DEAR MR. FAHEY:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040069-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: March 8, 1950
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040069-4
Transcribed for ..hd by cem
21 January 1953g~=
ER. 0-932 7
49716
b Uarch 1950
itiir. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr.
National Security Resources Board
urashington 25, D.C.
Dear iVir. Fahey:
In your letter of 3 March, 1950, you request my
estimate of the possibility of all-out war between the United
States and the USSR before 1957.
In view of the ultimate objective of Soviet policy --
a Communist world order under Soviet domination -- and of the
existing international situation., there is a present danger of
war which cannot be ignored. In present or comparable circum-
stances a deliberate, unprovoked Soviet attack on the United States!'
is improbable, as is any Soviet military aggression deemed to
incur serious risk of war with the United States. There is, how-
ever, a continuing danger of war through miscalculation, nor can
the possibility of deliberate attack be prudently excluded for
consideration.
The development of this situation is primarily de-
pendent on two factors: (1) the prospective development of Soviet
capabilities, with particular reference to a capability of large-
scale atomic attack; and (2) concurrent developments with respect
to the political and military posture of the United States and
its allies.
The first factor is calculable in broad terms. 1Iidway
in the period under consideration the USSR will be capable of
delivering a crippling attack on the United States, if US defenses
have been neglected or if surprise can be achieved. This quali-
fied capability would not of itself render probable an unprovoked
attack. The most ruthless and agressive dictatorship would want
reasonable certainty, not only of ultimate success, but also of
relative impunity, before deliberately initiating atomic warfare.
L substantial Soviet atomic capability, however, would increase
the possibility of deliberate attack. By encouraging Soviet
political aggression, it would also increase the danger of war
through miscalculation.
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