MONTHLY REPORT (REF. S/PP MEMO. 29 JAN. 49)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040060-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: February 1, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 January 1953
OW rho, JiFtp
Chief, Plans & Policy Staff
Chief, Global Survey Group
Monthly Report (Ref. S/YP memo. 29 Jan.
.9)
1 February 1919
1. Recommended changes in the ORE Intelligence Plan. The quarterly
Plan, as adopted at the 1 January meeting of the IPB, is not representa-
tive of the actual and projected activities of the Global Survey Group,
inasmuch as it is limited to a listing of specific projects in the NIS,
CIA, ORE, and SR Series. The greater portion of the work of the Group
is directed toward satisfaction of the specific intelligence require-
ments of such bodies as the NSC Staff and the NSRB as they arise. This
production cannot be scheduled on a quarterly basis in terms of specific
projects. Moreover, much of it falls outside of the astablished Series.
It can, however, be projected in general, but definite terms. G/GS,
which was not consulted in the preparation of the current plan, in
either its original or its revised form, is prepared to submit such a
statement and requests that such production receive notice in the next
quarterly plan.
It may also be noted that the current Plan does not describe
the IM-Series, which is the vehicle for an increasing volume of ORE
intelligence production. It is suggested that any Plan which fails to
mention any considerable l.ume of ORE intelligence production, at
least in generalterms, is not only imperfect, but may prove dangerously
misleading.
2. S Aal intelligence produced by G/GS (outside of the CIA,
ORE, and SR Series). '
a. For the Director: briefing notes to accompany CIA 1-L9, o
with reference to the Director's briefing of the NSC.
b. For the JCS: material to be used in the briefing of the] Secretary of Defense on 15 January. The general and conclusions ec ~'
>. 9
sections of the briefing were based primarily on G/GS drafts.
c. For the NSRB: with reference to the NSRB's "Basic is N a
44
Security Resources Assumption's" project, G/GS has prepared and
submitted texts on the probability of war before 1953 and on M
enemies, allies, and neutrals in the event of war before 1953. 4
04
Pursuant to NSRB instructions, these texts are in process of "?
coordination with the designated representatives of State and %0
10 the Joint Staff. (The first study is also being adopted for &W v
publication in the ORE Series.) N o!
4
3. Adequacy of coverage of global aspects.
a. By ORE: We feel that the foregoing studies, in conjunction
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with CIA 0-L9 and 1-l9, afford a reasonably adequate coverage of
the global situation as such. At the same time we feel, as a
broad generalization, that production by other components of O RR',
tends to be undesirably parochial in point of view. In this
connection we note that the Group is rarely, if ever, consulted
in the formulation of either Branch production programs or specific
projects. We become cognizant of the production of other components
only as it is submitted to TAG coordination, when it is already
too late to influence its general character.
With particular reference to the SR Series, G/GS has a
special interest in Section V, "Strategic Considerations Affecting
U.S. Security," in which the specific situation is related to
the global situation. We note that almost invariably these
sections fail to serve their purpose, being merely summaries of
the other sections rather than the fresh and specific analysis
called for by the title. A fault so general should be corrected
by general indoctrination.
b. the IAC agencies. Either there is no relevant intelli-
gence production by the IAC agencies, or we are denied access to
it. Except for the Army's SID Series (which is basic intelligence
of very low quality), the only production of the Service agencies
available to us is of that ephemeral type found in current periodicals.
OIR production reaches us only in large batches, at least a month
old, and generally consists of voluminous studies relatively narrow
in scope. On this showing we would say that there is no appreciable
treatment of the global aspects of the situation in the intelligence
production of the IAC agencies.
4. Functioning of ORE. It is our well known view that the existing
organization of ORE is too complex, ill defined, and cumbersome to function
efficiently. We have nothing to add to that generalization and to
observations in paragraphs 1 and 3 a above, except with respect to the
IPB. Although it is admittedly too early for conclusive judgment, so
far that game has not been worth the candle. The time of the Broad has
been taken up, for the most part with nitpicking on inadequately prepared
or overtaken papers, very little being devoted to the discussion of
problems of any real import.
5. Functioning of CD-L. G/GS has had no contact with other offices
of CIA during the month, other than the office of the Director.
6. Relations outside of CIA. As reported in detail in a memorandum
to the Assistant Director, the procedure devised by JIG for the prepara-
tion of the Forrestal briefing was appallingly cumbersome and wasteful
of the time of the ORE personnel involved. Subject to the correction
of that fault, however, CIA participation was beneficial for all concerned.
Relations with NSC Staff and. the NSRB continue to be excellent.
LUDKELL L. MONTAGUE
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