IAC REPRESENTATION IN THE PROPOSED COORDINATION AND LIAISON STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160120-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 120
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/08: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160120-3
ANNEX TO ENCLOSURE A
/AC REPRESENTATION IN THE PROPOSED
COORDINATION AND LIAISON STAFF
The concept of LAC representation within the proposed Office
of Estimates is difficult to convey and has previously been
rejected on theoretical grounds. It has, however, worked in
practice, in the British JIC and in the wartime US JIG. The
present lamentable state of inter-agency coordination is in large
measure a consequence of the subordination of practical coopera-
tion to abstract and theoretical considerations and ultra-formal
procedures.
The following excerpt from a memorandum of 15 April 1947
may serve to explain and justigy the concept. Certain out-of..
date references must be excused inasmuch as time was not avail-
able for revision in contemporary terms. The basic argument is
no less valid in present circumstances.
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EnAltrtflarg g g
3. The essentials of an effective procedure. From the experience
of the U.S. and 'tritish J.I.C.ts, the essentials of an effective pro-
cedure may he deduced. They are:
a. That the system be based on direct and informal
consultation to the maximum practicable degree,. with a minimum
of procedural formality and indirection.
b. That coordination with each departmental agency be
accomplished through an officer permanently and exclusively
charged with that function, directly responsible to the chief
of that agency and authorized, on due oonsultation, to ex-
press concurrence or dissent in his name.
c. That each such representative, although necessarily
a person of broad experience in strategic appreciation rather
than a specialist in any particular subject, be competent and
authorized to enter into substantive discussion and to exercise
substantive judgment.
d. That each such representative have direct and in-
forllia access to the chief of the agency represented by him
and to its substantive specialists.
e. That each such representative participate directly
in tEe final formulation of the estimates to be coordinated,
so that he may not only represent therein the departmental
point of view, but also represent, in departmental considera-
tion of the estimates the joint (or central) point of view.
CaNFITENTIAL
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No,
4. C.I.G. Administrative Order No, 3. Simultaneously with the
drafting ;TIME Directive No. 1 it was planned to meet the require-
ment of paragraph 6 therein by providing in the Central Reports Staff
an agency for the determination of departmental concurrence or
dissent in conformity with the principles indicated above. This plan
was formulated in C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 3 (Revised), para.
graph 3$ which follows in abbreviated form:
3. One Assistant to the Chief, C.R.S., shall be designated
by each permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
In distinction from other C.R.S. personnel ... these Assistants
shall be assigned to the offices of the permanent members of
the I.A.S. and responsible to them, although detailed to serve
full time with the Chief, C.R.S. They shall:
a. Represent the interests of their respective
members of the (I.A.B.) in the operations of the (C.R.
b. Represent the (C.R.S.) in its relations with
their respective agencies.
c. Assist the Chief. C.R.S. in: (1) The formula.
tion of directives to the subdivisions of C.R.S. and of
requests upon departmental agencies for essential
information; (2) The review of summaries, estimates, and
studies prepared by the subdivisions of C.R.S....
This concept had been explained to the members of the '.AJL and the
provision of such personnel had been agreed to by them when the draft
of N.I.A. Directive No, 2, Appendix "An? was before them for considera-
tion. The plan was never put into effect, however, because the C.R.S.
never reached the stage of producing estimates.
5. C.IG, Administrative Order No, 32. The language of C.I.G.
Administrative Order No. 32 does not preclude the establishment of
an effective system of coordination, but neither does it describe _
such a system and require its tmplementation.
The actual implementation of this Order to date constitutes
the most formal, indirect, cumbersome, and inefficient procedure
ever devised for the purpose. This situation is obviously attri-
butable to the fact that, in this context, the interest of the
departmental intelligence agencies is essentially negative, to prevent
apy action possibly prejudicial to them rather than positive, to
contribute toward and expedite the pro4ction of acceptable central
intelligence estimates.
The actual practice under C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32
stand* in contrast to the essentials of an effective procedure
indicated in paragraph 3 as follows:
a. It is extremely indirect and formal. In
era
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intelligence --
through the con-
structive recon-
ciliation of
NM,
the officers designated by the members of the I.A.B. pursuan
to the Order act only to transmit written memoranda without
concern to understand and influence the substance and reason-
ing of either C.I.G. estimates or departmental comment there-
Itonsequence they constitute a barrier to the true
tron-Wdivergent (or only apparently divergent)
interpretations,
b. The function of these officers with respect to M.G.
is incidental to other, departmental duties. None of them
feels any responsibility for a constructive contribution to
central intelligence.
c. Whether or not these officers are competent to enter
into substantive discussion, they will not do so. They function
only as post offices for the transmission of papers between
C.I.G. and departmental specialists. In this they constitute
a barrier to the direct discussion of points at issue and
possible reconciliation of Apparently opposing views.
d. In general these officers communicate with the chiefs
of the. agencies they represent and with its substantive
specialists only through written memoranda (at least so far as
the subject of this paper is concerned), Being thus uninformed
regarding the' reasons for a departmental dissent, they Obvious-
ly cannot discuss the issue or even explain the dissent, but
can only transmit it as they have received it.
e. These officers have rarely, if everi visited ORE,
much Tess participated in the preparation or review of C.I.G.
estimates. Consequently they are incapable of presenting
the C.I.G. point of view or even of interpreting a C.I.G.
draft to their principals or to the departmental specialists
concerned. For lack of discussion with anyone qualified to
inform them on these points, departmental specialists often
base their formal convents on misconceptions or address them
to issues that could have been resolved in a moment of informal
discussion.
The existing procedure is not only an obstacle to the true
coordination of intelligence through substantive consultation and agree-
ment, but it also entails unacceptable delay in the publication of
completed 0.1.0, estimates. For specifications on this latter point
see the Appendix. Even with the most thorough prior coordination on
the working level two to three weeks are required to obtain final action
through the departmental representatives designated under C.I.G.
Administrative Order No, 32* The average time required for this
purpose is 17.2gze Experience has shown that resort to the escape
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Iwo 1741
tau.
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clause in paragraph h of the Order produces more difficulties than
it avoids.
6. Conclusions.
a. That the existing procedure for the final coordina-
tion of C.I.G. estimates with the departmental agencies hinders
substantive agreement and entails unacceptable delays.
NTIAL
b. That the procedure for that purpose should conform
to the specifications in paragraph 3 above.
c. That the members of the I.A,B. should be requested to
detail to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff, ORE,
full-tine representatives qualified and authorized to function
in conformity with paragraph 3 above.
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