MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200100014-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 10, 1941
• Content Type: REPORT

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ti )EMO? 4 OFE8 iBUMENT OF
SRVIC OF S 1TROIC ID1FiOIti TION"
Ps"Ident uonw"A
StrateSy, without information Upon sAJ-vh it can rely, is helpless.
is is useless unless it s isirte aptly directed to
Li iewis~e
the strategic purpose. lodern warfare depends upon the economic bass
on the supply of raw materials,_. an t capacity' and performance of the
industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural produc\tdan and upon the
character and efficacy of co unications.; Strategic reberveg will
detersdue the, strength of the attack.ondi the resistance oy" the defense.
Steel and gasoline constitute these. reeerree as much as do `n en and powder.
The width and depth of terrain oopvrp3ued by the present day ark Y exacts
an equally wide and deep network of /operative lines,. The "depth,` of
strategy" depends on the "depth of f srsmnent,"
The cx itment of all resou%?ceas of a nations. moral as well as
materials constitute what to call~td total war. To anticipate ensi y Urten-
tion as to the mobilisation andtngAc sent of these forces is a difficult
We must try, by correctly foreseer
yr r e. e'S k-4 4l task. General You B6rnh4rdi ` 6"*
what is cog to antiaiptxte demalopments and thereby to gain an advantage
the future expects -40 to do.'a
Althourgh we are facing went peril.#, we are lacking in effective
service;, for analysing? comprehendian and appraising such information as
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t-4i4 i. .%"% f%n-nr.in nt.A cane t overcome on the field of battle. That is what
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For Release 7001/07/2Vfliy4l 06
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we might obtain, #, (or in some cases have..obtsined), relative to the inter
tion of potential enemies and the limit ,of the economic and military
resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information. is
inadequate. It .:La true we have intelligence units. in the Arzgy and the
Navy. We can assume that through these units our fighting services can
obtain technical information in time of peace, have available imediats
Operational information In time of war, and on certain occasions obtain
"spot" newt a8 to OMW mots. But these services cannot, out of
the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive# .ong.+
range information without which no strategic board can plan for the
futures. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid
down for the spring of l942.
We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our
governments, documents and memoranda a oncerning military and naval and
and economic potentials of the Axis which,. if gathered together and
'studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a fledge
both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable
often decisive results.
, itical. analysis of this information is an presently important
for Our supply program as if we more, actually engaged in armed coraf ;ict.
It is a taginabl a that Germany would engage in a $7 billion supply pro-
gram without first stuucring in detail the productive capacity of her
actuaal and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that
she displays such a mastery in the secrecy,, tim3.n ,,,and effectiveness of
her attacks..
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n if w participate to no greater extent than we do now, it
is essential that sot up a central enemy intelligence organization
which would itself collect .either directly or through existing departments
of goverrom ,, at hie and .abroado .pertinent information concerning
potential enemies, the character and eitreng of their armed forces, their
ink economic organization,. their Principal channels of supply, the
morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their
neighbors or a33 s.
For oxwVl+e, in the economic fold there are ma weapons that
can be used against the enamor, But in our goverreaent these weapons are
distributed through several different departments. How and when to use
them is of vital interest not only to the Wider-i",oChief but to each
of the dements concerned. All departments should have the saw informa+?
Lion upon which economic warfare could be . det mined,
To ana3yze and interpret such information by applying to it
the experience of Armor and Naval officers, but also of special.
iced trained research officials in the relative scientific fields,
(including technological, economic,, financial and psychological scholars)
is of ?determining influence in modern warfare.
its and interpretation must be done with immediacy
and speedily t ransn t ted to the intelligenc
a o f those ? epart.
ment$ Which, in some eases a would have been supplying the essent .
raw materials of information.
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But there is another element in modern warfare, and tk at is the
Psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a
nation. In this attack the most powerfui, weapon is radio. The we
of radio as a wapon, though effectively employed by Gem, is still
be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning,
and planning is dependent upon accurate information. From this informs
titan action could be carried out by appropriate agencies.
The neahar&ex of this service to the various departments should
be under the direction of a Coordinator of Strategic InforARtion who
would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator
could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of
FBI, the Directors of the Army and ?.ii-ey Intelligence Service, with
corresponding officials from other governmental departments principally
concerned,
Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy as
4011 as other departments of the government. The proposed centralized
unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the F'BI, Army and Navy
Intelligence, or aW other department, of the goverment.
The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is
to Constitute a means by which the President, as Cot mander in-Chief, atad;
tegic Board would have available accurate and complete ene r
inteJligenoO reports upon which ftilitsrY operational decisions could be
based.
W4aat J. Donovan
Washi
t
D
ng
on,
. C.
June 10, 1941
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