COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040058-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: February 8, 1949
• Content Type: MF

Transcribed for AM by cem
Apprg3&d?hgu kelb"$ 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040058-6
CQ FI T 1
SUBJECT: "Coordination of Intelligence"
8 February 19149
1. With reference to the recurring statements throughout the
Dulles Report that the IAC Agencies should more actively participate
in CIA's production of intelligence estimates, we think that complaints
by State are justified that it is not being consulted in production
of Intelligence Memoranda, when the subject is obviously within the
field of State's dominant interest. Furthermore, the Air Force received
no prior notification on two recent papers produced in ORE - "Rein-
forcing th4sraeli Air Force," and "Uncontrolled International Air
Traffic". Obviously these were both within the field of dominant in-
terest of the Air Force.
2. NSCID No. 3 paragraph lc(5) states that CIA and the Agencies
shall for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects
and plans for the production of staff intelligence, and paragraph le(4)
states that the DCI shall request and receive such special estimates
etc., etc., prepared by the individual departments in their fields of
dominant interest, etc., etc. 25X1A
3. In October we discussed this with Messrs. Babbitt and
when State first brought up the subject of not participating, and of
not being consulted orally when the subject of the IM was obviously
within their field of dominant interest. (See October memoranda).
Again State brought up this complaint at the end of December, so we
again, in a memo. of January 7 referred this matter to Mr. Babbitt.
All State wants is to be consulted orally or advised of the subject
under consideration. We think it would be no hardship, and not at all
difficult for ORE to advise State, or Air, or any IAC member of the
subject under consideration, even if it is so urgent that there is
not time for actual participation by the IAC Agency. DCI 3/1 covers
the way this should be done under normal procedures, under urgent
procedures, and under exceptional circumstances. We think ORE should
follow these instructions.
4. State says that it very recently began to receive mimeographed
slips about the subject that is to be considered, but that these slips
usually reach it after the dead-line specified therein. It would be
better pleased if it could be given prompt oral information on the
subject -- to avoid future confusion like the recent case of Manganese (?)
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5. ORE claims that State never meets its dead-lines, but we
think that should not be used as an excuse for CIA not doing its part
in accordance with the establihed regulations. Furthermore, we won-
der if 100% of the IM's are so urgent that the subject matter cannot
be at least orally given to State before production is completed.
6. We also think that the "Review of the World Situation" which
is now published regularly for the National Security Council would
carry a lot more weight and be more in accordance with the laws and
regulations if it were coordinated at least orally in advance of
publication. Formerly, there was an irregular dead-line making such
a procedure too difficult, but now that it has a fixed date of pub-
lication each month, we should think that the IAC members could
participate in this publication also.
7. The feeling that CIA has a free hand in current and staff in-
telligence, we think has gone too far, because the basic law and
regulation under which we function give to CIA the responsibility
for only national intelligence, and the method for setting up national
intelligence is participation by the various established intelligence
agencies in the National Military Establishment and State. We think
that CIA should stick to the rules of the game and not by-pass them.
Then after we have no mote in our own eye, we can with justification
get after the beam in the other fellow's.
/s/ P.C.
PRESCOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS
11111BUTIA,
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