(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160061-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: November 16, 1950
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160061-9
16 November 1950
MEMORANDUIA FOR GENERAL SMITH
In CIA 11-50, "REVIEW OF THE MORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES," dated 13 November 1950, the last
sentence on page ii of the Summary reads:
"Containment of Hots forces presently depends almost
exclusively on U.S..aid, and even with such help (short of
direct ground, air, and naval support) the,.Fxncbprobably
cannot hold northern Indochina for more than
...
a Thociina for more than ei Yiteen months.
This somewhat definite statement derives from "PROSPECTS FOR
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION IN INDOCHINA DURING 1950" (ORE 50-50 Supplement).
This paper is based on information available to CIA as of 5 September
1950, and it is concurred in by the-Departments of State, Navy, and
I Air Force. There is a dissent by the Department of Army (G-2), but not
in relation to the following pertinent paragraph (Page 9, Section 1,
paragraph 2) :
leventually expelling the French without the aid of a Chinese
n n.,, .mi + iv.tr.,ci n++ It w
!French receive no more aid than is presently programmed, of Al"
"Despite this general capability and despite the existence
of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina
border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open
Chinese Communist invasion-while possible and capable of being
launched with little or_no preliminary vrning-=is improbable in
1950 because considerations (from the standpoint of Ho Chi Minh,
the Chinese Communists, and international Communism) favoring
such act-Lon appear to be outweighed by considerations opposing
it. It is highly probable, however, that the Chinese Communists
will continue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh
forces (by measures short of open invasion) on a scale sufficient
to provide those forces with the capability of achieving signifi-
cant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and, assuming that the
77-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160061-9
000293
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160061-9
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL.
ILL CIRCLE CLASS' :ATION TOP AND BOTTOM)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
INITIALS
DATE
I
Mr. Monta ue
2
3
5
FROM
INITIAL
DATE
11/20/5C
2
3
CIAPPROVAL INFORMATION II SIGNATURE
L]ACTION DIRECT REPLY (_] RETURN
CJCOMMENT =PREPARATION OF REPLY i- I DISPATCH
=CONCURRENCE II RECOMMENDATION I FILE
REMARKS: Monty: Please note General Smith's
remarks at the bottom of the page.
~'YL LCL fi"On' V, cty~ /Sa
J
CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED
El-
FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947
This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of OCi/HS.
The record copy has been
released to National Archives
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date--- / a . HRP Z I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200160061-9