Special
Activities) you come to the much-debated subject of secret intelligence and counter-
espionage. hho should do those jobs and to what extent you ought to do them is e-
very serious question. Counter-espionage is not so difficult because it is recog-
nised, I think, among the governments of the world that counter-intelligence ac-
tivities are legitimate. find where we have the Y13I or the X-2 branch of the QSS
operating, they operate under Ntate Lepartment cover'--but the cover doesn't cover
them so far as other governments are concerned. I mean, for example, the Swedish
government knows who our counter-intelligence people in the Stockholm embassy are--
and, as a matter of fact, they have used them for the purpose of conveying, inform-
ation to this government. That isn't quite so much of a problem.
Dut the secret intelligence is a problem, and it is espeically a problem be-
cause. everybody has a different idea of what it is. hat is secret intelligence?
hell, you have seen the cartoon of that girl sitti.n.g on a park bench with all the
differenct children of different: races and ages--maybe you don't know that cartoon,
a very good one anyway--and beneath the cartoon is the comment: "That is X-37; in her
day, one of our most effective agents." The people who talk about 'secret intelli-
gence mean a lot of differenct things.
You ought to have your intelligence collection so set up that anybody who is
doirirr the job for you in foreign countries doesn't have a label on him--so you don't
put "Intelligence Officer" on the front of-his coat.
But from that point, the point where you buy information, where you employ paid
informers, you have a lot of problems. The secret intelligence agencies of different
governments--and I know a good deal about the British; something; about the r`rench and
a little something about some of the others--get most of their results short of the
fellow under the bed. 'hey get their results largely from open sources with which,
however, it may be difficult to make contact.
The had of the 06S sacra intelligence in Istanbul told me he had come to the
conclusion that he had not done any secret intelligence during the war. Ile thought
he had, but when it was over he decided he hadn't. 'the reasons for that were, he
stated, first, that the best information he got he got from sources where the secrecy
of the operation didn't make much difference; and, second, the fellows that he though'
were his secret agentu were known to the Turkish Government and everybody else in
Istanbul--so, he didn't do any secret intelligence.
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y`+ithout going into that discussion further--unless you fellows have some ques-
tions on that subject--it seems to be the view of everybody that no one department
should take that responsibility. I think the ~'nir Department would be willing to
take it, but prefers not to. The state Department doesn't want it. J-nd I don't know
about the Navy, but I guess they don't want it either. `that is the one kind of op-
eration where there seems to be the general opinion that if you are going to do it,
put it under some fellow who reports to this centralized authority.
hen you get all finished with this chart, you ask the question, "hat are the
intelligence agencies going to be doing; in the meantime? Well, there is certEin work
that the -rmy must do, which G-2 must do; the 1-rmy 6ervice r'orces must do some,
the technical parts especially. -n.d so on with the Navy. hose organizations should
be encouraged to do the best job they can and should concentrate their personnel on
the things they can do best. And `'tote Department doing principally the political
end economic in.telli ;once (let's say) ; and the specialized intelligence in fields
that fall under these boxes (on chart) ,being done either by the agency best equipped
to do them or by a joint agency, bossed (let's say) by one of the constituent ag,encie
as the Navy, for example, ran the technical air intelligence during the war, Japanese
air intelligence, the technical side, with contributions of Army personnel. Zjimmilarly
in your weekly political reporting, it would be my hope that out of this cormnittee's
(Political Intelligence `'ommittee's) recommendations there would be a joint state-
lirrny-i'havy group which would sit in the btate Department and actually serve the needs
of the whole government in weekly political reporting and also on the more important
political studies, studies of particular subjects, etc. In other words, as a r esult
of this central agency and the participation of all these people (Interdepartmental
Intelligence Coordinating Committees) in it, the whole field of intelli once would
be cove-,red, and in each of the subjects of it there would be somebody definitely re-
sponsible for it. It is easy to put forth an estimate of the capabilities of the
enemy if you. know all the particular things that go into the estimate. Our diff'i-
culty in the past has been that fellows used to write estimates of the enemy capa-
bilities and they didn' t know much; they just knew the things that were on the sur-
face and therefore their estimates weren't very good.
The plan does not prohibit other central operations under this agency (Inter-
departmental Intelligence). You might centralize Biographical "ecords, etc. but
every time you talk about centralizing something, the fellow that proposes it is
usually somebody who doesn't know about the field. 1, fellow has opinions on every
subject in the world except the one he works most closely with, therefore he knows
all the pitfalls and he is more careful about his opinions and he doesn't formulate
them so readily.
One of the favorite subjects for centralizing is photographic intelligence, and
always-the suggestion is made by somebody who has never worked in photographic intel?
lig once. inuring the war here in ~'hashin ;ton the Air iorces had a PI section which wag
supposed to serve everybody. They couldn't serve everybody except in the most super-
ficial way because a picture is another one of those things in life out of which you
get what you have put into' i t. I remember one time heard in the 1-ir i''oroes that t]
20th 1Air 1''oroe had taken some picture of Mukden. 4'ue had spent a lot of time loco-tin,
the factory of the Fiianchurian Aircraft Company because it wre..s difficult since all thi
maps of. dukden were in Chinese and all the addresses of this comps.ny were in Jep ones
nobody could get over from one language to another. We finally succeeded in finding,
a business dirdctory of i.ukden giving the Chinese address and we knew where this fac
tory was. ~;o, we went for the picture and up with it came an interpretation; it said
".Aircraft assembly and engine plant. On the field there are about 50 bi-planes." 'vYe
knew what was being; made there; we knew it was the Type 2, 11dvenoe Trainor. +ell, th
news that the Japanese were giving their advance training to their combat pilots in
planes was so staggering that it seemed it ought to be checked. And also the news
that they were making engines there was a bit staggering, too. I called in a fellow
who knew about such things. He said, "I can't tell what the planes are. .yet me g;rt
some other pictures." Of course, they weren't bi-planes; they were regular trainers
J,nd he took one look at the factory and said, "There are no facilities for testing
blocks, and therefore no engines are being m&l.de there.".
I had quite a number of photo-interpreters, as you use them as a tool to find
answers. The Array and Navy worked very successfully against the Japanese shipping,
with the aid of a cou;;lo of very good photo-interpreters who made a great contributi
hen you had the Joint 'Target; arou) and others doing the tarrget work, they had
an awful lot of photo-interpreters. but in every case the fellow who dealth with the
picture either had enough information to put into it to get something out of it, or
else he went and found the infornia.tion or went to the experts. `+henever we had ;;ic-
tures of thepla.nts that we thou;:;ht might be ethyl fluid in Japan we sent them to the
atandard Oil Company of New Jersey to find out if it was.
do, trips idea that you can take an operation Like photo-interpretation and got
a to opff c us an all. them photo-inter preters and they' can serve everybody is to my
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A!iaybe the Biographical records can be centralized. tend yet when you begin to
talk to people, you find that their objectives in connection with biographical
records are so different you wonder whether you can have any central operation of
that kind.
In any event, this ( the National fntellig once Authority) is the proposal that
is being; made by the Secretary of otate to the :iecreteries of Saar and i ev'y today.
Another thin; happeriing today is a much sadder thing. ne have in this government
a thing called the rederel broadcast Intelligence service. It is an enormous source of
information. It is particularly a source of information about the people in other parts
of the world. I can give you many illustrations of its usefulness, but have one fav-
orite story. During the activities of the 20th -ir Force against Japan it became de-
sirable to find out where they were makin,r their ethyl fluid. use had learned by that
time, or at least M15 had the opinion by that time, that we had made a groat mistake
in the war against Uermany in not knocking out their only two ethyl plants. In the
United s t&.tes we only had two ant didn't build another because it takes two or three
years to build one. Knowing that, we figured it would be a very nice thing,to hit
these one or two plants the Jags might have. On good evidence we came to the con-
clusion that the main plant was a. joint enterprise of the mitsubishi lead Company and
the Nippon soda Company. You would have a general idea where that would be located--
near to a source of salt, etc. but there were a good many places where it might be
and every lead we pursued proved to be fruitless until one day one of the boys digging
through some back numbers of theiederal broadcast intelligence Service weekly publi-
cations telling about the Japanese broadcasts. Ind he came upon an award, of the n-
peror, or the announcement of an award by the -mperor, of very high decorations to two
chemists, and the two chemists were one connected with the i:iitsubishi Lead Company
and one connected with the hippori Soda Company. "here is nothing in the world for~+nd
which you use soda and lead except tetra-ethyl lead, and it rather intrigued him.
the Japanese had been kind enough in.the broadcast to give the,town. where these two
gentlemen lived and worked --Koriyama. Co, they sent the boys up there to take some
pictures. They took the pictures and sent them back here and we sent them up to the
Standard Oil. In the Meantime, ueneral LeMay, who is a fellow who acts quickly, de-
cided he would.. take a shot at the place anyway because it wasn',t very big and
there
were only two or three possibilities of what this ethyl plant may be. y the
the report came beck from the Standard Oil Company, we got a telegram hack from the
bombing saying; "If Ethyl was where you said she was, she ain't there no more."
That is only one of a great many illustrations I can give you of the usefulness
of this r'ederal broadcast Intelligence Service; it arises from the fact thy: t all gov-
ernments have to talk. to their people these days and in talking to them they have to
use facts; they can't use baloney all the time; it has to be mainly true even though
the emphasis is wrong. All the information about the Balkans has actually come from
radio broadcast since the war ended. You can listen, for example, to what is sent in
by "ussian correspondents, let's say, and what comes out of Moscow; that is one little
trick in this field of activity.
hell, yesterday, the Congress in its wisdom knocked out the appropriation of this
very useful body and as of today it is being liquidated--going out of business--unless
before nightfall the State Department, which is already insolvent, can find some way
of Ailing this outfit out. that is the way I expect to spend the rest of my day.
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