COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040048-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: February 17, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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Transcribed by EH ' ABD
October 1, 1953
.en from File
"oouvenirs of G/GS"
17 February 1949
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: "Coordination of Intelligence"
REFERENCE: Memorandum,, 8 February 1949, to Director from
Chiefs ICAPS
1. Reference memorandum lends considerable weight to the re-
commendations concerning the functions of ICAPS contained in OREts
comments on the Duffles Report. It should be pointed out that
ICAPS, in reference memorandum, is representing the point of view
of OIR and is passing on this point of view to the Director with-
out consultation with the interested Office in CIA, to-wit: ORE.
(NA
49
431 Kw
2. Reference memorandum refers, first, to intelligence
memoranda, and second, to the monthly Review of'the World Situa-.;
tion. In regard to the IMts, as the Director is well aware,
requests for these reports come in from a variety of sources but
in almost all cases it can be said that the normal procedure is
"Urgent" because of the short time factor permitted. ORE is
currently informing OIR of the subject of each IM as expeditiously
as possible. Such notices of the subject matter and scope of
reference cannot be done by telephone for security reasons in a
vast majority of cases. Delays in communication being what they
are, it is quite true that OIR frequently gets its information after
the report is prepared and sometimes even after it has been forwarded
to the Director. Attempts are being made., whenever possible, to give
advance information to OIR as well as to the other IAC agencies eon-
cerned.
This docux t has been
approved for release through
the NI CAL REVIEW PAS of
the Ceatsal intelligence cY-
3. Paragraph 5 of reference memorandum more than implies that
ORE is not "doing its part in accordance with the established regu-
lations." In spite of the fact that the regulations prescribe a
cumbersome and time-consuming procedure$, ORE is endeavoring to
comply with them as fully as possible. It is obvious that the ob-
servance of the "normal" coordination process.,-or even the "urgent"
one, would in many cases place the Director in the position of having
to reply to a request from an officer of Cabinet rank that while CIA
had the information requested,, it was unable to forward it until the
departments had been consulted,
7--
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!t. The reference, paragraph 6, implicitly recommends that the CIA
Series be subjected to the sane processes of coordination as are re-
quired. in the case of the ORE Series. The basis of this recommenda-
tion is indicated in paragraph 7 which says:
... the basic law and regulation under which we function
give to CIA the responsibility for only national in-
telligence, and the method of setting up national
intelligence is participation by the various established
intelligence agencies....
CIA is also specifically authorized by "regulation" to produce current
intelligence in NSCID #3, paragraph lb(2).
5. The concept of national intelligence indicated in the foregoing
quotation is obviously taken from the Dulles Report, where, I believe,
it finds official expression for the first time. It is entitled to re-;
spectful consideration,, but is, in my opinion, the most controversial
aspect of the Dulles Report and certainly has not yet the force of
"basic law and regulation."
6. This controversial concept equates "national intelligence" to
"coordinated intelligence" in terms that make "coordinated intelligence"
mean nothing more than "Joint intelligence." In the minds of those who
took part in the early post-war discussions and conferences on the sub-
ject., the central intelligence organization to be set up was to produce,
as "strategic and national policy intelligence," something above and
beyond joint intelligence. "Strategic and national policy intelligence"
(now called "national intelligence" for short) was understood in terms
of the function such intelligence was intended to serve, not in terms
of a particular method of production. The essential idea with respect
to the production of such intelligence was expressed in the term "final
synthesis": it was to be an authoritative final evaluation and synthesis
of all available intelligence, free from the influence of departmental
bias. A pm cess of "coordination" was retained, not because joint in-
telligence was the end in view, but as a means of discovering and noting
any departmental position substantially different from the essentially
independent final analysis and interpretation of CIA.
7. This clear concept has been somewhat lost sight of since June
1946, It is still valid, however, and is consonant with the existing
"basic law and regulation." Moreover, the Dulles-ICAPS concept finds
no explicit support in the existing law and regulations.
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8. The law says only that CIA shall "correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security." It makes no stip-
ulation with respect to "coordination": it is CIA that is to
correlate and evaluate, language originally used to express the
concept of independent final analysis and interpretation set forth
above.
9. NSCID No, 1 defines "national intelligence" in terms of the
national security its function), not in terms of "coordination" or
any other process of production, It specifies that, insofar as is
practicable, CIA shall not duplicate departmental research, but shall
make use of departmental facilities and production. It says nothing
whatever about any coordination of interpretation.
10. NSCID No. 3 describes "national intelligence" as "integrated",.
(not "coordinated") departmental intelligence. This distinction
appears to be deliberate and points toward the original concept
("final synthesis") rather than the Dulles..ICAPS concept of CIA's
function. Coordination is referred to only with respect to the pro-
curement of departmental contributions for CIA consideration, not
with respect to any process of joint interpretation.
11. DCI 311. intended to "facilitate departmental participation
in the preparation of national intelligence," is the highest law or
regulation pertinent to the subject and the reference. In view of
the preceding demonstration, its relevant provisions must be regarded
as a matter of current policy rather than of compliance with the law
or with NSC direction. DCI 3/1 prescribes various procedures for obi.
taining departmental contributions to and concurrence or dissent on
"national intelligence reports and estimates" (the SR and ORE Series).
It specifically provides that coordination is not required with re-
spect to current intelligence.
12. DCI 3/1, dated 8 July 19149, was contemporary with the tenth
number in the CIA Series (CIA 7-148), It was specifically understood
at that time that the procedures prescribed therein with respect to
the ORE Series were not intended to apply to the CIA Series, which,
by mutual agreement with the departmental agencies, was already, accepted,
for these purposes,, as current intelligence.
13. This agreement was not reached on any basis of abstract con-
sideration, but as a result of practical experience, Initially we
undertook to coordinate items in the CIA Series as though they were
items in the ORE Series. CIA-1 (September 19147) was so coordinated,
at a cost in time and effort, to the agencies as well as to our-
selves, far in excess of any resultant benefit. CIA-2 was not
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coordinated, for absolute lack of any time in which to do so. I
do not recall precisely when the agencies begged off. They may well
have been prompted to do so by their relief on those occasions when
coordination proved impossible to accomplish for want of time. In
any case, I do recall distinctly that agreement to regard the CIA
Series as current intelligence was reached on agency initiative and
was as much for the relief of agency analysts as for our benefit. If
any agency representative now wants to resume coordination, he is pre-
sumably arguing in the abstract without appreciation of the practical
consequences of his proposal.
its, This observation has particular application in the case of the
Department of State. One obstacle to the efficient coordination of
any appreciation of global scope, such as items in the CIA Series, is
the. lack of any unit in the IAC agencies comparable to the Global
Survey Group, ORE. To coordinate with us in such a case OIR has to
employ a team of half a dozen area specialists. Each such specialist
is inclined to demand that his area be treated,as though it were the
sole subject of consideration. The net result is vaxatious delay and
diversion of effort for ORE and a much greater loss in man-hours for
OIR, without substantial effect upon the tenor of the estimate.
15. The Series is presently prepared with cognizance of depart..
mental views as conveyed to us through various media and in discussions
relative to estimates in the ORE Series. Specific prior consultation
with departmental specialists would consume their time and ours without
contributing materially to the preparation of the initial draft.
Moreover, experience shows that the comment elicited in the process of
coordinating a draft of such scope and character as an item in the CIA
Series is essentially editorial in character and without significant
substantive effect.
16. It is, of course, quite feasible to coordinate items in the
CIA Series as though they were items in the ORE Series, but it can be
done only at considerable cost in loss of timeliness and in terms of
man-hours expended, without commensurate gain. Under present pro-
cedures, which include elaborate coordination within ORE, it is
necessary to write in terms of the situation existing ten days in
advance of the publication date. The imposition of external coordina-
tion would require allowance of at least an additional week, very
definitely impairing the timeliness of the appreciation as of its
date of publication. (In this connection, ICAPS should be advised
that there is not, and cannot be, in real life anjr such thing as a
meaningful oral coordination.) Moreover, in view of the fact that
the Global Survey Group is already experiencing difficulty in giving
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proper attention to its many and various commitments,, the additional
conr3umption of time (approximately one man-week) would require the
provision of an additional member to the Group. If consultation and
coordination with the departmental agencies (including consultation
with half a dozen area specialists in OIR) is the controlling con-
sideration, the best procedure would be to set up a permanent inter-
departmental committee to produce the monthly review for the Security
Council.
17. The issue isp in essence, whether the CIA Series is intended
or desired to be (as we suppose) a responsible synthesis and inter-
pretation of the developing global situation., written with cognizance
of departmental views9 but with independent judgment' or merely a
routine joint intelligence periodical.
18. It is recommended that no action be taken on reference memoran:?
dum pending a basic policy decision by the National Security Council
with respect to the Dulles Report.
THEODORE BABBITT
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates
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