STATUS OF SPECIAL STAFF OPERATIONS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040070-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: September 20, 1950
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2000/09/1#
Transcribed for A_~ by EH
November 17, 1953
From P. Borells File
ORE - Special Staff Papers -
Miscellaneous
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20 September 1950
MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
FROM: Members of the Special Staff.
SUBJECT: Status of Special Staff Operations.
1, The Special Staff of the AD/ORE was charged initially with
the responsibility for preparing reports and estimates connected with
the crisis arising out of the Korean incident. In interpreting that
mission the Staff did not limit itself to problems directly, concern-
ing Korea, but it re-examined Soviet policy in other areas in the
light of the Korean affair, In pursuit of this objective the Staff
has prepared, or taken cognizance of, papers on the implications of
the Korean attack, possible Soviet courses of action with respect to
Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, Berlin? Iran, Yugoslavia, Greece and
Turkey. It has examined the Soviet capability.to take the risk of
global wars has examined reaction to a possible US initiation of
global war, and it is currently examining Sino-Soviet relations,
a crucial question in the analysis of possible Far Eastern develop-
ments.
2. Development of the Korean affair and the reactions of the
Soviet and non-Soviet nations thereto indicate that the incident in
Korea is bound to have continuing repercussions on US foreign and
domestic policy, as well as upon the foreign and domestic policies
of the USSR and all other nations. This fact suggests that the
planning and writing of estimates should be continued on a staff
basis, but that this should be done outside the limitations of
framework within which the Special Staff began its operations.
3. The following general conclusions regarding the planning
and writing of estimates emerge from the experience of the Special
Staff:
a. It is essential to maintain close contact between the
NSC Staff;" Department of State.. JCS, and other consumers of estimates
on the one hand and the personnel planning and writing the estimates
on the other hand.
b. It is necessary to have certain operational data and
information on US and Allied capabilities and vulnerability in order
to formulate definitive estimates.
c. The formulation of a useful program of intelligence
production involves, not only an understanding of the problems of
US policy-makers, but continuing discussion and oral exploration
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of various US problems and policy, a regular review of new information,
and an assiduous effort to avoid incestuous thinking by an appreciation
of departmental preoccupations and of the special viewpoints of regional
experts.
d. Estimates should be written by the Staff rather than by
the personnel charged with research responsibility. In each case where
the Special Staff directed the preparation of draft estimates in the
divisions it was necessary for the Staff to rewrite the estimate com-
pletely.
e. Operation 64 in particular demonstrated that (1) usefully
comprehensive and authoritative papers necessarily involve the resources
of more than one division,, (2) the method ofestablishing specific task
forces without regard to divisional lines was an effective device for
preparing research reports, (3) the most useful reports were those
which presented pertinent specific facts in analytical form, (1) the
draft estimate itself can best be written by a'staff group with knowl-
edge of the policy-makers problems, (5) the needed participation of OSI
created problems on the Inter-office level, (6) a useful contribution
to the final estimate was made through the participation of regional
division chiefs sitting with the Special Staff as an estimates staff.
f. Although the contributions from the divisions in the form
of draft estimates have been generally unsatisfactory, relations with
the chiefs of divisions have been most satisfactory when they partici-
pated in the final formulation of the estimate. This procedure, however,
has two inevitable counterparts: (1) it slows down the production of
estimates,, and (2) it makes the Special Staff a junior staff functioning
as a drafting unit subordinate to an unofficial board of estimates made
up of the division chiefs.
4. In view of all of the above considerations, it appears desirable
that definitive action be consciously and advisedly taken with reference
to the estimating function in ORE. Several alternatives present them..
selves (until such time as the new DCI makes a decision regarding the
ultimate organi zation and procedures for the formulation of national
intelligence estimates):
a. Permit the existing Special Staff to continue, but to
define its mission in such terms as to make clear that (1) its cognizance
covers the entire US intelligence problem, (2) it,is a junior staff
charged with initiating and preparing draft estimates, and (3) the
chiefs of divisions will act as a senior staff charged with approval
of t?oth the initial statement of the problem and the final estimate.
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b. Abolish the Special Staff# return some of its members to
their original assignments and assign others to D/Gl or D/Pub to streng-
then the existing organizations charged with inter-regional problems
and with the initiation and coordination of research projects and
estimates,
co Create an official estimates staff and authorize it to
exercise control over all ORE functions and to write all estimates.
Such a staff should consist of the present chiefs of certain existing
divisions and other qualified personnel,, who would be relieved from
divisional responsibilities. It would institute a formal staff organi.
zation by the assignment of personnel to specific staff functions and
could utilize certain existing functional divisions (D/Ge and D/Pub)
as arms for the administration of the research program and the editing
and processing of reports. This alternative strikes closest to the
kind of wholesale change which lies within the prerogative of the new
DCI; with certain modifications,, however# it could be put into effect
without the appearance of attempting is restrict the freedom of action
of the new administration.
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Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040070-2